Zhong Lun (中論)
Madhyamaka Treatise (Zhong Lun), Fascicle One
Buddhist Texts
Begin with the opening material of the Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp, then follow the contents to the teachers and exchanges you wish to read. The page divisions help navigation and do not replace the original fascicle headings.
Madhyamaka Treatise (Zhong Lun), Fascicle One
釋僧叡序
《中論》有五百偈,龍樹菩薩之所造也。以中為名者,照其實也;以論為稱者,盡其言也。實非名不悟,故寄中以宣之;言非釋不盡,故假論以明之。其實既宣、其言既明,於菩薩之行、道場之照朗然懸解矣。夫滯惑生於倒見,三界以之而淪溺;偏悟起於厭智,耿介以之而致乖。故知大覺在乎曠照、小智纏乎隘心,照之不曠則不足以夷有無一道俗、知之不盡則未可以涉中途泯二際,道俗之不夷、二際之不泯,菩薩之憂也。是以龍樹大士,析之以中道,使惑趣之徒望玄指而一變;括之以即化,令玄悟之賓喪諮詢於朝徹。蕩蕩焉,真可謂坦夷路於沖階、敞玄門於宇內,扇慧風於陳枚、流甘露於枯悴者矣。夫百梁之搆興則鄙茅茨之仄陋,覩斯論之宏曠則知偏悟之鄙倍。幸哉此區之赤縣,忽得移靈鷲以作鎮;險陂之邊情,乃蒙流光之餘惠。而今而後,談道之賢始可與論實矣。雲天竺諸國敢預學者之流,無不翫味斯論以為喉衿,其染翰申釋者甚亦不少。今所出者,是天竺梵志名賓伽羅、秦言青目之所釋也。其人雖信解深法而辭不雅中,其中乖闕煩重者法師皆裁而裨之,於經通之理盡矣,文或左右未盡善也。《百論》治外以閑邪,斯文袪內以流滯,《大智釋論》之淵博,《十二門觀》之精詣,尋斯四者,真若日月入懷,無不朗然鑒徹矣。予翫之味之,不能釋手,遂復忘其鄙拙託悟懷於一序,並目品義題之於首。豈期能釋耶?蓋是欣自同之懷耳。
The Madhyamaka Treatise has five hundred verses and was composed by the Bodhisattva Nagarjuna ("Bodhisattva" is short for bodhisattva, one who seeks awakening and also liberates beings). It takes "Middle" as its name in order to illuminate the true reality it sets out to reveal; it takes "Treatise" as its designation in order to say all that can be said. True reality cannot be entered without a name, so it borrows "Middle" to proclaim it; words cannot be fully expressed without explanation, so it borrows "Treatise" to elucidate them. Once true reality has been proclaimed and the words made clear, the practice of Bodhisattvas and the illumination at the site of the Way are all brightly opened up. Obstructing confusion arises from inverted views, and the three realms (the desire realm, form realm and formless realm) sink because of them; one-sided awakening arises from the small wisdom of weariness and renunciation, and the rigid and narrow go astray because of it. So one should know: great awakening lies in broad illumination, while petty cleverness is tangled in narrowness of mind. If the illumination is not broad, it is not enough to level existence and non-existence, the homeless and the householder into one road; if the knowing is not thorough, one cannot yet walk the Middle Way and efface the two sides of birth and death and nirvana (the state in which afflictions cease and one no longer revolves in birth and death). That the homeless and the householder are not leveled and the two sides are not effaced is exactly what Bodhisattvas worry about. Therefore Master Nagarjuna analyzed with the Middle Way, so that those caught in confusion, looking toward its profound direction, turn around at once; and he drew things together with "the present moment is itself transformation," so that those already profoundly awakened need not even inquire about "sudden awakening between dawn and dusk." Vast and boundless, one could truly say it lays a level road to the steps of empty serenity and opens the mysterious gate to the whole world, blows the wind of wisdom on withered branches and pours sweet dew on those who have wilted. Once a great hall of a hundred pillars stands, one finds thatched huts narrow and mean; seeing the breadth of this treatise, one knows how doubly shallow one-sided awakening is. How fortunate that this vast Chinese land has suddenly moved Vulture Peak to take as its refuge; even the dangerous and remote frontier mood has been touched by its lingering radiance. From now on the worthy who discuss the Way can discuss true reality together. In the countries of India, none who dared count themselves among scholars did not turn this treatise over like their throat and collar, and quite a few took up the pen to make commentaries on it. What is translated now is the commentary made by the Indian Brahmin named Pingala, called Qingmu (Blue Eyes) in Chinese. Though this man believed and understood the profound Dharma, his writing was not elegant and moderate enough; where it was mistaken, incomplete or redundant, the Dharma Master trimmed and corrected it all, so the principle that connects sutras and treatises is fully there, though the wording may have variants and is not yet perfect. The Hundred Treatise counters non-Buddhists to guard against heresy; this text clears away inner obstruction and lets it flow; the Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise is vast and erudite, and the Twelve Gates Treatise is precise and profound; seeking these four texts is truly like holding the sun and moon in one's bosom, and all is brightly illuminated to the end. I turned it over again and again and could not put it down, and so, not caring for my own coarseness and clumsiness, I entrusted my small understanding to this preface and set the main idea of each chapter at the head of the fascicle. How could I hope that I could truly explain it? It is only that I rejoice to share the author's mind.
中論觀因緣品第一(十六偈)
Madhyamaka Treatise, Chapter One: Examination of Conditions (sixteen verses)
龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋
Verses composed by Bodhisattva Nagarjuna; commentary by the Brahmin Qingmu.
姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva of the Later Qin, of the Yao Qin dynasty.
不生亦不滅,不常亦不斷,
Not arising, and not ceasing; not permanent, and not annihilated,
不一亦不異,不來亦不出。
Not one, and not different; not coming from elsewhere, and not going out elsewhere.
能說是因緣,善滅諸戲論,
The Buddha could teach such dependent origination, skillfully quieting all conceptual proliferation,
我稽首禮佛,諸說中第一。
I bow my head in homage to the Buddha; of all teachers, this is the foremost.
問曰:何故造此論?
The questioner said: Why was this treatise composed?
答曰:有人言萬物從大自在天生、有言從韋紐天生、有言從和合生、有言從時生、有言從世性生、有言從變生、有言從自然生、有言從微塵生。有如是等謬故,墮於無因、邪因、斷常等邪見,種種說我我所,不知正法。佛欲斷如是等諸邪見令知佛法故,先於聲聞法中說十二因緣,又為已習行有大心堪受深法者以大乘法說因緣相,所謂一切法不生不滅、不一不異等,畢竟空、無所有。如《般若波羅蜜》中說:佛告須菩提:「菩薩坐道場時,觀十二因緣,如虛空不可盡。」佛滅度後,後五百歲像法中,人根轉鈍、深著諸法,求十二因緣、五陰、十二入、十八界等決定相,不知佛意,但著文字,聞大乘法中說畢竟空,不知何因緣故空,即生疑見:若都畢竟空,云何分別有罪福報應等?如是則無世諦、第一義諦。取是空相而起貪著,於畢竟空中生種種過。龍樹菩薩為是等故,造此中論。
The answerer said: Some say that all things arise from the great god Mahesvara, some say from Visnu, some say from the union of various conditions, some say from time, some say from primal nature (the fundamental self-nature posited by the Samkhya school), some say from transformation, some say they exist naturally, and some say from atoms. Because of such errors, they fall into wrong views such as no cause, wrong cause, annihilation and permanence, variously establishing "self" and "what belongs to self," and not knowing the true Dharma. In order to cut off such wrong views and let people know the Buddha's Dharma, the Buddha first taught the twelve links of dependent origination in the Hearer Dharma (the one vehicle that practices from hearing the Buddha's teaching); and for those who had already practiced, whose minds were broad and who could bear the profound Dharma, he used the Great Vehicle Dharma to teach the marks of dependent origination, that is: all dharmas neither arise nor cease, are neither one nor different, and so on, being ultimately empty, with no self-nature to be found. As is said in the Prajnaparamita (the prajna is the wisdom that sees true reality, unlike worldly cleverness; paramita means "to the other shore"): the Buddha told Subhuti: "When a Bodhisattva sits at the site of the Way and contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination, they are inexhaustible like space." After the Buddha's passing, in the latter five hundred years, entering the age of the Semblance Dharma, people's faculties became dull, and they clung deeply to all kinds of dharmas, seeking a definite and real mark in the twelve links of dependent origination, the five aggregates, the twelve sense bases and the eighteen realms (these groups of terms, together with the four conditions, self-nature and mental factors discussed later, are a set of mutually interlocking analytic frameworks in the treatise, not unrelated words; this translation uses the original terms and notes their place in the framework only when a given item is first discussed on its own, without bracketing each term further), without knowing the Buddha's original intent and sticking only to the words. Hearing in the Great Vehicle Dharma of ultimate emptiness, they did not know for what reason it was empty, and so gave rise to doubtful views: if everything is ultimately empty, how can one still distinguish sin, merit and retribution? In this way even the conventional truth and the ultimate truth (the truth established according to the world's conventions, and the final truth spoken in terms of emptiness) would be gone. Clinging greedily to this mark of emptiness, they produced all kinds of faults within ultimate emptiness. The Bodhisattva Nagarjuna composed this Madhyamaka Treatise precisely for such people.
「不生亦不滅,不常亦不斷,
"Not arising, and not ceasing; not permanent, and not annihilated,
不一亦不異,不來亦不出。
Not one, and not different; not coming from elsewhere, and not going out elsewhere.
能說是因緣,善滅諸戲論,
The Buddha could teach such dependent origination, skillfully quieting all conceptual proliferation,
我稽首禮佛,諸說中第一。」
I bow my head in homage to the Buddha; of all teachers, this is the foremost."
以此二偈讚佛,則已略說第一義。
With these two verses praising the Buddha, the first and ultimate meaning has already been roughly stated.
問曰:諸法無量,何故但以此八事破?
The questioner said: Dharmas are without number; why use only these eight things to refute them?
答曰:法雖無量,略說八事則為總破一切法。不生者,諸論師種種說生相,或謂因果一、或謂因果異、或謂因中先有果、或謂因中先無果、或謂自體生、或謂從他生、或謂共生、或謂有生、或謂無生。如是等說生相皆不然,此事後當廣說。生相決定不可得,故不生。不滅者,若無生何得有滅?以無生、無滅故,餘六事亦無。
The answerer said: Though dharmas are without number, by briefly citing these eight things one refutes all dharmas at once. What is called not arising: the various masters differ in what they say about the mark of "arising": some say cause and effect are one, some say cause and effect are different, some say the effect already exists in the cause, some say the effect does not yet exist in the cause, some say it arises from itself, some say it arises from another, some say it arises from both, some say it arises with existence, and some say it arises without existence. All such statements about the mark of arising are wrong, and will be discussed widely later. The mark of arising cannot be definitely found, so it is said to be non-arising. What is called not ceasing: if there is no arising, how can there be ceasing? Because there is no arising and no ceasing, the remaining six things also do not exist.
問曰:不生、不滅已總破一切法。何故復說六事?
The questioner said: Non-arising and non-ceasing have already refuted all dharmas at once; why say the six things again?
答曰:為成不生不滅義故。有人不受不生不滅,而信不常不斷。若深求不常不斷,即是不生不滅。何以故?法若實有則不應無,先有今無是即為斷,若先有性是則為常,是故說不常不斷,即入不生不滅義。有人雖聞四種破諸法,猶以四門成諸法。是亦不然。若一則無緣,若異則無相續,後當種種破,是故復說不一不異。有人雖聞六種破諸法,猶以來出成諸法。來者言諸法從自在天、世性、微塵等來,出者還去至本處。復次萬物無生。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見劫初穀不生。何以故?離劫初穀,今穀不可得。若離劫初穀有今穀者則應有生;而實不爾,是故不生。
The answerer said: It is to establish the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing firmly. Some do not accept non-arising and non-ceasing, but believe in non-permanence and non-annihilation. If one searches deeply for non-permanence and non-annihilation, it is in fact non-arising and non-ceasing. Why? If a dharma truly exists, it cannot become non-existent; if it existed before and now does not, that is annihilation; if it had self-nature before, that is permanence. So by speaking of non-permanence and non-annihilation, one enters the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing. Some, though they have heard dharmas refuted by the four, still wish to establish dharmas by the other four gates. That is also wrong. If they were one, there would be no "condition" that can serve as a condition; if they were different, there would be no continuity. Later it will be refuted in all kinds of ways, so non-one and non-different are stated again. Some, though they have heard dharmas refuted by the six, still want to establish dharmas through "coming" and "going out." Coming means that dharmas come from Mahesvara, primal nature, atoms and the like; going out means returning to the original place. Moreover, all things are without arising. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes: the grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not have a separate "arising." Why? Apart from the grain at the beginning of the kalpa, the grain now cannot be found. If, apart from the grain at the beginning of the kalpa, there were still grain now, then there should be arising; but the facts are not so, so there is no arising.
問曰:若不生則應滅。
The questioner said: If there is no arising, then there should be ceasing.
答曰:不滅。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見劫初穀不滅。若滅,今不應有穀;而實有穀,是故不滅。
The answerer said: There is no ceasing. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes: the grain at the beginning of the kalpa has not ceased. If it had ceased, there should now be no grain; but in fact there is grain, so there is no ceasing.
問曰:若不滅則應常。
The questioner said: If there is no ceasing, then it should be permanent.
答曰:不常。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不常,如穀芽時種則變壞,是故不常。
The answerer said: Not permanent. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things are not permanent; for example, when grain sprouts, the seed spoils, so it is not permanent.
問曰:若不常則應斷。
The questioner said: If it is not permanent, then it should be annihilated.
答曰:不斷。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不斷,如從穀有芽,是故不斷;若斷,不應相續。
The answerer said: Not annihilated. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things are not annihilated; for example, a sprout comes from grain, so it is not annihilated; if it were annihilated, there should be no continuity.
問曰:若爾者,萬物是一。
The questioner said: If so, then things are one.
答曰:不一。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不一,如穀不作芽、芽不作穀。若穀作芽、芽作穀者應是一;而實不爾,是故不一。
The answerer said: Not one. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things are not one; for example, grain does not become a sprout, and a sprout does not become grain. If grain were the sprout and the sprout were grain, then they would be one; but the facts are not so, so they are not one.
問曰:若不一則應異。
The questioner said: If they are not one, then they should be different.
答曰:不異。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不異。若異者,何故分別穀芽、穀莖、穀葉?不說樹芽、樹莖、樹葉,是故不異。
The answerer said: Not different. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things are not different. If they were different, why would they be called grain sprout, grain stalk and grain leaf separately, and not tree sprout, tree stalk and tree leaf? So they are not different.
問曰:若不異,應有來。
The questioner said: If they are not different, then there should be coming.
答曰:無來。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不來,如穀子中芽無所從來。若來者,芽應從餘處來,如鳥來棲樹;而實不爾,是故不來。
The answerer said: There is no coming. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things do not come from elsewhere; for example, the sprout in a grain seed has no place it came from. If there were coming, the sprout would have to come from another place, like a bird flying in to perch in a tree; but the facts are not so, so there is no coming.
問曰:若不來,應有出。
The questioner said: If there is no coming, then there should be going out.
答曰:不出。何以故?世間現見故。世間眼見萬物不出。若有出,應見芽從穀出,如蛇從穴出;而實不爾,是故不出。
The answerer said: Not going out. Why? Because the world's direct perception can see it. The world sees with its eyes that things do not go out from inside to outside. If there were going out, we should see the sprout come out of the grain, like a snake from a hole; but the facts are not so, so there is no going out.
問曰:汝雖釋不生不滅義,我欲聞造論者所說。
The questioner said: Although you have explained the meaning of non-arising and non-ceasing, I would still like to hear what the author of the treatise himself says.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「諸法不自生,亦不從他生,
"Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor from others,
不共不無因,是故知無生。」
Not from both, nor without a cause, therefore know there is no arising."
不自生者,萬物無有從自體生,必待眾因。復次若從自體生,則一法有二體:一謂生、二謂生者。若離餘因從自體生者,則無因無緣。又生更有生,生則無窮。自無故,他亦無。何以故?有自故有他。若不從自生,亦不從他生,共生則有二過:自生、他生故。若無因而有萬物者,是則為常。是事不然。無因則無果,若無因有果者,佈施持戒等應墮地獄、十惡五逆應當生天,以無因故。復次:
What is called not arising from itself: no thing arises from its own self; it must await many causes. Moreover, if it arose from itself, the same dharma would have two substances: one "arising," and the other "the one who causes arising." If, apart from other causes, it arose from itself alone, that would be without cause and without condition. And once arisen, it would arise again, and arising would be endless. Where there is none on one's own side, there is also none on the other's side. Why? Because "self" exists, there is "other." If it does not arise from itself, nor arise from another, arising from both has two faults: it falls into arising from itself and also into arising from another. If things existed without a cause, that would be permanence. This is wrong. Without a cause there is no effect; if there were effects without causes, then those who give, keep precepts and do other good would fall into hell, and those who commit the ten evils and five heinous crimes would be born in heaven, because there would be no cause to decide. Furthermore:
「如諸法自性,不在於緣中,
"The self-nature of dharmas is not within the many conditions,
以無自性故,他性亦復無。」
Because there is no self-nature, there is no other-nature either."
諸法自性不在眾緣中,但眾緣和合故得名字。自性即是自體,眾緣中無自性。自性無故不自生,自性無故他性亦無。何以故?因自性有他性,他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性,是故不應從他性生。若破自性、他性,即破共義。無因則有大過,有因尚可破,何況無因!於四句中生不可得,是故不生。
The self-nature of dharmas is not within the many conditions; only because the many conditions come together is a name obtained. Self-nature is own-substance, and there is no self-nature within the many conditions. Self-nature does not exist, so there is no arising from itself; self-nature does not exist, so other-nature does not exist either. Why? Other-nature depends on self-nature; other-nature, on the other side, is in fact self-nature. If self-nature is refuted, other-nature is also refuted, so there should be no arising from another. If self-nature and other-nature are refuted, the meaning of arising from both is also refuted. Having no cause is a great fault: even having a cause can be refuted, how much more having none! Seeking "arising" within these four alternatives cannot find it, so there is no arising.
問曰:阿毘曇人言「諸法從四緣生」,云何言不生?何謂四緣?
The questioner said: The Abhidharma people (those who analyze and arrange the Buddha's teaching into systematic treatises) say "dharmas arise from the four conditions"; how can you say there is no arising? What are the four conditions?
「因緣次第緣,緣緣增上緣,
"The causal condition, the immediately preceding condition, the object condition, the dominant condition,
四緣生諸法,更無第五緣。」
The four conditions produce dharmas, and there is no fifth condition."
一切所有緣,皆攝在四緣,以是四緣萬物得生。因緣名一切有為法;次第緣除過去現在阿羅漢最後心心數法,餘過去現在心心數法;緣緣、增上緣一切法。
All conditions that exist are included in these four conditions, and it is by these four conditions that things arise. The causal condition refers to all conditioned dharmas; the immediately preceding condition, excepting the last mind and mental factors of past and present arhats (saints who have exhausted afflictions and no longer take birth), includes all other past and present minds and mental factors; the object condition and the dominant condition extend to all dharmas.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「果為從緣生,為從非緣生?
"Is the effect produced from a condition, or from a non-condition?
是緣為有果,是緣為無果?」
Does this condition already have the effect, or not have the effect?"
若謂有果,是果為從緣生、為從非緣生?若謂有緣,是緣為有果、為無果?二俱不然。何以故?
If you say the effect exists, does this effect arise from a condition or from a non-condition? If you say there is a condition, does this condition already have the effect or not have the effect? Neither is right. Why?
「因是法生果,是法名為緣;
"Because this dharma produces an effect, this dharma is called a condition;
若是果未生,何不名非緣?」
If this effect has not yet arisen, why is it not called a non-condition?"
諸緣無決定。何以故?若果未生,是時不名為緣;但眼見從緣生果,故名之為緣。緣成由於果,以果後、緣先故。若未有果,何得名為緣?如瓶以水土和合故有瓶生,見瓶故知水土等是瓶緣。若瓶未生時,何以不名水土等為非緣?是故果不從緣生。緣尚不生,何況非緣。復次:
The various conditions have no definiteness. Why? If the effect has not yet arisen, at that time it is not called a condition; only because the eyes see an effect arise from a condition is it called a condition. The condition is established by reliance on the effect; the effect comes later and the condition comes first. If there is not yet an effect, on what basis is it called a condition? For example, a pot: only when water and earth come together does a pot arise, and seeing the pot, one knows that water, earth and so on are the pot's conditions. If the pot has not yet arisen, why are water and earth not called non-conditions? So the effect does not arise from a condition. If a condition cannot produce, how much less a non-condition. Furthermore:
「果先於緣中,有無俱不可。
"If the effect were beforehand in the condition, saying it exists or does not exist both fail.
先無為誰緣,先有何用緣。」
If it did not exist beforehand, whose condition would it be? If it already existed beforehand, what would the condition be for?"
緣中先非有果、非無果。若先有果,不名為緣,果先有故。若先無果,亦不名為緣,不生餘物故。
Within the condition, beforehand, there is neither an effect nor no effect. If the effect existed beforehand, it would not be called a condition, because the effect already existed first. If the effect did not exist beforehand, it would also not be called a condition, because it does not produce anything else.
問曰:已總破一切因緣,今欲聞一一破諸緣。
The questioner said: You have already refuted all conditions at once; now I would like to hear each of the conditions refuted one by one.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若果非有生,亦復非無生,
"If an effect does not arise from "existence," nor from "non-existence,"
亦非有無生,何得言有緣?」
Nor from "both existence and non-existence," how can one speak of a condition?"
若緣能生果,應有三種:若有、若無、若有無。如先偈中說,緣中若先有果,不應言生,以先有故。若先無果,不應言生,以先無故,亦應與非緣同故。有無亦不生者,有無名為半有半無,二俱有過。又有與無相違,無與有相違,何得一法有二相?如是三種求果生相不可得故,云何言有因緣?次第緣者:
If a condition could produce an effect, there should be only three kinds: either existence, or non-existence, or both existence and non-existence. As in the earlier verses: if the effect already existed beforehand in the condition, one should not speak of arising, because it already existed first. If the effect did not exist beforehand, one should also not speak of arising, because it did not exist first and so would be the same as a non-condition. Both existence and non-existence also cannot produce: what is called existence and non-existence is only half existence and half non-existence, and the faults of both sides remain. Moreover, existence and non-existence are contrary to each other, and non-existence and existence are contrary to each other; how can one dharma have two marks? In this way, in seeking the arising of an effect through the three alternatives, one cannot find it; how can one speak of dependent origination? Now regarding the immediately preceding condition:
「果若未生時,則不應有滅,
"If the effect has not yet arisen, it should not already have ceased,
滅法何能緣?故無次第緣。」
How can a dharma that has already ceased still be a condition? So there is no immediately preceding condition."
諸心心數法於三世中次第生。現在心心數法滅,與未來心作次第緣。未來法未生,與誰作次第緣?若未來法已有,即是生,何用次第緣?現在心心數法無有住時,若不住,何能為次第緣,若有住,則非有為法。何以故,一切有為法常有滅相故。若滅已,則不能與作次第緣。若言滅法猶有則是常,若常則無罪福等。若謂滅時能與作次第緣,滅時半滅半未滅,更無第三法名為滅時。又佛說:一切有為法念念滅,無一念時住。云何言現在法有欲滅未欲滅?汝謂一念中無是欲滅未欲滅,則破自法。汝阿毘曇說:有滅法、有不滅法;有欲滅法、有不欲滅法。欲滅法者,現在法將欲滅。未欲滅法者,除現在將欲滅法,餘現在法及過去未來無為法,是名不欲滅法。是故無次第緣。緣緣者:
Minds and mental factors arise in sequence across the three times of past, present and future. When the present mind and mental factors cease, they serve as the immediately preceding condition for the future mind and mental factors. The future dharma has not yet arisen; for whom does it serve as immediately preceding condition? If the future dharma already existed, it would already have arisen, so what need is there of an immediately preceding condition? The present mind and mental factors have no moment of staying; if it does not stay, how can it serve as an immediately preceding condition; if it stays, it is not a conditioned dharma. Why? All conditioned dharmas always carry the mark of ceasing. If it has already ceased, it cannot again serve as an immediately preceding condition for another. If you say a dharma that has ceased still exists, that is permanence; if permanence, there is no such thing as sin and merit. If you say that at the moment of ceasing it can serve as an immediately preceding condition, the time of ceasing is half ceased and half not yet ceased, and apart from this there is no third dharma called "the time of ceasing." Furthermore, the Buddha said that all conditioned dharmas cease in every thought-moment, with no thought-moment that stays. How can you say that a present dharma has "about to cease" and "not yet about to cease"? If you say that within one thought-moment there is no such "about to cease / not about to cease," you refute your own dharma. Your Abhidharma says: there are dharmas that cease and dharmas that do not cease; there are dharmas about to cease and dharmas not about to cease. A dharma about to cease refers to a present dharma that is just about to cease. A dharma not about to cease, apart from the present dharma that is just about to cease, includes all other present dharmas as well as past, future and unconditioned dharmas, which are called dharmas not about to cease. So there is no immediately preceding condition. Now regarding the object condition:
「如諸佛所說,真實微妙法,
"As the buddhas have taught, the true and subtle dharma,
於此無緣法,云何有緣緣?」
Here there is no dharma to be taken as an object, so how could there be an object condition?"
佛說大乘諸法,若有色無色、有形無形、有漏無漏、有為無為等諸法相入於法性,一切皆空無相無緣。譬如眾流入海同為一味。實法可信,隨宜所說不可為實,是故無緣緣。增上緣者:
The Buddha teaches the dharmas of the Great Vehicle: whether with form or without form, with shape or without shape, tainted or untainted, conditioned or unconditioned, the marks of these dharmas all enter the dharma-nature, all are empty, with no marks and no object. Like many streams entering the great sea, they all become one taste. What can be believed is this real dharma; what is taught as convenient cannot be taken as real, so there is no object condition. Now regarding the dominant condition:
「諸法無自性,故無有有相;
"Dharmas have no self-nature, so there is also no mark of "existence";
說有是事故,是事有不然。」
To say "because there is this thing, there is that thing" does not hold."
經說十二因緣,是事有故是事有。此則不然。何以故?諸法從眾緣生故自無定性,自無定性故無有有相。有相無故,何得言是事有故是事有?是故無增上緣,佛隨凡夫分別有無故說。復次:
The sutras speak of the twelve links of dependent origination as "because this exists, that exists." This is not right. Why? All dharmas arise from many conditions and have no fixed nature of their own; if they have no fixed nature of their own, they have no mark of "existing." If there is not even the mark of existing, how can one say "because this exists, that exists"? So there is no dominant condition; the Buddha spoke this way only to follow the discriminations of ordinary people about being and non-being. Furthermore:
「略廣因緣中,求果不可得;
"In the causes and conditions spoken of briefly or at length, no fruit can be found by seeking;
因緣中若無,云何從緣出?」
if it is not within the causes and conditions, how can it be born from the conditions?"
略者,於和合因緣中無果。廣者,於一一緣中亦無果。若略廣因緣中無果,云何言果從因緣出?復次:
"Briefly" means that in the causes and conditions taken together there is no fruit. "At length" means that in each single condition there is no fruit either. If there is no fruit in the causes and conditions, whether spoken of briefly or at length, how can one say that the fruit comes from the causes and conditions? Furthermore:
「若謂緣無果,而從緣中出;
"If one says there is no fruit in the conditions, yet it is born from the conditions;
是果何不從,非緣中而出?」
why is this fruit not born from non-conditions?"
若因緣中求果不可得,何故不從非緣出?如泥中無瓶,何故不從乳中出?復次:
If no fruit can be found by seeking in the causes and conditions, why is it not born from non-conditions? Just as there is no pot in the clay, why is it not born from milk? Furthermore:
「若果從緣生,是緣無自性,
"If the fruit is born from conditions, these conditions have no self-nature,
從無自性生,何得從緣生?
and being born from what has no self-nature, how can it be called born from conditions?
果不從緣生,不從非緣生,
The fruit is neither born from conditions nor born from non-conditions,
以果無有故,緣非緣亦無。」
for since the fruit itself does not exist, conditions and non-conditions do not exist either."
果從眾緣生,是緣無自性。若無自性則無法,無法何能生?是故果不從緣生。不從非緣生者,破緣故說非緣。實無非緣法,是故不從非緣生。若不從二生,是則無果。無果故,緣非緣亦無。
The fruit is born from many conditions, but these conditions have no self-nature. If there is no self-nature, there is no dharma, and how can what has no dharma give birth? So the fruit is not born from conditions. As for "not born from non-conditions": "non-condition" is spoken of only in order to refute conditions. In fact there is no dharma called non-condition, so it is also not born from non-conditions. If it is not born from either of these two sides, then there is no fruit. If there is no fruit, then conditions and non-conditions do not exist either.
中論觀去來品第二(二十五偈)
The Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 2: Examination of Going and Coming (twenty-five verses)
問曰:世間眼見三時有作:已去、未去、去時。以有作故,當知有諸法。
The questioner says: In the world one sees with the eyes that "action" exists in three times: already gone, not yet gone, and going. Because there is action, one should know that dharmas exist.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「已去無有去,未去亦無去,
"In what has already gone there is no going, in what has not yet gone there is also no going,
離已去未去,去時亦無去。」
apart from what has gone and what has not gone, in the one who is going there is also no going."
已去無有去,已去故。若離去有去業,是事不然。未去亦無去,未有去法故。去時名半去半未去,不離已去、未去故。
In what has already gone there is no going, because it has already gone. If apart from "going" there were still an action of going, this would be wrong. In what has not yet gone there is also no going, because there is not yet the dharma of going. What is called the going-time is nothing but half gone and half not yet gone, and does not depart from what has gone and what has not gone.
問曰:
The questioner says:
「動處則有去,此中有去時,
"Where there is movement, there is going, and here there is precisely the going-time,
非已去未去,是故去時去。」
which is neither already gone nor not yet gone, so the going-time goes."
隨有作業處,是中應有去。眼見去時中有作業、已去中作業已滅、未去中未有作業,是故當知去時有去。
Wherever there is action, there should be going. The eyes see that in the going-time there is action, while in what has already gone the action has ceased, and in what has not yet gone there is not yet action, so it should be known that the going-time has going.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「云何於去時,而當有去法?
"How can there be, within the going-time, yet another dharma of going?
若離於去法,去時不可得。」
If apart from the dharma of going, the going-time cannot be found."
去時有去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法去時不可得。若離去法有去時者,應去時中有去,如器中有果。復次:
To say that the going-time has the dharma of going is wrong. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the going-time cannot be found. If apart from the dharma of going there were still a going-time, then the going-time would contain going, like a vessel containing fruit. Furthermore:
「若言去時去,是人則有咎;
"If one says the going-time goes, this person has a fault;
離去有去時,去時獨去故。」
for it would mean there is a going-time apart from going, and the going-time goes by itself."
若謂已去未去中無去、去時實有去者,是人則有咎。若離去法有去時,則不相因待。何以故?若說去時有去,是則為二;而實不爾,是故不得言離去有去時。復次:
If one says that in what has gone and not yet gone there is no going, and only in the going-time is there truly going, this person has a fault. If apart from the dharma of going there were still a going-time, the two would not be mutually dependent. Why? If one says the going-time has going, that would be two separate things; but the fact is not so, so one cannot say that apart from going there is still a going-time. Furthermore:
「若去時有去,則有二種去:
"If in the going-time there is going, there would be two kinds of going:
一謂為去時,二謂去時去。」
one called the going-time, and one called the going-time going."
若謂去時有去,是則有過,所謂有二去:一者因去有去時;二者去時中有去。
If one says the going-time has going, this has a fault, namely that there would be two kinds of going: first, the going-time exists because of going, and second, within the going-time there is again going.
問曰:若有二去,有何咎?
The questioner says: If there are two kinds of going, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若有二去法,則有二去者;
"If there were two dharmas of going, there would be two goers;
以離於去者,去法不可得。」
for apart from the goer, the dharma of going cannot be found."
若有二去法,則有二去者。何以故?因去法有去者故。一人有二去二去者,此則不然,是故去時亦無去。
If there were two dharmas of going, there would be two goers. Why? Because it is by relying on the dharma of going that there is a goer. But one person having two kinds of going and two goers is wrong, so in the going-time there is also no going.
問曰:離去者無去法,可爾。今三時中定有去者。
The questioner says: Apart from the goer there is no dharma of going, which is acceptable. But now in the three times there must be a goer.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若離於去者,去法不可得;
"If apart from the goer, the dharma of going cannot be found;
以無去法故,何得有去者?」
since there is no dharma of going, where is there a goer?"
若離於去者,則去法不可得。今云何於無去法中言三時定有去者?復次:
If apart from the goer the dharma of going cannot be found, then how, in the absence of the dharma of going, can one say that in the three times there must be a goer? Furthermore:
「去者則不去,不去者不去;
"The goer does not go, the non-goer also does not go;
離去不去者,無第三去者。」
apart from the goer and the non-goer, there is no third kind of goer."
無有去者。何以故?若有去者,則有二種:若去者、若不去者。若離是二,無第三去者。
There is no goer. Why? If there were a goer, there would be only two kinds: either the goer or the non-goer. Apart from these two, there is no third kind of goer.
問曰:若去者去,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the goer goes, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若言去者去,云何有此義?
"If one says the goer goes, how can this statement stand?
若離於去法,去者不可得。」
If apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found."
若謂定有去者用去法,是事不然。何以故?離去法,去者不可得故。若離去者定有去法,則去者能用去法;而實不爾。復次:
If one says that a goer definitely exists and makes use of the dharma of going, this is wrong. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. If apart from the goer there definitely were a dharma of going, then one could speak of the goer using the dharma of going; but the fact is not so. Furthermore:
「若去者有去,則有二種去:
"If the goer has going, there would be two kinds of going:
一謂去者去,二謂去法去。」
one in which the goer goes, and one in which the dharma of going goes."
若言去者用去法,則有二過,於一去者中而有二去:一以去法成去者、二以去者成去法。去者成已然後用去法,是事不然。是故先三時中謂定有去者用去法,是事不然。復次:
If one says the goer uses the dharma of going, there are two faults, in that within one goer there are two kinds of going: first, the goer is established by the dharma of going, and second, the dharma of going is established by the goer. That the goer is first established and then uses the dharma of going is wrong. So the earlier statement that in the three times there must be a goer who uses the dharma of going is wrong. Furthermore:
「若謂去者去,是人則有咎,
"If one says the goer goes, this person has a fault,
離去有去者,說去者有去。」
for it would mean there is a goer apart from going, yet it says the goer has going."
若人說去者能用去法,是人則有咎,離去法有去者。何以故?說去者用去法,是為先有去者後有去法。是事不然,是故三時中無有去者。復次,若決定有去、有去者,應有初發。而於三時中求發不可得。何以故?
If someone says the goer can use the dharma of going, this person has a fault, equivalent to there being a goer apart from the dharma of going. Why? To say the goer uses the dharma of going means the goer exists first and the dharma of going afterward. This is wrong, so in the three times there is no goer. Furthermore, if going and a goer definitely existed, there should be an initial start. But seeking this start in the three times, none can be found. Why?
「已去中無發,未去中無發,
"In what has already gone there is no start, in what has not yet gone there is no start,
去時中無發,何處當有發?」
and in the going-time too there is no start, so where can there be a start?"
何以故三時中無發?
Why is there no start in any of the three times?
「未發無去時,亦無有已去,
"If there is not yet a start, there is no going-time, and also no already-gone,
是二應有發,未去何有發?
the start should be in these two places, but in what has not yet gone, where is there a start?
無去無未去,亦復無去時,
There is no going, nor not-yet-going, and still less a going-time,
一切無有發,何故而分別?」
all is without a start, so what use is it to distinguish these?"
若人未發則無去時亦無已去;若有發當在二處:去時、已去中。二俱不然,未去時未有發故。未去中何有發?發無故無去,無去故無去者,何得有已去、未去、去時。
If a person has not yet started, then there is neither a going-time nor an already-gone; if there is a start, it should fall in two places: the going-time, and the already-gone. Both places are wrong, because at the time of not yet going there is not yet a start. In what has not yet gone, where is there a start? If there is no start, there is no going; if there is no going, there is no goer, so where are the already-gone, the not-yet-gone and the going-time?
問曰:若無去、無去者,應有住、住者。答曰:
The questioner says: If there is no going and no goer, there should be staying and a stayer. The answerer says:
「去者則不住,不去者不住,
"The goer does not stay, the non-goer also does not stay,
離去不去者,何有第三住?」
apart from the goer and the non-goer, where is there a third kind that stays?"
若有住、有住者,應去者住、若不去者住。若離此二,應有第三住。是事不然。去者不住,去未息故,與去相違名為住。不去者亦不住。何以故?因去法滅故有住,無去則無住。離去者不去者,更無第三住者。若有第三住者,即在去者、不去者中。以是故,不得言去者住。復次:
If there is staying and a stayer, then the goer should be the one who stays, or the non-goer should be the one who stays. If apart from these two there is a third kind of staying, this is wrong. The goer does not stay, because going has not stopped, and only what is contrary to going is called staying. The non-goer also does not stay. Why? Staying exists only when the dharma of going has ceased; without going there is no staying. Apart from the goer and the non-goer, there is no third kind of one who stays. If there were a third kind of stayer, it would also fall within the goer or the non-goer. Therefore, one cannot say that the goer stays. Furthermore:
「去者若當住,云何有此義?
"If the goer were to stay, how can this statement stand?
若當離於去,去者不可得。」
If apart from going, the goer cannot be found."
汝謂去者住。是事不然。何以故。離去法,去者不可得。若去者在去相,云何當有住?去住相違故。復次:
You say the goer stays. This is wrong. Why? Apart from the dharma of going, the goer cannot be found. If the goer is precisely in the mark of going, how can there be staying? Going and staying are contrary. Furthermore:
「去未去無住,去時亦無住,
"In what has gone or not yet gone there is no staying, and in the going-time there is also no staying,
所有行止法,皆同於去義。」
and all the dharmas of moving and stopping follow the same principle as going."
若謂去者住,是人應在去時、已去、未去中住。三處皆無住,是故汝言去者有住,是則不然。如破去法、住法,行、止亦如是。行者,如從穀子相續至芽莖葉等。止者,穀子滅故芽莖葉滅。相續故名行,斷故名止。又如無明緣諸行乃至老死是名行,無明滅故諸行等滅是名止。
If one says the goer stays, this person should stay in the going-time, in what has gone, or in what has not yet gone. In all three places there is no staying, so your saying that the goer has staying is wrong. Just as the dharmas of going and staying are refuted, so moving and stopping are the same. What is called moving is like the continuity from grain to sprout, stalk, leaf and so on. What is called stopping is when the grain ceases, so the sprout, stalk and leaf cease too. Continuity is called moving, and its being cut off is called stopping. Again, from ignorance conditioning the formations all the way to old age and death is called moving; when ignorance ceases, the formations and so on cease, and this is called stopping.
問曰:汝雖種種門破去去者、住住者,而眼見有去住。
The questioner says: Although you use many approaches to refute going and the goer, staying and the stayer, the eyes clearly see that there is going and staying.
答曰:肉眼所見不可信。若實有去去者,為以一法成?為以二法成?二俱有過。何以故?
The answerer says: What the physical eye sees is not trustworthy. If going and the goer truly exist, are they established by one dharma or by two dharmas? Both have faults. Why?
「去法即去者,是事則不然;
"That the dharma of going is the goer is wrong;
去法異去者,是事亦不然。」
that the dharma of going is different from the goer is also wrong."
若去法、去者一,是則不然,異亦不然。
If the dharma of going and the goer are one, this is wrong; if they are different, this is also wrong.
問曰:一、異有何過?
The questioner says: What are the faults of being one and being different?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若謂於去法,即為是去者;
"If one says the dharma of going is the goer,
作者及作業,是事則為一。
then the agent and the action become one and the same.
若謂於去法,有異於去者;
If one says the dharma of going is different from the goer,
離去者有去,離去有去者。」
then there is going apart from the goer, and a goer apart from going."
如是二俱有過。何以故?若去法即是去者,是則錯亂,破於因緣。因去有去者,因去者有去。又去名為法,去者名為人,人常法無常。若一者,則二俱應常、二俱無常。一中有如是等過。若異者則相違。未有去法應有去者,未有去者應有去法,不相因待,一法滅應一法在。異中有如是等過。復次:
In both cases there are faults. Why? If the dharma of going is the goer, then it is confused and destroys dependent origination, because the goer exists by relying on going, and going exists by relying on the goer. Moreover, going is called a dharma and the goer is called a person, and a person is permanent while a dharma is impermanent. If they were one, both should be permanent, or both impermanent. Being one has faults of this kind. If they are different, they contradict each other: going, not yet being a dharma, would already have a goer, and the goer, not yet being a goer, would already have the dharma of going, with no mutual dependence; when one dharma ceases, the other should still remain. Being different has faults of this kind. Furthermore:
「去去者是二,若一異法成,
"Going and the goer, these two, whether established as one or as different,
二門俱不成,云何當有成?」
cannot be established by either door, so how can one speak of establishing them?"
若去者、去法有,若以一法成、若以異法成,二俱不可得;先已說無第三法成。若謂有成,應說因緣。無去無去者,今當更說。
If the goer and the dharma of going exist, whether they are established by one dharma or by different dharmas, neither can be found; as said before, there is no third way of establishing them. If one says there is establishment, one should state the causes and conditions. There is no going and no goer, and now this is to be said again.
「因去知去者,不能用是去;
"By going one knows there is a goer, yet this going cannot be used again;
先無有去法,故無去者去。」
since before there was no dharma of going, there is no 'the goer goes.'"
隨以何去法知去者?是去者不能用是去法。何以故?是去法未有時無有去者,亦無去時、已去、未去。如先有人、有城邑,得有所起。去法、去者則不然,去者因去法成,去法因去者成故。復次:
Whichever dharma of going is used to know that there is a goer, this goer cannot again use this dharma of going. Why? Before this dharma of going existed, there was no goer, and also no going-time, already-gone or not-yet-gone. It is like how, when there are people and towns first, something can arise. But the dharma of going and the goer are not like this, because the goer is established by relying on the dharma of going, and the dharma of going is established by relying on the goer. Furthermore:
「因去知去者,不能用異去,
"By going one knows there is a goer, yet he cannot use another going,
於一去者中,不得二去故。」
because within one goer, two kinds of going cannot be found."
隨以何去法知去者,是去者不能用異去法。何以故?一去者中二去法不可得故。復次:
Whichever dharma of going is used to know that there is a goer, this goer cannot use another dharma of going. Why? Within one goer, two dharmas of going cannot be found. Furthermore:
「決定有去者,不能用三去;
"A goer who definitely exists cannot use the three kinds of going;
不決定去者,亦不用三去。
a goer who is not definite also cannot use the three kinds of going.
去法定不定,去者不用三,
Whether the dharma of going is definite or not, the goer does not use these three,
是故去去者,所去處皆無。」
so going, the goer and the place gone to all do not exist."
決定者,名本實有,不因去法生。去法名身動。三種名未去、已去、去時。若決定有去者,離去法應有去者,不應有住,是故說決定有去者不能用三去。若去者不決定,不決定名本實無,以因去法得名去者,以無去法故不能用三去。因去法故有去者,若先無去法則無去者。云何言不決定去者用三去?如去者,去法亦如是。若先離去者決定有去法,則不因去者有去法,是故去者不能用三去法。若決定無去法,去者何所用?如是思惟觀察,去法、去者、所去處,是法皆相因待。因去法有去者,因去者有去法,因是二法則有可去處,不得言定有、不得言定無,是故決定知,三法虛妄,空無所有,但有假名,如幻如化。
"Definite" means originally truly existing, not arising by relying on the dharma of going. The dharma of going refers to bodily motion. The three refer to not yet gone, already gone and going-time. If a goer definitely exists, then apart from the dharma of going there should already be a goer, and there should be no staying, so it is said that a definitely existing goer cannot use the three kinds of going. If the goer is not definite ("not definite" means originally truly nonexistent, and only by relying on the dharma of going does it get the name "goer"), then since there is no dharma of going, it also cannot use the three kinds of going. The goer exists by relying on the dharma of going; if there was no dharma of going before, there is no goer. How can one say that a goer who is not definite uses the three kinds of going? As with the goer, so with the dharma of going. If before, apart from the goer, there definitely was a dharma of going, then the dharma of going would not exist by relying on the goer, so the goer cannot use the three dharmas of going. If there definitely is no dharma of going, what would the goer use it for? Thinking and observing in this way: the dharma of going, the goer and the place gone to, these dharmas all depend on one another. By relying on the dharma of going there is a goer, by relying on the goer there is a dharma of going, and by relying on these two dharmas there is a place to go to, and one cannot say they definitely exist, nor that they definitely do not exist. So one knows for certain: these three dharmas are false, empty and without anything, only provisional names, like illusions and transformations.
中論觀六情品第三(八偈)
The Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 3: Examination of the Six Faculties (eight verses)
問曰:經中說有六情,所謂:
The questioner says: The sutras speak of six faculties, namely:
「眼耳及鼻舌、身意等六情,
"Eye and ear, and nose and tongue, body and mind, the six faculties,
此眼等六情,行色等六塵。」
these six faculties, the eye and the rest, operate on the six objects of form and the rest."
此中眼為內情、色為外塵,眼能見色,乃至意為內情、法為外塵,意能知法。
Here the eye is the inner faculty and form is the outer object, and the eye can see form; and so on up to the mind being the inner faculty and dharmas the outer object, and the mind can know dharmas.
答曰:無也。何以故?
The answerer says: No. Why?
「是眼則不能,自見其己體;
"This eye cannot see its own substance;
若不能自見,云何見餘物?」
if it cannot see itself, how can it see anything else?"
是眼不能見自體。何以故?如燈能自照亦能照他。眼若是見相,亦應自見亦應見他。而實不爾,是故偈中說「若眼不自見,何能見餘物?」
This eye cannot see its own substance. Why? For example a lamp can illuminate both itself and others. If the eye were truly of the mark of "seeing," it should be able to see both itself and others. But the fact is not so, so the verse says: "If the eye does not see itself, how can it see anything else?"
問曰:眼雖不能自見,而能見他。如火能燒他,不能自燒。
The questioner says: Although the eye cannot see itself, it can see others. It is like fire, which can burn others but cannot burn itself.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「火喻則不能,成於眼見法;
"The analogy of fire cannot establish the dharma of the eye's seeing;
去未去去時,已總答是事。」
already gone, not yet gone and going, this matter has already been answered in general."
汝雖作火喻,不能成眼見法。是事〈去來品〉中已答,如已去中無去、未去中無去、去時中無去;如已燒、未燒、燒時俱無有燒,如是已見、未見、見時俱無見相。復次:
Although you make the analogy of fire, it cannot establish the dharma of the eye's seeing. This matter has been answered in the Chapter on Going and Coming: just as in what has already gone there is no going, in what has not yet gone there is no going, and in the going-time there is no going; likewise, in what has already burned, not yet burned and is burning there is no burning, and in what has already seen, not yet seen and is seeing there is no mark of seeing. Furthermore:
「見若未見時,則不名為見;
"If seeing is still at the time of not yet seeing, it is not called seeing;
而言見能見,是事則不然。」
yet to say that seeing can see is wrong."
眼未對色則不能見,爾時不名為見,因對色名為見。是故偈中說「未見時無見」,云何以見能見?復次二處俱無見法。何以故?
When the eye has not yet faced form, it cannot see, and at that time it is not called seeing; only because it faces form is it called seeing. So the verse says "at the time of not yet seeing there is no seeing," so how can one see by relying on "seeing"? Furthermore, in both places there is no dharma of seeing. Why?
「見不能有見,非見亦不見;
"Seeing cannot see, and non-seeing also cannot see;
若已破於見,則為破見者。」
if seeing has already been refuted, the seer has also been refuted."
見不能見,先已說過故。非見亦不見,無見相故。若無見相,云何能見?見法無故,見者亦無。何以故?若離見有見者,無眼者亦應以餘情見。若以見見,則見中有見相。見者無見相,是故偈中說「若已破於見,則為破見者。」復次:
That seeing cannot see has been explained above. Non-seeing also cannot see, because it has no mark of seeing. If there is no mark of seeing, how can it see? If the dharma of seeing does not exist, the seer also does not exist. Why? If apart from seeing there were a seer, a person without eyes should be able to see with the other faculties. If seeing is done by relying on seeing, seeing should have the mark of seeing within it. The seer does not have the mark of seeing, so the verse says: "If seeing has already been refuted, the seer has also been refuted." Furthermore:
「離見不離見,見者不可得;
"Whether apart from seeing or not apart from seeing, the seer cannot be found;
以無見者故,何有見可見?」
since there is no seer, where are seeing and the seen?"
若有見,見者則不成;若無見,見者亦不成。見者無故,云何有見可見?若無見者,誰能用見法分別外色?是故偈中說「以無見者故,何有見可見?」復次:
If there is seeing, the seer cannot be established; if there is no seeing, the seer also cannot be established. If the seer does not exist, how can there be seeing and the seen? If there is no seer, who could use the dharma of seeing to discriminate external forms? So the verse says: "Since there is no seer, where are seeing and the seen?" Furthermore:
「見可見無故,識等四法無;
"Seeing and the seen being absent, the four dharmas of consciousness and so on are also absent;
四取等諸緣,云何當得有?」
how can the four graspings and the many other conditions still exist?"
見、可見法無故,識、觸、受、愛四法皆無。以無愛等故,四取等十二因緣分亦無。復次:
When the dharmas of seeing and the seen do not exist, the four dharmas of consciousness, contact, feeling and craving all do not exist. Since there is no craving and so on, the four graspings and the other links of the twelve-link dependent origination also do not exist. Furthermore:
「耳鼻舌身意,聲及聞者等,
"Ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, sound and the hearer and so on,
當知如是義,皆同於上說。」
one should know that these meanings are all the same as what was said above."
如見、可見法空,屬眾緣故無決定。餘耳等五情聲等五塵,當知亦同見可見法,義同故不別說。
As the dharmas of seeing and the seen are empty, belonging to many conditions and so without a fixed nature, so too for the other five faculties such as the ear and the five objects such as sound, which should be known to be the same as the dharmas of seeing and the seen; since the principle is the same, it is not stated separately.
中論觀五陰品第四(九偈)
The Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 4: Examination of the Five Aggregates (nine verses)
問曰:經說有五陰。是事云何?
The questioner says: The sutras speak of five aggregates. What about this?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若離於色因,色則不可得;
"If apart from the cause of form, form cannot be found;
若當離於色,色因不可得。」
if apart from form, the cause of form cannot be found."
色因者,如布因縷,除縷則無布,除布則無縷。布如色,縷如因。
What is called the cause of form is like the cause of cloth being the thread: remove the thread and there is no cloth, remove the cloth and there is no thread. Cloth is like form, and thread is like the cause.
問曰:若離色因有色,有何過?
The questioner says: If apart from the cause of form there is still form, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「離色因有色,是色則無因;
"If apart from the cause of form there is still form, this form is without cause;
無因而有法,是事則不然。」
to have a dharma without a cause is wrong."
如離縷有布,布則無因。無因而有法,世間所無有。
It is like there being cloth apart from thread, in which case the cloth would be without cause. To have a dharma without a cause is something that does not exist in the world.
問曰:佛法、外道法、世間法中皆有無因法。佛法有三無為,無為常故無因。外道法中虛空、時、方、神、微塵、涅槃等。世間法虛空、時、方等。是三法無處不有故名為常,常故無因。汝何以說無因法世間所無?
The questioner says: In the Buddha's teaching, in the teachings of outsiders and in worldly teachings there are dharmas without cause. In the Buddha's teaching there are three unconditioned dharmas, and the unconditioned is permanent and so without cause. In the outsiders' teachings there are space, time, direction, the self, atoms, nirvana and so on. In worldly teachings there are space, time, direction and so on. These three dharmas are present everywhere and so are called permanent; being permanent, they are without cause. Why do you say that dharmas without cause do not exist in the world?
答曰:此無因法但有言說,思惟分別則皆無。若法從因緣有,不應言無因。若無因緣,則如我說。
The answerer says: These dharmas without cause exist only in words, and once examined and discriminated in thought, they all disappear. If a dharma exists from causes and conditions, one should not call it causeless. If there are no causes and conditions, then it is just as I said.
問曰:有二種因:一者作因、二者言說因。是無因法無作因,但有言說因,令人知故。
The questioner says: There are two kinds of cause: one is the cause of making, the other is the cause of being spoken of. These dharmas without cause do not have a cause of making, only a cause of being spoken of, so that people may know them.
答曰:雖有言說因,是事不然。虛空如六種中破,餘事後當破。復次現事尚皆可破,何況微塵等不可見法?是故說無因法世間所無。
The answerer says: Although there is a cause of being spoken of, this is still wrong. Space is refuted as in the Chapter on the Six Elements, and the other matters will be refuted later. Furthermore, even present things can be refuted, how much more atoms and other unseen dharmas? So I say that dharmas without cause do not exist in the world.
問曰:若離色有色因,有何過?
The questioner says: If apart from form there is still a cause of form, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若離色有因,則是無果因;
"If apart from form there is still a cause, that would be a cause without a fruit;
若言無果因,則無有是處。」
to say there is a cause without a fruit is without any reason."
若除色果但有色因者,即是無果因。
If one removes form, the fruit, and leaves only the cause of form, that would be a cause without a fruit.
問曰:若無果有因,有何咎?
The questioner says: If there is a cause without a fruit, what is the fault?
答曰:無果有因,世間所無。何以故?以果故名為因。若無果,云何名因?復次若因中無果者,物何以不從非因生?是事如〈破因緣品〉中說。是故無有無果因。復次:
The answerer says: A cause without a fruit does not exist in the world. Why? Because only when there is a fruit is it called a cause. If there is no fruit, how can it be called a cause? Furthermore, if there is no fruit within the cause, why are things not born from non-causes? This matter is as stated in the Chapter on the Examination of Conditions. So there is no "cause without a fruit." Furthermore:
「若已有色者,則不用色因;
"If form already exists, there is no need for a cause of form;
若無有色者,亦不用色因。」
if form does not exist, there is also no need for a cause of form."
二處有色因,是則不然。若先因中有色,不名為色因;若先因中無色,亦不名為色因。
For both cases to have a cause of form is wrong. If form already existed within the cause beforehand, it would not be called the cause of form; if form did not exist within the cause beforehand, it would also not be called the cause of form.
問曰:若二處俱不然,但有無因色,有何咎?
The questioner says: If both cases are wrong and only form without a cause remains, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「無因而有色,是事終不然。
"To have form without a cause is in the end not right.
是故有智者,不應分別色。」
So the wise should not discriminate form."
若因中有果、因中無果,此事尚不可得,何況無因有色。是故言「無因而有色,是事終不然。是故有智者,不應分別色。」分別名凡夫,以無明愛染貪著色,然後以邪見生分別戲論,說因中有果、無果等。今此中求色不可得,是故智者不應分別。復次:
Whether there is a fruit within the cause or no fruit within the cause cannot even be found by seeking, how much less form without a cause. So it says: "To have form without a cause is in the end not right. So the wise should not discriminate form." What is called discrimination refers to ordinary people: because of ignorance and craving they cling to form, and then with wrong views give rise to discriminating conceptual play, saying that there is a fruit within the cause, or no fruit, and so on. Now, seeking form here, one cannot find it, so the wise should not discriminate. Furthermore:
「若果似於因,是事則不然;
"If the fruit resembles the cause, this is wrong;
果若不似因,是事亦不然。」
if the fruit does not resemble the cause, this is also wrong."
若果與因相似,是事不然,因細果麁故。因果色力等各異,如布似縷則不名布,縷多布一故。不得言因果相似。若因果不相似,是亦不然。如麻縷不成絹,麁縷無出細布,是故不得言因果不相似。二義不然,故無色、無色因。
If the fruit resembles the cause, this is wrong, because the cause is fine and the fruit is coarse. Cause and fruit differ from each other in color, strength and so on; if cloth resembled thread it would not be called cloth, because thread is many and cloth is one. One cannot say that cause and fruit resemble each other. If cause and fruit do not resemble each other, this is also wrong. For example hemp thread cannot be woven into silk, and coarse thread cannot produce fine cloth, so one cannot say that cause and fruit do not resemble each other. Both principles are wrong, so there is no form and also no cause of form.
「受陰及想陰、行陰識陰等,
"The aggregates of feeling, perception, volition and consciousness and the rest,
其餘一切法,皆同於色陰。」
and all other dharmas, are all like the aggregate of form."
四陰及一切法,亦應如是思惟破。又今造論者欲讚美空義故而說偈:
The other four aggregates and all dharmas should likewise be refuted by thinking in this way. Furthermore, the author of the treatise, in order to praise the principle of emptiness, adds another verse:
「若人有問者,離空而欲答,
"If someone comes to ask, and one wishes to answer apart from emptiness,
是則不成答,俱同於彼疑。
this cannot make an answer, and both sides fall into the same doubt.
若人有難問,離空說其過,
If someone comes to object, and apart from emptiness speaks of the other's faults,
是不成難問,俱同於彼疑。」
this cannot make an objection, and both sides fall into the same doubt."
若人論議時各有所執,離於空義而有問答者,皆不成問答,俱亦同疑。如人言:「瓶是無常。」問者言:「何以故無常?」答言:「從無常因生故。」此不名答。何以故?因緣中亦疑,不知為常、為無常?是為同彼所疑。問者若欲說其過,不依於空而說諸法無常,則不名問難。何以故?汝因無常破我常,我亦因常破汝無常。若實無常則無業報,眼耳等諸法念念滅,亦無有分別。有如是等過,皆不成問難,同彼所疑。若依空破常者,則無有過。何以故?此人不取空相故。是故若欲問答,尚應依於空法,何況欲求離苦寂滅相者。
When people debate, each holds to something; if apart from the principle of emptiness there are questions and answers, none can be made into a question or answer, and both sides also fall into the same doubt. For example, someone says: "A pot is impermanent." The questioner says: "Why is it impermanent?" The answerer says: "Because it arises from impermanent causes." This is not called an answer. Why? The causes and conditions are equally doubtful, and one does not know whether they are permanent or impermanent. This is the same as what the other side doubts. If a questioner wishes to speak of the other's faults and, not relying on emptiness, says that all dharmas are impermanent, this is also not called an objection. Why? You use impermanence to refute my permanence, and I also use permanence to refute your impermanence. If things were truly impermanent, there would be no karmic retribution, and the eye, ear and other dharmas would perish moment by moment, and there would be no discrimination. With faults of this kind, none can make an objection, being the same as what the other side doubts. If one relies on emptiness to refute permanence, there is no fault. Why? This person does not take hold of the mark of emptiness. So even for questions and answers one must rely on the dharma of emptiness, how much more those who wish to leave suffering and attain the mark of quiescence.
中論觀六種品第五(八偈)
The Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 5: Examination of the Six Elements (eight verses)
問曰:六種各有定相,有定相故則有六種。
The questioner says: Each of the six elements has a definite mark, and because they have definite marks, there are six elements.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「空相未有時,則無虛空法;
"Before the mark of space exists, there is no dharma of space;
若先有虛空,即為是無相。」
if space existed beforehand, it would be without mark."
若未有虛空相先有虛空法者,虛空則無相。何以故?無色處名虛空相。色是作法無常,若色未生,未生則無滅,爾時無虛空相。因色故有無色處,無色處名虛空相。
If there is not yet a mark of space but already the dharma of space, then space is without mark. Why? A place without form is called the mark of space. Form is a made dharma and impermanent; if form has not yet arisen, then since it has not arisen there is no ceasing, and at that time there is also no mark of space. Because there is form, there is a place without form; only a place without form is called the mark of space.
問曰:若無相有虛空,有何咎?
The questioner says: If there is space without a mark, what is the fault?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「是無相之法,一切處無有;
"This dharma without mark does not exist anywhere;
於無相法中,相則無所相。」
within a dharma without mark, a mark has no object to mark."
若於常無常法中,求無相法不可得。如論者言,是有是無,云何知各有相?故生住滅是有為相,無生住滅是無為相。虛空若無相,則無虛空。若謂先無相、後相來相者,是亦不然。若先無相,則無法可相。何以故?
Whether in permanent dharmas or impermanent dharmas, a dharma without a mark cannot be found by seeking. When debaters say "this is being, this is non-being," by what do they know that each has its own mark? So arising, abiding and ceasing are the marks of the conditioned, and non-arising, non-abiding and non-ceasing are the marks of the unconditioned. If space has no mark, there is no space. If one says that earlier it had no mark and later a mark comes to mark it, this is also wrong. If earlier it had no mark, there is no dharma to be marked. Why?
「有相無相中,相則無所住;
"In what has a mark, and in what has no mark, a mark has no place to dwell;
離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」
apart from what has a mark and what has no mark, there is no other place for it to dwell."
如有峰有角、尾端有毛、頸下垂𩑶,是名牛相。若離是相則無牛。若無牛,是諸相無所住。是故說於無相法中相則無所相。有相中相亦不住,先有相故。如水相中火相不住,先有自相故。復次若無相中相住者,則為無因,無因名為無法而有相。相、可相、常相,因待故。離有相無相法,更無第三處可相。是故偈中說「離有相無相,餘處亦不住。」復次:
For example, having a hump, horns, hair at the end of the tail and a dewlap hanging below the neck is called the mark of an ox. If apart from these marks, there is no ox. If there is no ox, these marks have no place to dwell. So it is said: within a dharma without mark, a mark has no object to mark. In what has a mark, a mark cannot dwell either, because there was already a mark beforehand. Just as in the mark of water the mark of fire cannot dwell, because it already had its own mark beforehand. Furthermore, if a mark dwelled in what has no mark, that would be causeless; what is called causeless is a mark without a dharma. Mark and the marked are always mutually dependent. Apart from dharmas with a mark and without a mark, there is no third place to be marked. So the verse says: "Apart from what has a mark and what has no mark, there is no other place for it to dwell." Furthermore:
「相法無有故,可相法亦無;
"If the dharma of mark does not exist, the dharma of the marked also does not exist;
可相法無故,相法亦復無。」
if the dharma of the marked does not exist, the dharma of mark also does not exist."
相無所住故,則無可相法;可相法無故,相法亦無。何以故?因相有可相,因可相有相,共相因待故。
If a mark has no place to dwell, there is no dharma to be marked; if the dharma to be marked does not exist, the dharma of mark also does not exist. Why? Because the marked exists by relying on mark, and mark exists by relying on the marked, each depending on the other.
「是故今無相,亦無有可相;
"So now there is no mark and also no marked;
離相可相已,更亦無有物。」
apart from mark and the marked, there is nothing else."
於因緣中本末推求,相、可相決定不可得。是二不可得故,一切法皆無。一切法皆攝在相、可相二法中,或相為可相、或可相為相。如火以煙為相,煙亦復以火為相。
In dependent origination, seeking from root to end, mark and the marked cannot definitely be found. When these two cannot be found, all dharmas do not exist. All dharmas are contained in these two dharmas of mark and the marked: sometimes the mark serves as the marked, and sometimes the marked serves as the mark. Just as fire has smoke as its mark, and smoke in turn has fire as its mark.
問曰:若無有有,應當有無。
The questioner says: If there is no "being," there should be "non-being."
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若使無有有,云何當有無?
"If even "being" does not exist, how can there be "non-being"?
有無既已無,知有無者誰?」
Since being and non-being both do not exist, who is the one who knows being and non-being?"
凡物若自壞、若為他壞,名為無。無不自有,從有而有。是故言「若使無有有,云何當有無?」眼見耳聞尚不可得,何況無物。
All things either destroy themselves or are destroyed by others, and this is called non-being. Non-being does not exist by itself, but exists only from being. So it is said: "If even 'being' does not exist, how can there be 'non-being'?" What is seen with the eye and heard with the ear cannot even be found, how much less what does not exist.
問曰:以無有有故無亦無,應當有知有無者。
The questioner says: Because there is no "being," there is also no "non-being," so there should be one who knows being and non-being.
答曰:若有知者,應在有中、應在無中?有無既破,知者亦同破。
The answerer says: If there is a knower, should he fall within being or within non-being? Since being and non-being have been refuted, the knower is also refuted together with them.
「是故知虛空,非有亦非無,
"So one should know that space is neither being nor non-being,
非相非可相,餘五同虛空。」
neither mark nor the marked, and the other five are like space."
如虛空種種求相不可得,餘五種亦如是。
Just as space cannot be found by seeking its marks in any way, so too the other five.
問曰
The questioner says:
虛空不在初、不在後。何以先破?
Space is neither the first nor the last. Why refute it first?
答曰:地、水、火、風眾緣和合,故易破。識以苦樂因故知無常變異,故易破。虛空無如是相,但凡夫悕望為有,是故先破。復次虛空能持四大,四大因緣有識,是故先破根本,餘者自破。
The answerer says: Earth, water, fire and wind are combinations of many conditions, so they are easy to refute. Consciousness, being the cause of pain and pleasure, can be known to be impermanent and changing, so it is easy to refute. Space has no marks of this kind, and it is only that ordinary people hope it to exist, so it is refuted first. Furthermore, space supports the four great elements, and consciousness arises from the conditions of the four great elements, so refuting the root first, the rest are refuted of themselves.
問曰:世間人盡見諸法是有是無,汝何以獨與世間相違,言無所見?
The questioner says: All people of the world see that dharmas exist or do not exist; why do you alone go against the world and say that nothing is seen?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「淺智見諸法,若有若無相,
"The shallow wisdom that sees dharmas either falls into the mark of being or falls into the mark of non-being,
是則不能見,滅見安隱法。」
and so cannot see the peaceful dharma where all views are extinguished."
若人未得道,不見諸法實相,愛見因緣故種種戲論。見法生時謂之為有,取相言有;見法滅時謂之為斷,取相言無。智者見諸法生即滅無見,見諸法滅即滅有見,是故於一切法雖有所見,皆如幻如夢,乃至無漏道見尚滅,何況餘見。是故若不見滅、見安隱法者,則見有見無。
If a person has not yet attained the Way, he cannot see the true mark of dharmas, and because of the conditions of love and views gives rise to many kinds of conceptual play. Seeing a dharma arise, he says it exists, and takes the mark and says there is being; seeing a dharma cease, he says it is cut off, and takes the mark and says there is non-being. The wise, seeing dharmas arise, at once extinguish the view of non-being; seeing dharmas cease, at once extinguish the view of being. So although he has views of all dharmas, they are all like illusions and dreams; even the view of the undefiled path must be extinguished, how much more other views. So if one cannot see the peaceful dharma where all views are extinguished, one will see being and see non-being.
中論觀染染者品第六(十偈)
The Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 6: Examination of Defilement and the Defiled (ten verses)
問曰:經說貪欲、瞋恚、愚痴是世間根本。貪欲有種種名,初名愛、次名著、次名染、次名婬欲、次名貪欲,有如是等名字。此是結使,依止眾生眾生名染者,貪欲名染法。有染法、染者故,則有貪欲。餘二亦如是,有瞋則有瞋者、有痴則有痴者。以此三毒因緣起三業,三業因緣起三界,是故有一切法。
The questioner says: The sutras say that greed, hatred and delusion are the root of the world. Greed has many names: at first it is called love, next attachment, next defilement, next lust, next craving, and so on. These are fetters, which depend on beings; the being is called the defiled one, and craving is called the dharma of defilement. Because there is a dharma of defilement and a defiled one, there is craving. The other two are likewise: where there is hatred there is one who hates, and where there is delusion there is one who is deluded. By the conditions of these three poisons the three karmas of body, speech and mind arise, and by the conditions of the three karmas the three realms arise, and so all dharmas exist.
答曰:經雖說有三毒名字,求實不可得。何以故?
The answerer says: Although the sutras speak of the names of the three poisons, seeking their reality they cannot be found. Why?
「若離於染法,先自有染者,
"If apart from the dharma of defilement there already was a defiled one beforehand,
因是染欲者,應生於染法;
then relying on this one who has craving, defilement should arise;
若無有染者,云何當有染?
if there is no defiled one, how can there be defilement?
若有若無染,染者亦如是。」
Whether there is defilement or no defilement, the defiled one is likewise."
若先定有染者,則不更須染,染者先已染故。若先定無染者,亦復不應起染,要當先有染者然後起染。若先無染者,則無受染者。染法亦如是,若先離人定有染法,此則無因,云何得起?似如無薪火。若先定無染法則無有染者,是故偈中說「若有若無染,染者亦如是。」
If a defiled one definitely existed beforehand, there would be no need for defilement, because the defiled one had already been defiled beforehand. If a defiled one definitely did not exist beforehand, defilement should not arise either, for there should first be a defiled one and only then defilement arises. If there is no defiled one beforehand, there is no one to receive defilement. The dharma of defilement is likewise: if apart from the person there definitely were a dharma of defilement beforehand, it would have no cause, so how could it arise? It would be like fire without firewood. If there definitely were no dharma of defilement beforehand, there would also be no defiled one. So the verse says: "Whether there is defilement or no defilement, the defiled one is likewise."
問曰:若染法、染者先後相待生,是事不可得者。若一時生,有何咎?答曰:
The questioner says: If the dharma of defilement and the defiled one arise in dependence on each other in sequence, this cannot be found; if they arise simultaneously, what is the fault? The answerer says:
「染者及染法,俱成則不然;
"The defiled one and the dharma of defilement being established simultaneously is wrong;
染者染法俱,則無有相待。」
if the defiled one and the dharma of defilement are simultaneous, there is no mutual dependence."
若染法、染者一時成,則不相待,不因染者有染法。不因染法有染者,是二應常,已無因成故。若常則多過,無有解脫法。復次今當以一異法破染法、染者。何以故?
If the dharma of defilement and the defiled one are established simultaneously, they do not depend on each other: it is not that the dharma of defilement exists by relying on the defiled one, nor that the defiled one exists by relying on the dharma of defilement, and these two would have to be permanent, because they are established without a cause. If they are permanent, the faults are many, and there would be no dharma of liberation. Furthermore, now the dharma of defilement and the defiled one are to be refuted by way of one and different. Why?
「染者染法一,一法雲何合?
"If the defiled one and the dharma of defilement are one, how can one dharma be united?
染者染法異,異法雲何合?」
If the defiled one and the dharma of defilement are different, how can different dharmas be united?"
染法、染者,若以一法合、若以異法合。若一則無合。何以故?一法雲何自合?如指端不能自觸。若以異法合,是亦不可。何以故?以異成故。若各成竟,不須復合,雖合猶異。復次一異俱不可。何以故?
The dharma of defilement and the defiled one are united either as one or as different. If they are one, there is no union. Why? How can one dharma unite with itself? Just as a fingertip cannot touch itself. If they are united as different, this also does not work. Why? Because each has already been established by itself. If each has been established completely by itself, there is no need to unite; even if they unite, they are still different. Furthermore, neither one nor different works. Why?
「若一有合者,離伴應有合;
"If being one there were union, apart from its companion there should be union;
若異有合者,離伴亦應合。」
if being different there were union, apart from its companion there should be union."
若染、染者一,強名為合者,應離餘因緣而有染、染者。復次若一,亦不應有染、染者二名,染是法、染者是人。若人法為一,是則大亂。若染、染者各異而言合者,則不須餘因緣而有合。若異而合者,雖遠亦應合。
If defilement and the defiled one are one and one grudgingly calls it union, then apart from other conditions there should be defilement and the defiled one. Furthermore, if they are one, there should not be two names, defilement and the defiled one, since defilement is a dharma and the defiled one is a person. If person and dharma are one, there would be great confusion. If defilement and the defiled one are each different yet one speaks of union, then without other conditions there would be union. If different things unite, however far apart they are they should unite.
問曰:一不合,可爾;眼見異法共合。
The questioner says: That the one cannot unite is acceptable; the eyes see different dharmas united together.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若異而有合,染染者何事?
"If different things have union, what is accomplished by defilement and the defiled one?
是二相先異,然後說合相。」
These two marks were already different beforehand, and only then does one speak of the mark of union."
若染、染者先有決定異相而後合者,是則不合。何以故?是二相先已異,而後強說合。復次:
If defilement and the defiled one already had definite marks of difference beforehand and only then united, this is not union. Why? These two marks were already different beforehand, and only afterward is union grudgingly spoken of. Furthermore:
「若染及染者,先各成異相,
"If defilement and the defiled one, beforehand each established marks of difference,
既已成異相,云何而言合?」
since the marks of difference are already established, how can one still speak of union?"
若染、染者先各成別相,汝今何以強說合相?復次:
If defilement and the defiled one beforehand each established separate marks, on what grounds do you now grudgingly speak of the mark of union? Furthermore:
「異相無有成,是故汝欲合;
"The mark of difference is not established, and so you wish for union;
合相竟無成,而復說異相。」
the mark of union is in the end not established, and you speak again of the mark of difference."
汝已染、染者異相不成故,復說合相。合相中有過,染、染者不成。汝為成合相故,復說異相。汝自已為定,而所說不定。何以故?
Because the mark of difference of defilement and the defiled one is not established, you change your words and speak of the mark of union. There is a fault in the mark of union, and defilement and the defiled one are still not established. In order to establish the mark of union, you again speak of the mark of difference. You yourself have taken it as settled, but what you say is not settled. Why?
「異相不成故,合相則不成;
"If the mark of difference is not established, the mark of union is not established;
於何異相中,而欲說合相?」
within which mark of difference do you still wish to speak of the mark of union?"
以此中染、染者異相不成故,合相亦不成。汝於何異相中而欲說合相?復次:
Because here the mark of difference of defilement and the defiled one is not established, the mark of union is also not established. Within which mark of difference do you still wish to speak of the mark of union? Furthermore:
「如是染染者,非合不合成;
"Thus defilement and the defiled one cannot be established by union nor by non-union;
諸法亦如是,非合不合成。」
dharmas are likewise, and cannot be established by union nor by non-union."
如染,恚痴亦如是。如三毒,一切煩惱、一切法亦如是。非先非後、非合非散等,因緣所成。
As with defilement, so with hatred and delusion. As with the three poisons, so with all afflictions and all dharmas. Not before and not after, not united and not scattered, and so on, all are formed by causes and conditions.
Treatise on the Middle, Fascicle 1
Treatise on the Middle, Fascicle 2
龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋
Verses composed by the Bodhisattva Nagarjuna, commentary by the brahmin Pingala (Qingmu).
姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva of the Later Qin (the Yao Qin dynasty).
觀三相品第七(三十五偈)
Chapter 7: Examination of the Three Marks (thirty-five verses)
問曰:經說有為法有三相:生、住、滅。萬物以生法生、以住法住、以滅法滅,是故有諸法。
The questioner says: The sutras say that conditioned dharmas have three marks: arising, abiding and ceasing. Things arise by the dharma of arising, abide by the dharma of abiding, and cease by the dharma of ceasing, and so dharmas exist.
答曰:不爾。何以故?三相無決定故。是三相為是有為能作有為相?為是無為能作有為相?二俱不然。何以故?
The answerer says: It is not so. Why? The three marks have no fixed nature. These three marks, is it the conditioned that can serve as the marks of the conditioned, or the unconditioned that can serve as the marks of the conditioned? Both are wrong. Why?
「若生是有為,則應有三相;
"If arising is conditioned, there should be another three marks;
若生是無為,何名有為相?」
if arising is unconditioned, how can it be called a mark of the conditioned?"
若生是有為,應有三相生住滅。是事不然。何以故?共相違故。相違者,生相應生法、住相應住法、滅相應滅法。若法生時,不應有住、滅相違法。一時則不然,如明闇不俱。以是故,生不應是有為法;住、滅相亦應如是。
If arising is conditioned, it should have three marks: arising, abiding and ceasing. This is wrong. Why? They contradict one another. What is called contradiction: the mark of arising should let a dharma arise, the mark of abiding should let a dharma abide, and the mark of ceasing should let a dharma cease. If a dharma is arising, it should not simultaneously have the contradictory dharmas of abiding and ceasing. This does not work in the same instant, like light and darkness that cannot coexist. Therefore arising should not be a conditioned dharma; the marks of abiding and ceasing should be seen in the same way.
問曰:若生非有為,若是無為,有何咎?
The questioner says: If arising is not conditioned, and is unconditioned, what is the fault?
答曰:若生是無為,云何能為有為法作相。何以故?無為法無性故。因滅有為名無為,是故說不生不滅名無為相,更無自相。是故無法,不能為法作相,如兔角龜毛等不能為法作相。是故生非無為;住、滅亦如是。復次:
The answerer says: If arising is unconditioned, how can it serve as a mark for conditioned dharmas? Why? Unconditioned dharmas have no self-nature. Because it is by the ceasing of the conditioned that something is called unconditioned, non-arising and non-ceasing are called the mark of the unconditioned, and it has no mark of its own. So it has no dharma and cannot serve as a mark for dharmas, just as rabbit horns and turtle hair cannot serve as marks for dharmas. So arising is not unconditioned; abiding and ceasing are likewise. Furthermore:
「三相若聚散,不能有所相;
"Whether the three marks are gathered or scattered, they cannot mark anything;
云何於一處,一時有三相?」
how can the three marks exist in the same place at the same moment?"
是生、住、滅相,若一一能為有為法作相?若和合能與有為法作相?二俱不然。何以故?若謂一一者,於一處中或有有相、或有無相,生時無住、滅,住時無生、滅,滅時無生、住。若和合者,共相違法,云何一時俱?若謂三相更有三相者,是亦不然。何以故?
These marks of arising, abiding and ceasing, can each one serve as a mark of a conditioned dharma, or can they united serve as marks of a conditioned dharma? Both are wrong. Why? If one says each one, then in the same place some would have marks and some would not: when arising there is no abiding or ceasing, when abiding there is no arising or ceasing, when ceasing there is no arising or abiding. If one says united, how can mutually contradictory dharmas all exist at the same moment? If one says the three marks have yet another three marks, this too is wrong. Why?
「若謂生住滅,更有有為相,
“If you say that arising, abiding, and ceasing each further have a conditioned mark,
是即為無窮,無即非有為。」
then it would go on without end; if they do not, they are not conditioned.”
若謂生、住、滅更有有為相,生更有生、有住、有滅。如是三相,復應更有相,若爾則無窮。若更無相,是三相則不名有為法,亦不能為有為法作相。
If arising, abiding, and ceasing each further have a conditioned mark, then arising would still need arising, abiding, and ceasing. Then the three marks would again need marks of their own, and this would go on without end. If there are no further marks, then these three marks are not called conditioned dharmas, and cannot serve as marks for conditioned dharmas.
問曰:汝說三相為無窮。是事不然。生、住、滅雖是有為,而非無窮。何以故?
The questioner says: You say the three marks would go on without end. This is not right. Although arising, abiding, and ceasing are conditioned, they are not endless. Why?
「生生之所生,生於彼本生,
“That which the arising of arising gives rise to is the arising of that primary arising;
本生之所生,還生於生生。」
and that which the primary arising gives rise to turns back and gives rise to that arising of arising.”
法生時通自體七法共生:一法、二生、三住、四滅、五生生、六住住、七滅滅。是七法中,本生除自體,能生六法。生生能生本生,本生能生生生,是故三相雖是有為,而非無窮。
When a dharma arises, seven dharmas arise together, including its own substance: first the dharma, second arising, third abiding, fourth ceasing, fifth the arising of arising, sixth the abiding of abiding, and seventh the ceasing of ceasing. Among these seven dharmas, the primary arising, excepting its own substance, can give rise to the other six. The arising of arising can give rise to the primary arising, and the primary arising can give rise to the arising of arising, so although the three marks are conditioned, they are not endless.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若謂是生生,能生於本生;
“If you say that this arising of arising can give rise to that primary arising;
生生從本生,何能生本生?」
yet the arising of arising comes from the primary arising, so how can it still give rise to the primary arising?”
若是生生能生本生者,是生生則不名從本生生。何以故?是生生從本生生,云何能生本生。復次:
If this arising of arising can give rise to the primary arising, then this arising of arising should not be said to arise from the primary arising. Why? This arising of arising arises from the primary arising, so how can it still give rise to the primary arising? Furthermore:
「若謂是本生,能生於生生;
“If you say that this primary arising can give rise to that arising of arising;
本生從彼生,何能生生生?」
yet the primary arising comes from that arising, so how can it still give rise to the arising of arising?”
若謂本生能生生生者,是本生不名從生生生。何以故?是本生從生生生,云何能生生生?生生法應生本生。而今生生不能生本生,生生未有自體,何能生本生?是故本生不能生生生。
If you say the primary arising can give rise to the arising of arising, then this primary arising should not be said to arise from the arising of arising. Why? This primary arising arises from the arising of arising, so how can it still give rise to the arising of arising? This dharma, the arising of arising, ought to give rise to the primary arising. But now the arising of arising cannot give rise to the primary arising, since the arising of arising has no substance of its own yet, so how could it give rise to the primary arising? So the primary arising also cannot give rise to the arising of arising.
問曰:是生生生時,非先非後能生本生,但生生生時能生本生。
The questioner says: When this arising of arising is arising, it gives rise to the primary arising neither before nor after, but just at the very time when the arising of arising is in the process of arising.
答曰:不然。何以故?
The answerer says: It is not so. Why?
「若生生生時,能生於本生;
“If the arising of arising, at the time it is arising, can give rise to the primary arising;
生生尚未有,何能生本生?」
since the arising of arising does not yet exist, how can it give rise to the primary arising?”
若謂生生生時能生本生可爾,而實未有,是故生生生時不能生本生。復次:
If you say that the arising of arising, while arising, can give rise to the primary arising, the statement seems possible, but in fact it does not yet exist, so the arising of arising, while arising, cannot give rise to the primary arising. Furthermore:
「若本生生時,能生於生生;
“If the primary arising, at the time it is arising, can give rise to the arising of arising;
本生尚未有,何能生生生?」
since the primary arising does not yet exist, how can it give rise to the arising of arising?”
若謂是本生生時能生生生可爾,而實未有,是故本生生時不能生生生。
If you say that the primary arising, while arising, can give rise to the arising of arising, the statement seems possible, but in fact it does not yet exist, so the primary arising, while arising, cannot give rise to the arising of arising.
問曰:
The questioner says:
「如燈能自照,亦能照於彼;
“Just as a lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate other things;
生法亦如是,自生亦生彼。」
so too the dharma of arising: it arises itself and also gives rise to others.”
如燈入於闇室,照了諸物亦能自照。生亦如是,能生於彼亦能自生。
Like a lamp entering a dark room and illuminating all the various things, it can also illuminate itself. Arising is the same: it can give rise to others, and can also arise by itself.
答曰:不然。何以故?
The answerer says: It is not so. Why?
「燈中自無闇,住處亦無闇,
“Within the lamp itself there is no darkness, and in the place where it is there is no darkness,
破闇乃名照,無闇則無照。」
to destroy darkness is what is called illuminating; where there is no darkness there is no illuminating.”
燈體自無闇,明所及處亦無闇,明闇相違故。破闇故名照,無闇則無照,何得言燈自照亦照彼?
The body of the lamp itself has no darkness, and where its light reaches there is also no darkness, because light and darkness are opposed. To destroy darkness is called illuminating; where there is no darkness there is no illuminating, so how can one say the lamp illuminates itself and also illuminates others?
問曰:是燈非未生有照,亦非生已有照,但燈生時能自照亦照彼。
The questioner says: This lamp does not illuminate before it has arisen, nor does it illuminate only after it has finished arising, but only while the lamp is in the process of arising it can illuminate itself and others.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「云何燈生時,而能破於闇?
“When the lamp is in the process of arising, how can it destroy darkness?
此燈初生時,不能及於闇。」
This lamp, at the moment it has just arisen, cannot yet reach the darkness.”
燈生時名半生半未生,燈體未成就,云何能破闇?又燈不能及闇,如人得賊乃名為破。若謂燈雖不到闇而能破闇者,是亦不然。何以故?
A lamp in the process of arising is called half arisen and half not yet arisen; the body of the lamp is not yet complete, so how can it destroy darkness? Moreover the lamp cannot reach the darkness; it is like a person who has caught a thief, and only then is it called breaking. If you say that although the lamp cannot reach the darkness it can destroy darkness, this too is wrong. Why?
「燈若未及闇,而能破闇者,
“If the lamp, though it cannot yet reach the darkness, can destroy the darkness,
燈在於此間,則破一切闇。」
then a lamp here should destroy the darkness in all places.”
若燈有力,不到闇而能破者。此處燃燈,應破一切處闇,俱不及故。復次燈不應自照、照彼。何以故?
If the lamp had the power to destroy darkness without reaching it, then lighting a lamp here should destroy the darkness in all places, since all are equally unreached. Furthermore, the lamp should neither illuminate itself nor illuminate others. Why?
「若燈能自照,亦能照於彼;
“If the lamp can illuminate itself and also illuminate others;
闇亦應自闇,亦能闇於彼。」
then darkness should also darken itself and also darken others.”
若燈與闇相違故,能自照亦照於彼。闇與燈相違故,亦應自蔽蔽彼。若闇與燈相違,不能自蔽蔽彼。燈與闇相違,亦不應自照亦照彼。是故燈喻非也。破生因緣未盡故,今當更說。
If the lamp, because it is opposed to darkness, can illuminate itself and others, then darkness, because it is opposed to the lamp, should also conceal itself and conceal others. If darkness, though opposed to the lamp, cannot conceal itself or conceal others, then the lamp, though opposed to darkness, should also not illuminate itself and others. So the example of the lamp is wrong. The causes and conditions for refuting arising have not yet been fully told, and now I will say more.
「此生若未生,云何能自生?
“If this arising has not yet arisen, how can it arise itself?
若生已自生,生已何用生?」
If it arises itself after it has already arisen, what need is there to arise when it has already arisen?”
是生自生時,為生已生?為未生生?若未生生,則是無法,無法何能自生?若謂生已生,則為已成,不須復生,如已作不應更作。若已生、若未生,是二俱不生,故無生。汝先說生如燈,能自生亦生彼,是事不然;住、滅亦如是。復次:
When this arising arises itself, does it arise after already having arisen, or arise when it has not yet arisen? If it arises when it has not yet arisen, then it is a nonexistent dharma, and how can a nonexistent dharma arise itself? If you say it arises again after having arisen, then it is already accomplished and need not arise again, like what has already been made should not be made again. Whether already arisen or not yet arisen, neither can arise, and so there is no arising. What you said before, that arising is like a lamp that can arise itself and also give rise to others, is wrong; abiding and ceasing are the same. Furthermore:
「生非生已生,亦非未生生,
“Arising is not already-arisen arising again, nor is it not-yet-arisen arising,
生時亦不生,去來中已答。」
nor does it arise at the time of arising; this was already answered in the chapter on Going and Coming.”
生名眾緣和合有生,已生中無作故無生,未生中無作故無生。生時亦不然,離生法生時不可得、離生時生法亦不可得、云何生時生?是事〈去來〉中已答。已生法不可生。何以故?生已復生,如是展轉則為無窮,如作已復作。復次若生已更生者,以何生法生?是生相未生。而言生已生者,則自違所說。何以故?生相未生而汝謂生。若未生謂生者,法或可生已而生、或可未生而生。汝先說生已生,是則不定。復次如燒已不應復燒、去已不應復去,如是等因緣故,生已不應生。未生法亦不生。何以故?法若未生則不應與生緣和合,若不與生緣和合則無法生。若法未與生緣和合而生者,應無作法而作、無去法而去、無染法而染、無恚法而恚、無痴法而痴。如是則皆破世間法,是故未生法不生。復次若未生法生者,世間未生法皆應生,一切凡夫未生菩提今應生菩提,不壞法阿羅漢無有煩惱今應生煩惱,兔等無角今皆應生。但是事不然,是故未生法亦不生。
What is called arising is that arising exists because the many conditions come together. In what has already arisen there is no “making,” so there is no arising; in what has not yet arisen there is no “making,” so there is no arising. At the time of arising it is also wrong: apart from the dharma of arising, the time of arising cannot be obtained; apart from the time of arising, the dharma of arising cannot be obtained, so how can one say arising is occurring at the time of arising? This matter was already answered in the chapter on Going and Coming. A dharma that has already arisen cannot arise again. Why? If it arises again after having arisen, this goes on endlessly in turn, like making again what has been made. Moreover, if it arises again after having arisen, by which dharma of arising does it arise? This mark of arising has not yet arisen. If you say it arises again after already arising, you contradict what you said yourself. Why? The mark of arising has not yet arisen, yet you say it arises. If it has not yet arisen and you say it arises, then a dharma could perhaps arise again after having arisen, or could perhaps arise without having arisen. What you said before, that it arises again after having arisen, is thus not fixed. Furthermore, just as what has been burned should not be burned again and what has been gone to should not be gone to again, by this kind of reasoning what has already arisen should not arise again. A dharma that has not yet arisen also does not arise. Why? If a dharma has not yet arisen, it should not come together with the conditions of arising; if it does not come together with the conditions of arising, there is no dharma arising. If a dharma that has not yet come together with the conditions of arising were to arise, then dharmas with no making would be made, dharmas with no going would be gone, dharmas with no defilement would be defiled, dharmas with no anger would be angry, and dharmas with no ignorance would be ignorant. In this way all worldly dharmas would be destroyed, so a dharma that has not yet arisen does not arise. Furthermore, if a dharma that has not yet arisen could arise, all the dharmas in the world that have not yet arisen should arise: all ordinary people who have not yet given rise to bodhi should now give rise to bodhi; arhats who have not destroyed dharmas and have no afflictions should now give rise to afflictions; hares and the like with no horns should now all grow horns. But this is not so, and so a dharma that has not yet arisen also does not arise.
問曰:未生法不生者,以未有緣、無作、無作者、無時、無方等故不生。若有緣、有作、有作者、有時、有方等和合故,未生法生。是故若說一切未生法皆不生,是事不爾。
The questioner says: A dharma that has not yet arisen does not arise because it does not yet have conditions, no making, no maker, no time, no direction, and so on, and so does not arise. If there are conditions, making, a maker, time, direction, and so on coming together, the dharma that has not yet arisen arises. So to say that all dharmas not yet arisen do not arise is wrong.
答曰:若法有緣、有時、有方等和合則生者,先有亦不生、先無亦不生、有無亦不生。三種先已破,是故生已不生。未生亦不生、生時亦不生。何以故?已生分不生,未生分亦不生,如先答。復次若離生有生時者,應生時生。但離生無生時,是故生時亦不生。復次若言生時生者,則有二生過:一以生故名生時;二以生時中生。二皆不然。無有二法,云何有二生?是故生時亦不生。復次生法未發則無生時,生時無故生何所依?是故不得言生時生。如是推求,生已無生、未生無生、生時無生,無生故生不成,生不成故住、滅亦不成。生、住、滅不成,故有為法不成。是故偈中說去未去去時中已答。
The answerer says: If a dharma arises when conditions, time, direction, and so on come together, then what existed before also does not arise, what did not exist before also does not arise, and what both exists and does not exist also does not arise. These three have already been refuted above, so what has already arisen does not arise, what has not yet arisen does not arise, and what is in the process of arising does not arise. Why? The portion that has already arisen does not arise, and the portion that has not yet arisen does not arise, as was answered before. Furthermore, if apart from arising there were a time of arising, then it would be right to say that arising occurs at the time of arising. But apart from arising there is no time of arising, so the time of arising also does not arise. Furthermore, if one says arising occurs at the time of arising, there are two faults of arising: first, because of arising it is called the time of arising; second, within the time of arising there is further arising. Both are wrong. Since there are not two dharmas, how can there be two kinds of arising? So the time of arising also does not arise. Furthermore, when the dharma of arising has not yet been set in motion, there is no time of arising; if the time of arising does not exist, what does arising rely on? So one cannot say that arising occurs at the time of arising. Investigating in this way: what has already arisen has no arising, what has not yet arisen has no arising, and the time of arising has no arising; since there is no arising, arising cannot be established; since arising cannot be established, abiding and ceasing also cannot be established. When arising, abiding, and ceasing cannot be established, conditioned dharmas cannot be established. So the verse says: what has already gone, what has not yet gone, and what is going were already answered.
問曰:我不定言生已生、未生生、生時生,但眾緣和合故有生。
The questioner says: I do not fixedly say that it arises again after having arisen, or arises without having arisen, or arises at the time of arising; I only say that arising exists because the many conditions come together.
答曰:汝雖有是說,此則不然。何以故?
The answerer says: Although you have this view, it is still wrong. Why?
「若謂生時生,是事已不成;
“If you say that arising occurs at the time of arising, this matter has already been refuted;
云何眾緣合,爾時而得生?」
how could it be that when the many conditions come together, at that time it can arise?”
生時生已種種因緣破,汝今何以更說眾緣和合故有生?若眾緣具足、不具足,皆與生同破。復次:
Arising at the time of arising has already been refuted by various causes and conditions, so on what basis do you now say that arising exists because the many conditions come together? Whether the many conditions are complete or not, they are refuted together with arising. Furthermore:
「若法眾緣生,即是寂滅性;
“If a dharma arises from the many conditions, it is of the nature of quiescence;
是故生生時,是二俱寂滅。」
so arising and the time of arising, both of these are quiescent.”
眾緣所生法,無自性故寂滅,寂滅名為無此無彼無相,斷言語道、滅諸戲論。眾緣名,如因縷有布、因蒲有席。若縷自有定相,不應從麻出。若布自有定相,不應從縷出。而實從縷有布、從麻有縷,是故縷亦無定性、布亦無定性。如燃、可燃因緣和合成,無有自性,可燃無故燃亦無、燃無故可燃亦無。一切法亦如是,是故從眾緣生法無自性,無自性故空,如野馬無實。是故偈中說生與生時二俱寂滅,不應說生時生。汝雖種種因緣欲成生相,皆是戲論,非寂滅相。
A dharma produced by the many conditions is quiescent because it has no self-nature. What is called quiescent is having no this, no that, and no sign, cutting off the road of words and extinguishing all conceptual proliferation. As for the many conditions, for example, cloth exists because of threads and a mat exists because of rushes. If the thread itself had a fixed mark, it should not come out of hemp. If the cloth itself had a fixed mark, it should not come out of thread. But in fact cloth comes from thread and thread comes from hemp, so thread has no fixed nature and cloth has no fixed nature. Like burning and what is burned, which come about by the combination of causes and conditions and have no self-nature: if there is no fuel there is no burning; if there is no burning there is no fuel. All dharmas are likewise, so dharmas that arise from many conditions have no self-nature, and because they have no self-nature they are empty, like a mirage with no substance. So the verse says that arising and the time of arising are both quiescent, and one should not say arising occurs at the time of arising. Although you use various causes and conditions to try to establish the mark of arising, all of it is conceptual proliferation and not the mark of quiescence.
問曰:定有三世別異。未來世法得生,因緣即生。何故言無生?答曰:
The questioner says: There are definitely differences among the three times. A dharma of the future obtains the conditions of arising and so arises. Why do you say there is no arising? The answerer says:
「若有未生法,說言有生者,
“If there is a not-yet-arisen dharma, yet you say it has arising,
此法先已有,更復何用生?」
this dharma already existed before, so what need is there to arise?”
若未來世中有未生法而生,是法先已有,何用更生?有法不應更生。
If in the future time there is a dharma that has not yet arisen and it arises, this dharma already existed before, so what need is there for it to arise again? A dharma that already exists should not arise again.
問曰:未來雖有,非如現在相,以現在相故說生。
The questioner says: Although it exists in the future, it does not have the mark of the present; it is because the mark of the present appears that one says it arises.
答曰:現在相未來中無,若無,云何言未來生法生;若有,不名未來,應名現在,現在不應更生。二俱無生,故不生。復次汝謂生時生亦能生彼。今當更說。
The answerer says: The mark of the present does not exist in the future. If it does not exist, how can one say the arising dharma of the future is arising; if it does exist, it would not be called future but present, and the present should not arise again. In both cases there is no arising, so there is no arising. Furthermore, you say that arising occurs at the time of arising and can also give rise to others. Now I will say more.
「若言生時生,是能有所生;
“If you say that arising occurs at the time of arising, it can give rise to something;
何得更有生,而能生是生?」
how could there be yet another arising that gives rise to this arising?”
若生生時能生彼,是生誰復能生?
If arising, when it is arising, can give rise to others, then who gives rise to this arising?
「若謂更有生,生生則無窮,
“If you say there is yet another arising, arising would be endless,
離生生有生,法皆能自生。」
and if apart from the arising of arising there is still arising, then all dharmas would be able to arise by themselves.”
若生更有生,生則無窮。若是生更無生而自生者,一切法亦皆能自生,而實不爾。復次:
If arising has yet another arising, arising would be endless. If this arising has no further arising and yet can arise by itself, then all dharmas too should be able to arise by themselves, but in fact it is not so. Furthermore:
「有法不應生,無亦不應生,
“A dharma that exists should not arise, a dharma that does not exist should also not arise,
有無亦不生,此義先已說。」
and one that both exists and does not exist also does not arise; this principle was stated before.”
凡所有生,為有法有生?為無法有生?為有無法有生?是皆不然,是事先已說。離此三事更無有生,是故無生。復次:
Whatever has arising, does a dharma that exists have arising, or a dharma that does not exist have arising, or a dharma that both exists and does not exist have arising? All of these are wrong, as was stated before. Apart from these three alternatives there is no further arising, so there is no arising. Furthermore:
「若諸法滅時,是時不應生;
“If dharmas are in the process of ceasing, at that time they should not arise;
法若不滅者,終無有是事。」
if a dharma does not cease at all, there is in the end no such thing.”
若法滅相,是法不應生。何以故?二相相違故。一是滅相,知法是滅。一是生相,知法是生。二相相違法,一時則不然,是故滅相法不應生。
If a dharma carries the mark of ceasing, this dharma should not arise. Why? Two marks are opposed to each other. One is the mark of ceasing, by which one knows the dharma is ceasing; the other is the mark of arising, by which one knows the dharma is arising. Dharmas with two opposed marks cannot exist at the same moment, so a dharma carrying the mark of ceasing should not arise.
問曰:若滅相法不應生,不滅相法應生。
The questioner says: If a dharma carrying the mark of ceasing should not arise, then a dharma not carrying the mark of ceasing should arise.
答曰:一切有為法念念滅故,無不滅法。離有為,無有決定無為法。無為法但有名字,是故說不滅法,終無有是事。
The answerer says: All conditioned dharmas cease moment by moment, so there are no dharmas that do not cease. Apart from the conditioned, there is no definite unconditioned dharma. The unconditioned dharma has only a name, so it is said that a dharma that does not cease is in the end nonexistent.
問曰:若法無生,應有住。
The questioner says: If dharmas have no arising, there should be abiding.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「不住法不住,住法亦不住,
“A dharma that does not abide does not abide, a dharma that abides also does not abide,
住時亦不住,無生云何住?」
it does not abide even in the process of abiding; with no arising, how could it abide?”
不住法不住,無住相故。住法亦不住。何以故?已有住故。因去故有住,若住法先有,不應更住。住時亦不住,離住、不住更無住時,是故亦不住。如是一切處求住不可得故,即是無生。若無生,云何有住?復次:
A dharma that does not abide does not abide, because it has no mark of abiding. A dharma that abides also does not abide. Why? Because it already has abiding. Abiding depends on going; if the dharma of abiding already existed before, it should not abide again. It also does not abide in the process of abiding: apart from abiding and not abiding there is no further time of abiding, so it also does not abide. Thus seeking abiding in all places yields nothing, which is also non-arising. If there is no arising, how can there be abiding? Furthermore:
「若諸法滅時,是則不應住;
“If dharmas are in the process of ceasing, they should not abide;
法若不滅者,終無有是事。」
if a dharma does not cease at all, there is in the end no such thing.”
若法滅相,是法無有住相。何以故?一法中有二相相違故,一是滅相、二是住相。一時一處有住滅相,是事不然,是故不得言滅相法有住。
If a dharma carries the mark of ceasing, this dharma has no mark of abiding. Why? In one dharma there would be two opposed marks: first the mark of ceasing, second the mark of abiding. For abiding and ceasing, two marks, to exist at the same moment and the same place is wrong, so one cannot say that a dharma carrying the mark of ceasing has abiding.
問曰:若法不滅,應有住。
The questioner says: If a dharma does not cease, there should be abiding.
答曰:無有不滅法。何以故?
The answerer says: There is no dharma that does not cease. Why?
「所有一切法,皆是老死相,
“All dharmas whatever carry the marks of aging and death,
終不見有法,離老死有住。」
and in the end one never sees a dharma that can abide apart from aging and death.”
一切法生時,無常常隨逐。無常有二,名老及死。如是一切法常有老死,故無住時。復次:
When any dharma arises, impermanence constantly follows it. Impermanence has two names: aging and death. Thus all dharmas constantly have aging and death, so there is no time for abiding. Furthermore:
「住不自相住,亦不異相住;
“Abiding does not abide by its own mark, nor by a mark different from itself;
如生不自生,亦不異相生。」
just as arising does not arise by itself, nor by another's mark.”
若有住法,為自相住?為他相住?二俱不然。若自相住,則為是常。一切有為法從眾緣生,若住法自住,則不名有為。住若自相住,法亦應自相住。如眼不能自見,住亦如是。若異相住,則住更有住,是則無窮。復次見異法生異相,不得不因異法而有異相,異相不定故。因異相而住者,是事不然。
If there is a dharma of abiding, does it abide by its own mark or by another's mark? Both are wrong. If it abides by its own mark, it would be permanent. All conditioned dharmas arise from many conditions; if the dharma of abiding abides by itself, it would not be called conditioned. If abiding abides by its own mark, a dharma should also abide by its own mark. Just as the eye cannot see itself, abiding is the same. If it abides by a different mark, abiding would need yet another abiding, and this would go on endlessly. Furthermore, we see that when a different dharma produces a different mark, it must depend on a different dharma to have a different mark, and the different mark is not fixed. To abide by a different mark is wrong.
問曰:若無住,應有滅。
The questioner says: If there is no abiding, there should be ceasing.
答曰:無。何以故?
The answerer says: There is not. Why?
「法已滅不滅,未滅亦不滅,
“A dharma that has already ceased does not cease, one that has not yet ceased also does not cease,
滅時亦不滅,無生何有滅?」
one that is in the process of ceasing also does not cease; with no arising, where is ceasing?”
若法已滅則不滅,以先滅故。未滅亦不滅,離滅相故。滅時亦不滅,離二更無滅時。如是推求,滅法即是無生,無生何有滅?復次:
If a dharma has already ceased, it does not cease, because it had already ceased before. If it has not yet ceased, it also does not cease, because it is apart from the mark of ceasing. If it is in the process of ceasing, it also does not cease, because apart from these two sides there is no further time of ceasing. Investigating in this way, the dharma of ceasing is also non-arising; with no arising, where is ceasing? Furthermore:
「法若有住者,是則不應滅;
“If a dharma abides, it should not cease;
法若不住者,是亦不應滅。」
if a dharma does not abide, it should also not cease.”
若法定住則無有滅。何以故?由有住相故。若住法滅,則有二相:住相、滅相。是故不得言住中有滅,如生死不得一時有。若法不住,亦無有滅。何以故?離住相故。若離住相則無法,無法雲何滅?復次:
If a dharma definitely abides, it has no ceasing. Why? Because it has the mark of abiding. If a dharma that abides ceases, there would be two marks: the mark of abiding and the mark of ceasing. So one cannot say that within abiding there is ceasing, just as birth and death cannot exist at the same moment. If a dharma does not abide, it also has no ceasing. Why? Because it is apart from the mark of abiding. If apart from the mark of abiding there is no dharma, then with no dharma, how can it cease? Furthermore:
「是法於是時,不於是時滅;
“This dharma, at this time, does not cease at this time;
是法於異時,不於異時滅。」
this dharma, at another time, also does not cease at another time.”
若法有滅相,是法為自相滅?為異相滅?二俱不然。何以故?如乳不於乳時滅。隨有乳時,乳相定住故。非乳時亦不滅,若非乳不得言乳滅。復次:
If a dharma has the mark of ceasing, does this dharma cease by its own mark or by a different mark? Both are wrong. Why? Just as milk does not cease at the time of milk. As long as it is still the time of milk, the mark of milk remains fixed. At a time that is not the time of milk it also does not cease; if it is not milk, one cannot say milk ceases. Furthermore:
「如一切諸法,生相不可得;
“Just as with all dharmas, the mark of arising cannot be obtained;
以無生相故,即亦無滅相。」
because there is no mark of arising, there is also no mark of ceasing.”
如先推求,一切法生相不可得,爾時即無滅相,破生故無生,無生云何有滅?若汝意猶未已,今當更說破滅因緣。
As in the earlier investigation, the mark of arising of all dharmas cannot be obtained, and at that time there is also no mark of ceasing: since arising is refuted, there is no arising, and with no arising, how could there be ceasing? If your mind has still not stopped, I will now further refute the causes and conditions of ceasing.
「若法是有者,是即無有滅;
“If a dharma exists, it has no ceasing;
不應於一法,而有有無相。」
it should not be that in the same dharma there is both the mark of ‘existence’ and the mark of ‘non-existence.’”
諸法有時,推求滅相不可得。何以故?云何一法中亦有亦無相?如光影不同處。復次:
When dharmas are still existent, investigating the mark of ceasing yields nothing. Why? How can there be, in one dharma, the marks of both existence and non-existence? Just as light and shadow are not in the same place. Furthermore:
「若法是無者,是即無有滅;
“If a dharma does not exist, it has no ceasing;
譬如第二頭,無故不可斷。」
like a second head, which cannot be cut off because it does not exist.”
法若無者則無滅相,如第二頭、第三手,無故不可斷。復次:
If a dharma does not exist, there is no mark of ceasing, like a second head or a third hand, which cannot be cut off because they do not exist. Furthermore:
「法不自相滅,他相亦不滅;
“A dharma does not cease by its own mark, nor by another's mark;
如自相不生,他相亦不生。」
just as it does not arise by its own mark, nor by another's.”
如先說生相,生不自生亦不從他生。若以自體生,是則不然,一切物皆從眾緣生。如指端不能自觸,如是生不能自生。從他生亦不然。何以故?生未有故,不應從他生。是生無故無自體,自體無故他亦無,是故從他生亦不然。滅法亦如是,不自相滅、不他相滅。復次:
As said earlier about the mark of arising: arising does not arise by itself, nor does it arise from another. If it arises by its own substance, this is wrong, since all things arise from the many conditions. Just as a fingertip cannot touch itself, arising cannot arise itself. Arising from another is also wrong. Why? Since arising does not yet exist, it should not arise from another. If this arising does not exist, there is no own-substance; if own-substance does not exist, then other does not exist either, so arising from another is also wrong. The dharma of ceasing is the same: it does not cease by its own mark and does not cease by another's mark. Furthermore:
「生住滅不成,故無有有為;
“Arising, abiding, and ceasing are all not established, and so there is no conditioned;
有為法無故,何得有無為?」
if there are no conditioned dharmas, where could there be the unconditioned?”
汝先說有生、住、滅相故有有為,以有有為故有無為。今以理推求,三相不可得,云何得有有為?如先說,無有無相法,有為法無故,何得有無為?無為相名不生不住不滅。止有為相故名無為相,無為自無別相,因是三相有無為相。如火為熱相、地為堅相、水為冷相,無為則不然。
You said before that because there are the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing there is the conditioned, and because there is the conditioned there is the unconditioned. Now, investigating according to reason, the three marks cannot be obtained, so how can there be the conditioned? As said before, there is no dharma without marks; if conditioned dharmas do not exist, where could there be the unconditioned? The mark of the unconditioned is called non-arising, non-abiding, and non-ceasing. Only by stopping the marks of the conditioned is it called the mark of the unconditioned; the unconditioned has no separate mark of its own, and the mark of the unconditioned exists by means of these three marks. Just as fire has heat as its mark, earth has solidity as its mark, and water has coolness as its mark, the unconditioned is not like that.
問曰:若是生、住、滅畢竟無者,云何論中得說名字?
The questioner says: If arising, abiding, and ceasing ultimately do not exist, how can the treatise still speak these names?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「如幻亦如夢,如乾闥婆城,
“Like an illusion, and like a dream, like a gandharva city (a city made by a mirage, which seems to exist from afar but is not there when near),
所說生住滅,其相亦如是。」
what is called arising, abiding, and ceasing, their marks are also like this.”
生、住、滅相無有決定,凡人貪著謂有決定。諸賢聖憐愍欲止其顛倒,還以其所著名字為說,語言雖同其心則異。如是說生、住、滅相,不應有難。如幻化所作,不應責其所由,不應於中有憂喜想,但應眼見而已。如夢中所見不應求實,如乾闥婆城日出時現而無有實,但假為名字不久則滅。生、住、滅亦如是,凡夫分別為有,智者推求則不可得。
The marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not definite, but ordinary people cling to them and say they are definite. The worthy and the sages, out of pity, wish to stop their inversion, and still use the very names they are attached to to speak; although the words are the same, the mind is different. Speaking of the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing in this way should not draw further objections. Like what an illusion creates, one should not investigate where it comes from or give rise to thoughts of sorrow or joy in it, but only look at it with the eyes. Like what is seen in a dream, one should not seek its reality; like the gandharva city, which appears when the sun comes up but has no substance, it is only a provisionally established name and soon vanishes. Arising, abiding, and ceasing are likewise: ordinary people discriminate them as existing, but the wise cannot find them once they investigate.
中論觀作作者品第八(十二偈)
Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 8: Examination of Action and Agent (12 verses)
問曰:現有作、有作者、有所用作法,三事和合故有果報,是故應有作者、作業。
The questioner says: In what is before us there is an action, an agent, and a method of action that is used, and because these three things come together there is a karmic result, so there should be an agent and an act.
答曰:上來品品中破一切法皆無有餘。如破三相,三相無故無有有為,有為無故無無為。有為無為無故,一切法盡無作、作者。若是有為,有為中已破。若是無為,無為中已破。不應復問。汝著心深故而復更問,今當復答。
The answerer says: In the preceding chapters, one chapter after another, all dharmas have been refuted without remainder. For example, in refuting the three marks: if the three marks do not exist, there is no conditioned; if the conditioned does not exist, there is no unconditioned. If neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned exists, then all dharmas have no action and no agent. If it is conditioned, it has already been refuted within the conditioned. If it is unconditioned, it has already been refuted within the unconditioned. One should not ask again. Your clinging mind is deep, so you ask again, and now I will answer again.
「決定有作者,不作決定業;
“An agent that definitely exists does not perform a definite action;
決定無作者,不作無定業。」
an agent that definitely does not exist also does not perform an indefinite action.”
若先定有作者、定有作業,則不應作。若先定無作者、定無作業,亦不應作。何以故?
If beforehand there definitely is an agent and definitely is an action, there should be no further performing. If beforehand there definitely is no agent and definitely is no action, there should also be no performing. Why?
「決定業無作,是業無作者;
“A definite action is not performed, and this action has no agent;
定作者無作,作者亦無業。」
a definite agent does not perform, and the agent has no action.”
若先決定有作業,不應更有作者;又離作者應有作業。但是事不然。若先決定有作者,不應更有作業;又離作業應有作者。但是事不然。是故決定作者、決定作業,不應有作。不決定作者、不決定作業,亦不應有作。何以故?本來無故。有作者、有作業尚不能作,何況無作者、無作業。復次:
If an action definitely exists beforehand, there should be no further agent; moreover, apart from the agent there should already be an action. But this is not so. If an agent definitely exists beforehand, there should be no further action; moreover, apart from the action there should already be an agent. But this is not so. So a definite agent and a definite action should not perform. An indefinite agent and an indefinite action also should not perform. Why? Because they do not exist from the start. Even those that have an agent and have an action cannot perform, how much less those with no agent and no action. Furthermore:
「若定有作者,亦定有作業,
“If an agent definitely exists, and an action also definitely exists,
作者及作業,即墮於無因。」
then the agent and the action fall into being without a cause.”
若先定有作者、定有作業,汝謂作者有作,即為無因,離作業有作者、離作者有作業,則不從因緣有。
If beforehand an agent definitely exists and an action definitely exists, and you still say the agent performs, then that is being without a cause: with the agent existing apart from the action and the action existing apart from the agent, they do not exist from causes and conditions.
問曰:若不從因緣有作者、有作業,有何咎?
The questioner says: If an agent and an action exist not from causes and conditions, what fault is there?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若墮於無因,則無因無果,
“If it falls into being without a cause, there is no cause and no effect,
無作無作者,無所用作法。
no action, no agent, and no method of action used.
若無作等法,則無有罪福,
If there are no dharmas such as action, there is no sin or merit,
罪福等無故,罪福報亦無。
and if sin, merit, and the like do not exist, the fruit of sin and merit also does not exist.
若無罪福報,亦無有涅槃,
If there is no fruit of sin and merit, there is also no nirvana,
諸可有所作,皆空無有果。」
and everything that can be done is empty and without fruit.”
若墮於無因,一切法則無因無果。能生法名為因、所生法名為果,是二即無。是二無故,無作、無作者亦無所用作法,亦無罪福。罪福無故,亦無罪福果報及涅槃道。是故不得從無因生。
If it falls into being without a cause, all dharmas have no cause and no effect. A dharma that can produce is called a cause, and a dharma that is produced is called an effect, and both of these would not exist. If these two do not exist, there is no action, no agent, no method of action used, and no sin or merit. If there is no sin or merit, there is also no retribution of sin and merit and no path to nirvana. So things cannot arise without a cause.
問曰:若作者不定,而作不定業,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the agent is not definite but performs an action that is not definite, what fault is there?
答曰:一事無尚不能起作業,何況二事都無。譬如化人以虛空為舍,但有言說,而無作者、作業。
The answerer says: With even one of the two missing, an action cannot be started; how much less with both missing. It is like an illusory person taking empty space as a house: there are only words, with no agent and no action.
問曰:若無作者、無作業,不能有所作;今有作者、有作業,應有作。
The questioner says: If there is no agent and no action, there can be no performing; now that there is an agent and an action, there should be performing.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「作者定不定,不能作二業,
“An agent, whether definite or indefinite, cannot perform these two kinds of action,
有無相違故,一處則無二。」
since being and non-being are opposed, and two cannot exist in one place.”
作者定不定,不能作定不定業。何以故?有無相違故,一處不應有二。有是決定、無是不決定,一人一事云何有有無?復次:
An agent, whether definite or indefinite, cannot perform a definite or an indefinite action. Why? Being and non-being are opposed, and two should not exist in one place. Being is definite and non-being is indefinite; how can the same person and the same matter be both existent and nonexistent? Furthermore:
「有不能作無,無不能作有,
“Being cannot make non-being, and non-being cannot make being;
若有作作者,其過如先說。」
if there is an act and an agent, the faults are as said before.”
若有作者而無業,何能有所作?若無作者而有業,亦不能有所作。何以故?如先說。有中若先有業,作者復何所作?若先無業,云何可得作?如是則破罪福等因緣果報。是故偈中說「有不能作無,無不能作有,若有作作者,其過如先說。」復次:
If there is an agent but no action, how can there be performing? If there is no agent but there is an action, there also cannot be performing. Why? As said before. If in being there already was an action beforehand, what does the agent still perform? If there was no action beforehand, how could it be performed? In this way the causes, conditions, and effects of sin, merit, and the like are refuted. So the verse says: “Being cannot make non-being, and non-being cannot make being; if there is an act and an agent, the faults are as said before.” Furthermore:
「作者不作定,亦不作不定,
“An agent does not perform a definite action, and does not perform an indefinite one,
及定不定業,其過如先說。」
and also does not perform an action that is both definite and indefinite; the faults are as said before.”
定業已破,不定業亦破,定不定業亦破;今欲一時總破,故說是偈,是故作者不能作三種業。今三種作者,亦不能作業。何以故?
A definite action has been refuted, an indefinite action has been refuted, and an action both definite and indefinite has been refuted; now wishing to refute them all together at one moment, this verse is spoken. So an agent cannot perform the three kinds of action. Now the three kinds of agent also cannot perform an action. Why?
「作者定不定、亦定亦不定,
“An agent that is definite, or indefinite, or both definite and indefinite,
不能作於業,其過如先說。」
cannot perform an action; the faults are as said before.”
作者定、不定、亦定亦不定,不能作於業。何以故?如先三種過因緣。此中應廣說,如是一切處求作者作業,皆不可得。
An agent that is definite, or indefinite, or both definite and indefinite, cannot perform an action. Why? By the causes and conditions of the three faults as before. Here it should be told at length. In this way, seeking an agent and an action in all places, neither can be obtained.
問曰:若言無作、無作者,則復墮無因。
The questioner says: If you say there is no act and no agent, you again fall into being without a cause.
答曰:是業從眾緣生,假名為有,無有決定。不如汝所說。何以故?
The answerer says: This action arises from many conditions, and is provisionally called existent, with no definiteness. It is not as you say. Why?
「因業有作者,因作者有業,
“By means of the action there is an agent, and by means of the agent there is the action;
成業義如是,更無有餘事。」
the principle by which action is established is this, and there is nothing else.”
業先無決定,因人起業;因業有作者,作者亦無決定。因有作業,名為作者,二事和合故得成作、作者。若從和合生則無自性,無自性故空,空則無所生。但隨凡夫憶想分別故,說有作業有作者;第一義中無作業、無作者。復次:
Action is not definite beforehand, and only because of a person does action arise; only because of action is there an agent, and the agent also is not definite. Because there is the performing of an action, one is called an agent; when the two things come together, then the act and the agent are established. If something arises from combination, it has no self-nature; having no self-nature it is empty; being empty, nothing arises. It is only by following the recollections and discriminations of ordinary people that one says there is an action and an agent; in the ultimate meaning there is no action and no agent. Furthermore:
「如破作作者,受受者亦爾,
“As with the refutation of act and agent, so it is with grasping and the grasper,
及一切諸法,亦應如是破。」
and all dharmas should be refuted in this same way.”
如作、作者不得相離,不相離故不決定,無決定故無自性。受受者亦如是,受名五陰身,受者是人,如是離人無五陰、離五陰無人,但從眾緣生如受受者。餘一切法亦應如是破。
As act and agent cannot be separated from each other, and being inseparable are not definite, and being not definite have no self-nature. Grasping and the grasper are the same: grasping refers to the body of the five aggregates, and the grasper is the person. Thus apart from the person there are no five aggregates, and apart from the five aggregates there is no person; they arise only from many conditions, as with grasping and the grasper. All other dharmas should be refuted in the same way.
中論觀本住品第九(十二偈)
Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 9: Examination of the Original Abider (12 verses)
問曰:有人言:
The questioner says: Someone says:
「眼耳等諸根,苦樂等諸法,
“The eye, ear, and other faculties, and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas,
誰有如是事?是則名本住。
who possesses these things? That is what is called the original abider.
若無有本住,誰有眼等法?
If there were no original abider, who would possess the eye and other such dharmas?
以是故當知,先已有本住。」
Therefore one should know that an original abider existed beforehand.”
眼耳鼻舌身命等諸根,名為眼耳等根。苦受、樂受、不苦不樂受、想、思、憶念等心心數法,名為苦樂等法。有論師言:先未有眼等法,應有本住。因是本住,眼等諸根得增長。若無本住,身及眼等諸根,為因何生而得增長?答曰:
The faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and life are called the eye, ear, and other faculties. Painful feeling, pleasant feeling, neither painful nor pleasant feeling, perception, thought, recollection, and other mind and mental factors are called pain, pleasure, and other dharmas. Some teachers say: before the eye and other dharmas there must be an original abider. Relying on this original abider, the eye and other faculties are able to grow. If there were no original abider, by what cause would the body and the eye and other faculties arise and grow? The answerer says:
「若離眼等根,及苦樂等法,
“If apart from the eye and other faculties, and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas,
先有本住者,以何而可知?」
an original abider existed beforehand, by what can it be known?”
若離眼耳等根、苦樂等法先有本住者,以何可說?以何可知?如外法瓶衣等,以眼等根得知;內法以苦樂等根得知。如經中說:可壞是色相,能受是受相,能識是識相。汝說離眼耳苦樂等先有本住者,以何可知說有是法?
If apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas an original abider existed beforehand, by what can it be said? By what can it be known? Like external things such as a jar or clothing, which are known by means of the eye and other faculties; inner dharmas are known by means of pain, pleasure, and the like. As the sutra says: what can be broken down is the mark of form, what can feel is the mark of feeling, and what can cognize is the mark of consciousness. You say apart from the eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and so on an original abider exists beforehand; by what is it known, and by what do you say that this dharma exists?
問曰:有論師言:出入息、視眴、壽命、思惟、苦樂、憎愛、動發等是神相。若無有神,云何有出入息等相?是故當知,離眼耳等根、苦樂等法先有本住。
The questioner says: Some teachers say: inhalation and exhalation, blinking, lifespan, thinking, pain and pleasure, hatred and love, and impulse are the marks of the spirit. If there were no spirit, how would there be the marks of inhalation and exhalation and the like? So one should know that apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas, an original abider existed beforehand.
答曰:是神若有,應在身內,如壁中有柱;若在身外,如人被鎧。若在身內,身則不可壞,神常在內故。是故言神在身內,但有言說,虛妄無實。若在身外覆身如鎧者,身應不可見,神細密覆故。亦應不可壞,而今實見身壞。是故當知,離苦樂等先無餘法。若謂斷臂時神縮在內不可斷者,斷頭時亦應縮在內不應死,而實有死。是故知離苦樂等先有神者,但有言說虛妄無實。復次若言身大則神大、身小則神小,如燈大則明大、燈小則明小者,如是神則隨身不應常。若隨身者,身無則神無,如燈滅則明滅。若神無常,則與眼耳苦樂等同。是故當知,離眼耳等先無別神。復次如風狂病人不得自在,不應作而作。若有神是諸作主者,云何言不得自在?若風狂病不惱神者,應離神別有所作。如是種種推求,離眼耳等根苦樂等法先無本住。若必謂離眼耳等根苦樂等法有本住者,無有是事。何以故?
The answerer says: If this spirit exists, it should be inside the body, like a pillar in a wall; if it is outside the body, it is like a person wearing armor. If it is inside the body, the body should not be breakable, because the spirit is always within. So the statement that the spirit is inside the body is only words, false and unreal. If it is outside the body covering it like armor, the body should not be visible, because the spirit would cover it densely; nor should it be breakable. But now we actually see the body break down. So one should know that apart from pain, pleasure, and so on, there is no other dharma beforehand. If you say that when an arm is cut off the spirit shrinks inside and so cannot be cut off, then when the head is cut off it should also shrink inside and one should not die, but in fact there is death. So one should know that the statement that apart from pain, pleasure, and so on a spirit existed beforehand is only words, false and unreal. Furthermore, if you say that when the body is large the spirit is large and when the body is small the spirit is small, like a large lamp having large light and a small lamp having small light, then the spirit follows the body and should not be permanent. If it follows the body, then when the body is gone the spirit is gone, like when a lamp goes out the light goes out. If the spirit is impermanent, it is the same as the eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and so on. So one should know that apart from the eye, ear, and so on, there is no other spirit beforehand. Furthermore, take a person sick with madness who has no freedom and does what should not be done. If there were a spirit that is the master of these acts, how could one say he has no freedom? If the sickness of madness does not trouble the spirit, then the spirit should be able to act on its own apart from it. Investigating in all these ways, apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas there is no original abider beforehand. If one insists that apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas there is an original abider, there is no such thing. Why?
「若離眼耳等,而有本住者;
“If there is an original abider apart from the eye, ear, and so on,
亦應離本住,而有眼耳等。」
then there should also be the eye, ear, and so on apart from the original abider.”
若本住離眼耳等根、苦樂等法先有者,今眼耳等根、苦樂等法亦應離本住而有。
If the original abider existed beforehand apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas, then now the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas should also exist apart from the original abider.
問曰:二事相離可爾,但使有本住。
The questioner says: That two things are separate from each other is acceptable; it is enough to let the original abider exist.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「以法知有人,以人知有法;
“By means of dharmas one knows there is a person, and by means of a person one knows there are dharmas;
離法何有人?離人何有法?」
apart from dharmas, where is the person? Apart from the person, where are dharmas?”
法者,眼耳苦樂等。人者,是本住。汝謂以有法故知有人、以有人故知有法。今離眼耳等法何有人?離人何有眼耳等法?復次:
What are called dharmas are the eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and so on. What is called the person is the original abider. You say that because there are dharmas one knows there is a person, and because there is a person one knows there are dharmas. Now apart from the dharmas of the eye, ear, and so on, where is the person? Apart from the person, where are the dharmas of the eye, ear, and so on? Furthermore:
「一切眼等根,實無有本住;
“All faculties such as the eye truly have no original abider;
眼耳等諸根,異相而分別。」
the eye, ear, and other faculties are distinguished by their various different marks.”
眼耳等諸根、苦樂等諸法,實無有本住。因眼緣色生眼識,以和合因緣知有眼耳等諸根,不以本住故知。是故偈中說「一切眼等根,實無有本住」,眼耳等諸根,各自能分別。問曰:
The eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas truly have no original abider. Because the eye takes form as its object and gives rise to eye consciousness, one knows through the causes and conditions of combination that there are the eye, ear, and other faculties, and not through an original abider. So the verse says “all faculties such as the eye truly have no original abider,” and the eye, ear, and other faculties each can discriminate. The questioner says:
「若眼等諸根,無有本住者,
“If the eye and other faculties have no original abider,
眼等一一根,云何能知塵?」
how can each single faculty, the eye and the rest, know its sense object?”
若一切眼耳等諸根、苦樂等諸法無本住者,今一一根云何能知塵?眼耳等諸根無思惟,不應有知。而實知塵,當知離眼耳等諸根,更有能知塵者。
If all the faculties of eye, ear, and so on, and the dharmas of pain, pleasure, and so on, have no original abider, how can each single faculty now know its object? The eye, ear, and other faculties have no thinking and should have no knowing. Yet in fact they know objects, so one should know that apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties there is something else that can know objects.
答曰:若爾者,為一一根中各有知者?為一知者在諸根中?二俱有過。何以故?
The answerer says: If this is so, does each faculty have its own knower, or is there one knower within all the faculties? Both have faults. Why?
「見者即聞者,聞者即受者,
“That which can see is that which can hear, that which can hear is that which can feel,
如是等諸根,則應有本住。」
then these faculties would have an original abider.”
若見者即是聞者、聞者即是受者,則是一神。如是眼等諸根應先有本住。色聲香等無有定知者,或可以眼聞聲,如人有六向隨意見聞。若聞者、見者是一,於眼等根隨意見聞,但是事不然。
If what can see is what can hear and what can hear is what can feel, then it is the same spirit. Then the eye and other faculties would have an original abider beforehand. Forms, sounds, smells, and so on would have no definite knower, and perhaps one could hear sounds with the eye, as a person who has six directions sees and hears at will. If what hears and what sees are one, seeing and hearing at will through the eye and other faculties, but this is not so.
「若見聞各異,受者亦各異,
“If seeing and hearing are each different, and the feeler is also different in each,
見時亦應聞,如是則神多。」
then when seeing one should also hear, and the spirits would be many.”
若見者、聞者、受者各異,則見時亦應聞。何以故?離見者有聞者故。如是鼻舌身中,神應一時行。若爾者,人一而神多,以一切根一時知諸塵。而實不爾,是故見者、聞者、受者不應俱用。復次:
If the one who can see, the one who can hear, and the one who can feel are each different, then when seeing one should also hear. Why? Because apart from the one who can see there is yet another who can hear. In this way, in the nose, tongue, and body, the spirits should operate at the same moment. If so, the person is one but the spirits are many, because all the faculties know various objects at the same moment. But in fact it is not so, so seeing, hearing, and feeling should not all operate at once. Furthermore:
「眼耳等諸根,苦樂等諸法,
“The eye, ear, and other faculties, pain, pleasure, and other dharmas,
所從生諸大,彼大亦無神。」
the great elements from which they arise, in those elements too there is no spirit.”
若人言離眼耳等諸根、苦樂等諸法別有本住,是事已破。今於眼耳等所因四大,是四大中亦無本住。
If someone says that apart from the eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas there is another original abider, this has already been refuted. Now as for the four great elements that the eye, ear, and so on depend on, within these four elements there is also no original abider.
問曰:若眼耳等諸根、苦樂等諸法,無有本住可爾。眼耳等諸根、苦樂等諸法應有。
The questioner says: If the eye, ear, and other faculties and the dharmas of pain, pleasure, and so on have no original abider, that is acceptable. The eye, ear, and other faculties and pain, pleasure, and other dharmas themselves should exist.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若眼耳等根,苦樂等諸法,
“If the eye, ear, and other faculties, pain, pleasure, and other dharmas,
無有本住者,眼等亦應無。」
have no original abider, the eye and so on should also not exist.”
若眼耳苦樂等諸法無有本住者,誰有此眼耳等?何緣而有?是故眼耳等亦無。復次:
If the dharmas of eye, ear, pain, pleasure, and so on have no original abider, who possesses these eyes, ears, and so on? By what causes and conditions do they exist? So the eye, ear, and so on also do not exist. Furthermore:
「眼等無本住,今後亦復無,
“The eye and so on had no original abider before, and will have none hereafter,
以三世無故,無有無分別。」
since in the three times it is absent, there is no ‘being’ and also no discrimination.”
思惟推求本住,於眼等先無,今後亦無。若三世無,即是無生寂滅。不應有難:若無本住,云何有眼等?如是問答、戲論則滅。戲論滅故,諸法則空。
Thinking and investigating the original abider: before the eye and so on it did not exist, and hereafter it does not exist either. If it does not exist in the three times, that is also non-arising and quiescence. One should not raise further objections such as: if there is no original abider, how can there be the eye and so on? In this way, questions, answers, and conceptual proliferation are extinguished. When conceptual proliferation is extinguished, all dharmas are empty.
中論觀燃可燃品第十(十六偈)
Treatise on the Middle, Chapter 10: Examination of Fire and Fuel (16 verses)
問曰:應有受、受者,如燃、可燃,燃是受者、可燃是受,所謂五陰。
The questioner says: There should be grasping and a grasper, like burning and fuel: burning is the grasper, and the fuel is grasping, namely the five aggregates.
答曰:是事不然。何以故?燃、可燃俱不成故。燃、可燃若以一法成,若以二法成,二俱不成。
The answerer says: This is not right. Why? Burning and fuel are both not established. Whether burning and fuel are established by one dharma or by two dharmas, neither is established.
問曰:且置一異法。若言無燃、可燃,今云何以一異相破?如兔角龜毛,無故不可破。世間眼見實有事,而後可思惟。如有金,然後可燒可鍛。若無燃、可燃,不應以一異法思惟。若汝許有一異法,當知有燃、可燃。若許有者,則為已有。
The questioner says: Set aside oneness and difference for now. If you say there is no burning and no fuel, then on what basis do you refute them using the marks of oneness and difference? Like a hare's horn or a tortoise's hair, they cannot be refuted because they do not exist. In the world one sees real things with one's eyes and only then can reflect on them. For example, only because there is gold can it be burned and forged. If there were no burning and no fuel, one should not reflect using oneness and difference. If you admit there is oneness and difference, you should know there is burning and fuel. If you admit they exist, then they already exist.
答曰:隨世俗法言說,不應有過。燃、可燃若說一若說異,不名為受。若離世俗言說,則無所論。若不說燃、可燃,云何能有所破?若無所說,則義不可明。如有論者欲破有無,必應言有無,不以稱有無故而受有無。是以隨世間言說故無咎。若口有言便是受者,汝言破即為自破,燃、可燃亦如是。雖有言說亦復不受,是故以一異法思惟燃、可燃,二俱不成。何以故?
The answerer says: To speak according to conventional dharmas should not be at fault. Whether one speaks of burning and fuel as one or as different, neither is called “grasping.” If one leaves conventional speech, there is nothing to discuss. If one does not speak of burning and fuel, how can anything be refuted? If nothing is said, the meaning cannot become clear. Just as a debater who wishes to refute being and non-being must speak of being and non-being, and does not accept being and non-being merely because the mouth names them. Therefore following worldly speech has no fault. If to say it with the mouth were to accept it, then your saying “refute” would refute yourself; burning and fuel are the same. Although there is speech, there is no acceptance. So in reflecting on burning and fuel with oneness and difference, both are not established. Why?
「若燃是可燃,作作者則一;
“If burning is the same as fuel, then act and agent would be one;
若燃異可燃,離可燃有燃。」
if burning is different from fuel, then burning would exist apart from fuel.”
燃是火、可燃是薪。作者是人、作是業。若燃、可燃一,則作、作者亦應一。若作、作者一,則陶師與瓶一。作者是陶師、作是瓶,陶師非瓶、瓶非陶師,云何為一?是以作、作者不一;故燃、可燃亦不一。若謂一不可則應異。是亦不然。何以故?若燃與可燃異,應離可燃別有燃。分別是可燃、是燃,處處離可燃應有燃。而實不爾,是故異亦不可。復次:
Burning is fire, and fuel is firewood. The agent is the person, and the act is the deed. If burning and fuel are one, act and agent should also be one. If act and agent are one, the potter and the pot would be one. The agent is the potter and the act is the pot; the potter is not the pot and the pot is not the potter, so how could they be one? Thus act and agent are not one; so burning and fuel are also not one. If one will not do, then they should be different. This is also wrong. Why? If burning and fuel are different, burning should exist apart from fuel. Distinguishing this as fuel and this as burning, in all places there should be burning apart from fuel. But in fact it is not so, so being different also does not work. Furthermore:
「如是常應燃,不因可燃生;
“Then there would be burning constantly, not arising from fuel;
則無燃火功,亦名無作火。」
and there would also be no effort of kindling, and it would be called a fire without a maker.”
若燃、可燃異,則燃不待可燃而常燃。若常燃者則自住其體、不待因緣,人功則空。人功者,將護火令燃。是功現有,是故知火不異可燃。
If fire and fuel were different, fire would burn constantly without depending on fuel. If it burned constantly, it would stand on its own substance without depending on causes and conditions, and human effort would be in vain. What is called human effort is tending the fire to make it burn. Since this effort is evidently present, we know that fire is not different from fuel.
復次若燃異可燃,燃即無作。離可燃,火何所然?若爾者,火則無作。無作火,無有是事。
Furthermore, if fire were different from fuel, fire would have no action. Apart from fuel, what would the fire burn? If so, fire would have no action. A fire with no action is something that does not exist.
問曰:云何火不從因緣生,人功亦空?
The questioner says: Why do you say that fire does not arise from causes and conditions, and that human effort is also in vain?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「燃不待可燃,則不從緣生;
"If burning does not depend on fuel, it does not arise from conditions;
火若常燃者,人功則應空。」
if fire burned constantly, human effort would be in vain."
燃、可燃若異,則不待可燃有燃。若不待可燃有然,則無相因法,是故不從因緣生。復次若燃異可燃,則應常燃。若常燃者,應離可燃別見有燃,更不須人功。何以故?
If burning and fuel were different, there would be burning without depending on fuel. If there were burning without depending on fuel, there would be no dharmas that depend on each other, so it would not arise from causes and conditions. Furthermore, if burning were different from fuel, it would burn constantly. If it burned constantly, one would see burning apart from fuel, and there would be no need for human effort. Why?
「若汝謂燃時,名為可燃者;
"If you say that what is burning at the moment of burning is called fuel,
爾時但有薪,何物燃可燃?」
then at that time there is only firewood; what is burning this fuel?"
若謂先有薪,燒時名可燃者,是事不爾。若離燃別有可燃者,云何言燃時名可燃?復次:
If you say there was firewood beforehand and it is called fuel when burning, this is not right. If fuel exists apart from burning, how can it be said that it is called fuel only when burning? Furthermore:
「若異則不至,不至則不燒,
"If they are different they cannot reach each other, and if they do not reach, there is no burning;
不燒則不滅,不滅則常住。」
with no burning there is no extinction, and with no extinction it would abide forever."
若燃異可燃,則燃不應至可燃。何以故?不相待成故。若燃不相待成,則自住其體,何用可燃?是故不至。若不至,則不燃可燃。何以故?無有不至而能燒故。若不燒則無滅,應常住自相。是事不爾。
If burning were different from fuel, burning could not reach fuel. Why? Because it would be established without depending on the other. If burning is established without dependence, it stands on its own substance, so what is fuel for? So it cannot reach. If it cannot reach, it does not burn the fuel. Why? There is nothing that burns without reaching. If it does not burn, it would never go out, and would abide forever in its own form. This is not so.
問曰:
The questioner says:
「燃與可燃異,而能至可燃;
"Burning and fuel are different, yet burning can reach fuel;
如此至彼人,彼人至此人。」
like this person reaching that person and that person reaching this person."
燃與可燃異,而能至可燃;如男至於女,如女至於男。
Burning and fuel are different, yet burning can reach fuel, as a man goes to a woman and a woman comes to a man.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若謂燃可燃,二俱相離者,
"If burning and fuel were both apart from each other,
如是燃則能,至於彼可燃。」
then burning could reach that fuel."
若離燃有可燃、若離可燃有燃,各自成者,如是則應燃至可燃。而實不爾。何以故?離燃無可燃、離可燃無燃故。今離男有女、離女有男,是故汝喻非也。喻不成故,燃不至可燃。
If there were fuel apart from burning and burning apart from fuel, each established by itself, then it would be right for burning to reach fuel. But the fact is not so. Why? Apart from burning there is no fuel, and apart from fuel there is no burning. But now there is a woman apart from a man and a man apart from a woman, so your analogy is wrong. If the analogy does not hold, burning cannot reach fuel.
問曰:燃、可燃相待而有,因可燃有燃、因燃有可燃,二法相待成。
The questioner says: Burning and fuel exist in mutual dependence: because of fuel there is burning, and because of burning there is fuel; the two dharmas depend on each other and are established.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若因可燃燃,因燃有可燃,
"If because of fuel there is burning, and because of burning there is fuel,
先定有何法,而有燃可燃?」
which of the two dharmas is first established, such that there is burning and fuel?"
若因可燃而燃成,亦應因燃可燃成。是中若先定有可燃,則因可燃而燃成。若先定有燃,則因燃可燃成。今若因可燃而燃成者,則先有可燃而後有燃,不應待燃而有可燃。何以故?可燃在先、燃在後故。若燃不燃可燃,是則可燃不成;又可燃不在餘處,離於燃故。若可燃不成,燃亦不成。若先燃後有可燃,燃亦有如是過。是故燃、可燃二俱不成。復次:
If burning is established because of fuel, then fuel should also be established because of burning. Here, if fuel were already definitely present beforehand, only then could one speak of burning being established because of fuel. If burning were already definitely present beforehand, only then could one speak of fuel being established because of burning. Now if burning is established because of fuel, then fuel comes first and burning after, and fuel should not need to wait for burning to exist. Why? Fuel is first and burning is later. If burning does not burn fuel, fuel is not established; and fuel is not anywhere else, because it is apart from burning. If fuel is not established, burning is not established either. If burning comes first and fuel after, burning has the same fault. So burning and fuel are both not established. Furthermore:
「若因可燃燃,則燃成復成;
"If because of fuel there is burning, burning being established would be established again;
是為可燃中,則為無有燃。」
this would mean there is no burning within the fuel."
若欲因可燃而成燃,則燃成已復成。何以故?燃自住於燃中。若燃不自住其體,從可燃成者,無有是事。是故有是燃從可燃成,今則燃成復成,有如是過。復有可燃無燃過。何以故?可燃離燃自住其體故。是故燃可燃相因待,無有是事。復次:
If one wants burning to be established on account of fuel, then burning is already established and is established again. Why? Burning abides within burning. If burning does not abide on its own substance but is established from fuel, there is no such thing. So there is this burning established from fuel, and now burning is established and established again, which is this kind of fault. There is also the fault that the fuel has no burning. Why? Fuel, apart from burning, abides on its own substance. So to say that burning and fuel depend on each other is not so. Furthermore:
「若法因待成,是法還成待;
"If a dharma is established by depending on something, this dharma in turn establishes that on which it depends;
今則無因待,亦無所成法。」
now there is neither dependence nor any dharma that is established."
若法因待成,是法還成本因待。如是決定則無二事。如因可燃而成燃,還因於燃而成可燃,是則二俱無定。無定故,不可得。何以故?
If a dharma is established by depending on something, this dharma in turn establishes what it originally depended on. Settled this way, both matters turn out not to exist. Like burning being established on account of fuel and in turn fuel being established on account of burning, both of these are not determined. Being undetermined, they cannot be obtained. Why?
「若法有待成,未成云何待?
"If a dharma depends on something to be established, how does it depend before it is established?
若成已有待,成已何用待?」
If it depends only after it is established, what is the use of depending once it is established?"
若法因待成,是法先未成,未成則無,無則云何有因待?若是法先已成,已成何用因待?是二俱不相因待,是故汝先說燃,可燃相因待成,無有是事。是故:
If a dharma is established by depending on something, this dharma was not yet established beforehand; what is not yet established is nonexistent, and how can nonexistence depend on anything? If this dharma was already established beforehand, what is the use of depending once it is established? In neither case do they depend on each other. So what you said earlier, that burning and fuel are established in mutual dependence, is not so. Therefore:
「因可燃無燃,不因亦無燃;
"Depending on fuel there is no burning, and not depending on fuel there is no burning either;
因燃無可燃,不因無可燃。」
depending on burning there is no fuel, and not depending on burning there is no fuel either."
今因待可燃,燃不成;不因待可燃,燃亦不成。可燃亦如是。因燃、不因燃,二俱不成,是過先已說。復次:
Now, if burning depends on fuel, it is not established; if it does not depend on fuel, burning is not established either. Fuel is the same. Whether depending on burning or not, both are not established, and these faults have been explained earlier. Furthermore:
「燃不餘處來,燃處亦無燃,
"Burning does not come from elsewhere, and there is no burning in the place of burning,
可燃亦如是,餘如去來說。」
and fuel is the same; the rest is as said in the chapter on going and coming."
燃不於餘方來入可燃,可燃中亦無燃,析薪求燃不可得故。可燃亦如是,不從餘處來入燃中,燃中亦無可燃。如燃已不燃,未燃不燃、燃時不燃,是義如〈去來〉中說。是故:
Burning does not come from another place and enter fuel, and there is no burning within fuel, because one splits the firewood and cannot find burning. Fuel is the same: it does not come from elsewhere and enter burning, and there is no fuel within burning. As for what has been burned not burning, what has not yet been burned not burning, and what is being burned not burning either, this principle is as said in the chapter on going and coming. Therefore:
「可燃即非燃,離可燃無燃;
"Fuel is not burning, and apart from fuel there is no burning;
燃無有可燃,燃中無可燃,
burning does not possess fuel, and there is no fuel within burning,
可燃中無燃。」
and there is no burning within fuel."
可燃即非燃。何以故?先已說作、作者一過故。離可燃無燃,有常燃等過故。燃無有可燃、燃中無可燃、可燃中無燃,以有異過故,三皆不成。
Fuel is not burning. Why? The fault that action and agent would be one has been explained before. Apart from fuel there is no burning, because of the faults of constant burning and so forth. Burning does not possess fuel, there is no fuel within burning and no burning within fuel, because of the fault of "they are different," and all three are not established.
問曰:何故說燃、可燃?
The questioner says: Why speak of burning and fuel?
答曰:如因可燃有燃,如是因受有受者。受名五陰,受者名人。燃可燃不成故,受受者亦不成。何以故?
The answerer says: As with burning that exists because of fuel, so the one who grasps exists because of grasping. Grasping means the five aggregates; the one who grasps means the person. If burning and fuel are not established, grasping and the one who grasps are not established either. Why?
「以燃可燃法,說受受者法,
"The dharma of burning and fuel is used to explain the dharma of grasping and the one who grasps,
及以說瓶衣,一切等諸法。」
and also to explain pots, clothes, and all other dharmas."
如可燃非燃,如是受非受者,作作者一過故。又離受無受者,異不可得故。以異過故,三皆不成。如受受者,外瓶衣等一切法皆同上說,無生畢竟空。是故:
Just as fuel is not burning, so grasping is not the one who grasps, because of the fault that action and agent would be one. Moreover, apart from grasping there is no one who grasps, because "they are different" cannot be obtained. Because "they are different" has faults, all three are not established. Just as with grasping and the one who grasps, so external pots, clothes and all dharmas are the same as stated above: unborn and ultimately empty. Therefore:
「若人說有我,諸法各異相;
"If someone says there is a self, and that all dharmas each have their own characteristics,
當知如是人,不得佛法味。」
one should know that such a person does not obtain the taste of the Buddha's Dharma."
諸法從本已來無生,畢竟寂滅相,是故品末說是偈。若人說我相,如犢子部眾說:不得言色即是我、不得言離色是我,我在第五不可說藏中。如薩婆多部眾說:諸法各各相,是善、是不善、是無記。是有漏、無漏、有為、無為等別異。如是等人不得諸法寂滅相,以佛語作種種戲論。
All dharmas are originally unborn, which is the characteristic of ultimate stillness, and so this verse is spoken at the end of the chapter. If someone speaks of the characteristic of a self, as the Vatsiputriya school says: one cannot say form is the self, one cannot say the self is apart from form, and the self lies in the fifth store of the "inexpressible." Or as the Sarvastivada school says: all dharmas each have their own characteristics, this is good, this is unwholesome, this is neutral, this is with outflows, without outflows, conditioned, unconditioned, and so on, each with its differences. Such people do not obtain the characteristic of stillness of all dharmas, and use the Buddha's words to make various conceptual proliferations.
中論觀本際品第十一(八偈)
Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 11: Examination of the Original Limit (eight verses)
問曰:《無本際經》說:眾生往來生死,本際不可得。是中說有眾生、有生死。以何因緣故而作是說?
The questioner says: The Sutra of No Original Limit says: beings go back and forth through birth and death, and the original limit cannot be found. Here you speak of beings and of birth and death. On what causes and conditions do you say this?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「大聖之所說,本際不可得,
"What the Great Sage has said is that the original limit cannot be found,
生死無有始,亦復無有終。」
and birth and death have no beginning and no end."
聖人有三種:一者外道五神通;二者阿羅漢辟支佛;三者得神通大菩薩。佛於三種中最上,故言大聖。佛所言說,無不是實說。生死無始。何以故?生死初後不可得,是故言無始。汝謂若無初後,應有中者,是亦不然。何以故?
There are three kinds of sages: first, the five spiritual powers of outsiders; second, arhats and pratyekabuddhas; third, great Bodhisattvas who have attained spiritual powers. The Buddha is the highest among these three, and so is called the Great Sage. What the Buddha says is all said as things really are. Birth and death have no beginning. Why? Neither the beginning nor the end of birth and death can be found, so it is said to be beginningless. You say that if there is no beginning and no end, there should be a middle, but this is not right either. Why?
「若無有始終,中當云何有?
"If there is no beginning and no end, how can there be a middle?
是故於此中,先後共亦無。」
So in this, before, after and simultaneity are all absent as well."
因中、後故有初,因初、中故有後。若無初無後,云何有中?生死中無初、中、後,是故說先後共不可得。何以故?
The beginning exists depending on the middle and the end, and the end exists depending on the beginning and the middle. If there is no beginning and no end, how can there be a middle? In birth and death there is no beginning, middle or end, so it is said that before, after and simultaneity cannot be found. Why?
「若使先有生,後有老死者;
"If birth came first and old age and death later;
不老死有生,不生有老死。
then there would be birth without old age and death, and old age and death without birth.
若先有老死,而後有生者;
If old age and death came first and birth afterward;
是則為無因,不生有老死。」
then it would be without cause, with old age and death without birth."
生死眾生,若先生、漸有老而後有死者,則生無老死。法應生有老死、老死有生。又不老死而生,是亦不然;又不因生有老死。若先老死後生,老死則無因,生在後故;又不生,何有老死?若謂生老死先後不可,謂一時成者,是亦有過。何以故?
For beings in birth and death, if one is born first, gradually grows old, and then dies, then birth has no old age and death. By reason it would have to be that birth has old age and death and old age and death have birth. Also, being born without aging and dying is not right; and having old age and death not depending on birth is not right either. If old age and death came first and birth afterward, then old age and death would be without cause, because birth comes later; and without birth, where would old age and death come from? If one says birth and old age and death cannot be before and after but are established at the same moment, this too has faults. Why?
「生及於老死,不得一時共;
"Birth and old age and death cannot be together at the same moment;
生時則有死,是二俱無因。」
if at the moment of birth there is death, then the two both have no cause."
若生老死一時,則不然。何以故?生時即有死故。法應生時有、死時無,若生時有死,是事不然。若一時生,則無有相因。如牛角一時出則不相因。是故:
If birth and old age and death were at the same moment, this is not right. Why? At the time of birth there would be death. By reason, there should be being at the time of birth and non-being at the time of death; if at the time of birth there is death, this is not right. If they arise at the same moment, there is no mutual dependence. Like the two horns of an ox growing out at the same moment, they do not depend on each other. Therefore:
「若使初後共,是皆不然者,
"If beginning, end and simultaneity are all not right,
何故而戲論,謂有生老死?」
why still engage in conceptual proliferation, saying that there are birth, old age and death?"
思惟生老死三皆有過故,即無生,畢竟空。汝今何故貪著戲論生老死,謂有決定相?復次:
Reflecting that birth, old age and death all have faults is also seeing them as unborn and ultimately empty. Why do you now cling to conceptual proliferation about birth, old age and death, saying that they have determinate characteristics? Furthermore:
「諸所有因果,相及可相法,
"All cause and effect, characteristics and what is characterized,
受及受者等,所有一切法,
grasping and the one who grasps, and all dharmas whatsoever,
非但於生死,本際不可得,
not only birth and death, have an original limit that cannot be found,
如是一切法,本際皆亦無。」
and so for all dharmas, the original limit does not exist either."
一切法者,所謂因果相可相、受及受者等,皆無本際,非但生死無本際。以略開示故,說生死無本際。
What is called all dharmas means cause and effect, characteristics and what is characterized, grasping and the one who grasps, and so on, none of which has an original limit, not only birth and death. It is because it is a general teaching that birth and death are said to have no original limit.
中論觀苦品第十二(十偈)
Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 12: Examination of Suffering (ten verses)
有人說曰:
Someone says:
「自作及他作,共作無因作,
"Self-made, made by another, made by both, or made without cause,
如是說諸苦,於果則不然。」
to speak of suffering in these ways, all are wrong when applied to the result."
有人言:苦惱自作;或言他作;或言亦自作亦他作;或言無因作,於果皆不然。於果皆不然者,眾生以眾緣致苦,厭苦欲求滅。不知苦惱實因緣有四種謬,是故說於果皆不然。何以故?
Someone says: suffering is made by oneself; or says it is made by another; or says it is made by both oneself and another; or says it is made without cause; all are wrong when applied to the result. What is meant by all being wrong when applied to the result is this: beings, because of many conditions, bring on suffering, and, disliking suffering and wanting to end it, do not know the true causes and conditions of suffering, and give rise to four mistaken views, so it is said that all are wrong when applied to the result. Why?
「苦若自作者,則不從緣生,
"If suffering were made by oneself, it would not arise from conditions,
因有此陰故,而有彼陰生。」
for it is because of this aggregate that that aggregate arises."
若苦自作,則不從眾緣生,自名從自性生。是事不然。何以故?因前五陰有後五陰生,是故苦不得自作。
If suffering were made by oneself, it would not arise from many conditions; "self" means arising from self-nature. This is not right. Why? The later five aggregates arise depending on the earlier five aggregates, so suffering cannot be made by oneself.
問曰:若言此五陰作彼五陰者,則是他作。
The questioner says: If this set of five aggregates makes that set of five aggregates, then it is made by another.
答曰:是事不然。何以故?
The answerer says: This is not right. Why?
「若謂此五陰,異彼五陰者,
"If it is said that this set of five aggregates is different from that set of five aggregates,
如是則應言,從他而作苦。」
then it would be right to say that suffering is made from another."
若此五陰與彼五陰異,彼五陰與此五陰異者應從他作。如縷與布異者,應離縷有布。若離縷無布者,則布不異縷。如是彼五陰異此五陰者,則應離此五陰有彼五陰。若離此五陰無彼五陰者,則此五陰不異彼五陰,是故不應言苦從他作。
If this set of five aggregates were different from that set, and that set different from this set, then it would be made from another. Like thread and cloth: if they were different, there should be cloth apart from the thread. If there is no cloth apart from the thread, then cloth is not different from thread. Likewise, if that set of five aggregates were different from this set, there should be that set apart from this set. If there is no that set apart from this set, then this set is not different from that set, so one should not say that suffering is made from another.
問曰:自作者,是人人自作苦、自受苦。
The questioner says: What is called self-made is that a person makes suffering himself and experiences suffering himself.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若人自作苦,離苦何有人?
"If a person made suffering himself, where would a person be apart from suffering?
而謂於彼人,而能自作苦。」
Yet it is said that in that person he can make suffering himself."
若謂人自作苦者,離五陰苦,何處別有人而能自作苦?應說是人,而不可說,是故苦非人自作。若謂人不自作苦,他人作苦與此人者,是亦不然。何以故?
If one says a person makes suffering himself, apart from this suffering of the five aggregates, where is there another person who can make suffering himself? One should be able to point out this person but cannot, so suffering is not made by a person himself. If one says that a person does not make suffering himself, but another person makes suffering and gives it to this person, this is not right either. Why?
「若苦他人作,而與此人者;
"If suffering is made by another person and then given to this person;
若當離於苦,何有此人受?」
apart from suffering, where is this person who would receive it?"
若他人作苦與此人者,離五陰無有此人受。復次:
If another person makes suffering and gives it to this person, apart from the five aggregates there is no such person to receive it. Furthermore:
「苦若彼人作,持與此人者;
"If suffering is made by that person and handed to this person;
離苦何有人,而能授於此?」
apart from suffering, where is the person who could give it to this side?"
若謂彼人作苦授與此人者,離五陰苦,何有彼人作苦持與此人?若有者,應說其相。復次:
If one says that person makes suffering and hands it to this person, apart from this suffering of the five aggregates, where is that person who makes suffering and hands it to this person? If there is one, his characteristics should be stated. Furthermore:
「自作若不成,云何彼作苦?
"If self-making is still not established, how can one speak of making suffering by another?
若彼人作苦,即亦名自作。」
If that person makes suffering, then in him it is also called self-made."
種種因緣彼自作苦不成,而言他作苦。是亦不然。何以故?此彼相待故。若彼作苦,於彼亦名自作苦。自作苦先已破,汝受自作苦不成故,他作亦不成。復次:
Through various causes and conditions, that other side's making suffering itself is not established, yet you say another makes suffering. This is not right either. Why? This and that depend on each other. If that side makes suffering, on that side it is also called making suffering by oneself. Self-made suffering has been refuted before; since you admit that self-made suffering is not established, other-made is not established either. Furthermore:
「苦不名自作,法不自作法,
"Suffering is not called self-made, a dharma does not make a dharma by itself,
彼無有自體,何有彼作苦?」
and that side has no substance of its own, so where is suffering made by another?"
自作苦不然。何以故?如刀不能自割。如是法不能自作法,是故不能自作。他作亦不然。何以故?離苦無彼自性。若離苦有彼自性者,應言彼作苦,彼亦即是苦,云何苦自作苦?
Suffering made by oneself is not right. Why? As a knife cannot cut itself. So a dharma cannot make a dharma by itself, so it cannot be made by itself. Other-made is also not right. Why? Apart from suffering, that side has no self-nature. If apart from suffering there were the self-nature of that side, then it would be right to say that side makes suffering; but that side is itself suffering, so how can suffering make suffering by itself?
問曰:若自作、他作不然,應有共作。
The questioner says: If self-made and other-made are both not right, there should be made by both.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若此彼苦成,應有共作苦;
"If the suffering of this and that were both established, there could be making of suffering by both;
此彼尚無作,何況無因作!」
since this and that do not even make it, how much less without cause!"
自作、他作猶尚有過,何況無因作。無因多過,如〈破作作者品〉中說。復次:
Self-made and other-made already have faults, how much more without cause. The faults of being without cause are even more, as stated in the chapter on refuting action and agent. Furthermore:
「非但說於苦,四種義不成;
"Not only in speaking of suffering are the four kinds of principle not established;
一切外萬物,四義亦不成。」
for all external things, the four kinds of principle are not established either."
佛法中雖說五受陰為苦,有外道人謂苦受為苦,是故說不但說於苦四種義不成,外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。
Although in the Buddha's teaching the five grasping aggregates are called suffering, there are outsiders who take the feeling of pain as suffering, so it is said: not only in speaking of suffering are the four kinds of principle not established; for external things such as earth, water, mountains, trees and all dharmas, they are not established either.
中論觀行品第十三(九偈)
Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 13: Examination of Conditioned Things (nine verses)
問曰:
The questioner says:
「如佛經所說,虛誑妄取相,
"As the Buddha's sutra says, what is false is the characteristic of mistaken grasping,
諸行妄取故,是名為虛誑。」
and because conditioned things are mistakenly grasped, they are called false."
佛經中說,虛誑者,即是妄取相;第一實者,所謂涅槃,非妄取相。以是經說故,當知有諸行虛誑妄取相。
The Buddha's sutra says: what is called false is the characteristic of mistaken grasping; the first reality, called nirvana, is not the characteristic of mistaken grasping. Because the sutra says so, one should know that there are conditioned things that are false and have the characteristic of mistaken grasping.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「虛誑妄取者,是中何所取?
"False, mistakenly grasped: what is grasped in this?
佛說如是事,欲以示空義。」
The Buddha says such things in order to reveal the meaning of emptiness."
若妄取相法即是虛誑者,是諸行中為何所取?佛如是說,當知說空義。
If the dharma of mistakenly grasping characteristics is false, what is grasped within these conditioned things? When the Buddha says this, one should know he is speaking of the meaning of emptiness.
問曰:云何知一切諸行皆是空?
The questioner says: How do you know that all conditioned things are empty?
答曰:一切諸行虛妄相故空。諸行生滅不住,無自性故空。諸行名五陰,從行生故。五陰名行,是五陰皆虛妄無有定相。何以故?如嬰兒時色非匍匐時色、匍匐時色非行時色、行時色非童子時色、童子時色非壯年時色、壯年時色非老年時色。如色念念不住故,分別決定性不可得。嬰兒色為即是匍匐色乃至老年色,為異,二俱有過。何以故?若嬰兒色即是匍匐色乃至老年色者,如是則是一色皆為嬰兒,無有匍匐乃至老年。又如泥團常是泥團,終不作瓶。何以故?色常定故。若嬰兒色異匍匐色者,則嬰兒不作匍匐、匍匐不作嬰兒。何以故?二色異故。如是童子、少年、壯年、老年色不應相續有,失親屬法無父無子。若爾者,唯有嬰兒應得父,餘則匍匐乃至老年不應有分。是故二俱有過。
The answerer says: All conditioned things are empty because they have the characteristic of falsity. Conditioned things arise and cease without abiding and have no self-nature, so they are empty. Conditioned things refer to the five aggregates, which arise from formation. The five aggregates are called formations, and all five are false, without determinate characteristics. Why? The form of the infant is not the form of the crawling stage, the form of the crawling stage is not the form of the walking stage, the form of the walking stage is not the form of the child, the form of the child is not the form of the prime of life, and the form of the prime of life is not the form of old age. Form does not abide from moment to moment, so one cannot find a determinate nature to distinguish. Is the form of the infant the same as the form of the crawling stage up to old age, or different? Both have faults. Why? If the form of the infant is the form of the crawling stage up to old age, then it is only one form, all would be infants, and there would be no crawling up to old age. Also, like a lump of clay being always a lump of clay, it would never become a pot. Why? Because form would be always fixed. If the form of the infant were different from the form of the crawling stage, the infant would not become the crawler and the crawler would not become the infant. Why? The two forms are different. Then the forms of the child, youth, prime of life and old age should not continue to exist in succession, and the dharma of kinship would be lost, with no father and no son. If so, only the infant could be a father, and from the crawling stage to old age none could have a share. So both have faults.
問曰:色雖不定,嬰兒色滅已,相續更生乃至老年色,無有如上過。
The questioner says: Although form is not determinate, after the form of the infant ceases, it continues to arise in succession up to the form of old age, and there are none of the above faults.
答曰:嬰兒色相續生者,為滅已相續生?為不滅相續生?若嬰兒色滅,云何有相續?以無因故。如雖有薪可燃,火滅故無有相續。若嬰兒色不滅而相續者,則嬰兒色不滅,常住本相亦無相續。
The answerer says: When it is said that the infant's form arises in continuity, does it arise in continuity after ceasing, or arise in continuity without ceasing? If the infant's form has ceased, how can there be continuity? Because there is no cause. Like firewood that can burn: once the fire has gone out, there is no continuity. If the infant's form continues without ceasing, the infant's form does not cease and always abides in its original form, and there is no continuity either.
問曰:我不說滅不滅故相續生,但說不住相似生,故言相續生。
The questioner says: I am not saying that it continues because of ceasing or not ceasing, only that it arises similarly without abiding, so it is called arising in continuity.
答曰:若爾者,則有定色而更生,如是應有千萬種色。但是事不然,如是亦無相續。如是一切處求色無有定相,但以世俗言說故有。如芭蕉樹求實不可得,但有皮葉。如是智者求色相念念滅,更無實色可得,不住色形色相。相似次第生難可分別,如燈炎分別定色不可得,從是定色更有色生不可得。是故色無性故空,但以世俗言說故有。受亦如是,智者種種觀察,次第相似故生滅難可別知,如水流相續,但以覺故說三受在身。是故當知,受同色說。想因名相生,若離名相則不生。是故佛說,分別知名字相故名為想。非決定先有,從眾緣生無定性,無定性故如影隨形。因形有影、無形則無影,影無決定性。若定有者,離形應有影。而實不爾,是故從眾緣生,無自性故不可得。想亦如是,但因外名相,以世俗言說故有。識因色聲香味觸等、眼耳鼻舌身等生,以眼等諸根別異故,識有別異。是識為在色、為在眼、為在中間?無有決定。但生已識塵識此人、識彼人。知此人識為即是知彼人識。為異是二,難可分別。如眼識,耳識亦難可分別。以難分別故,或言一或言異,無有決定分別,但從眾緣生故,眼等分別故空無自性。如伎人含一珠出已復示人則生疑,為是本珠、為更有異?識亦如是,生已更生,為是本識、為是異識?是故當知,識不住故無自性,虛誑如幻。諸行亦如是。諸行者,身、口、意。行有二種:淨、不淨。何等為不淨?惱眾生、貪著等,名不淨。不惱眾生、實語、不貪著等,名淨,或增或減。淨行者,在人中、欲天、色天、無色天受果報已則減,還作故名增。不淨行者亦如是,在地獄、畜生、餓鬼、阿修羅中受果報已則減,還作故名增。是故諸行有增有減故不住。如人有病,隨宜將適病則除愈,不將適病則還集。諸行亦如是,有增有減故不決定,但以世俗言說故有,因世諦故得見第一義諦。
The answerer says: If so, there would be determinate form that arises again, and then there should be thousands and tens of thousands of forms. But this is not so, and in this way there is no continuity either. So seeking form everywhere, there is no determinate characteristic, and it exists only through worldly convention. Like a plantain tree, where one seeks the core and cannot find it, finding only the skin and leaves. So when the wise seek the characteristic of form, it ceases moment by moment, no real form can be found, and there is no abiding form-shape or form-appearance. Arising in similar succession, it is hard to distinguish, like a lamp flame; seeking to distinguish a determinate form, one cannot find it; and from this determinate form arising again as form, one cannot find it either. So form has no nature, therefore is empty, and exists only through worldly convention. Feeling is also so: the wise observe in many ways, and because of the similarity of succession, arising and ceasing are hard to distinguish and know, like a flowing stream in continuity, and only because of awareness are three kinds of feeling said to be in the body. So one should know that feeling is spoken of like form. Perception arises depending on name and appearance, and if apart from name and appearance it does not arise. So the Buddha said: distinguishing and understanding name and appearance is what is called perception. It is not determinate that it existed before; it arises from many conditions with no fixed nature; having no fixed nature, it is like a shadow following a form. Depending on the form there is a shadow, and without the form there is no shadow, and the shadow has no determinate nature. If it were determinate, there should be a shadow apart from the form. But this is not so, so it arises from many conditions, has no self-nature, and therefore cannot be found. Perception is also so, depending only on external name and appearance, and exists through worldly convention. Consciousness arises depending on form, sound, smell, taste, touch and so on, and the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and so on; because the eye and other faculties each differ, consciousness differs. Is this consciousness in the form, in the eye, or in between? There is no determinate answer. It is only that after arising, there is consciousness of the object, consciousness of this person, consciousness of that person. Is the consciousness knowing this person the same as the consciousness knowing that person, or different? These two are hard to distinguish. Like eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness is also hard to distinguish. Because they are hard to distinguish, some say they are one and some say they are different, with no determinate distinction, arising only from many conditions, and because of the differences among the eye and so on, it is empty and without self-nature. Like a performer holding a pearl in his mouth who takes it out and shows it to people again, they begin to doubt: is it the original pearl or another pearl? Consciousness is also so: arising and arising again, is it the original consciousness or another consciousness? So one should know that consciousness does not abide, and therefore has no self-nature, and is false and illusory. Conditioned things are also so. What are called conditioned things are body, speech and mind. Conditioned actions are of two kinds: pure and impure. What is impure? Troubling beings, greed and attachment and the like are called impure. Not troubling beings, truthful speech, non-attachment and the like are called pure. They may increase or decrease. For pure actions: after receiving their retribution among humans, desire-realm gods, form-realm gods and formless-realm gods, they decrease, and as they are done again they are called increasing. Impure actions are the same: after receiving retribution in hell, as animals, hungry ghosts and asuras, they decrease, and as they are done again they are called increasing. So conditioned actions increase and decrease, and therefore do not abide. Like a person who has an illness, which is cured if properly treated and gathers again if not treated. Conditioned things are also so, with increase and decrease, so they are not determinate, and exist only through worldly convention; relying on conventional truth, one can see the ultimate truth.
所謂無明緣諸行,從諸行有識著,識著故有名色,從名色有六入,從六入有觸,從觸有受,從受有愛,從愛有取,從取有有,從有有生,從生有老、死、憂悲苦惱、恩愛別苦、怨憎會苦等,如是諸苦皆以行為本。佛以世諦故說,若得第一義諦生真智慧者則無明息,無明息故諸行亦不集,諸行不集故見諦所斷身見、疑、戒取等斷,及思惟所斷貪、恚、色染、無色染、調戲無明亦斷。以是斷故一一分滅,所謂無明、諸行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生、老死憂悲苦惱恩愛別苦怨憎會苦等皆滅。以是滅故,五陰身畢竟滅更無有餘,唯但有空。是故佛欲示空義故,說諸行虛誑。復次諸法無性故虛誑,虛誑故空。如偈說:
What is called ignorance conditioning formations: from formations there is the clinging of consciousness, from the clinging of consciousness there is name and form, from name and form the six sense bases, from the six sense bases contact, from contact feeling, from feeling craving, from craving grasping, from grasping becoming, from becoming birth, and from birth old age, death, sorrow, grief, suffering and distress, the suffering of separation from loved ones, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and so on; all these sufferings take formations as their root. The Buddha speaks thus because of conventional truth. If one attains the ultimate truth and gives rise to true wisdom, ignorance ceases; when ignorance ceases, formations no longer gather; when formations no longer gather, what is severed by seeing the truth, namely view of self, doubt, clinging to precepts and rites and the like, is cut off, and what is cut off by meditation, namely greed, hatred, desire for form, desire for the formless, restlessness and ignorance, is also cut off. Because these are cut off, link by link they cease: ignorance, formations, consciousness, name and form, the six sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering and distress, the suffering of separation from loved ones, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and so on all cease. Because these cease, the body of five aggregates is ultimately extinguished, with no remainder, and only emptiness is left. So the Buddha, in order to reveal the meaning of emptiness, says that conditioned things are false. Furthermore, dharmas are false because they have no nature, and being false, they are empty. As the verse says:
「諸法有異故,知皆是無性;
"Because dharmas have differences, we know that they all have no nature;
無性法亦無,一切法空故。」
and dharmas without nature do not exist either, because all dharmas are empty."
諸法無有性。何以故?諸法雖生,不住自性,是故無性。如嬰兒定住自性者,終不作匍匐乃至老年。而嬰兒次第相續有異相現,匍匐乃至老年,是故說見諸法異相故知無性。
Dharmas have no nature. Why? Though dharmas arise, they do not abide on a self-nature, and so they are without nature. As if an infant definitely abided in his own nature, he would never become a crawler up to old age. But the infant succeeds in order and continues, with different characteristics appearing, from crawling up to old age, so it is said that seeing the different characteristics of dharmas, one knows they have no nature.
問曰:若諸法異相無性,即有無性法,有何咎?
The questioner says: If dharmas are without nature because of different characteristics, then there is the dharma of no-nature; what fault is there in that?
答曰:若無性,云何有法?云何有相?何以故?無有根本故。但為破性,故說無性。是無性法若有者,不名一切法空;若一切法空,云何有無性法?
The answerer says: If there is no nature, how can there be a dharma? How can there be characteristics? Why? Because there is no root. It is only in order to refute nature that no-nature is spoken. If this dharma of no-nature existed, it would not be called all dharmas being empty; if all dharmas are empty, how can there still be this dharma of no-nature?
問曰:
The questioner says:
「諸法若無性,云何說嬰兒,
"If dharmas have no nature, how can one say that from infancy
乃至於老年,而有種種異?」
to old age there are various differences?"
諸法若無性則無有異相,而汝說有異相,是故有諸法性。若無諸法性,云何有異相?
If dharmas have no nature, there would be no different characteristics; but you say there are different characteristics, so dharmas have nature. If there were no nature of dharmas, how could there be different characteristics?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若諸法有性,云何而得異?
"If dharmas have nature, how can they still differ?
若諸法無性,云何而有異?」
If dharmas have no nature, how can they still have differences?"
若諸法決定有性,云何可得異?性名決定有,不可變異。如真金不可變,又如暗性不變為明、明性不變為暗。復次:
If dharmas definitely have nature, how can they still differ? Nature is called definitely existent and unchangeable. Like true gold, which does not change, and like the nature of darkness, which does not become light, and the nature of light, which does not become darkness. Furthermore:
「是法則無異,異法亦無異,
"This dharma itself does not differ, and a different dharma does not differ either,
如壯不作老,老亦不作壯。」
as a person in the prime of life does not become old, and an old person does not become a person in the prime of life."
若法有異者,則應有異相。為即是法異?為異法異?是二不然。若即是法異,則老應作老;而老實不作老。若異法異者,老與壯異,壯應作老;而壯實不作老。二俱有過。
If a dharma has differences, there should be different characteristics. Is it this very dharma that differs, or is it another dharma that differs? Neither is right. If it is this very dharma that differs, old age should become old age; but old age in fact does not become old age. If it is another dharma that differs, old age being different from the prime of life, the prime of life should become old age; but the prime of life in fact does not become old age. Both have faults.
問曰:若法即異,有何咎?如今眼見年少經日月歲數則老。
The questioner says: If it is this very dharma that differs, what fault is there? Now the eyes see that the young grow old as days, months and years pass.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若是法即異,乳應即是酪;
"If it is this very dharma that differs, milk should itself be curd;
離乳有何法,而能作於酪?」
apart from milk, what other dharma could make curd?"
若是法即異者,乳應即是酪,更不須因緣。是事不然。何以故?乳與酪有種種異故。乳不即是酪,是故法不即異。若謂異法為異者,是亦不然,離乳更有何物為酪?如是思惟,是法不異、異法亦不異,是故不應偏有所執。
If it is this very dharma that differs, milk should itself be curd, with no need of causes and conditions. This is not right. Why? Milk and curd have various differences. Milk is not itself curd, so a dharma is not itself difference. If one says it is another dharma that differs, this is also not right: apart from milk, what thing is curd? Thinking in this way: this dharma does not differ, and a different dharma does not differ either, so one should not cling to either side.
問曰:破是、破異猶有空在,空即是法。
The questioner says: Having refuted "same" and refuted "different," there is still emptiness, and emptiness is a dharma.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若有不空法,則應有空法;
"If there were a non-empty dharma, there should be an empty dharma;
實無不空法,何得有空法?」
in fact there is no non-empty dharma, so where is there an empty dharma?"
若有不空法,相因故應有空法。而上來種種因緣破不空法,不空法無故則無相待,無相待故何有空法?
If there were a non-empty dharma, then by mutual dependence there should be an empty dharma. But above we refuted the non-empty dharma by various causes and conditions; without a non-empty dharma there is no mutual reliance; without mutual reliance, where is there an empty dharma?
問曰:汝說不空法無故空法亦無。若爾者,即是說空但無相待,故不應有執。若有對應有相待、若無對則無相待,相待無故則無相,無相故則無執。如是即為說空。
The questioner says: You say the non-empty dharma does not exist and the empty dharma does not exist either. If so, this too is speaking of emptiness; it is only because there is no mutual reliance that there should be no clinging. If there is a counterpart, there should be mutual reliance; if there is no counterpart, there is no mutual reliance; without mutual reliance there is no characteristic; without characteristic there is no clinging. So this too is speaking of emptiness.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「大聖說空法,為離諸見故;
"The Great Sage speaks of the dharma of emptiness in order to leave all views;
若復見有空,諸佛所不化。」
if one again sees emptiness as existing, even the Buddhas cannot teach such a person."
大聖為破六十二諸見,及無明、愛等諸煩惱故說空。若人於空復生見者,是人不可化。譬如有病須服藥可治,若藥復為病則不可治。如火從薪出以水可滅,若從水生為用何滅?如空是水,能滅諸煩惱火,有人罪重貪著心深,智慧鈍故於空生見,或謂有空、或謂無空,因有無還起煩惱。若以空化此人者,則言我久知是空,若離是空則無涅槃道。如經說,離空無相無作門得解脫者,但有言說。
The Great Sage speaks of emptiness to refute the sixty-two views and the various afflictions such as ignorance and craving. If a person again gives rise to a view about emptiness, this person cannot be taught. It is like a person with an illness who must take medicine to be cured; if the medicine itself becomes the illness, it cannot be cured. Like fire that comes out of firewood, which water can extinguish; if it comes out of water, with what can it be put out? Emptiness is like water, able to put out the fire of various afflictions; but some people are heavy in guilt, deep in clinging and slow in wisdom, and give rise to a view about emptiness, saying there is emptiness or saying there is no emptiness, and because of being and non-being give rise to affliction again. If one teaches such a person with emptiness, he says: I already knew this emptiness; if one leaves this emptiness, there is no path to nirvana. As the sutra says: those who attain liberation apart from the three gates of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness have only words.
中論觀合品第十四(八偈)
Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 14: Examination of Combination (eight verses)
說曰:上〈破根品〉中說見、所見、見者皆不成。此三事無異法故則無合。無合義今當說。問曰:何故眼等三事無合?
The speaker says: In the chapter on refuting the faculties above, it was said that seeing, the seen and the seer are not established. These three matters have no different dharmas, so there is no combination. The meaning of there being no combination should now be explained. The questioner says: Why do the three, the eye and the others, have no combination?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「見可見見者,是三各異方;
"Seeing, the seen and the seer, these three are each in a different place;
如是三法異,終無有合時。」
and so the three dharmas differ, and they never have a time of combining."
見是眼根、可見是色塵、見者是我,是三事各在異處,終無合時。異處者,眼在身內,色在身外,我者或言在身內、或言遍一切處,是故無合。復次若謂有見法,為合而見、不合而見?二俱不然。何以故?若合而見者,隨有塵處應有根有我。但是事不然,是故不合。若不合而見者,根我塵各在異處亦應有見,而不見。何以故?如眼根在此,不見遠處瓶,是故二俱不見。
Seeing is the eye faculty, the seen is the object of form, and the seer is the self. These three matters are in different places, and never have a time of combining. What is called different places: the eye is inside the body, form is outside the body, and the self is said by some to be inside the body and by others to pervade everywhere, so there is no combination. Furthermore, if one says there is a dharma of seeing, does it see when combined, or also see when not combined? Neither is right. Why? If it sees when combined, then wherever there is an object there should be a faculty and a self. But this is not so, so they do not combine. If it sees even when not combined, the faculty, the self and the object, each in a different place, should also see, but they do not. Why? As the eye faculty is here, it cannot see a pot far away, so in both cases it cannot see.
問曰:我、意、根、塵四事合,故有知生,能知瓶衣等萬物,是故有見、可見、見者。
The questioner says: The four matters of self, mind, faculty and object combine, and so knowing arises and can know pots, clothes and the myriad things, so there are seeing, the seen and the seer.
答曰:是事〈根品〉中已破,今當更說。汝說四事合故知生,是知為見瓶衣等物已生、為未見而生?若見已生者,知則無用。若未見而生者,是則未合。云何有知生?若謂四事一時合而知生,是亦不然。若一時生則無相待。何以故?先有瓶、次見、後知生,一時則無先後。知無故,見、可見、見者亦無。如是諸法如幻如夢無有定相,何得有合?無合故空。復次:
The answerer says: This matter was already refuted in the chapter on faculties, but I will say it again. You say that the four matters combine and so knowing arises; does this knowing arise after seeing pots, clothes and so on, or arise before seeing? If it arises after seeing, knowing is of no use. If it arises before seeing, then it is not yet combined. How could knowing arise? If you say the four matters combine at the same moment and knowing arises, this is also not right. If they arise at the same moment, there is no dependence. Why? First there is the pot, then seeing, and then knowing arises; at the same moment there is no before and after. If knowing does not exist, seeing, the seen and the seer do not exist either. In this way all dharmas are like illusions and dreams, without determinate characteristics, so how could there be combination? With no combination, they are empty. Furthermore:
「染與於可染,染者亦復然,
"Defilement, what is defiled, and the defiler are likewise,
餘入餘煩惱,皆亦復如是。」
and the remaining sense bases and the remaining afflictions are all likewise."
如見、可見、見者無合故,染、可染、染者亦應無合。如說見、可見、見者三法,則說聞、可聞、聞者餘入等。如說染、可染、染者,則說瞋、可瞋、瞋者餘煩惱等。復次:
Just as seeing, the seen and the seer have no combination, so defilement, the defiled and the defiler should also have no combination. In saying these three dharmas of seeing, the seen and the seer, one has also said hearing, the heard and the hearer and the remaining sense bases. In saying defilement, the defiled and the defiler, one has also said anger, the angered and the angry and the remaining afflictions. Furthermore:
「異法當有合,見等無有異,
"Different dharmas are what could combine, but seeing and the rest are not different,
異相不成故,見等云何合?」
and since the characteristic of difference is not established, how could seeing and the rest combine?"
凡物皆以異故有合,而見等異相不可得,是故無合。復次:
All things combine because of difference, but the characteristic of difference among seeing and the rest cannot be found, so there is no combination. Furthermore:
「非但見等法,異相不可得;
"Not only for seeing and these other dharmas can the characteristic of difference not be found;
所有一切法,皆亦無異相。」
for all dharmas whatsoever, there is no characteristic of difference either."
非但見、可見、見者等三事異相不可得,一切法皆無異相。
Not only can the characteristic of difference among the three matters of seeing, the seen and the seer not be found, but no dharma has a characteristic of difference.
問曰:何故無有異相?
The questioner says: Why is there no characteristic of difference?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「異因異有異,異離異無異;
"Different exists because of the different; apart from the different there is no different;
若法從因出,是法不異因。」
if a dharma comes out of a cause, this dharma is not different from its cause."
汝所謂異,是異因異法故名為異。離異法不名為異。何以故?若法從眾緣生,是法不異因,因壞果亦壞故。如因梁椽等有舍,舍不異梁椽,梁椽等壞舍亦壞故。
What you call the different, this different is called different because of the existence of a different dharma. Apart from a different dharma it is not called different. Why? If a dharma arises from many conditions, this dharma is not different from its cause, because when the cause is destroyed the effect is destroyed too. Like a house existing because of beams and rafters, the house is not different from the beams and rafters; when the beams and rafters are destroyed, the house is also destroyed.
問曰:若有定異法,有何咎?
The questioner says: If there is a determinate different dharma, what fault is there?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「若離從異異,應餘異有異;
"If apart from the 'different that comes from the different' there were another different, there should be another difference on top of the remaining difference;
離從異無異,是故無有異。」
apart from 'coming from the different' there is no different, so there is no difference."
若離從異有異法者,則應離餘異有異法。而實離從異無有異法,是故無餘異。如離五指異,有拳異者,拳異應於瓶等異物有異。今離五指異,拳異不可得,是故拳異於瓶等無有異法。
If apart from "coming from the different" there were a different dharma, there should be a different dharma apart from the remaining difference. But in fact, apart from "coming from the different" there is no different dharma, so there is no remaining difference. Like the difference of a fist apart from the difference of the five fingers: the difference of a fist should also have difference with respect to different things like pots. Now, apart from the difference of the five fingers, the difference of the fist cannot be found, so the difference of the fist has no different dharma with respect to pots and the like.
問曰:我經說,異相不從眾緣生,分別總相故有異相,因異相故有異法。
The questioner says: My scripture says: the characteristic of difference does not arise from many conditions; because the general characteristic is distinguished there is the characteristic of difference, and depending on the characteristic of difference there is a different dharma.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「異中無異相,不異中亦無;
"In the different there is no characteristic of difference, and in the not-different there is none either;
無有異相故,則無此彼異。」
since there is no characteristic of difference, there is no difference of this and that."
汝言分別總相故有異相,因異相故有異法。若爾者,異相從眾緣生,如是即說眾緣法,是異相離異法不可得故。異相因異法而有,不能獨成。今異法中無異相。何以故?先有異法故,何用異相?不異法中亦無異相。何以故?若異相在不異法中,不名不異法。若二處俱無,即無異相,異相無故此彼法亦無。復次,異法無故亦無合。
You say that because the general characteristic is distinguished there is the characteristic of difference, and depending on the characteristic of difference there is a different dharma. If so, the characteristic of difference arises from many conditions, and this too is speaking of the dharma of many conditions, because this characteristic of difference cannot be found apart from the different dharma. The characteristic of difference exists depending on the different dharma and cannot be established alone. Now within the different dharma there is no characteristic of difference. Why? The different dharma already exists beforehand, so what is the characteristic of difference for? In the not-different dharma there is no characteristic of difference either. Why? If the characteristic of difference were in the not-different dharma, it would not be called a not-different dharma. If it is in neither place, there is no characteristic of difference; when the characteristic of difference does not exist, this dharma and that dharma do not exist either. Furthermore, when the different dharma does not exist, there is no combination.
「是法不自合,異法亦不合,
"This dharma does not combine with itself, and a different dharma does not combine either,
合者及合時,合法亦皆無。」
and the one who combines, the time of combining, and the dharma of combining all do not exist."
是法自體不合,以一故,如一指不自合。異法亦不合,以異故,異事已成不須合故。如是思惟,合法不可得。是故說合者、合時、合法皆不可得。
The own-substance of this dharma does not combine, because it is one, as one finger does not combine with itself. A different dharma does not combine either, because it is different, and the matter of difference is already established and need not combine again. Thinking in this way, the dharma of combination cannot be found. So it is said that the one who combines, the time of combining and the dharma of combining all cannot be found.
Treatise on the Middle Way, Fascicle Two
Treatise on the Middle Way, Fascicle Three
龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋
Verses composed by the Bodhisattva Nagarjuna, commentary by the brahmin Pingala (Qingmu).
姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva of the Later Qin, during the Yao Qin period.
觀有無品第十五(十一偈)
Chapter 15: Examination of Being and Non-being (eleven verses)
問曰:諸法各有性,以有力用故,如瓶有瓶性、布有布性,是性眾緣合時則出。
The questioner says: Dharmas each have their own nature, because they have power and function. Like a pot has the nature of a pot and cloth has the nature of cloth, this nature emerges when the many conditions come together.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「眾緣中有性,是事則不然;
"That nature exists within the many conditions is not right;
性從眾緣出,即名為作法。」
if nature comes out of the many conditions, it is called a made dharma."
若諸法有性,不應從眾緣出。何以故?若從眾緣出,即是作法,無有定性。
If dharmas had nature, it should not come out of the many conditions. Why? If it comes out of the many conditions, it is a made dharma and has no determinate nature.
問曰:若諸法性從眾緣作,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the nature of dharmas is made from the many conditions, what fault is there?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「性若是作者,云何有此義?
"If nature were made, how could that statement hold?
性名為無作,不待異法成。」
Nature is called unmade, not depending on a different dharma to be established."
如金雜銅則非真金,如是若有性,則不須眾緣,若從眾緣出,當知無真性。又性若決定,不應待他出,非如長短、彼此,無定性故待他而有。問曰:諸法若無自性,應有他性。
Like gold mixed with copper is not true gold; likewise, if there were nature, it would not need the many conditions; if it comes out of the many conditions, one should know there is no true nature. Moreover, if nature were determinate, it should not need to depend on another to come out, unlike long and short, or this and that, which depend on another because they have no fixed nature. The questioner says: If dharmas have no self-nature, there should be other-nature.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「法若無自性,云何有他性?
"If a dharma has no self-nature, how can there be other-nature?
自性於他性,亦名為他性。」
The self-nature of another is also called other-nature."
諸法性眾緣作故,亦因待成,故無自性。若爾者,他性於他亦是自性,亦從眾緣生相待故,亦無。無故,云何言諸法從他性生?他性亦是自性故。
The nature of dharmas is made by many conditions and is established through mutual dependence, so there is no self-nature. If so, other-nature, on its own side, is also self-nature, also arising from many conditions and dependent, so it also does not exist. If it does not exist, how can one say dharmas arise from other-nature? Because other-nature is also self-nature.
問曰:若離自性、他性有諸法,有何咎?
The questioner says: If dharmas exist apart from self-nature and other-nature, what fault is there?
答曰:
The answerer says:
「離自性他性,何得更有法?
"Apart from self-nature and other-nature, where could a dharma be?
若有自他性,諸法則得成。」
If there are self-nature and other-nature, dharmas can be established."
汝說離自性、他性有法者,是事不然。若離自性他性,則無有法。何以故?有自性、他性法則成,如瓶體是自性、依物是他性。
You say that there are dharmas apart from self-nature and other-nature, but this is not right. If apart from self-nature and other-nature, there is no dharma. Why? With self-nature and other-nature, a dharma is established, as with a pot, whose substance is self-nature and the things it rests on are other-nature.
問曰:若以自性、他性破有者,今應有無。
The questioner says: If being is refuted using self-nature and other-nature, there should now be non-being.
答曰:
The answerer says:
「有若不成者,無云何可成?
"If being is still not established, how can non-being be established?
因有有法故,有壞名為無。」
Because there is the dharma of 'being,' when being is destroyed it is called non-being."
若汝已受有不成者,亦應受無亦無。何以故?有法壞敗故名無,是無因有壞而有。復次:
If you have already admitted that being is not established, you should also admit that non-being does not exist either. Why? When a dharma of being is destroyed, it is called non-being, and this non-being exists because being is destroyed. Furthermore:
「若人見有無,見自性他性;
"If a person sees being and non-being, sees self-nature and other-nature;
如是則不見,佛法真實義。」
then he does not see the true meaning of the Buddha's Dharma."
若人深著諸法,必求有見。若破自性則見他性,若破他性則見有,若破有則見無,若破無則迷惑。若利根著心薄者,知滅諸見安隱故,更不生四種戲論,是人則見佛法真實義。是故說上偈。復次:
When people are deeply attached to dharmas, they must seek a view of being. If self-nature is refuted they see other-nature, if other-nature is refuted they see being, if being is refuted they see non-being, and if non-being is refuted they are confused. If one's faculties are sharp and one's attachment is thin, and one knows that extinguishing all views is peace, one no longer gives rise to these four conceptual proliferations, and this person sees the true meaning of the Buddha's Dharma. So the above verse is spoken. Furthermore:
「佛能滅有無,如化迦旃延,
"The Buddha can extinguish being and non-being, as in teaching Katyayana,
經中之所說,離有亦離無。」
in the sutra it is said: apart from being and apart from non-being."
《刪陀迦旃延經》中,佛為說正見義離有離無。若諸法中少決定有者,佛不應破有,無若破有,則人謂為無。佛通達諸法相故,說二俱無。是故汝應捨有無見。復次:
In the Sutra of Shan Tuo Katyayana, the Buddha teaches him the meaning of right view: apart from being and apart from non-being. If among dharmas there were even a bit of determinate being, the Buddha should not refute being; if non-being, having refuted being, were taken by people to be nothing, then the Buddha, penetrating the characteristics of dharmas, says that both sides are absent. Therefore you should give up views of being and non-being. Furthermore:
「若法實有性,後則不應異;
"If a dharma truly has nature, afterward it should not change;
性若有異相,是事終不然。」
if nature has a characteristic of change, this is in the end not right."
若諸法決定有性,終不應變異。何以故?若定有自性,不應有異相,如上真金喻。今現見諸法有異相故,當知無有定相。復次:
If dharmas definitely had a nature, they should in the end not change. Why? If they definitely had self-nature, there should not be different marks, as in the earlier analogy of true gold. Now, seeing before our eyes that dharmas have different marks, we should know that they have no fixed mark. Furthermore:
「若法實有性,云何而可異?
"If a dharma truly has a nature, how can it still differ?
若法實無性,云何而可異?」
If a dharma truly has no nature, how can it still differ?"
若法定有性,云何可變異?若無性,則無自體,云何可變異?復次:
If a dharma definitely has a nature, how can it change? If it has no nature, then it has no substance, so how can it change? Furthermore:
「定有則著常,定無則著斷;
"Definitely existing falls into permanence, definitely not existing falls into annihilation;
是故有智者,不應著有無。」
therefore the wise should not cling to existence or non-existence."
若法定有有相,則終無無相,是即為常。何以故?如說三世者,未來中有法相,是法來至現在,轉入過去,不捨本相,是則為常。又說因中先有果,是亦為常。若說定有無,是無必先有今無,是則為斷滅,斷滅名無相續因。由是二見,即遠離佛法。
If a dharma definitely has the mark of "existence," and in the end has no mark of "non-existence," this is permanence. Why? Like those who speak of the three times: in the future there is the mark of the dharma; when this dharma comes to the present and turns into the past, it does not abandon its original mark, and this is permanence. Again, to say that the effect already exists beforehand in the cause is also permanence. If one says that non-existence definitely exists, this non-existence must have been existence before and now is gone, and this is annihilation; annihilation is called the lack of a continuing cause. Because of these two views, one is far from the Buddha's teaching.
問曰:何故因有生常見、因無生斷見?
The questioner said: Why does existence give rise to the view of permanence and non-existence give rise to the view of annihilation?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若法有定性,非無則是常;
"If a dharma has a definite nature and is not non-existent, that is permanence;
先有而今無,是則為斷滅。」
if it existed before and now does not exist, that is annihilation."
若法性定有,則是有相非無相,終不應無。若無則非有,即為無法,先已說過故,如是則墮常見。若法先有,敗壞而無者,是名斷滅。何以故?有不應無故,汝謂有無各有定相故。若有斷常見者,則無罪福等,破世間事,是故應捨。
If the nature of a dharma definitely exists, then it is the mark of existence and not the mark of non-existence, and in the end it should not be non-existent. If it were non-existent it would not be existent, and so would be a non-existent dharma, as already said; in this way one falls into the view of permanence. If a dharma existed before and, having decayed, becomes non-existent, this is called annihilation. Why? Existence should not turn into non-existence, yet you consider existence and non-existence each to have a fixed mark. If there are views of annihilation and permanence, then there is no sin or merit and the like, and the affairs of the world are destroyed, so they should be abandoned.
中論觀縛解品第十六(十偈)
Madhyamaka-shastra, Chapter Sixteen: Examination of Bondage and Liberation (ten verses)
問曰:生死非都無根本,於中應有眾生往來、若諸行往來。汝以何因緣故,說眾生及諸行盡空,無有往來?
The questioner said: Birth and death are not entirely without foundation; within them there should be beings going and coming, or there should be conditioned phenomena going and coming. By what cause and condition do you say that beings and conditioned phenomena are all empty and there is no going or coming?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「諸行往來者,常不應往來,
"Conditioned phenomena going and coming, if permanent should not go and come,
無常亦不應,眾生亦復然。」
and if impermanent also should not go and come, and beings are likewise."
諸行往來六道生死中者,為常相往來?為無常相往來?二俱不然。若常相往來者,則無生死相續,以決定故、自性住故。若以無常往來者,亦無往來生死相續,以不決定故、無自性故。若眾生往來者,亦有如是過。復次:
Do conditioned phenomena go and come in the birth and death of the six paths bearing the mark of permanence, or bearing the mark of impermanence? Neither is right. If they go and come bearing the mark of permanence, there would be no continuity of birth and death, because they would already be fixed and dwelling in self-nature. If they go and come bearing impermanence, there would also be no continuity of going and coming in birth and death, because they would not be fixed and would have no self-nature. If beings go and come, this kind of fault applies as well. Furthermore:
「若眾生往來,陰界諸入中,
"If a being goes and comes, within the aggregates, realms, and sense bases,
五種求盡無,誰有往來者?」
the five kinds of searching find none at all; who is the one who goes and comes?"
生死陰界入即是一義。若眾生於此陰界入中往來者,是眾生於〈燃可燃品〉中五種求不可得,誰於陰界入中而有往來者?復次:
Birth and death, the aggregates, realms, and sense bases are in fact one meaning. If a being goes and comes within these aggregates, realms, and sense bases, this being cannot be found by the five kinds of searching in the chapter on Fire and Fuel; who then is going and coming within the aggregates, realms, and sense bases? Furthermore:
「若從身至身,往來即無身;
"If one goes from one body to another body, the one going and coming has no body;
若其無有身,則無有往來。」
if there is no body at all, there is no going and coming."
若眾生往來,為有身往來?為無身往來?二俱不然。何以故?若有身往來,從一身至一身,如是則往來者無身。又若先已有身,不應復從身至身。若先無身則無有,若無有云何有生死往來?
If a being goes and comes, does it go and come with a body or without a body? Neither is right. Why? If it goes and comes with a body, going from one body to another body, then the one going and coming has no body. Moreover, if there already was a body before, it should not again go from body to body. If there was no body before, then there is no "existence"; if there is no "existence," how can there be going and coming in birth and death?
問曰:經說有涅槃滅一切苦,是滅應諸行滅、若眾生滅。
The questioner said: The sutras say there is nirvana, extinguishing all suffering; this extinction should be the extinction of conditioned phenomena, or the extinction of beings.
答曰:二俱不滅。何以故?
The answerer said: Neither is extinguished. Why?
「諸行若滅者,是事終不然;
"If conditioned phenomena are extinguished, this is in the end not right;
眾生若滅者,是事亦不然。」
if beings are extinguished, this too is not right."
汝說若諸行滅、若眾生滅,是事先已答,諸行無有性,眾生亦種種推求生死往來不可得,是故諸行不滅,眾生亦不滅。
You say either conditioned phenomena are extinguished or beings are extinguished; this matter has already been answered: conditioned phenomena have no nature, and beings too, by various searches, cannot be found in birth and death or in going and coming, so conditioned phenomena are not extinguished and beings are not extinguished either.
問曰:若爾者則無縛無解,根本不可得故。
The questioner said: If so, there is no bondage and no liberation, because at root they cannot be found.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「諸行生滅相,不縛亦不解;
"Conditioned phenomena have the mark of arising and ceasing, and are neither bound nor liberated;
眾生如先說,不縛亦不解。」
beings, as spoken of earlier, are neither bound nor liberated."
汝謂諸行及眾生有縛解者,是事不然。諸行念念生滅故,不應有縛解。眾生先說五種推求不可得,云何有縛解?復次:
You consider that conditioned phenomena and beings have bondage and liberation, but this is not right. Conditioned phenomena arise and cease moment by moment and should not have bondage or liberation. Beings, as said earlier, cannot be found by the five kinds of searching; how could they have bondage or liberation? Furthermore:
「若身名為縛,有身則不縛,
"If the body is called bondage, then one who has a body is not bound,
無身亦不縛,於何而有縛?」
and one with no body is not bound either; where then can there be bondage?"
若謂五陰身名為縛,若眾生先有五陰,則不應縛。何以故?一人有二身故。無身亦不應縛。何以故?若無身則無五陰,無五陰則空,云何可縛?如是第三更無所縛。復次:
If the body of the five aggregates is called bondage, then if beings already had the five aggregates beforehand, they should not be bound. Why? Because then the same person would have two bodies. Having no body also should not be bound. Why? If there is no body there are no five aggregates, and with no five aggregates there is emptiness; how can emptiness be bound? Thus a third case has even less to be bound. Furthermore:
「若可縛先縛,則應縛可縛;
"If something bindable already had bondage beforehand, it should bind this bindable;
而先實無縛,餘如去來答。」
but in fact there was no bondage beforehand, and the rest is as answered in the chapter on Going and Coming."
若謂可縛先有縛,則應縛可縛。而實離可縛先無縛,是故不得言眾生有縛。或言,眾生是可縛、五陰是縛;或言,五陰中諸煩惱是縛、餘五陰是可縛。是事不然。何以故?若離五陰先有眾生者,則應以五陰縛眾生,而實離五陰無別眾生。若離五陰別有煩惱者,則應以煩惱縛五陰,而實離五陰無別煩惱。復次如〈去來品〉中說,已去不去、未去不去、去時不去,如是未縛不縛、縛已不縛、縛時不縛。復次亦無有解。何以故?
If one says the bindable already had bondage before, it should bind this bindable. But in fact, apart from the bindable, there was no bondage beforehand, so one cannot say beings have bondage. Or one says beings are the bindable and the five aggregates are the bonds; or that the various afflictions within the five aggregates are the bonds and the other aggregates are the bindable. This is not right. Why? If beings already existed apart from the five aggregates, then one should use the five aggregates to bind beings; but in fact there are no other beings apart from the five aggregates. If there were afflictions apart from the five aggregates, then one should use afflictions to bind the five aggregates; but in fact there are no other afflictions apart from the five aggregates. Furthermore, as is said in the chapter on Going and Coming: what has gone does not go, what has not yet gone does not go, and what is going does not go; likewise, what is not yet bound is not bound, what is already bound is not bound, and what is being bound is not bound. Furthermore, there is no liberation either. Why?
「縛者無有解,無縛亦無解,
"What is already bound has no liberation, what is not bound has no liberation either,
縛時有解者,縛解則一時。」
if liberation exists while being bound, then bondage and liberation would be at the same moment."
縛者無有解。何以故?已縛故。無縛亦無解。何以故?無縛故。若謂縛時有解,則縛解一時,是事不然,又縛解相違故。
What is already bound has no liberation. Why? Because it is already bound. What is not bound also has no liberation. Why? Because there is no bondage. If one says there is liberation while being bound, then bondage and liberation would be at the same moment, which is not right, and bondage and liberation contradict each other.
問曰:有人修道現入涅槃得解脫,云何言無?
The questioner said: Some people cultivate the Way, and in this very life enter nirvana and attain liberation; how can you say it does not exist?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若不受諸法,我當得涅槃;
"If I do not grasp any dharmas, I will attain nirvana;
若人如是者,還為受所縛。」
if a person is like this, he is still bound by grasping."
若人作是念:我離受得涅槃。是人即為受所縛。復次:
If a person has this thought: I will attain nirvana by leaving grasping, this person is bound by grasping. Furthermore:
「不離於生死,而別有涅槃,
"Apart from birth and death, there is no separate nirvana,
實相義如是,云何有分別?」
such is the meaning of true reality; how can there still be discrimination?"
諸法實相第一義中,不說離生死別有涅槃。如經說,涅槃即生死、生死即涅槃。如是諸法實相中,云何言是生死、是涅槃?
In the true reality of dharmas, the first principle, it is not said that apart from birth and death there is a separate nirvana. As the sutra says: nirvana is birth and death, and birth and death is nirvana. Thus in the true reality of dharmas, how can one say this is birth and death and this is nirvana?
中論觀業品第十七(三十三偈)
Madhyamaka-shastra, Chapter Seventeen: Examination of Karma (thirty-three verses)
問曰:汝雖種種破諸法,而業決定有,能令一切眾生受果報。如經說,一切眾生皆隨業而生,惡者入地獄、修福者生天、行道者得涅槃,是故一切法不應空。所謂業者:
The questioner said: Although you refute all dharmas in various ways, karma definitely exists and lets all beings receive its retribution. As the sutra says: all beings are born following karma; those who do evil enter hell, those who cultivate merit are born in heaven, and those who practice the Way attain nirvana, so all dharmas should not be empty. As for what is called karma:
「人能降伏心,利益於眾生,
"A person who can subdue the mind and benefit beings,
是名為慈善,二世果報種。」
this is called kindness and goodness, the seed of the retribution of two lives."
人有三毒,為惱他故生行。善者先自滅惡,是故說降伏其心利益他人。利益他者,行佈施、持戒、忍辱等,不惱眾生,是名利益他,亦名慈善福德,亦名今世後世樂果種子。復次:
People have the three poisons, and in order to afflict others they give rise to actions. A good person first extinguishes evil in himself, and so it is said to subdue one's mind and benefit others. What is meant by benefiting others: practicing giving, keeping precepts, patience, and so on, not afflicting beings; this is called benefiting others, also called kindness, goodness, and merit, and also called the seed of the fruit of happiness in this life and the next. Furthermore:
「大聖說二業,思與從思生,
"The Great Sage speaks of two kinds of karma, volition and what arises from volition,
是業別相中,種種分別說。」
within the distinct marks of karma, they are explained in various divisions."
大聖略說業有二種:一者思、二者從思生,是二業如阿毘曇中廣說。
The Great Sage briefly says there are two kinds of karma: first, volition; second, what arises from volition. These two kinds of karma are explained at length in the Abhidharma.
「佛所說思者,所謂意業是;
"What the Buddha calls volition is mental karma;
所從思生者,即是身口業。」
what arises from volition is bodily karma and verbal karma."
思是心數法,諸心數法中能發起、有所作,故名業。因是思故起外身口業。雖因餘心心數法有所作,但思為所作本,故說思為業。是業今當說相。
Volition is a mental factor; among the mental factors it can initiate and accomplish something, so it is called karma. Because of this volition, outward bodily karma and verbal karma arise. Although actions depend on other minds and mental factors as well, volition is the root of action, so volition is said to be karma. Now the marks of this karma should be explained.
「身業及口業,作與無作業,
"Bodily karma and verbal karma, karma that is performed and not performed,
如是四事中,亦善亦不善。
in these four matters, there is also good and also not good.
從用生福德,罪生亦如是,
From enjoyment arises merit, and the arising of sin is likewise,
及思為七法,能了諸業相。」
and volition: together these are seven dharmas that distinguish the marks of the various karmas."
口業者,四種口業。身業者,三種身業。是七種業有二種差別,有作、有無作。作時名作業,作已常隨逐生,名無作業。是二種有善、不善。不善名不止惡,善名止惡。復有從用生福德,如施主施受者,若受者受用,施主得二種福:一從施生;二從用生。如人以箭射人,若箭殺人,有二種罪:一者從射生;二者從殺生。若射不殺,射者但得射罪,無殺罪。是故偈中說罪福從用生,如是名為六種業。第七名思,是七種即是分別業相。是業有今世、後世果報,是故決定有業、有果報故,諸法不應空。
Verbal karma is of four kinds. Bodily karma is of three kinds. These seven kinds of karma have two distinctions: informative and non-informative. While being done, it is called karma; when finished, what keeps arising afterward is called non-informative karma. These two kinds include good and not good. Not good is called not restraining evil; good is called restraining evil. There is also merit arising from enjoyment: for example, when a donor gives to a recipient, if the recipient enjoys it, the donor obtains two kinds of merit: one from giving and the other from the enjoyment. Like a man shooting an arrow at a person, if the arrow kills the person, there are two sins: one from shooting and one from killing. If he shot but did not kill, the shooter obtains only the sin of shooting and not the sin of killing. Therefore the verse says that sin and merit arise from enjoyment. These are called six kinds of karma. The seventh is called volition. These seven are the distinguishing of the marks of karma. This karma has retribution in this life and the next, so karma and retribution definitely exist, and dharmas should not be empty.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「業住至受報,是業即為常;
"If karma lasts until receiving retribution, this karma is permanent;
若滅即無業,云何生果報?」
if it ceases, there is no karma; how can it still produce retribution?"
業若住至受果報,即為是常。是事不然。何以故?業是生滅相,一念尚不住,何況至果報!若謂業滅,滅則無,云何能生果報?
If karma lasts until receiving its fruit, that is permanence. This is not right. Why? Karma has the mark of arising and ceasing, and even one thought does not abide; how can it last until retribution! If one says that karma ceases, then having ceased it is non-existent; how can it produce retribution?
問曰:
The questioner said:
「如芽等相續,皆從種子生,
"Like a sprout and so on in continuity, all arising from a seed,
從是而生果,離種無相續。
from this the fruit arises, and apart from the seed there is no continuity.
從種有相續,從相續有果,
From the seed there is continuity, from the continuity there is fruit,
先種後有果,不斷亦不常。
first the seed and afterward the fruit, neither cut off nor permanent.
如是從初心,心法相續生,
So from the initial mind, mental dharmas arise in continuity,
從是而有果,離心無相續。
from this there is fruit, and apart from the mind there is no continuity.
從心有相續,從相續有果,
From the mind there is continuity, from the continuity there is fruit,
先業後有果,不斷亦不常。」
first karma and afterward the fruit, neither cut off nor permanent."
如從穀有芽,從芽有莖葉等相續,從是相續而有果生。離種無相續生,是故從穀子有相續,從相續有果。先種後有果,故不斷亦不常。如穀種喻,業果亦如是。初心起罪福,猶如穀種。因是心,餘心心數法相續生,乃至果報。先業後果故,不斷亦不常。若離業有果報,則有斷常。是善業因緣果報者,所謂:
Like a sprout from a grain, and from the sprout the stalk, leaves, and so on in continuity, and from this continuity the fruit arises. Apart from the seed, there is no continuous arising, so from the grain there is continuity, and from the continuity there is fruit. First the seed and afterward the fruit, so it is neither cut off nor permanent. Like the analogy of the grain seed, so too is the fruit of karma. The initial mind that gives rise to sin or merit is like the grain seed. Because of this mind, the other minds and mental factors arise in continuity until retribution. First karma and afterward the fruit, so it is neither cut off nor permanent. If apart from karma there were still retribution, there would be annihilation and permanence. As for the retribution of good karma by cause and condition:
「能成福德者,是十白業道,
"What can accomplish merit is the ten white paths of action,
二世五欲樂,即是白業報。」
the pleasures of the five desires in two lives are the retribution of white karma."
白名善淨。成福德因緣者,從是十白業道生,不殺、不盜、不邪婬、不妄語、不兩舌、不惡口、不無益語、不嫉、不恚、不邪見,是名為善。從身口意生是果報者,得今世名利,後世天人中貴處生。佈施恭敬等雖有種種福德,略說則攝在十善道中。
White is called good and pure. The causes and conditions that accomplish merit arise from these ten white paths of action: not killing, not stealing, not committing sexual misconduct, not lying, not slandering, not speaking harshly, not speaking idly, not being envious, not being angry, and not holding wrong views; this is called good. From body, speech, and mind arise these results: in this life one obtains fame and gain, and in later lives one is born in honored places among gods and humans. Although giving, reverence, and the like have various kinds of merit, in brief they are all included in the ten good paths.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若如汝分別,其過則甚多,
"If you discriminate in this way, the faults are very many,
是故汝所說,於義則不然。」
so what you say is not right in meaning."
若以業果報相續故,以穀子為喻者,其過甚多,但此中不廣說。汝說穀子喻者,是喻不然。何以故?穀子有觸有形,可見有相續。我思惟是事,尚未受此言,況心及業,無觸無形不可見。生滅不住欲以相續,是事不然。復次從穀子有芽等相續者,為滅已相續?為不滅相續?若穀子滅已相續者,則為無因。若穀子不滅而相續者,從是穀子常生諸穀。若如是者,一穀子則生一切世間穀。是事不然,是故業果報相續則不然。
If one takes grain as an analogy because of the continuity of the retribution of karma, the faults are very many, but I will not go into them at length here. The analogy of grain that you have given is not right. Why? Grain has touch and form, can be seen, and has continuity. When I reflect on this matter, I have not yet accepted these words, much less mind and karma, which have no touch, no form, cannot be seen, and arise and cease without abiding, yet one wants to speak of them in terms of continuity; this is not right. Furthermore, does the continuity of a sprout and so on from a grain come after the grain has ceased, or while it has not ceased? If continuity comes after the grain has ceased, it is without cause. If it continues without the grain having ceased, then from this grain all kinds of grain would constantly be produced. If so, one grain would produce all the grain of the whole world. This is not right, so the continuity of the retribution of karma is not right.
問曰:
The questioner said:
「今當復更說,順業果報義,
"Now I will further speak of the meaning of retribution in accord with karma,
諸佛辟支佛,賢聖所稱歎。」
which is praised by the Buddhas, pratyekabuddhas, and sages."
所謂:
This is as follows:
「不失法如券,業如負財物,
"The non-loss dharma is like a deed or contract, and karma is like an owed debt,
此性則無記,分別有四種。
its nature is indeterminate, and it is divided into four kinds.
見諦所不斷,但思惟所斷,
What is not cut off by seeing the truths is only cut off by cultivation,
以是不失法,諸業有果報。
because of this non-loss dharma, karmas have their retribution.
若見諦所斷,而業至相似,
If it were cut off by seeing the truths, and karma still reached the similar,
則得破業等,如是之過咎。
one would incur this kind of fault of the destruction of karma and so on.
一切諸行業,相似不相似,
All conditioned karmas, similar and dissimilar,
一界初受身,爾時報獨生。
when first receiving a body in one realm, at that time the retribution arises alone.
如是二種業,現世受果報,
Thus these two kinds of karma receive retribution in this life,
或言受報已,而業猶故在。
or it is said that after receiving retribution, the karma still remains.
若度果已滅,若死已而滅,
Or it ceases after crossing to the fruit, or ceases after death,
於是中分別,有漏及無漏。」
and within this, there are discriminated the contaminated and the uncontaminated."
不失法者當知如券,業者如取物。是不失法,欲界繫、色界繫、無色界繫亦不繫。若分別善、不善、無記中,但是無記。是無記義,阿毘曇中廣說。見諦所不斷,從一果至一果,於中思惟所斷。是以諸業,以不失法故果生。若見諦所斷而業至相似,則得破業過。是事阿毘曇中廣說。復次不失法者,於一界諸業相似不相似,初受身時果報獨生,於現在身從業更生業。是業有二種,隨重而受報。或有言,是業受報已業猶在,以不念念滅故。若度果已滅、若死已而滅者,須陀洹等度果已而滅,諸凡夫及阿羅漢死已而滅。於此中分別有漏及無漏者,從須陀洹等諸賢聖,有漏、無漏等應分別。
What is called the non-loss dharma should be understood as like a deed or contract; karma is like the goods taken away. This non-loss dharma: it is bound to the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm, and it can also be unbound. If one discriminates good, not good, and indeterminate, it is only indeterminate. The meaning of this indeterminate is explained at length in the Abhidharma. What is not cut off by seeing the truths, from one fruit to another fruit, within that is cut off by cultivation. Therefore karmas, because of this non-loss dharma, produce their fruit. If it were cut off by seeing the truths and karma still reached the similar, there would be the fault of the destruction of karma. This matter is explained at length in the Abhidharma. Furthermore, what is called the non-loss dharma: within one realm, karmas similar or dissimilar, when first receiving a body the retribution arises alone; in the present body, from karma further karma arises. This karma is of two kinds, and the heavier one receives retribution. Some say: after this karma has received retribution, the karma still remains, because it does not cease moment by moment. What is meant by ceasing after crossing the fruit and ceasing after death: srota-apannas and others cease after crossing to the fruit, and ordinary beings and arhats cease after death. Within this distinguish the contaminated and the uncontaminated: from srota-apannas and the other sages, one should distinguish the contaminated, the uncontaminated, and so on.
答曰:是義俱不離斷常過,是故亦不應受。
The answerer said: All these meanings do not leave the faults of annihilation and permanence, so they also should not be accepted.
問曰:若爾者,則無業果報。
The questioner said: If so, there is no retribution of karma.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「雖空亦不斷,雖有亦不常,
"Though empty it is not cut off, though existent it is not permanent,
業果報不失,是名佛所說。」
the retribution of karma is not lost; this is what the Buddha taught."
此論所說義離於斷常。何以故?業畢竟空、寂滅相、自性離,有何法可斷、何法可失?顛倒因緣故,往來生死亦不常。何以故?若法從顛倒起則是虛妄無實,無實故非常。復次貪著顛倒不知實相故,言業不失。此是佛所說。復次:
The meaning spoken in this treatise is apart from annihilation and permanence. Why? Karma is ultimately empty, with the mark of stillness, self-nature far removed; what dharma is there to cut off, what dharma to lose? Because of the causes and conditions of inversion, one goes and comes in birth and death, and it is also not permanent. Why? If a dharma arises from inversion, it is false and unreal; because it is unreal, it is not permanent. Furthermore, it is by clinging to inversion and not knowing true reality that one says karma is not lost. This is what the Buddha taught. Furthermore:
「諸業本不生,以無定性故;
"Karmas originally do not arise, because they have no fixed nature;
諸業亦不滅,以其不生故。
karmas also do not cease, because they do not arise.
若業有性者,是則名為常,
If karma has a nature, then it is called permanent,
不作亦名業,常則不可作。
what is not made would also be called karma, but the permanent cannot be made.
若有不作業,不作而有罪,
If there were unmade karma, one would have sin without doing,
不斷於梵行,而有不淨過。
without breaking the holy life, one would have the fault of impurity.
是則破一切,世間語言法,
In this way the dharma of all worldly speech would be destroyed,
作罪及作福,亦無有差別。
making sin and making merit would also have no difference.
若言業決定,而自有性者,
If one says karma is definite and has a nature of its own,
受於果報已,而應更復受。
then after receiving retribution, it should be received again.
若諸世間業,從於煩惱生,
If worldly karmas arise from afflictions,
是煩惱非實,業當何有實?」
and these afflictions are not real, how can karma be real?"
第一義中諸業不生。何以故?無性故。以不生因緣故則不滅,非以常故不滅。若不爾者,業性應決定有。若業決定有性則為是常,若常則是不作業。何以故?常法不可作故。復次若有不作業者,則他人作罪此人受報,又他人斷梵行而此人有罪,則破世俗法。若先有者,冬不應思為春事,春不應思為夏事。有如是等過。復次作福及作罪者則無有別異,起佈施持戒等業名為作福,起殺盜等業名為作罪。若不作而有業,則無有分別。復次是業若決定有性,則一時受果報已復應更受。是故汝說以不失法故有業報,則有如是等過。復次若業從煩惱起,是煩惱無有決定,但從憶想分別有。若諸煩惱無實,業云何有實?何以故?因無性故業亦無性。
In the first principle, karmas do not arise. Why? Because they have no nature. Because of the cause and condition of non-arising, they also do not cease, and it is not that they do not cease because they are permanent. If not so, the nature of karma would definitely exist. If karma definitely had a nature, that would be permanent; if permanent, it would be unmade karma. Why? A permanent dharma cannot be made. Furthermore, if there were unmade karma, then one person would make sin and another would receive retribution, and another would break the holy life and this person would be guilty, which would destroy worldly dharma. If it already existed beforehand, winter should not be thought of as the work of spring, nor spring as the work of summer. There are such faults. Furthermore, making merit and making sin would have no difference: raising karma such as giving and keeping precepts is called making merit, and raising karma such as killing and stealing is called making sin. If there were karma without doing, there would be no distinction. Furthermore, if this karma definitely had a nature, then after receiving retribution at the same moment it should be received again. So what you say, that there is karmic retribution because of the non-loss dharma, has this kind of fault. Furthermore, if karma arises from afflictions, these afflictions are not definite and exist only through recollection and discrimination. If the afflictions are not real, how can karma be real? Why? Because there is no nature, karma too has no nature.
問曰:若諸煩惱及業無性不實,今果報身現有,應是實。
The questioner said: If afflictions and karma have no nature and are unreal, the present retribution body that appears before us should be real.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「諸煩惱及業,是說身因緣;
"Afflictions and karmas are said to be the causes and conditions of the body;
煩惱諸業空,何況於諸身。」
if afflictions and karmas are both empty, how much more these bodies."
諸賢聖說煩惱及業是身因緣,是中愛能潤生,業能生上中下好醜貴賤等果報。今諸煩惱及業,種種推求無有決定,何況諸身有決定果?隨因緣故。
The sages say that afflictions and karma are the causes and conditions of the body: among them craving can moisten and give rise to birth, and karma can give rise to retributions of high, middle, and low, good and ugly, honored and humble, and so on. Now afflictions and karma, searched for in various ways, have no definiteness; how much more could the bodies have a definite fruit? It is only according to causes and conditions.
問曰:汝雖種種因緣破業及果報,而經說,有起業者。起業者有故,有業有果報。如說:
The questioner said: Although you refute karma and retribution by various causes and conditions, the sutra says there is a person who gives rise to karma. Because there is a person who gives rise to karma, there is karma and retribution. As it says:
「無明之所蔽,愛結之所縛,
"Covered by ignorance, bound by the knot of craving,
而於本作者,不即亦不異。」
with regard to the original maker, it is neither identical nor different."
《無始經》中說,眾生為無明所覆、愛結所縛,於無始生死中往來,受種種苦樂。今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。若即是,人作罪受牛形,則人不作牛、牛不作人。若異則失業果報,墮於無因,無因則斷滅。是故今受者於先作者,不即是、亦不異。
The Beginningless Sutra says: beings are covered by ignorance and bound by the knot of craving, go and come in beginningless birth and death, and receive various pains and pleasures. The person who now receives, with regard to the one who made it earlier, is neither identical nor different. If identical, a person who commits sin and takes the form of an ox would mean that the person does not make an ox and the ox does not make a person. If different, then the retribution of karma would be lost and fall into causelessness; causelessness is annihilation. So the one who now receives, with regard to the one who made it earlier, is neither identical nor different.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「業不從緣生,不從非緣生,
"Karma does not arise from conditions, and does not arise from non-conditions,
是故則無有,能起於業者。
and so there is no one who can give rise to karma.
無業無作者,何有業生果?
With no karma and no maker, where is the fruit that arises from karma?
若其無有果,何有受果者?」
If there is no fruit at all, where is the person who receives the fruit?"
若無業、無作業者,何有從業生果報?若無果報,云何有受果報者?業有三種:五陰中假名人是作者,是業於善惡處生,名為果報。若起業者尚無,何況有業、有果報及受果報者?
If there is no karma and no one who performs karma, where is the retribution that arises from karma? If there is no retribution, how can there be one who receives retribution? Karma is of three kinds: the person provisionally established among the five aggregates is the maker, and this karma arises in places of good and evil and is called retribution. If even the one who gives rise to karma does not exist, how much less do karma, retribution, and the one who receives retribution?
問曰:汝雖種種破業、果報及起業者,而今現見眾生作業受果報。是事云何?
The questioner said: Although you refute karma, retribution, and the one who gives rise to karma in various ways, now we directly see beings performing karma and receiving retribution. How about this matter?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「如世尊神通,所作變化人,
"Like a magical person made by the World-Honored One through spiritual powers,
如是變化人,復變作化人。
such a magical person again makes another magical person.
如初變化人,是名為作者,
The first magical person is called the maker,
變化人所作,是則名為業。
and what the magical person makes is called karma.
諸煩惱及業,作者及果報,
Afflictions and karma, makers and retribution,
皆如幻與夢,如炎亦如嚮。」
are all like illusions and dreams, like a mirage, and also like an echo."
如佛神通力所作化人,是化人復化作化人。如化人,無有實事但可眼見,又化人口業說法、身業佈施等,是業雖無實而可眼見。如是生死身作者及業,亦應如是知。諸煩惱者,名為三毒,分別有九十八使、九結、十纏、六垢等無量諸煩惱。業名為身、口、意業。今世、後世分別有善、不善、無記,苦報、樂報、不苦不樂報,現報業、生報業、後報業,如是等無量。作者名為能起諸煩惱業、能受果報者。果報名從善惡業生無記五陰,如是等諸業皆空無性,如幻如夢、如炎如嚮。
Like a magical person made by the Buddha through the power of spiritual powers, this magical person again makes another magical person. Like magical persons, they have no real substance and can only be seen by the eye; moreover, the verbal karma of a magical person's teaching and the bodily karma of giving and so on, although these karmas are not real, can be seen by the eye. In this way, the makers of birth-and-death bodies and their karma should be understood likewise. What is called afflictions are called the three poisons, divided into ninety-eight latent tendencies, nine fetters, ten entanglements, six defilements, and so on, immeasurable afflictions. Karma is called bodily, verbal, and mental karma. In this life and later lives there are distinguished good, not good, and indeterminate, retribution of suffering, retribution of pleasure, retribution of neither suffering nor pleasure, karma bearing fruit in this life, karma bearing fruit at birth, and karma bearing fruit later, immeasurable in this way. The maker is called the one able to give rise to the karma of afflictions and able to receive retribution. Retribution is called the indeterminate five aggregates arising from good and evil karma. Thus all karmas are empty and without nature, like illusions and dreams, like a mirage and an echo.
中論觀法品第十八(十二偈)
Madhyamaka-shastra, Chapter Eighteen: Examination of Dharmas (twelve verses)
問曰:若諸法盡畢竟空、無生無滅,是名諸法實相者,云何入?
The questioner said: If all dharmas are ultimately empty, unborn, and unceasing, this is called the true reality of dharmas; how does one enter it?
答曰:滅我我所著故,得一切法空。無我慧名為入。
The answerer said: Extinguishing the clinging to self and what belongs to self, one attains the emptiness of all dharmas. The wisdom of non-self is called entering.
問曰:云何知諸法無我?
The questioner said: By what do we know that dharmas are without self?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若我是五陰,我即為生滅;
"If the self is the five aggregates, the self would become arising and ceasing;
若我異五陰,則非五陰相。
if the self is different from the five aggregates, it would not have the mark of the five aggregates.
若無有我者,何得有我所?
If there is no self, where is what belongs to self?
滅我我所故,名得無我智。
Extinguishing self and what belongs to self is called attaining the wisdom of non-self.
得無我智者,是則名實觀;
One who attains the wisdom of non-self is called one who observes as things are;
得無我智者,是人為希有。
one who attains the wisdom of non-self, this person is rare.
內外我我所,盡滅無有故,
When the self and what belongs to self, inside and outside, are completely extinguished and gone,
諸受即為滅,受滅則身滅。
the feelings cease, and when feelings cease the body ceases.
業煩惱滅故,名之為解脫,
When karma and afflictions are extinguished, it is called liberation,
業煩惱非實,入空戲論滅。
karma and afflictions are not real; entering emptiness, conceptual proliferation ceases.
諸佛或說我,或說於無我,
The Buddhas sometimes speak of a self and sometimes speak of no-self,
諸法實相中,無我無非我。
in the true reality of dharmas, there is neither self nor non-self.
諸法實相者,心行言語斷,
The true reality of dharmas: the activity of the mind and speech are both cut off,
無生亦無滅,寂滅如涅槃。
neither arising nor ceasing, still and extinguished like nirvana.
一切實非實,亦實亦非實,
All is real, not real, both real and not real,
非實非非實,是名諸佛法。
neither real nor not real; this is called the Dharma of the Buddhas.
自知不隨他,寂滅無戲論,
Self-knowing, not following others, still and extinguished, without conceptual proliferation,
無異無分別,是則名實相。
without difference and without discrimination, this is called true reality.
若法從緣生,不即不異因,
If a dharma arises from conditions, it is neither identical with the cause nor different from the cause,
是故名實相,不斷亦不常。
and so it is called true reality, neither cut off nor permanent.
不一亦不異,不常亦不斷,
Neither one nor different, neither permanent nor cut off,
是名諸世尊,教化甘露味。
this is called the taste of sweet dew taught by the World-Honored Ones.
若佛不出世,佛法已滅盡,
If a Buddha does not appear in the world, and the Buddha's teaching has already ended,
諸辟支佛智,從於遠離生。」
the wisdom of the pratyekabuddhas arises from seclusion."
有人說神,應有二種:若五陰即是神、若離五陰有神。若五陰是神者,神則生滅相,如偈中說。若神是五陰,即是生滅相。何以故?生已壞敗故。以生滅相故,五陰是無常。如五陰無常,生滅二法亦是無常。何以故?生滅亦生已壞敗故無常。神若是五陰,五陰無常故,神亦應無常生滅相;但是事不然。若離五陰有神,神即無五陰相,如偈中說。若神異五陰,則非五陰相,而離五陰更無有法。若離五陰有法者,以何相何法而有?若謂神如虛空,離五陰而有者,是亦不然。何以故?〈破六種品〉中已破,虛空無有法名為虛空。若謂以有信故有神,是事不然。何以故?信有四種:一現事可信;二名比知可信,如見煙知有火;三名譬喻可信,如國無鍮石喻之如金;四名賢聖所說故可信,如說有地獄、有天、有欝單曰。無有見者,信聖人語故知。是神於一切信中不可得,現事中亦無,比知中亦無。何以故?比知名先見故後比類而知,如人先見火有煙,後但見煙則知有火。神義不然,誰能先見神與五陰合,後見五陰知有神?若謂有三種比知:一者如本;二者如殘;三者共見。如本名先見火有煙,今見煙知如本有火。如殘名如炊飯,一粒熟知餘者皆熟。共見名如眼見人從此去到彼,亦見其去;日亦如是,從東方出至西方。雖不見去,以人有去相故,知日亦有去。如是苦樂憎愛覺知等,亦應有所依。如見人民,知必依王。是事皆不然。何以故?共相信先見人與去法合而至餘方,後見日到餘方,故知有去法。無有先見五陰與神合,後見五陰知有神,是故共相比知中亦無神。聖人所說中亦無神。何以故?聖人所說皆先眼見而後說,又諸聖人說餘事可信故,當知說地獄等亦可信。而神不爾,無有先見神而後說者,是故於四信等諸信中求神不可得,求神不可得故無,是故離五陰無別神。
Some say there is a spirit (atman), and there should be two cases: either the five aggregates are the spirit, or there is a spirit apart from the five aggregates. If the five aggregates are the spirit, then the spirit has the mark of arising and ceasing, as the verse says: if the spirit is the five aggregates, it has the mark of arising and ceasing. Why? What arises then decays. Because it has the mark of arising and ceasing, the five aggregates are impermanent. As the five aggregates are impermanent, arising and ceasing, the two dharmas, are also impermanent. Why? Arising and ceasing also decay once arisen, so they are impermanent. If the spirit is the five aggregates, and the five aggregates are impermanent, the spirit too should be impermanent, with the mark of arising and ceasing; but this is not so. If there is a spirit apart from the five aggregates, the spirit would have no mark of the five aggregates, as the verse says: if the spirit is different from the five aggregates, it is not the mark of the five aggregates; yet apart from the five aggregates there is no other dharma. If there were a dharma apart from the five aggregates, by what mark and what dharma would it exist? If one says the spirit is like space and exists apart from the five aggregates, this is also not right. Why? It has been refuted in the chapter Refuting the Six Kinds: space does not have a dharma called space. If one says that because there is faith, there is a spirit, this is not right. Why? Faith is of four kinds: first, what is directly before one can be believed; second, what is called inference can be believed, like seeing smoke and knowing there is fire; third, what is called analogy can be believed, like saying that where a country has no brass, one uses gold as a comparison; fourth, what is spoken by the sages can be believed, like saying there are hells, heavens, and Uttarakuru, and those who have not seen them know them because they believe the sages' words. This spirit cannot be found in any of these kinds of faith: it is not in what is directly present, and not in inference. Why? What is called inference is knowing through comparison what one has seen before, as a person who has seen fire with smoke before, and later seeing only smoke knows there is fire. The meaning of the spirit is not like this: who has seen before the spirit joined with the five aggregates, and later on seeing the five aggregates knows there is a spirit? If one says there are three kinds of inference: first, like the original; second, like the remainder; third, commonly seen. Like the original: having seen fire with smoke before, now seeing smoke, one knows there is fire as before. Like the remainder: like cooking rice, when one grain is cooked one knows the rest is cooked. Commonly seen: like the eye seeing a person go from here to there and also seeing him go; the sun is also like this, rising in the east and reaching the west. Although the going cannot be seen, because the person has the mark of going, one knows the sun also has going. In the same way, pain, pleasure, hatred, love, awareness, and the like should have a basis. Like seeing the people, one knows they must depend on a king. None of these is right. Why? Faith in common marks is that one has seen before that a person and the dharma of going combine and arrive elsewhere, and later seeing the sun arrive elsewhere, one knows there is a dharma of going. There is no case where one first saw the five aggregates join with a spirit and later on seeing the five aggregates knew there was a spirit, so in common-mark inference there is also no spirit. In what the sages say there is also no spirit. Why? What the sages say is all first seen with the eyes and then spoken; moreover, since the sages' words on other matters can be believed, one should know that their words on hell and the like can also be believed. But the spirit is not like this; there is no case where a spirit was first seen and then spoken of. So when one seeks a spirit in the four kinds of faith and the like, one cannot find it; since seeking it one cannot find it, it does not exist. Therefore apart from the five aggregates there is no separate spirit.
復次〈破根品〉中見、見者、可見破故,神亦同破。又眼見麁法尚不可得,何況虛妄憶想等而有神,是故知無我。因有我故有我所,若無我則無我所,修習八聖道分,滅我我所因緣故,得無我無我所決定智慧。
Furthermore, in the chapter Refuting the Faculties, seeing, the seer, and what is seen are refuted, and the spirit is refuted together. Moreover, even the coarse dharmas seen by the eye cannot be found, so how much more is there a spirit in false recollection and the like; thus one knows non-self. Because there is a self there is what belongs to self; if there is no self there is no what belongs to self. By cultivating the eightfold noble path and extinguishing the causes and conditions of self and what belongs to self, one attains the definite wisdom of no-self and no what belongs to self.
又無我無我所者,於第一義中亦不可得。無我無我所者,能真見諸法。凡夫人以我我所障慧眼故,不能見實。今聖人無我我所故,諸煩惱亦滅。諸煩惱滅故,能見諸法實相。內外我我所滅故諸受亦滅,諸受滅故無量後身皆亦滅,是名說無餘涅槃。
Moreover, no-self and no what belongs to self also cannot be found in the first principle. One who has no-self and no what belongs to self can truly see dharmas. Ordinary people, because of self and what belongs to self, have their wisdom eye blocked and cannot see reality. Now the sages have no self and no what belongs to self, and afflictions are also extinguished. When afflictions are extinguished, they can see the true reality of dharmas. When self and what belongs to self, inside and outside, are extinguished, feelings are also extinguished; when feelings are extinguished, the immeasurable future bodies are all extinguished, and this is called speaking of nirvana without remainder.
問曰:有餘涅槃云何?
The questioner said: What about nirvana with remainder?
答曰:諸煩惱及業滅故,名心得解脫。是諸煩惱業皆從憶想分別生、無有實,諸憶想分別皆從戲論生。得諸法實相畢竟空,諸戲論則滅,是名說有餘涅槃。實相法如是。諸佛以一切智觀眾生故,種種為說,亦說有我亦說無我。若心未熟者,未有涅槃分,不知畏罪,為是等故說有我。又有得道者,知諸法空,但假名有我,為是等故說我無咎。又有佈施持戒等福德,厭離生死苦惱畏涅槃永滅,是故佛為是等說無我。諸法但因緣和合,生時空生、滅時空滅,是故說無我,但假名說有我。又得道者,知無我不墮斷滅,故說無我無咎。是故偈中說,諸佛說有我,亦說於無我,若於真實中,不說我非我。
The answerer said: When afflictions and karma are extinguished, it is called the mind attaining liberation. These afflictions and karma all arise from recollection and discrimination and are not real; all recollection and discrimination arise from conceptual proliferation. Attaining the ultimate emptiness of the true reality of dharmas, conceptual proliferation is extinguished, and this is called speaking of nirvana with remainder. The Dharma of true reality is thus. The Buddhas, observing beings with omniscient wisdom, teach them in various ways: they speak of a self and also speak of no-self. If the mind is not yet ripe, not yet a part of nirvana, and does not know to fear offenses, they speak of a self for these people. There are also those who have attained the Way and know that dharmas are empty, and that a self is only a provisional name, and for these people speaking of a self is without fault. There are also those with the merit of giving, keeping precepts, and the like, who are weary of the suffering of birth and death and fear the permanent extinction of nirvana, and so the Buddha speaks of no-self for these people. Dharmas are only the harmonious joining of causes and conditions; when they arise it is empty arising, and when they cease it is empty ceasing, so no-self is spoken of, and only provisionally is a self spoken of. Also, those who have attained the Way know no-self without falling into annihilation, so speaking of no-self is without fault. Therefore the verse says: the Buddhas speak of a self and also speak of no-self; in true reality, neither self nor non-self is spoken of.
問曰:若無我是實,但以世俗故說有我,有何咎?
The questioner said: If no-self is real, and a self is spoken of only because of worldly convention, what fault is there?
答曰:因破我法有無我,我決定不可得,何有無我。若決定有無我,則是斷滅生於貪著。如《般若》中說菩薩有我亦非行、無我亦非行。
The answerer said: Because the dharma of self is refuted, there is no-self; since a self is definitely not found, where would no-self be? If no-self definitely existed, it would be annihilation, giving rise to clinging. As the Prajna sutra says: a Bodhisattva's having a self is not practice, and having no-self is also not practice.
問曰:若不說我非我、空不空,佛法為何所說?
The questioner said: If neither self, non-self, empty, nor not empty is spoken of, what does the Buddha's teaching speak of?
答曰:佛說諸法實相,實相中無語言道、滅諸心行。心以取相緣生,以先世業果報故有,不能實見諸法,是故說心行滅。
The answerer said: The Buddha speaks of the true reality of dharmas. In true reality there is no path of language, and all mental activity is extinguished. The mind arises from grasping marks and conditions and exists through the fruit of former karma, and cannot see dharmas as they are, and so it is said that mental activity is extinguished.
問曰:若諸凡夫心不能見實,聖人心應能見實,何故說一切心行滅?
The questioner said: If the minds of ordinary beings cannot see reality, the minds of sages should be able to see reality; why do you say that all mental activity is extinguished?
答曰:諸法實相即是涅槃。涅槃名滅,是滅為向涅槃,故亦名為滅。若心是實,何用空等解脫門?諸禪定中,何故以滅盡定為第一?又亦終歸無餘涅槃。是故當知,一切心行皆是虛妄,虛妄故應滅。諸法實相者,出諸心數法,無生無滅、寂滅相,如涅槃。
The answerer said: The true reality of dharmas is nirvana. Nirvana is called extinction; this extinction, because it heads toward nirvana, is also called extinction. If the mind were real, what use would there be for the gates of liberation such as emptiness? Among the meditative absorptions, why is the cessation absorption the foremost? And it ends in nirvana without remainder. So it should be known that all mental activity is false; because it is false, it should be extinguished. The true reality of dharmas goes beyond the mental factors, with the mark of no arising, no ceasing, and stillness, like nirvana.
問曰:經中說,諸法先來寂滅相即是涅槃。何以言如涅槃?
The questioner said: The sutra says that dharmas are originally of the mark of stillness, which is nirvana. Why say "like nirvana"?
答曰:著法者分別法有二種:是世間、是涅槃。說涅槃是寂滅,不說世間是寂滅。此論中說一切法性空寂滅相,為著法者不解故,以涅槃為喻。如汝說涅槃相空無相寂滅無戲論,一切世間法亦如是。
The answerer said: Those who cling to dharmas discriminate two kinds of dharma: this is the world, and this is nirvana. They say nirvana is stillness, and do not say the world is stillness. This treatise says that the nature of all dharmas is empty and of the mark of stillness; because those who cling to dharmas do not understand, nirvana is used as an analogy. As you say that the mark of nirvana is empty, signless, still, and without conceptual proliferation, all worldly dharmas are also like this.
問曰:若佛不說我非我,諸心行滅、言語道斷者,云何令人知諸法實相?
The questioner said: If the Buddha does not speak of self or non-self, all mental activity is extinguished and the path of language is cut off, how does one let people know the true reality of dharmas?
答曰:諸佛無量方便力,諸法無決定相,為度眾生或說一切實、或說一切不實、或說一切實不實、或說一切非實非不實。一切實者,推求諸法實性,皆入第一義平等一相,所謂無相。如諸流異色異味,入於大海則一色一味。一切不實者,諸法未入實相時,各各分別觀皆無有實,但眾緣合故有。一切實不實者,眾生有三品,有上、中、下。上者觀諸法相非實非不實;中者觀諸法相一切實一切不實;下者智力淺故,觀諸法相少實少不實,觀涅槃無為法不壞故實,觀生死有為法虛偽故不實。非實非不實者,為破實不實,故說非實非不實。
The answerer said: The Buddhas have immeasurable power of skillful means. Dharmas have no definite mark, and in order to liberate beings, they sometimes say all is real, sometimes say all is not real, sometimes say all is both real and not real, and sometimes say all is neither real nor not real. What is called all is real: searching for the real nature of dharmas, all enter the first principle, equal and of one mark, namely signless. Like the various rivers differing in color and flavor, which on entering the great ocean become one color and one flavor. What is called all is not real: when dharmas have not yet entered true reality, when each is observed separately none is real, existing only because of the harmony of many conditions. What is called all is both real and not real: beings are of three grades, high, middle, and low. The highest observe the marks of dharmas as neither real nor not real; the middle observe the marks of dharmas as all real and all not real; the lowest, with shallow wisdom, observe the marks of dharmas as slightly real and slightly not real, seeing the unconditioned dharma of nirvana as real because it is not destroyed and the conditioned dharma of birth and death as not real because it is false. What is called neither real nor not real: in order to refute real and not real, it is said to be neither real nor not real.
問曰:佛於餘處說離非有非無,此中何以言非有非無是佛所說?
The questioner said: Elsewhere the Buddha speaks of leaving behind neither existence nor non-existence; why does he say here that neither existence nor non-existence is spoken by the Buddha?
答曰:餘處為破四種貪著故說。而此中於四句無戲論,聞佛說則得道,是故言非實非不實。
The answerer said: Elsewhere it is said in order to refute the four kinds of clinging. But here, with the four propositions there is no conceptual proliferation, and on hearing the Buddha speak one attains the Way, so it is said to be neither real nor not real.
問曰:知佛以是四句因緣說,又得諸法實相者以何相可知?又實相云何?答曰:若能不隨他。不隨他者,若外道雖現神力說是道是非道,自信其心而不隨之,乃至變身雖不知非佛,善解實相故心不可迴。此中無法可取可捨故,名寂滅相。寂滅相故,不為戲論所戲論。戲論有二種,一者愛論、二者見論,是中無此二戲論。二戲論無故,無憶想分別、無別異相,是名實相。
The questioner said: We know that the Buddha speaks using the causes and conditions of these four propositions; moreover, one who attains the true reality of dharmas, by what mark can one know it? And what is true reality like? The answerer said: If one can not follow others. What is meant by not following others: even if non-Buddhist teachers display spiritual powers and say this is the Way and this is not the Way, one believes one's own mind and does not follow them, even if one transforms and, without knowing that he is not the Buddha, because one understands true reality well, the mind cannot be turned back. In this there is no dharma to take or discard, and it is called the mark of stillness. Because it is the mark of stillness, it is not proliferated by conceptual proliferation. Conceptual proliferation is of two kinds: first, proliferation of desire; second, proliferation of views; here there are neither of these two proliferations. When both proliferations are absent, there is no recollection and discrimination and no mark of separate difference, and this is called true reality.
問曰:若諸法盡空,將不墮斷滅耶?又不生不滅或墮常耶?
The questioner said: If all dharmas are empty, does one not fall into annihilation? And unborn and unceasing, does one perhaps fall into permanence?
答曰:不然。先說實相無戲論,心相寂滅言語道斷。汝今貪著取相,於實相法中見斷常過。得實相者,說諸法從眾緣生,不即是因亦不異因,是故不斷不常。若果異因則是斷,若不異因則是常。
The answerer said: It is not so. As said before, true reality has no conceptual proliferation, the mark of the mind is still, and the path of language is cut off. You now cling to taking marks and see the faults of annihilation and permanence in the Dharma of true reality. One who attains true reality says that dharmas arise from many conditions, and are neither the same as the cause nor different from the cause, so they are neither cut off nor permanent. If the effect were different from the cause it would be annihilation, and if not different from the cause it would be permanence.
問曰:若如是解,有何等利?
The questioner said: If one understands in this way, what benefit is there?
答曰:若行道者能通達如是義,則於一切法不一不異、不斷不常。若能如是,即得滅諸煩惱戲論,得常樂涅槃,是故說諸佛以甘露味教化。如世間言得天甘露漿,則無老病死無諸衰惱。此實相法是真甘露味,佛說實相有三種:若得諸法實相、滅諸煩惱,名為聲聞法;若生大悲發無上心,名為大乘;若佛不出世,無有佛法時,辟支佛因遠離生智。若佛度眾生已入無餘涅槃,遺法滅盡。先世若有應得道者,少觀厭離因緣,獨入山林遠離憒鬧得道,名辟支佛。
The answerer said: If a practitioner of the Way can penetrate such a meaning, then regarding all dharmas there is neither one nor different, neither cut off nor permanent. If one can do so, one extinguishes all afflictions and conceptual proliferation and attains the permanent bliss of nirvana, and so it is said that the Buddhas teach with the taste of sweet dew. As the world says that if one obtains the sweet dew nectar of the gods, there is no aging, illness, or death and no manner of decline and distress. This Dharma of true reality is the true taste of sweet dew. The Buddha says there are three kinds of true reality: if one attains the true reality of dharmas and extinguishes all afflictions, this is called the shravaka Dharma; if one gives rise to great compassion and aspires to the unsurpassed mind, this is called the Mahayana; if a Buddha does not appear in the world and there is no Buddha Dharma, a pratyekabuddha gives rise to wisdom through seclusion. When the Buddha has finished liberating beings and entered nirvana without remainder, and his remaining teaching has ended, if there were people in former lives who should attain the Way, they slightly observe the causes and conditions of weariness and detachment, enter mountain forests alone, leave the clamor, and attain the Way, and are called pratyekabuddhas.
中論觀時品第十九(六偈)
Madhyamaka-shastra, Chapter Nineteen: Examination of Time (six verses)
問曰:應有時,以因待故成。因有過去時,則有未來、現在時;因現在時,有過去、未來時;因未來時,有過去、現在時。上中下一異等法,亦相因待故有。
The questioner said: There should be time, established through mutual dependence. Because there is past time, there is future and present time; because of present time, there is past and future time; because of future time, there is past and present time. High, middle, and low, one and different, and other dharmas also exist through mutual dependence.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若因過去時,有未來現在;
"If future and present exist because of past time,
未來及現在,應在過去時。」
the future and present should be in past time."
若因過去時,有未來、現在時者,則過去時中應有未來、現在時。何以故?隨所因處有法成,是處應有是法。如因燈有明成,隨有燈處應有明。如是因過去時,成未來、現在時者,則過去時中應有未來、現在時。若過去時中有未來、現在時者,則三時盡名過去時。何以故?未來、現在時在過去時中故。若一切時盡過去者,則無未來、現在時,盡過去故。若無未來、現在時,亦應無過去時。何以故?過去時因未來、現在時故名過去時。如因過去時成未來、現在時,如是亦應因未來、現在時成過去時。今無未來、現在時故,過去時亦應無。是故先說,因過去時成未來、現在時,是事不然。若謂過去時中無未來、現在時,而因過去時成未來、現在時。是事不然。何以故?
If future and present time exist because of past time, then future and present time should exist within past time. Why? Wherever a dharma depends on something to be established, that place should have this dharma. Like light being established because of a lamp, wherever there is a lamp there should be light. In the same way, if future and present time are established because of past time, then future and present time should be in past time. If future and present time are in past time, then all three times are called past time. Why? Because future and present time are in past time. If all times are past, there is no future or present time, because all have become past. If there is no future or present time, there should also be no past time. Why? Past time is called past time because of future and present time. Just as future and present time are established because of past time, so too past time should be established because of future and present time. Now there is no future or present time, so past time should also not exist. Therefore what was said earlier, that future and present time are established because of past time, is not right. If one says there is no future or present time in past time, yet they are established because of past time, this is not right. Why?
「若過去時中,無未來現在;
"If there is no future or present in past time;
未來現在時,云何因過去?」
how can future and present time still depend on the past?"
若未來、現在時不在過去時中者,云何因過去時成未來、現在時。何以故?若三時各異相,不應相因待成,如瓶衣等物各自別成不相因待。而今不因過去時,則未來、現在時不成。不因現在時,則過去、未來時不成。不因未來時,則過去、現在時不成。汝先說過去時中雖無未來、現在時,而因過去時成未來、現在時者。是事不然。
If future and present time are not in past time, how can they be established because of past time? Why? If the three times each have their own mark, they should not be established by mutual dependence, like a pot and a garment, which are established separately and do not depend on each other. But now, without depending on past time, future and present time are not established. Without depending on present time, past and future time are not established. Without depending on future time, past and present time are not established. What you said earlier, that although there is no future or present time in past time they are established because of past time, is not right.
問曰:若不因過去時成未來、現在時,而有何咎?
The questioner said: If future and present time are not established because of past time, what fault is there?
答曰:
The answerer said:
「不因過去時,則無未來時,
"Without depending on past time, there is no future time,
亦無現在時,是故無二時。」
and no present time either, so these two times do not exist."
不因過去時,則不成未來、現在時。何以故?若不因過去時有現在時者,於何處有現在時?未來亦如是,於何處有未來時?是故不因過去時則無未來、現在時,如是相待有故,實無有時。
Without depending on past time, future and present time are not established. Why? If there is present time without depending on past time, where is present time? Future is likewise; where is future time? So without depending on past time, there is no future or present time. Thus they exist through mutual dependence, and in truth there is no time.
「以如是義故,則知餘二時,
"Because of such a principle, one knows the other two times,
上中下一異,是等法皆無。」
high, middle, low, one, and different, these dharmas all do not exist."
以如是義故,當知餘未來現在亦應無,及上中下一異等諸法亦應皆無。如因上有中下,離上則無中下。若離上有中下,則不應相因待。因一故有異、因異故有一,若一實有,不應因異而有;若異實有,不應因一而有。如是等諸法,亦應如是破。
Because of such a principle, one should know that the other two, future and present, should also not exist, and that high, middle, low, one, different, and other dharmas should all not exist. Like middle and low existing because of high; apart from high there is no middle or low. If there were middle and low apart from high, they should not be mutually dependent. Different exists because of one, and one exists because of different; if one truly existed, it should not exist because of different; if different truly existed, it should not exist because of one. Thus all dharmas should be refuted in the same way.
問曰:如有歲月日須臾等差別,故知有時。
The questioner said: Because there are distinctions such as year, month, day, and moment, we know there is time.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「時住不可得,時去亦叵得,
"Time abiding cannot be found, time going also cannot be found,
時若不可得,云何說時相?
if time cannot be found, how can one speak of the mark of time?
因物故有時,離物何有時?
Because of things there is time; apart from things where is time?
物尚無所有,何況當有時!」
If things themselves do not exist, how much less could time exist!"
時若不住,不應可得,時住亦無。若時不可得,云何說時相?若無時相則無時。因物生故則名時,若離物則無時。上來種種因緣破諸物,物無故,何有時?
If time does not abide, it should not be attainable; if time abides, there is no time either. If time cannot be found, how can one speak of the mark of time? If there is no mark of time, there is no time. It is called time because things arise; apart from things there is no time. Above, things have been refuted by various causes and conditions; if there are no things, where is time?
中論觀因果品第二十(二十四偈)
Madhyamaka-shastra, Chapter Twenty: Examination of Cause and Effect (twenty-four verses)
問曰:眾因緣和合現有果生故,當知是果從眾緣和合有。
The questioner said: Many causes and conditions come together, and a fruit now arises before us; one should know that this fruit exists from the harmony of many conditions.
答曰:
The answerer said:
「若眾緣和合,而有果生者;
"If a result arises from the union of many conditions;
和合中已有,何須和合生?」
if it is already in the union, what need is there for it to arise from the union?"
若謂眾因緣和合有果生,是果則和合中已有。而從和合生者,是事不然。何以故?果若先有定體,則不應從和合生。
If one says a result arises from the union of many causes and conditions, then the result already exists within the union. Yet to say it again arises from the union is wrong. Why? If the result already had a determinate substance beforehand, it should not arise from the union.
問曰:眾緣和合中雖無果,而果從眾緣生者,有何咎?
The questioner says: Though the result is not within the union of many conditions, the result arises from many conditions; what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若眾緣和合,是中無果者,
"If the many conditions unite, and there is no result in this,
云何從眾緣,和合而果生?」
how does the result arise from the union of many conditions?"
若從眾緣和合則果生者,是和合中無果,而從和合生。是事不然。何以故?若物無自性,是物終不生。復次:
If the result arises from the union of many conditions, and this union has no result within it, yet it arises from the union, this is wrong. Why? If a thing has no self-nature, this thing in the end does not arise. Furthermore:
「若眾緣和合,是中有果者;
"If the many conditions unite and there is a result within this;
和合中應有,而實不可得。」
it should be in the union, yet it cannot actually be found."
若從眾緣和合中有果者,若色應可眼見、若非色應可意知,而實和合中果不可得。是故和合中有果,是事不然。復次:
If there were a result in the union of many conditions: if it were form, it should be visible to the eye; if it were not form, it should be knowable by the mind. But in fact the result cannot be found in the union. So to say the result is in the union is wrong. Furthermore:
「若眾緣和合,是中無果者;
"If the many conditions unite and there is no result within this;
是則眾因緣,與非因緣同。」
then these many causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions."
若眾緣和合中無果者,則眾因緣即同非因緣。如乳是酪因緣,若乳中無酪,水中亦無酪。若乳中無酪,則與水同,不應言但從乳出。是故眾緣和合中無果者,是事不然。
If there is no result in the union of many conditions, the many causes and conditions would be the same as non-causes and non-conditions. For example, milk is the cause and condition of curd; if there were no curd in milk, there would be no curd in water either. If there were no curd in milk, it would be the same as water, and one should not say it comes only from milk. So to say there is no result in the union of many conditions is wrong.
問曰:因為果作因已滅,而有因果。無如是咎。
The questioner says: Because the cause has already ceased after serving as cause for the result, there is both cause and result. There is no such fault.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因與果因,作因已而滅,
"If a cause gives rise to a result as cause and ceases when it has done so,
是因有二體,一與一則滅。」
this cause would have two substances: one that gives and one that ceases."
若因與果作因已而滅者,是因則有二體:一謂與因;二謂滅因。是事不然,一法有二體故。是故因與果作因已而滅,是事不然。
If the cause has ceased after serving as cause for the result, this cause would have two substances: one called the giving cause and one called the ceasing cause. This is wrong, because one dharma would have two substances. So to say the cause ceases after serving as cause for the result is wrong.
問曰:若謂因不與果作因已而滅,亦有果生,有何咎。
The questioner says: If the cause ceases without serving as cause for the result, and yet a result arises, what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因不與果,作因已而滅,
"If the cause has ceased without serving as cause for the result,
因滅而果生,是果則無因。」
the cause ceases and the result arises, and this result is causeless."
若是因不與果作因已而滅者,則因滅已而果生,是果則無因。是事不然。何以故?現見一切果,無有無因生者。是故汝說因不與果作因已而滅亦有果生者,是事不然。
If the cause has ceased without serving as cause for the result, then the cause ceases and the result arises, and this result is without cause. This is wrong. Why? We see before our eyes that no result arises without a cause. So to say that a result arises even though the cause has ceased without serving as cause is wrong.
問曰:眾緣合時而有果生者,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the result arises at the time the many conditions unite, what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若眾緣合時,而有果生者,
"If the result arises at the time the many conditions unite,
生者及可生,則為一時俱。」
then the producer and the produced would exist together at the same moment."
若眾緣合時有果生者,則生者可生即一時俱。但是事不爾。何以故?如父子不得一時生。是故汝說眾緣合時有果生者,是事不然。
If the result arises when the many conditions unite, the producer and the produced would be together at the same moment. But this is not so. Why? For example, a father and son cannot be born at the same moment. So to say the result arises when the many conditions unite is wrong.
問曰:若先有果生,而後眾緣合,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the result arises first and then the many conditions unite, what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若先有果生,而後眾緣合,
"If the result arises first and then the many conditions unite,
此即離因緣,名為無因果。」
then it is apart from causes and conditions, and is called a causeless result."
若眾緣未合而先有果生者,是事不然,果離因緣故則名無因果。是故汝說眾緣未合時先有果生者,是事則不然。
If the many conditions have not yet united and yet a result arises first, this is wrong: a result apart from causes and conditions is called a causeless result. So to say the result arises first before the many conditions unite is wrong.
問曰:因滅變為果者,有何咎?
The questioner says: If the cause ceases and changes into the result, what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因變為果,因即至於果,
"If the cause changes into the result, the cause reaches the result,
是則前生因,生已而復生。」
then the cause that was born earlier would be born and born again."
因有二種:一者前生;二者共生。若因滅變為果,是前生因應還更生。但是事不然。何以故?已生物不應更生。若謂是因即變為果,是亦不然。何以故?若即是不名為變,若變不名即是。
There are two kinds of cause: one born earlier, and one born together. If the cause ceases and changes into the result, this earlier-born cause would have to be born again. But this is wrong. Why? A thing already born should not be born again. If one says this cause itself is the result, this is also wrong. Why? If it is the same, it is not called change; if it changes, it is not called the same.
問曰:因不盡滅但名字滅,而因體變為果,如泥團變為瓶,失泥團名而瓶名生。
The questioner says: The cause does not entirely cease, only its name ceases, and the substance of the cause changes into the result, as a lump of clay changes into a pot, losing the name of clay lump while the name of pot arises.
答曰:泥團先滅而有瓶生,不名為變。又泥團體不獨生,瓶瓫甕等皆從泥中出。若泥團但有名,不應變為瓶,變名如乳變為酪。是故汝說因名雖滅而變為果,是事不然。
The respondent says: When the clay lump ceases first, then the pot arises, and this is not called change. Moreover, the substance of the clay lump does not arise by itself; pots, jars and urns all come out of clay. If the clay lump were only a name, it would not change into a pot; what is called change is like milk changing into curd. So to say that though the name of the cause ceases it changes into the result is wrong.
問曰:因雖滅失而能生果,是故有果。無如是咎。
The questioner says: Though the cause is lost and ceases, it can produce a result, and so there is a result. There is no such fault.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「云何因滅失,而能生於果?
"How can a cause that is lost and ceased still produce a result?
又若因在果,云何因生果?」
And if the cause is in the result, how does the cause still produce the result?"
若因滅失已,云何能生果?若因不滅而與果合,何能更生果?
If the cause is lost and ceased, how can it produce a result? If the cause does not cease and joins with the result, how can it still produce the result again?
問曰:是因遍有果而果生。
The questioner says: This cause is entirely full of the result, and so the result arises.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因遍有果,更生何等果?
"If the cause is entirely full of the result, what kind of result is there still to produce?
因見不見果,是二俱不生。」
Whether the cause sees the result or does not see the result, neither produces it."
是因若不見果,尚不應生果,何況見!若因自不見果,則不應生果。何以故?若不見果,果則不隨因。又未有果,云何生果?若因先見果,不應復生,果已有故。復次:
If this cause cannot see the result, it should not produce the result, much less if it sees it! If the cause itself cannot see the result, it should not produce the result. Why? If it cannot see the result, the result does not follow the cause. And with no result yet, how could it produce a result? If the cause had already seen the result beforehand, it should not produce it again, because the result already exists. Furthermore:
「若言過去因,而於過去果,
"If one speaks of a past cause, then with a past result,
未來現在果,是則終不合。
a future one or a present one, it can in the end never unite.
若言未來因,而於未來果,
If one speaks of a future cause, then with a future result,
現在過去果,是則終不合。
a present one or a past one, it can in the end never unite.
若言現在因,而於現在果,
If one speaks of a present cause, then with a present result,
未來過去果,是則終不合。」
a future one or a past one, it can in the end never unite."
過去果不與過去、未來、現在因合。未來果不與未來、現在、過去因合。現在果不與現在、未來、過去因合。如是三種果,終不與過去、未來、現在因合。復次:
A past result does not unite with a past, future or present cause. A future result does not unite with a future, present or past cause. A present result does not unite with a present, future or past cause. Thus the three kinds of result never unite in the end with a past, future or present cause. Furthermore:
「若不和合者,因何能生果?
"If they do not unite, how can the cause produce the result?
若有和合者,因何能生果?」
If they do unite, how can the cause produce the result?"
若因果不和合則無果,若無果云何因能生果?若謂因果和合時因能生果者,是亦不然。何以故?若果在因中,則因中已有果,云何而復生?復次:
If cause and result do not unite, there is no result; and if there is no result, how can the cause produce a result? If one says that the cause can produce the result when cause and result unite, this too is wrong. Why? If the result were in the cause, the cause would already contain the result, so how could it be produced again? Furthermore:
「若因空無果,因何能生果?
"If the cause is empty and has no result, how can the cause produce a result?
若因不空果,因何能生果?」
If the cause is not empty and has a result, how can the cause produce a result?"
若因無果者,以無果故因空,云何因生果?如人不懷姙,云何能生子?若因先有果,已有果故不應復生。復次,今當說果。
If the cause has no result, then because it has no result the cause is empty; how can it produce a result? Like a person not pregnant, how can she bear a child? If the cause already had a result beforehand, then because it already has the result, it should not produce it again. Furthermore, now we should speak of the result.
「果不空不生,果不空不滅,
"A result that is not empty does not arise, and a result that is not empty does not cease,
以果不空故,不生亦不滅。
because the result is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases.
果空故不生,果空故不滅,
A result that is empty does not arise, and a result that is empty does not cease,
以果是空故,不生亦不滅。」
because the result is empty, it neither arises nor ceases."
果若不空,不應生、不應滅。何以故?果若因中先決定有,更不須復生,生無故無滅,是故果不空故不生不滅。若謂果空故有生滅,是亦不然。何以故?果若空,空名無所有,云何當有生滅?是故說果空故不生不滅。復次,今以一異破因果。
If the result is not empty, it should not arise or cease. Why? If the result already definitely exists within the cause beforehand, it has no need to arise again; where there is no arising, there is no ceasing. So because the result is not empty, it neither arises nor ceases. If one says that because the result is empty there is arising and ceasing, this too is wrong. Why? If the result is empty, and emptiness means having nothing, how can there still be arising and ceasing? So it is said that because the result is empty, it neither arises nor ceases. Furthermore, now sameness and difference are used to refute cause and result.
「因果是一者,是事終不然;
"That cause and result are one is in the end wrong;
因果若異者,是事亦不然。
if cause and result are different, this is also wrong.
若因果是一,生及所生一;
If cause and result are one, then the producer and the produced would be one;
若因果是異,因則同非因。
if cause and result are different, then the cause would be the same as a non-cause.
若果定有性,因為何所生?
If the result definitely has a nature, what is there for the cause to produce?
若果定無性,因為何所生?
If the result definitely has no nature, what is there for the cause to produce?
因不生果者,則無有因相,
If the cause does not produce a result, then there is no mark of a cause,
若無有因相,誰能有是果?
and if there is no mark of a cause, who could have this result?
若從眾因緣,而有和合生,
If, from the many causes and conditions, there is an arising from union,
和合自不生,云何能生果?
and the union itself is not born, how can it produce a result?
是故果不從,緣合不合生;
So the result is neither born from a union of conditions nor from a non-union;
若無有果者,何處有合法?」
if there is no result, where could there be a dharma of union?"
是眾緣和合法,不能生自體。自體無故,云何能生果?是故果不從緣合生,亦不從不合生。若無有果者,何處有合法?
This dharma of the union of many conditions cannot produce its own substance. With no substance of its own, how can it produce a result? So the result is neither born from a union of conditions nor from a non-union. If there is no result, where could there be a dharma of union?
中論觀成壞品第二十一(二十偈)
The Middle Treatise, Chapter Twenty-One: Examination of Formation and Destruction (twenty verses)
問曰:一切世間事現是壞敗相,是故有壞。
The questioner says: All affairs of the world are plainly marked by decay and destruction, and so there is destruction.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「離成及共成,是中無有壞;
"Apart from formation, and together with formation, there is no destruction in it;
離壞及共壞,是中亦無成。」
apart from destruction, and together with destruction, there is no formation in it."
若有成、若無成,俱無壞。若有壞、若無壞,俱無成。何以故?
Whether there is formation or no formation, there is no destruction. Whether there is destruction or no destruction, there is no formation. Why?
「若離於成者,云何而有壞?
"If apart from formation, how can there still be destruction?
如離生有死,是事則不然。
As if there could be death apart from birth, this is wrong.
成壞共有者,云何有成壞?
If formation and destruction are together, how can there be formation and destruction?
如世間生死,一時俱不然。
As in the world's birth and death, being at the same moment is wrong.
若離於壞者,云何當有成?
If apart from destruction, how can there be formation?
無常未曾有,不在諸法時。」
Impermanence has never been absent from the dharmas at any time."
若離成,壞不可得。何以故?若離成有壞者,則不因成有壞,壞則無因,又無成法而可壞。成名眾緣合,壞名眾緣散,若離成有壞者,無成誰當壞?如無瓶,不得言瓶壞,是故離成無壞。若謂共成有壞者,是亦不然。何以故?法先別成而後有合,合法不離異。若壞離異,壞則無因,是故共成亦無壞。若離壞共壞無有成者,若離壞有成,成則為常,常是不壞相。而實不見有法常不壞相,是故離壞無成。若謂共壞有成者,是亦不然。成壞相違,云何一時有?如人有髮無髮不得一時俱,成壞亦爾,是故共壞有成是事不然。何以故?若謂分別法者,說成中常有壞。是事不然。何以故?若成中常有壞,則不應有住法;而實有住,是故若離壞共壞不應有成。復次:
If apart from formation, destruction cannot be found. Why? If there were destruction apart from formation, then destruction would not depend on formation, and destruction would be causeless; and there would be no dharma of formation to be destroyed. Formation means the union of many conditions, and destruction means the dispersal of many conditions. If there were destruction apart from formation, then with no formation, what would be destroyed? As without a pot one cannot say the pot is destroyed, so apart from formation there is no destruction. If one says destruction exists together with formation, this too is wrong. Why? A dharma is first completed through distinction, and only then is there union, and a dharma of union is not apart from difference. If destruction were apart from difference, destruction would be causeless, so there is no destruction together with formation either. As for 'apart from destruction and together with destruction, there is no formation': if there were formation apart from destruction, formation would be permanent, and the permanent is the mark of the indestructible. But in fact no dharma is ever seen to be always of an indestructible mark, so apart from destruction there is no formation. If one says formation exists together with destruction, this too is wrong. Formation and destruction oppose each other; how could they be at the same moment? As a person cannot have hair and have no hair at the same moment, so it is with formation and destruction, and so to say formation exists together with destruction is wrong. Why? If one who distinguishes dharmas says that destruction is always within formation, this is wrong. Why? If destruction were always within formation, there should be no dharma of abiding; but there really is abiding, so whether apart from destruction or together with destruction, there should be no formation. Furthermore:
「成壞共無成,離亦無有成,
"Formation and destruction together give no formation, apart also give no formation,
是二俱不可,云何當有成?」
neither works; how then can there be formation?"
若成壞共亦無成、離亦無成。若共成則二法相違,云何一時?若離則無因。二門俱不成,云何當有成?若有應說。
If formation and destruction together give no formation, and apart also give no formation: if they achieve it together, two dharmas oppose each other, so how can they be at the same moment? If apart, it is causeless. Neither gate holds; how can there still be formation? If there is, it should be stated.
問曰:現有盡滅相法。是盡滅相法,亦說盡亦說不盡,如是則應有成壞。
The questioner says: There are dharmas now before us with the mark of exhaustion and extinction. This dharma with the mark of exhaustion is said to be exhausted and also not exhausted, and so there should be formation and destruction.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「盡則無有成,不盡亦無成;
"If exhausted, there is no formation; if not exhausted, there is also no formation;
盡則無有壞,不盡亦不壞。」
if exhausted, there is no destruction; if not exhausted, there is also no destruction."
諸法日夜中念念常滅盡,過去如水流不住,是則名盡。是事不可取、不可說,如野馬無決定性可得。如是盡無決定性可得,云何可得分別說有成?是故言盡亦不成。成無故,亦不應有壞,是故說盡亦無有壞。又念念生滅常相續不斷故名不盡,如是法決定常住不斷。云何可得分別說言今是成時?是故說無盡亦無成。成無故無壞,是故說不盡亦無壞。如是推求,實事不可得,故無成無壞。
The dharmas, day and night, moment by moment constantly exhaust and pass, as a flowing stream that does not stop in the past; this is called exhaustion. This cannot be taken or spoken of, like a heat shimmer, with no determinate nature to be found. Since exhaustion has no determinate nature to be found, how can one distinguish and say there is formation? So it is said that exhaustion is not formation either. Since there is no formation, there should be no destruction, and so it is said that exhaustion has no destruction either. And again, moment by moment arising and ceasing continue without break; this is called non-exhaustion, and such a dharma would definitely abide always without interruption. How can one distinguish and say that the present is a time of formation? So it is said that non-exhaustion has no formation either. With no formation there is no destruction, so it is said that non-exhaustion has no destruction either. Searching in this way, no real thing can be found, so there is neither formation nor destruction.
問曰:且置成壞。但令有法,有何咎?
The questioner says: Put formation and destruction aside for now. Let there simply be dharmas; what fault is there?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若離於成壞,是亦無有法;
"If apart from formation and destruction, there is also no dharma;
若當離於法,亦無有成壞。」
if apart from dharma, there is also no formation or destruction."
離成壞無法者,若法無成無壞,是法應或無或常。而世間無有常法,汝說離成壞有法,是事不然。
As for 'apart from formation and destruction there is no dharma': if a dharma had no formation and no destruction, this dharma would have to be either nonexistent or permanent. But the world has no permanent dharma, so to say that apart from formation and destruction there is a dharma is wrong.
問曰:若離法但有成壞,有何咎?
The questioner says: If apart from dharma there are only formation and destruction, what fault is there?
答曰:離法有成壞,是亦不然。何以故?若離法,誰成誰壞。是故離法有成壞,是事不然。復次:
The respondent says: For there to be formation and destruction apart from dharma is also wrong. Why? If apart from dharma, what is formed and what is destroyed? So to say there is formation and destruction apart from dharma is wrong. Furthermore:
「若法性空者,誰當有成壞?
"If the nature of a dharma is empty, who could have formation and destruction?
若性不空者,亦無有成壞。」
If its nature is not empty, there is also no formation or destruction."
若諸法性空,空何有成壞?若諸法性不空,不空則決定有,亦不應有成壞。復次:
If the nature of all dharmas is empty, where in emptiness is there formation and destruction? If the nature of all dharmas is not empty, then not-empty is definitely existing, and there should again be no formation and destruction. Furthermore:
「成壞若一者,是事則不然;
"If formation and destruction are one, this is wrong;
成壞若異者,是事亦不然。」
if formation and destruction are different, this too is wrong."
推求成壞一則不可得。何以故?異相故、種種分別故。又成壞異亦不可得。何以故?無有別故、亦無因故。復次:
Searching for formation and destruction as one, it cannot be found. Why? Because the marks differ, and because of the various distinctions. And that formation and destruction are different also cannot be found. Why? Because there is no distinction and also no cause. Furthermore:
「若謂以眼見,而有生滅者,
"If one says there is arising and ceasing because the eyes see it,
則為是痴妄,而見有生滅。」
it is only through foolish delusion that one sees arising and ceasing."
若謂以眼見有生滅者,云何以言說破?是事不然。何以故?眼見生滅者,則是愚痴顛倒故。見諸法性空、無決定、如幻如夢,但凡夫先世顛倒因緣得此眼,今世憶想分別因緣故,言眼見生滅。第一義中實無生滅,是事已於〈破相品〉中廣說。復次:
If one says there is arising and ceasing because the eyes see it, by what means can it be refuted with words? This is wrong. Why? The eyes' seeing of arising and ceasing is foolish inversion. One sees that the nature of all dharmas is empty, indeterminate, like illusions and dreams; it is only because ordinary people, through the inverted causes and conditions of a former life, obtained these eyes, and because of the causes and conditions of recollection and discrimination in this life, that they say the eyes see arising and ceasing. In the ultimate meaning there is truly no arising or ceasing, as has already been explained at length in the chapter on refuting marks. Furthermore:
「從法不生法,亦不生非法;
"From a dharma no dharma is born, nor is a non-dharma born;
從非法不生,法及於非法。」
from a non-dharma no dharma is born, nor is a non-dharma born."
從法不生法者,若失若至,二俱不然。從法生法,若至若失,是則無因,無因則墮斷常。若已至從法生法,是法至已而名為生,則為是常,又生已更生,又亦無因生。是事不然。若已失從法生法者,是則失因,生者無因,是故從失亦不生法。從法不生非法者,非法名無所有、法名有,云何從有相生無相?是故從法不生非法。從非法不生法者,非法名為無,無云何生有?若從無生有者,是則無因,無因則有大過,是故不從非法生法。不從非法生非法者,非法名無所有,云何從無所有生無所有?如兔角不生龜毛,是故不從非法生非法。
As for 'from a dharma no dharma is born': whether by loss or by arrival, neither is right. If a dharma is born from a dharma, whether by arrival or by loss, it is causeless; and the causeless falls into annihilation and permanence. If, when it has already arrived, a dharma is born from a dharma, this dharma is only called born once it has arrived, and so it is permanent, and born again and again, and again would be born without cause. This is wrong. If, when it has already been lost, a dharma is born from a dharma, it has lost its cause, and the one born has no cause, so from loss also no dharma is born. As for 'from a dharma no non-dharma is born': a non-dharma means having nothing, a dharma means having something; how can the mark of nothing arise from the mark of something? So from a dharma no non-dharma is born. As for 'from a non-dharma no dharma is born': a non-dharma means nonexistent; how could nonexistence give birth to existence? If existence were born from nonexistence, it would be causeless; the causeless has great faults, so from a non-dharma no dharma is born. As for 'not from a non-dharma is a non-dharma born': a non-dharma means having nothing at all; how could nothing be born from nothing? As the horns of a rabbit do not give birth to the hair of a tortoise, so from a non-dharma no non-dharma is born.
問曰:法非法雖種種分別故無生,但法應生法。
The questioner says: Though dharma and non-dharma, through various distinctions, are unborn, a dharma should still give birth to a dharma.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「法不從自生,亦不從他生,
"A dharma is not born from itself, nor from another,
不從自他生,云何而有生?」
nor from self and other together; how then can there be birth?"
法未生時無所有故,又即自不生故,是故法不自生。若法未生則亦無他,無他故不得言從他生。又未生則無自,無自亦無他,共亦不生。若三種不生,云何從法有法生?復次:
When a dharma has not yet been born, it has nothing, and it is by itself unborn, so a dharma is not born from itself. If a dharma has not yet been born, there is also no other; with no other, one cannot say it is born from another. And before birth there is no self, and with no self there is also no other, and together they do not give birth either. If all three do not give birth, how can a dharma be born from a dharma? Furthermore:
「若有所受法,即墮於斷常,
"If there are dharmas that are grasped, one falls into annihilation or permanence,
當知所受法,為常為無常。」
and it should be known that a grasped dharma is either permanent or impermanent."
受法者,分別是善是不善、常無常等,是人必墮若常見若斷見。何以故?所受法應有二種:若常、若無常。二俱不然。何以故?若常即墮常邊,若無常即墮斷邊。
As for taking up dharmas: distinguishing this as good, this as not good, permanent, impermanent and so on, this person must fall into the view of permanence or the view of annihilation. Why? A grasped dharma must be one of two kinds: permanent or impermanent. Neither is right. Why? If permanent, one falls into the extreme of permanence; if impermanent, one falls into the extreme of annihilation.
問曰:
The questioner says:
「所有受法者,不墮於斷常,
"Those who hold to dharmas do not fall into annihilation or permanence,
因果相續故,不斷亦不常。」
because cause and effect continue in succession, neither broken nor permanent."
有人雖信受分別說諸法,而不墮斷常。如經說五陰無常苦空無我,而不斷滅;雖說罪福無量劫數不失,而不是常。何以故?是法因果常生滅相續故往來不絕,生滅故不常,相續故不斷。
There are those who, though they believe in and distinguish the dharmas, do not fall into annihilation or permanence. For example, the sutras say the five aggregates are impermanent, suffering, empty and without self, yet there is no annihilation; and though they say that sin and merit are not lost through countless kalpas, it is not permanence. Why? This dharma's cause and effect constantly arise and cease in succession, and so go back and forth without break: because they arise and cease, they are not permanent; because they are continuous, they are not broken.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因果生滅,相續而不斷;
"If cause and effect arise and cease in continuity without a break;
滅更不生故,因即為斷滅。」
if what has ceased does not arise again, the cause is annihilated."
若汝說諸法因果相續故不斷不常。若滅法已滅更不復生,是則因斷。若因斷,云何有相續?已滅不生故。復次:
If you say the dharmas' cause and effect are continuous and so are neither broken nor permanent: if a dharma that ceases has ceased and does not arise again, this cause is a break. If the cause is broken, how can there still be continuity? Because what has ceased does not arise. Furthermore:
「法住於自性,不應有有無;
"A dharma abiding in its own nature should not have being and also non-being;
涅槃滅相續,則墮於斷滅。」
if nirvana ends continuity, one falls into annihilation."
法決定在有相中,爾時無無相,如瓶定在瓶相,爾時無失壞相。隨有瓶時無失壞相,無瓶時亦無失壞相。何以故?若無瓶則無所破,以是義故滅不可得。離滅故亦無生。何以故?生滅相因待故。又有常等過故,是故不應於一法而有有無。又汝先說因果生滅相續故,雖受諸法不墮斷常。是事不然。何以故?汝說因果相續故有三有相續,滅相續名涅槃。若爾者,涅槃時應墮斷滅,以滅三有相續故。復次:
A dharma that is definitely in the mark of being has at that time no mark of non-being, as a pot definitely in the mark of a pot has at that time no mark of destruction. So long as there is a pot there is no mark of destruction, and when there is no pot there is also no mark of destruction. Why? If there is no pot there is nothing to be destroyed. For this reason cessation cannot be found. Apart from cessation there is no arising either. Why? Arising and ceasing depend on each other. And there are the faults of permanence and so on, so one dharma should not have both being and non-being. And as for what you said before, that cause and effect continue in succession so that though one holds to dharmas one does not fall into annihilation or permanence, this is wrong. Why? You say that cause and effect continue, and so the three existences continue, and that the ending of continuity is called nirvana. If so, at the time of nirvana one would fall into annihilation, because the continuity of the three existences has ended. Furthermore:
「若初有滅者,則無有後有;
"If the former existence has ceased, there is no later existence;
初有若不滅,亦無有後有。」
if the former existence has not ceased, there is also no later existence."
初有名今世有,後有名來世有。若初有滅次有後有,是即無因。是事不然,是故不得言初有滅有後有。若初有不滅,亦不應有後有。何以故?若初有未滅而有後有者,是則一時有二有。是事不然,是故初有不滅無有後有。
The former existence means existence in this life; the later existence means existence in the next life. If the former existence ceases and only then comes the later existence, it is causeless. This is wrong, so one cannot say that the later existence arises only after the former has ceased. If the former existence has not ceased, there should be no later existence either. Why? If the former existence has not yet ceased and yet there is a later existence, then two existences would be at the same moment. This is wrong, so if the former existence does not cease, there is no later existence.
問曰:後有不以初有滅生、不以不滅生,但滅時生。
The questioner says: The later existence does not arise because the former has ceased, nor because it has not ceased, but arises at the moment of ceasing.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若初有滅時,而後有生者,
"If the former existence is in the course of ceasing, and the later existence is born,
滅時是一有,生時是一有。」
then at the time of ceasing there is one existence, and at the time of arising there is another existence."
若初有滅時後有生者,即二有一時俱:一有是滅時,一有是生時。
If the former existence is ceasing while the later existence is born, then two existences would be together at the same moment: one existence at the time of ceasing and one at the time of arising.
問曰:滅時生時二有俱者則不然。但現見初有滅時後有生。
The questioner says: It is wrong that the two existences of the time of ceasing and the time of arising are together. We only see before us the former existence ceasing and the later existence arising.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若言於生滅,而謂一時者,
"If one speaks of arising and ceasing yet holds them to be at the same moment,
則於此陰死,即於此陰生。」
then in this very aggregate one dies, and in this very aggregate one is born."
若生時滅時一時無二有,而謂初有滅時後有生者,今應隨在何陰中死,即於此陰生,不應餘陰中生。何以故?死者即是生者。如是死生相違法,不應一時一處。是故汝先說滅時生時一時無二有,但現見初有滅時後有生者,是事不然。復次:
If the time of arising and the time of ceasing are at the same moment without there being two existences, yet one says the former existence is ceasing while the later existence is born: then in whichever aggregate one dies, one should be born in that same aggregate, and should not be born in the other aggregates. Why? The one who dies is the one who is born. Such opposing dharmas as death and birth should not be at the same moment and in the same place. So what you said before, that the time of ceasing and the time of arising are at one moment without there being two existences, and that we only see before us the former existence ceasing and the later existence arising, is wrong. Furthermore:
「三世中求有,相續不可得,
"Seeking existence in the three times, continuity cannot be found,
若三世中無,何有有相續?」
if there is none in the three times, where could there be a continuity of existence?"
三有名欲有、色有、無色有。無始生死中不得實智故,常有三有相續。今於三世中諦求不可得。若三世中無有,當於何處有有相續?當知有有相續,皆從愚痴顛倒故有,實中則無。
The three existences are called the existence of desire, the existence of form and the existence of formlessness. In beginningless birth and death, true wisdom has not been obtained, and so there is always a continuity of the three existences. Now, searching as they truly are in the three times, they cannot be found. If there is no existence in the three times, where could there be a continuity of existence? One should know that every continuity of existence comes from foolish inversion, and in reality there is none.
The Middle Treatise, Volume Three
The Middle Treatise, Volume Four
龍樹菩薩造梵志青目釋
Verses composed by Nagarjuna Bodhisattva, commentary by the Brahmin Pingala (Blue Eyes).
姚秦三藏鳩摩羅什譯
Translated by the Tripitaka Master Kumarajiva of the Later Qin (Yao Qin) dynasty.
觀如來品第二十二(十六偈)
Chapter Twenty-Two: Examination of the Tathagata (sixteen verses)
問曰:一切世中尊,唯有如來正遍知號為法王,一切智人是則應有。
The questioner says: Among all the honored ones of the world, only the Tathagata, Perfectly Enlightened, called the Dharma King, who is omniscient, must surely exist.
答曰:今諦思惟,若有應取;若無何所取?何以故?如來,
The respondent says: Now let us think about it as it truly is: if he exists, he should be grasped; if he does not exist, what is grasped? Why? The Tathagata,
「非陰不離陰,此彼不相在;
"is not the aggregates, not apart from the aggregates, this and that are not in each other;
如來不有陰,何處有如來?」
the Tathagata does not possess the aggregates; where then is the Tathagata?"
若如來實有者,為五陰是如來?為離五陰有如來?為如來中有五陰?為五陰中有如來?為如來有五陰。是事皆不然。五陰非是如來。何以故?生滅相故。五陰生滅相,若如來是五陰,如來即是生滅相。若生滅相者,如來即有無常斷滅等過。又受者受法則一,受者是如來、受法是五陰。是事不然,是故如來非是五陰。離五陰亦無如來,若離五陰有如來者,不應有生滅相。若爾者,如來有常等過。又眼等諸根不能見知,但是事不然,是故離五陰亦無如來。如來中亦無五陰。何以故?若如來中有五陰,如器中有果、水中有魚者,則為有異。若異者,即有如上常等過,是故如來中無五陰。又五陰中無如來。何以故?若五陰中有如來,如床上有人、器中有乳者,如是則有別異,如上說過,是故五陰中無如來。如來亦不有五陰。何以故?若如來有五陰,如人有子,如是則有別異。若爾者,有如上過。是事不然,是故如來不有五陰。如是五種求不可得,何等是如來?
If the Tathagata truly exists, are the five aggregates the Tathagata? Or is there a Tathagata apart from the five aggregates? Or are the five aggregates within the Tathagata? Or is the Tathagata within the five aggregates? Or does the Tathagata possess the five aggregates? None of these is right. The five aggregates are not the Tathagata. Why? Because they are marked by arising and ceasing. The five aggregates are marked by arising and ceasing; if the Tathagata were the five aggregates, the Tathagata would be marked by arising and ceasing. If marked by arising and ceasing, the Tathagata would have the faults of impermanence, annihilation and so on. And the one who takes and what is taken would become one: the one who takes is the Tathagata, and what is taken is the five aggregates. This is wrong, so the Tathagata is not the five aggregates. Apart from the five aggregates there is also no Tathagata. If there were a Tathagata apart from the five aggregates, he should not have the mark of arising and ceasing. If so, the Tathagata would have the faults of permanence and so on. And the sense roots such as the eye could not see or know him, but this is wrong, so apart from the five aggregates there is no Tathagata. Within the Tathagata there are also no five aggregates. Why? If the five aggregates were within the Tathagata, like fruit in a vessel or fish in water, they would be different. If different, there would be the faults of permanence and so on as above, so within the Tathagata there are no five aggregates. And within the five aggregates there is no Tathagata. Why? If the Tathagata were within the five aggregates, like a person on a bed or milk in a vessel, there would be distinction and difference, with the faults described above, so within the five aggregates there is no Tathagata. The Tathagata also does not possess the five aggregates. Why? If the Tathagata possessed the five aggregates, like a person having a child, there would be distinction and difference. If so, there are the faults above. This is wrong, so the Tathagata does not possess the five aggregates. When all five kinds of search fail in this way, what then is the Tathagata?
問曰:如是義求如來不可得,而五陰和合有如來。
The questioner says: In this way, searching by principle, the Tathagata cannot be found, yet from the union of the five aggregates there is a Tathagata.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「陰合有如來,則無有自性;
"If the Tathagata exists through the union of the aggregates, he has no self-nature;
若無有自性,云何因他有?」
if there is no self-nature, how can he exist depending on another?"
若如來五陰和合故有,即無自性。何以故?因五陰和合有故。
If the Tathagata exists because of the union of the five aggregates, he has no self-nature. Why? Because he exists depending on the union of the five aggregates.
問曰:如來不以自性有,但因他性有。
The questioner says: The Tathagata does not exist through self-nature, but only through other-nature.
答曰:若無自性,云何因他性有?何以故?他性亦無自性。又無相待因故,他性不可得,不可得故不名為他。復次:
The respondent says: If there is no self-nature, how can there be existence through other-nature? Why? Other-nature also has no self-nature. And with no cause to depend on, other-nature cannot be found; if it cannot be found, it is not called other. Furthermore:
「法若因他生,是即為非我;
"If a dharma arises depending on another, then it is not me;
若法非我者,云何是如來?」
if a dharma is not me, how can it be the Tathagata?"
若法因眾緣生,即無有我。如因五指有拳,是拳無有自體。如是因五陰名我,是我即無自體。我有種種名,或名眾生、人、天、如來等。若如來因五陰有,即無自性,無自性故無我。若無我,云何說名如來?是故偈中說「法若因他生,是即為非我;若法非我者,云何是如來?」復次:
If a dharma arises depending on many conditions, there is no self. As a fist exists through five fingers, this fist has no substance of its own. In the same way, what is called a self through the five aggregates has no substance of its own. The self has many names, such as being, person, god and Tathagata. If the Tathagata exists depending on the five aggregates, he has no self-nature; with no self-nature, there is no self. If there is no self, how can one still speak of the name of Tathagata? So the verse says: "If a dharma arises depending on another, then it is not me; if a dharma is not me, how can it be the Tathagata?" Furthermore:
「若無有自性,云何有他性?
"If there is no self-nature, how can there be other-nature?
離自性他性,何名為如來?」
Apart from self-nature and other-nature, what is called the Tathagata?"
若無自性,他性亦不應有。因自性故名他性,此無故彼亦無,是故自性、他性二俱無。若離自性、他性,誰為如來?復次:
If there is no self-nature, other-nature should also not exist. Because there is self-nature, it is called other-nature; when this is absent, that is also absent. So neither self-nature nor other-nature exists. If apart from self-nature and other-nature, who is the Tathagata? Furthermore:
「若不因五陰,先有如來者,
"If, not depending on the five aggregates, there were already a Tathagata beforehand,
以今受陰故,則說為如來。
it would be through taking the aggregates now that he is called the Tathagata.
今實不受陰,更無如來法,
But now in truth there is no taking of aggregates, still less a dharma called the Tathagata,
若以不受無,今當云何受?
if there is none because there is no taking, how can there be taking now?
若其未有受,所受不名受,
If there is not yet taking, what is taken is not called taking,
無有無受法,而名為如來。
and there is no dharma without taking that is called the Tathagata.
若於一異中,如來不可得,
If the Tathagata cannot be found in sameness or difference,
五種求亦無,云何受中有?
and the five kinds of search also find nothing, how can he be in what is taken?
又所受五陰,不從自性有,
And the five aggregates that are taken do not exist through self-nature,
若無自性者,云何有他性?」
if there is no self-nature, how can there be other-nature?"
若未受五陰先有如來者,是如來今應受五陰已作如來,而實未受五陰時先無如來,今云何當受?又不受五陰者,五陰不名為受,無有無受而名為如來。又如來一異中求不可得,五陰中五種求亦不可得。若爾者,云何於五陰中說有如來?又所受五陰,不從自性有。若謂從他性有。若不從自性有。云何從他性有?何以故?以無自性故,又他性亦無。復次:
If there were already a Tathagata beforehand who had not yet taken the five aggregates, this Tathagata would now take the five aggregates in order to become the Tathagata; but in fact when the five aggregates have not yet been taken, there was no Tathagata beforehand, so how could he take them now? And if he does not take the five aggregates, the five aggregates are not called what is taken; and there is no dharma without taking that is called the Tathagata. Furthermore, the Tathagata cannot be found in sameness or difference, and cannot be found in the five aggregates by the five kinds of search. If so, how can one say there is a Tathagata in the five aggregates? Also the five aggregates that are taken do not exist through self-nature. If one says they exist through other-nature: if they do not exist through self-nature, how can they exist through other-nature? Why? Because there is no self-nature, and other-nature also does not exist. Furthermore:
「以如是義故,受空受者空,
"By this reasoning, the taking is empty and the taker is empty,
云何當以空,而說空如來?」
how can one still use emptiness to speak of an empty Tathagata?"
以是義思惟,受及受者皆空。若受空者,云何以空受而說空如來?
Reflecting by this principle, both the taking and the taker are empty. If the taking is empty, how can one use an empty taking to speak of an empty Tathagata?
問曰:汝謂受空、受者空,則定有空耶?
The questioner says: You hold that the taking is empty and the taker is empty; does that mean emptiness definitely exists?
答曰?
The respondent says:
不然。何以故?
It is not so. Why?
「空則不可說,非空不可說,
"Empty cannot be said, non-empty cannot be said,
共不共叵說,但以假名說。」
both and neither cannot be said; it is only spoken of by provisional names."
諸法空則不應說,諸法不空亦不應說,諸法空不空亦不應說,非空非不空亦不應說。何以故?但破相違故以假名說。如是正觀思惟,諸法實相中不應以諸難為難。何以故?
That all dharmas are empty should not be asserted, that all dharmas are not empty should not be asserted, that all dharmas are both empty and not empty should not be asserted, that they are neither empty nor not empty should not be asserted. Why? It is only to refute opposition that provisional names are used. Reflecting rightly in this way, in the true nature of dharmas one should not raise various questions as objections. Why?
「寂滅相中無,常無常等四;
"In the mark of stillness and extinction there are no four phrases such as permanent and impermanent;
寂滅相中無,邊無邊等四。」
in the mark of stillness and extinction there are no four phrases such as finite and infinite."
諸法實相如是微妙寂滅,但因過去世起四種邪見:世間有常、世間無常、世間常無常、世間非常非無常;寂滅中盡無。何以故?諸法實相畢竟清淨不可取,空尚不受,何況有四種見。四種見皆因受生,諸法實相無所因受。四種見皆以自見為貴、他見為賤,諸法實相無有此彼。是故說寂滅中無四種見。如因過去世有四種見,因未來世有四種見亦如是。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間有邊無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。
The true nature of dharmas is so subtle and still, and it is only because four wrong views arose in past ages: that the world is permanent, that the world is impermanent, that the world is both permanent and impermanent, that the world is neither permanent nor impermanent; in stillness there are none of these. Why? The true nature of dharmas is ultimately pure and ungraspable; even emptiness is not accepted, how much less the four views. The four views all arise from taking, and the true nature of dharmas has no taking for them to arise from. The four views all value one's own view and despise another's, but the true nature of dharmas has no this and that. So it is said that in stillness there are no four views. As with past ages having four views, so future ages have four views as well: that the world is finite, that the world is infinite, that the world is both finite and infinite, that the world is neither finite nor infinite.
問曰:若如是破如來者,則無如來耶?
The questioner says: If the Tathagata is refuted in this way, then is there no Tathagata?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「邪見深厚者,則說無如來;
"Only those with deep wrong views say there is no Tathagata;
如來寂滅相,分別有亦非。」
the Tathagata is the mark of stillness, and it is also wrong to distinguish and say he exists."
邪見有二種:一者破世間樂;二者破涅槃道。破世間樂者是麁邪見,言無罪無福,無如來等賢聖。起是邪見,捨善為惡,則破世間樂。破涅槃道者,貪著於我,分別有無,起善滅惡。起善故得世間樂,分別有無故不得涅槃。是故若言無如來者,是深厚邪見,乃失世間樂,何況涅槃!若言有如來,亦是邪見。何以故?如來寂滅相,而種種分別故。是故寂滅相中,分別有如來亦為非。
There are two kinds of wrong view: one destroys worldly happiness, the other destroys the path to nirvana. The one that destroys worldly happiness is coarse wrong view, saying there is no sin and no merit and no Tathagata or worthy sages and so on. Giving rise to this wrong view, one gives up good and does evil, and so destroys worldly happiness. The one that destroys the path to nirvana clings to the self and distinguishes being and non-being, giving rise to good and ending evil. Giving rise to good, one gains worldly happiness, but because of distinguishing being and non-being, one does not gain nirvana. So to say there is no Tathagata is deep wrong view, losing even worldly happiness, to say nothing of nirvana! To say there is a Tathagata is also wrong view. Why? The Tathagata is the mark of stillness, yet one makes all kinds of distinctions. So in the mark of stillness, to distinguish and say there is a Tathagata is also wrong.
「如是性空中,思惟亦不可,
"So in emptiness of nature, reflection also cannot be obtained,
如來滅度後,分別於有無。」
to distinguish being and non-being after the Tathagata's extinction."
諸法實相性空故,不應於如來滅後思惟若有、若無、若有無。如來從本已來畢竟空,何況滅後!
Because the true nature of dharmas is empty of nature, one should not think after the Tathagata's extinction of whether he exists, does not exist, or both exists and does not exist. The Tathagata has been ultimately empty from the beginning, to say nothing of after his extinction!
「如來過戲論,而人生戲論,
"The Tathagata is beyond conceptual proliferation, but people give rise to conceptual proliferation,
戲論破慧眼,是皆不見佛。」
conceptual proliferation destroys the eye of wisdom, and these people cannot see the Buddha."
戲論名憶念取相分別此彼。言佛滅不滅等,是人為戲論,覆慧眼故,不能見如來法身。此〈如來品〉中,初中後思惟,如來定性不可得。是故偈說:
Conceptual proliferation (prapanca) is called recollection, grasping at marks and distinguishing this and that. When one says the Buddha is extinguished or not extinguished and so on, that person's eye of wisdom is covered by conceptual proliferation, and he cannot see the Tathagata's Dharma body. In this chapter on the Tathagata, reflecting at the beginning, middle and end, the determinate nature of the Tathagata cannot be found. So the verse says:
「如來所有性,即是世間性;
"What nature the Tathagata has is the nature of the world;
如來無有性,世間亦無性。」
the Tathagata has no nature, and the world has no nature."
此品中思惟推求,如來性即是一切世間性。
Reflecting and searching in this chapter, the nature of the Tathagata is the nature of all the world.
問曰:何等是如來性?
The questioner says: What is the nature of the Tathagata?
答曰:如來無有性,同世間無性。
The respondent says: The Tathagata has no nature, the same as the world having no nature.
中論觀顛倒品第二十三(二十四偈)
The Middle Treatise, Chapter Twenty-Three: Examination of Inversions (twenty-four verses)
問曰:
The questioner says:
「從憶想分別,生於貪恚痴,
"From recollection and discrimination, desire, hatred and delusion arise,
淨不淨顛倒,皆從眾緣生。」
the inversions of pure and impure all arise from many conditions."
經說因淨不淨顛倒,憶想分別生貪恚痴。是故當知有貪恚痴。
The sutras say that because of the inversions of pure and impure, recollection and discrimination give rise to desire, hatred and delusion. So it should be known that desire, hatred and delusion exist.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若因淨不淨,顛倒生三毒,
"If the three poisons arise because of the inversions of pure and impure,
三毒即無性,故煩惱無實。」
the three poisons have no nature, and so the afflictions are not real."
若諸煩惱因淨不淨顛倒憶想分別生,即無自性,是故諸煩惱無實。復次:
If the afflictions arise because of the inversions of pure and impure and recollection and discrimination, they have no self-nature, and so the afflictions are not real. Furthermore:
「我法有以無,是事終不成;
"The dharma of self, whether existing or not, can in the end not be established;
無我諸煩惱,有無亦不成。」
with no self, the existence or non-existence of the afflictions cannot be established either."
我無有因緣若有若無而可成,今無我諸煩惱云何以有無而可成?何以故?
The self has no cause or condition by which, whether existing or not, it can be established; now with no self, how can the afflictions be established by existence or non-existence? Why?
「誰有此煩惱,是即為不成;
"Who has these afflictions? This is not established;
若離是而有,煩惱則無屬。」
if they exist apart from this, the afflictions would have no one to belong to."
煩惱名為能惱他,惱他者應是眾生,是眾生於一切處推求不可得。若謂離眾生但有煩惱,是煩惱則無所屬。若謂雖無我而煩惱屬心,是事亦不然。何以故?
Afflictions are called what can trouble and disturb others; what troubles others should be a being, and this being cannot be found anywhere on search. If one says that apart from beings there are only afflictions, these afflictions would belong to no one. If one says that though there is no self, the afflictions belong to the mind, this too is wrong. Why?
「如身見五種,求之不可得,
"As the view of the body cannot be found by the five kinds of search,
煩惱於垢心,五求亦不得。」
the afflictions in relation to the defiled mind also cannot be found by the five kinds of search."
如身見,五陰中五種求不可得;諸煩惱亦於垢心中,五種求亦不可得。又垢心於煩惱中,五種求亦不可得。復次:
As the view of the body cannot be found in the five aggregates by the five kinds of search; so the afflictions in relation to the defiled mind cannot be found by the five kinds of search either. And the defiled mind in relation to the afflictions cannot be found by the five kinds of search either. Furthermore:
「淨不淨顛倒,是則無自性;
"The inversions of pure and impure have no self-nature;
云何因此二,而生諸煩惱?」
how can the afflictions arise depending on these two?"
淨不淨顛倒者,顛倒名虛妄。若虛妄即無性,無性則無顛倒。若無顛倒,云何因顛倒起諸煩惱?
As for the inversions of pure and impure: inversion means falsity. If false, it has no nature, and if it has no nature, there is no inversion. If there is no inversion, how can the afflictions arise from inversion?
問曰:
The questioner says:
「色聲香味觸,及法為六種,
"Form, sound, smell, taste, touch and dharmas, these six,
如是之六種,是三毒根本。」
these six are the root of the three poisons."
是六入,三毒根本,因此六入生淨不淨顛倒,因淨不淨顛倒生貪恚痴。
These six sense-bases are the root of the three poisons: because of these six sense-bases the inversions of pure and impure arise, and because of the inversions of pure and impure desire, hatred and delusion arise.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「色聲香味觸,及法體六種,
"Form, sound, smell, taste, touch and dharmas, the substance of these six,
皆空如炎夢,如乾闥婆城。
are all empty, like heat shimmer, like a dream, like the city of gandharvas.
如是六種中,何有淨不淨?
In these six, where is there pure or impure?
猶如幻化人,亦如鏡中像。」
Like a conjured person, like an image in a mirror."
色聲香味觸法自體,未與心和合時空無所有,如炎如夢,如化如鏡中像,但誑惑於心,無有定相。如是六入中,何有淨不淨?復次:
The own substance of form, sound, smell, taste, touch and dharmas, before uniting with the mind, is empty and has nothing, like a heat shimmer, like a dream, like a conjuration or an image in a mirror; it only deceives the mind and has no determinate mark. In these six sense-bases, where is there pure or impure? Furthermore:
「不因於淨相,則無有不淨;
"Not depending on the pure, there is no impure;
因淨有不淨,是故無不淨。」
it is because of the pure that there is impure, and so there is no impure."
若不因於淨,先無有不淨,因何而說不淨?是故無不淨。復次:
If not depending on the pure, there was no impure beforehand, by what is the impure called impure? So there is no impure. Furthermore:
「不因於不淨,則亦無有淨;
"Not depending on the impure, there is also no pure;
因不淨有淨,是故無有淨。」
it is because of the impure that there is pure, and so there is no pure."
若不因不淨,先無有淨,因何而說淨?是故無有淨。復次:
If not depending on the impure, there was no pure beforehand, by what is the pure called pure? So there is no pure. Furthermore:
「若無有淨者,何由而有貪?
"If there is no pure, from what could desire arise?
若無有不淨,何由而有恚?」
If there is no impure, from what could hatred arise?"
無淨不淨故,則不生貪恚。
With no pure and no impure, desire and hatred do not arise.
問曰:經說常等四顛倒。若無常中見常,是名顛倒;若無常中見無常,此非顛倒。餘三顛倒亦如是。有顛倒故,顛倒者亦應有,何故言都無?
The questioner says: The sutras speak of the four inversions beginning with permanence. If one sees permanence within the impermanent, this is called inversion; if one sees impermanence within the impermanent, this is not inversion. The other three inversions are likewise. Because there are inversions, there should also be those who invert; why do you say neither exists?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「於無常著常,是則名顛倒;
"Clinging to permanence in the impermanent is called inversion;
空中無有常,何處有常倒?」
in emptiness there is no permanence, so where is the inversion of permanence?"
若於無常中著常,名為顛倒。諸法性空中無有常,是中何處有常顛倒?餘三亦如是。復次:
If one clings to permanence within the impermanent, it is called inversion. Within the emptiness of nature of all dharmas there is no permanence, so where within this is there the inversion of permanence? The other three are likewise. Furthermore:
「若於無常中,著無常非倒;
"If one clings to impermanence within the impermanent, it is not inversion;
空中無無常,何有非顛倒?」
in emptiness there is no impermanence, so where is non-inversion?"
若著無常言是無常,不名為顛倒者,諸法性空中無無常,無常無故,誰為非顛倒?餘三亦如是。復次:
If one clings to impermanence and says this is impermanence, it is not called inversion: but within the emptiness of nature of all dharmas there is no impermanence; with no impermanence, who is non-inverted? The other three are likewise. Furthermore:
「可著著者著,及所用著法,
"The attachable, the one who attaches, the attaching, and the dharma of attaching used,
是皆寂滅相,云何而有著?」
these are all the mark of stillness; how can there still be attachment?"
可著名物,著者名作者,著名業,所用法名所用事,是皆性空寂滅相。如〈如來品〉中所說,是故無有著。復次:
The attachable is called the thing; the one who attaches is called the agent; attaching is called karma; the dharma used is called the thing used. These are all empty of nature and the mark of stillness. As explained in the chapter on the Tathagata, so there is no attachment. Furthermore:
「若無有著法,言邪是顛倒,
"If there is no dharma of attachment, to say the wrong is inversion,
言正不顛倒,誰有如是事?」
and to say the right is non-inversion, who has such matters?"
著名憶想分別此彼有無等。若無此著者,誰為邪顛倒?誰為正不顛倒?復次:
Attachment is called recollection and discrimination of this and that, being and non-being and so on. If there is no such attachment, who is the wrongly inverted? Who is the rightly non-inverted? Furthermore:
「有倒不生倒,無倒不生倒,
"One already inverted does not give rise to inversion, one not inverted does not give rise to inversion,
倒者不生倒,不倒亦不生。
the one who is inverting does not give rise to inversion, and the one not inverting does not either.
若於顛倒時,亦不生顛倒,
If at the very time of inversion, inversion also does not arise,
汝可自觀察,誰生於顛倒?」
you may observe for yourself: who gives rise to inversion?"
已顛倒者,則更不生顛倒,已顛倒故。不顛倒者亦不顛倒,無有顛倒故。顛倒時亦不顛倒,有二過故。汝今除憍慢心,善自觀察,誰為顛倒者?復次:
One already inverted gives rise to still no inversion, because he is already inverted. One not inverted also does not invert, because there is no inversion. At the very time of inverting, there is also no inversion, because there would be a double fault. Now set aside the proud mind and observe well for yourself: who is the inverted person? Furthermore:
「諸顛倒不生,云何有此義?
"If the inversions do not arise, how can this statement be established?
無有顛倒故,何有顛倒者?」
Since there is no inversion, where is the inverted person?"
顛倒種種因緣破故,墮在不生。彼貪著不生,謂不生是顛倒實相。是故偈說,云何名不生為顛倒?乃至無漏法尚不名為不生相,何況顛倒是不生相。顛倒無故,何有顛倒者?因顛倒有顛倒者。復次:
Inversion has been refuted by various causes and conditions and falls to non-arising. That side clings to non-arising and says non-arising is the true nature of inversion. So the verse says: how can non-arising be called inversion? Even undefiled dharmas are not called the mark of non-arising, much less inversion as the mark of non-arising. If inversion does not exist, where is the inverted person? Because there is inversion, there is the inverted person. Furthermore:
「若常我樂淨,而是實有者,
"If permanence, self, happiness and purity are real,
是常我樂淨,則非是顛倒。」
then these permanence, self, happiness and purity are not inversions."
若常我樂淨是四實有性者,是常我樂淨則非顛倒。何以故?定有實事故。云何言顛倒?若謂常我樂淨倒是四無者,無常苦無我不淨是四應實有,不名顛倒。顛倒相違故名不顛倒。是事不然。何以故?
If permanence, self, happiness and purity truly have nature, these permanence, self, happiness and purity are not inversions. Why? Because there is definitely a real thing. How can it be called inversion? If one says that the opposites of permanence, self, happiness and purity do not exist, then impermanence, suffering, no-self and impurity should truly exist and not be called non-inversion. Because it is called non-inversion by being opposed to inversion. This is wrong. Why?
「若常我樂淨,而實無有者;
"If permanence, self, happiness and purity truly do not exist;
無常苦不淨,是則亦應無。」
impermanence, suffering and impurity should also not exist."
若常我樂淨是四實無,無故無常等四事亦不應有。何以故?無相因待故。復次:
If permanence, self, happiness and purity truly do not exist, because they do not exist, the four things of impermanence and the rest should not exist either. Why? Because there is no mark of dependence on a counterpart. Furthermore:
「如是顛倒滅,無明則亦滅,
"Thus when inversions cease, ignorance also ceases,
以無明滅故,諸行等亦滅。」
and because ignorance has ceased, the formations and the rest also cease."
如是者,如其義。滅諸顛倒故,十二因緣根本無明亦滅,無明滅故三種行業乃至老死等皆滅。復次:
'Thus' means in accord with its meaning. When all inversions cease, ignorance, the root of the twelve links of dependent origination, also ceases; when ignorance ceases, the three kinds of formative karma, up to old age and death, all cease. Furthermore:
「若煩惱性實,而有所屬者,
"If the nature of the afflictions is real and they belong to someone,
云何當可斷?誰能斷其性?」
how can they be cut off? Who can cut off their nature?"
若諸煩惱即是顛倒而實有性者,云何可斷?誰能斷其性?若謂諸煩惱皆虛妄無性而可斷者,是亦不然。何以故?
If the afflictions are inversion and truly have a nature, how can they be cut off? Who can cut off their nature? If one says the afflictions are all false and without nature and so can be cut off, this too is wrong. Why?
「若煩惱虛妄,無性無屬者,
"If the afflictions are false, without nature and belonging to no one,
云何當可斷?誰能斷無性?」
how can they be cut off? Who can cut off what has no nature?"
若諸煩惱虛妄無性,則無所屬,云何可斷?誰能斷無性法?
If the afflictions are false and without nature, they belong to no one; how can they be cut off? Who can cut off a dharma that has no nature?
中論觀四諦品第二十四(四十偈)
The Middle Treatise, Chapter Twenty-Four: Examination of the Four Truths (forty verses)
問曰:破四顛倒,通達四諦,得四沙門果。
The questioner says: With the four inversions refuted, one penetrates the four truths and attains the four fruits of the shramana.
「若一切皆空,無生亦無滅,
"If everything is empty, with no arising and no ceasing,
如是則無有,四聖諦之法。
then there would be no such thing as the Four Noble Truths.
以無四諦故,見苦與斷集,
Because there are no Four Truths, there is no seeing suffering and cutting off its origin,
證滅及修道,如是事皆無。
realizing cessation and practicing the path; such things would not exist.
以是事無故,則無四道果;
Because these things do not exist, there are no fruits of the four paths;
無有四果故,得曏者亦無。
with no four fruits, there are also no persons who attain the fruits or approach the fruits.
若無八賢聖,則無有僧寶;
If there are no eight kinds of worthy and holy persons, there is no Sangha Jewel;
以無四諦故,亦無有法寶;
because there are no Four Truths, there is also no Dharma Jewel;
以無法僧寶,亦無有佛寶。
because there is no Dharma Jewel or Sangha Jewel, there is also no Buddha Jewel.
如是說空者,是則破三寶。」
One who speaks of emptiness in this way thereby destroys the Three Jewels."
若一切世間皆空無所有者,即應無生無滅。以無生無滅故,則無四聖諦。何以故?從集諦生苦諦,集諦是因、苦諦是果。滅苦集諦名為滅諦,能至滅諦名為道諦。道諦是因、滅諦是果。如是四諦有因有果,若無生無滅則無四諦。四諦無故,則無見苦、斷集、證滅、修道。見苦斷集證滅修道無故,則無四沙門果。四沙門果無故,則無四向四得者。若無此八賢聖,則無僧寶。又四聖諦無故,法寶亦無。若無法寶、僧寶者,云何有佛?得法名為佛,無法何有佛?汝說諸法皆空,則壞三寶。復次:
If all the world were empty and without anything, there should be no arising and no ceasing. Because there is no arising and ceasing, there would be no Four Noble Truths. Why? From the truth of the origin arises the truth of suffering; the origin is the cause and suffering is the result. The extinction of suffering and its origin is called the truth of cessation, and what can reach the truth of cessation is called the truth of the path. The path is the cause and cessation is the result. Thus the Four Truths have causes and results; if there is no arising and ceasing, there are no Four Truths. Without the Four Truths, there is no seeing suffering, cutting off the origin, realizing cessation and cultivating the path. Without seeing suffering, cutting off the origin, realizing cessation and cultivating the path, there are no four fruits of the shramana. Without the four fruits of the shramana, there are no persons of the four approaches and the four attainments. If there are no such eight worthy and noble ones, there is no Sangha Jewel. And if the Four Noble Truths do not exist, neither does the Dharma Jewel. If there are no Dharma Jewel and Sangha Jewel, how could there still be a Buddha? One who attains the Dharma is called Buddha; without the Dharma, where is the Buddha? You say all dharmas are empty, and so you destroy the Three Jewels. Moreover:
「空法壞因果,亦壞於罪福,
"The doctrine of emptiness destroys cause and effect, and also destroys sin and merit,
亦復悉毀壞,一切世俗法。」
and moreover wholly destroys all worldly dharmas."
若受空法者,則破罪福及罪福果報,亦破世俗法。有如是等諸過故,諸法不應空。
If one accepts the doctrine of emptiness, one breaks sin and merit and their retributions, and also breaks worldly dharmas. With such various faults, dharmas should not be empty.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「汝今實不能,知空空因緣,
"You now truly cannot know emptiness, the causes and conditions of emptiness,
及知於空義,是故自生惱。」
and the meaning of emptiness, and so you yourself give rise to distress."
汝不解云何是空相?以何因緣說空?亦不解空義。不能如實知故,生如是疑難。復次:
You do not understand what the characteristic of emptiness is. On what causes and conditions does one speak of emptiness? And you do not understand the meaning of emptiness. Not knowing it as it really is, you give rise to such objections. Moreover:
「諸佛依二諦,為眾生說法:
"The Buddhas, relying on the two truths, teach the Dharma to beings:
一以世俗諦,二第一義諦。
the first is the conventional truth, and the second is the ultimate truth.
若人不能知,分別於二諦,
If a person cannot know and distinguish these two truths,
則於深佛法,不知真實義。」
then regarding the profound Buddha-Dharma he does not know the real meaning."
世俗諦者,一切法性空,而世間顛倒,故生虛妄法,於世間是實。諸賢聖真知顛倒性,故知一切法皆空無生,於聖人是第一義諦名為實。諸佛依是二諦,而為眾生說法。若人不能如實分別二諦,則於甚深佛法不知實義。若謂一切法不生是第一義諦,不須第二俗諦者,是亦不然。何以故?
What is called the conventional truth: all dharmas are empty by nature, but the world is inverted, and so false dharmas arise, and in the world this is regarded as real. The worthy and noble truly know the nature of inversion and so know that all dharmas are empty and unborn; for the noble this is the ultimate truth, called real. The Buddhas, relying on these two truths, teach the Dharma to beings. If a person cannot distinguish the two truths as they really are, he does not know the real meaning of the profound Buddha-Dharma. If one says that the non-arising of all dharmas is the ultimate truth and there is no need for a second, conventional truth, this too is wrong. Why?
「若不依俗諦,不得第一義;
"If one does not rely on the conventional truth, one cannot attain the ultimate meaning;
不得第一義,則不得涅槃。」
if one does not attain the ultimate meaning, one cannot attain nirvana."
第一義皆因言說,言說是世俗,是故若不依世俗,第一義則不可說。若不得第一義,云何得至涅槃?是故諸法雖無生,而有二諦。復次:
The ultimate meaning is entirely dependent on speech, and speech is conventional; so if one does not rely on the conventional, the ultimate meaning cannot be spoken. If one cannot attain the ultimate meaning, how can one reach nirvana? So although dharmas are unborn, there are the two truths. Moreover:
「不能正觀空,鈍根則自害,
"Not rightly contemplating emptiness, the dull-witted harm themselves,
如不善呪術,不善捉毒蛇。」
like one who does not use a spell well or does not seize a venomous snake well."
若人鈍根不善解空法,於空有失而生邪見。如為利捉毒蛇,不能善捉反為所害。又如呪術,欲有所作不能善成則還自害。鈍根觀空法亦如是。復次:
If a person is dull-witted and does not understand the doctrine of emptiness well, he finds fault with emptiness and gives rise to wrong views. It is like seizing a venomous snake for gain: unable to seize it well, he is instead harmed by it. It is also like a spell: wishing to accomplish something but unable to do it well, he instead harms himself. The dull-witted contemplating the doctrine of emptiness are likewise. Moreover:
「世尊知是法,甚深微妙相,
"The World-Honored One knew that this Dharma has a profound and subtle characteristic,
非鈍根所及,是故不欲說。」
which the dull-witted cannot reach, and so was unwilling to teach it."
世尊以法甚深微妙,非鈍根所解,是故不欲說。復次:
Because the Dharma is profound and subtle and cannot be understood by the dull-witted, the World-Honored One was unwilling to teach it. Moreover:
「汝謂我著空,而為我生過;
"You think that I cling to emptiness, and so you produce faults for me;
汝今所說過,於空則無有。」
the faults you now speak of do not exist in emptiness."
汝謂我著空故,為我生過。我所說性空,空亦復空,無如是過。復次:
You think that I cling to emptiness, and so you produce faults for me. The emptiness of nature I speak of is itself also empty, and has no such faults. Moreover:
「以有空義故,一切法得成;
"Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas can be established;
若無空義者,一切則不成。」
if there were no meaning of emptiness, nothing at all could be established."
以有空義故,一切世間、出世間法皆悉成就。若無空義,則皆不成就。復次:
Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all worldly and supramundane dharmas are accomplished. If there were no meaning of emptiness, none would be accomplished. Moreover:
「汝今自有過,而以迴向我,
"You yourself now have the fault, yet you turn it onto me,
如人乘馬者,自忘於所乘。」
like a person riding a horse who forgets the horse he is riding."
汝於有法中有過不能自覺,而於空中見過,如人乘馬而忘其所乘。何以故?
You have faults within the dharmas that exist yet cannot notice them yourself, and instead see faults in emptiness, like a person riding a horse who forgets the one he rides. Why?
「若汝見諸法,決定有性者,
"If you see that dharmas definitely have a nature,
即為見諸法,無因亦無緣。」
then you see that dharmas have no cause and no condition."
汝說諸法有定性。若爾者,則見諸法無因無緣。何以故?若法決定有性,則應不生不滅,如是法何用因緣?若諸法從因緣生,則無有性。是故諸法決定有性,則無因緣。若謂諸法決定住自性,是則不然。何以故?
You say that dharmas have a fixed nature. If so, you are seeing that dharmas have no cause and no condition. Why? If a dharma definitely has a nature, it should not arise or cease; what use would such a dharma have for causes and conditions? If dharmas arise from causes and conditions, they have no nature. So if dharmas definitely have a nature, there are no causes and conditions. If you say dharmas definitely abide in self-nature, that is wrong. Why?
「即為破因果,作作者作法,
"That would be to break cause and effect, doing, the doer and the act of doing,
亦復壞一切,萬物之生滅。」
and moreover to destroy the arising and ceasing of all things."
諸法有定性,則無因果等諸事。如偈說:
If dharmas have a fixed nature, there are no such matters as cause and effect. As the verse says:
「眾因緣生法,我說即是無,
"The dharmas that arise from many causes and conditions I say are empty,
亦為是假名,亦是中道義。
they are also a provisional name, and also the meaning of the middle way.
未曾有一法,不從因緣生,
There has never been a single dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions,
是故一切法,無不是空者。」
and so there is no dharma that is not empty."
眾因緣生法,我說即是空。何以故?眾緣具足和合而物生,是物屬眾因緣故無自性,無自性故空,空亦復空。但為引導眾生故,以假名說,離有無二邊,故名為中道。是法無性故不得言有,亦無空故不得言無。若法有性相,則不待眾緣而有,若不待眾緣則無法,是故無有不空法。汝上所說空法有過者,此過今還在汝。何以故?
The dharmas that arise from many causes and conditions I say are empty. Why? When many conditions are complete and come together, things arise; this thing belongs to the many causes and conditions, and so has no self-nature; because it has no self-nature, it is empty; and emptiness too is empty. Only to guide beings is it spoken of by a provisional name, leaving the two extremes of being and non-being, and so it is called the middle way. This dharma has no nature, so one cannot say it exists; nor is there emptiness, so one cannot say it does not exist. If a dharma had a characteristic of nature, it would exist without depending on many conditions; if it did not depend on many conditions, there would be no dharma. So there is no dharma that is not empty. The fault you spoke of above, that the doctrine of emptiness has faults, that fault is still on your side now. Why?
「若一切不空,則無有生滅,
"If everything were not empty, there would be no arising and ceasing,
如是則無有,四聖諦之法。」
and thus there would be no such thing as the Four Noble Truths."
若一切法各各有性不空者,則無有生滅。無生滅故,則無四聖諦法。何以故?
If all dharmas each had a nature and were not empty, there would be no arising and ceasing. Without arising and ceasing, there would be no dharma of the Four Noble Truths. Why?
「苦不從緣生,云何當有苦?
"If suffering did not arise from conditions, how could there be suffering?
無常是苦義,定性無無常。」
Impermanence is the meaning of suffering, and a fixed nature has no impermanence."
苦不從緣生故則無苦。何以故?經說無常是苦義。若苦有定性,云何有無常?以不捨自性故。復次:
If suffering did not arise from conditions, there would be no suffering. Why? The sutra says impermanence is the meaning of suffering. If suffering had a fixed nature, how could there still be impermanence? Because it does not give up its own nature. Moreover:
「若苦有定性,何故從集生?
"If suffering had a fixed nature, why would it arise from the origin?
是故無有集,以破空義故。」
So there would be no origin, because the meaning of emptiness would be broken."
若苦有定性者,則不應更生,先已有故。若爾者,則無集諦,以壞空義故。復次:
If suffering had a fixed nature, it should not arise again, because it already existed before. If so, there would be no truth of the origin, because the meaning of emptiness would have been destroyed. Moreover:
「苦若有定性,則不應有滅。
"If suffering had a fixed nature, there should be no cessation.
汝著定性故,即破於滅諦。」
If you cling to a fixed nature, you break the truth of cessation."
苦若有定性者,則不應滅。何以故?性則無滅故。復次:
If suffering had a fixed nature, it should not cease. Why? A nature would not cease. Moreover:
「苦若有定性,則無有修道;
"If suffering had a fixed nature, there would be no cultivation of the path;
若道可修習,即無有定性。」
if the path can be cultivated, there is no fixed nature."
法若定有,則無有修道。何以故?若法實者則是常,常則不可增益。若道可修,道則無有定性。復次:
If a dharma definitely exists, there is no cultivating the path. Why? If a dharma is real, it is permanent, and what is permanent cannot be augmented. If the path can be cultivated, the path has no fixed nature. Moreover:
「若無有苦諦,及無集滅諦,
"If there were no truth of suffering, and no truths of origin and cessation,
所可滅苦道,竟為何所至?」
to what would the path that can end suffering ultimately lead?"
諸法若先定有性,則無苦集滅諦。今滅苦道,竟為至何滅苦處?復次:
If dharmas earlier definitely had a nature, there would be no truths of suffering, origin and cessation. Now the path that ends suffering, to what place of ending suffering would it finally lead? Moreover:
「若苦定有性,先來所不見,
"If suffering definitely had a nature, it was never seen before,
於今云何見?其性不異故。」
so how is it seen now? Because its nature does not differ."
若先凡夫時不能見苦性,今亦不應見。何以故?不見性定故。復次:
If earlier, in the time of the ordinary person, one could not see the nature of suffering, one should not see it now either. Why? The nature of what was not seen is fixed. Moreover:
「如見苦不然,斷集及證滅,
"If seeing suffering is not right, so too cutting off the origin and realizing cessation,
修道及四果,是亦皆不然。」
cultivating the path and the four fruits, these too are all not right."
如苦諦性,先不見者後亦不應見。如是亦不應有斷集、證滅、修道。何以故?是集性先來不斷,今亦不應斷,性不可斷故。滅先來不證,今亦不應證,先來不證故。道先來不修,今亦不應修,先來不修故。是故四聖諦見斷證修四種行,皆不應有。四種行無故,四道果亦無。何以故?
Like the nature of the truth of suffering, what was not seen before should not be seen afterward. Thus there should also be no cutting off the origin, realizing cessation or cultivating the path. Why? The nature of this origin was never cut off before, and should not be cut off now, because a nature cannot be cut off. Cessation was never realized before, and should not be realized now, because it was not realized before. The path was never cultivated before, and should not be cultivated now, because it was not cultivated before. So the four practices of seeing, cutting off, realizing and cultivating the Four Noble Truths should not exist. Without the four practices, there are no four fruits of the path either. Why?
「是四道果性,先來不可得;
"The nature of these four fruits of the path could never be found before;
諸法性若定,今云何可得?」
if the nature of dharmas is fixed, how could it be obtained now?"
諸法若有定性,四沙門果先來未得,今云何可得?若可得者,性則無定。復次:
If dharmas have a fixed nature, the four fruits of the shramana were never obtained before, so how could they be obtained now? If they can be obtained, the nature is not fixed. Moreover:
「若無有四果,則無得曏者,
"If there are no four fruits, there are no persons who have attained the fruit or are approaching the fruit,
以無八聖故,則無有僧寶。」
and because there are no eight noble ones, there is no Sangha Jewel."
無四沙門果故,則無得果、向果者。無八賢聖故,則無有僧寶。而經說八賢聖,名為僧寶。復次:
Without the four fruits of the shramana, there are no persons who have attained the fruit or are approaching it. Without the eight worthy and noble ones, there is no Sangha Jewel. Yet the sutra says that the eight worthy and noble ones are called the Sangha Jewel. Moreover:
「無四聖諦故,亦無有法寶,
"Without the Four Noble Truths, there is also no Dharma Jewel,
無法寶僧寶,云何有佛寶?」
and without the Dharma Jewel and the Sangha Jewel, how could there be the Buddha Jewel?"
行四聖諦得涅槃法,若無四諦則無法寶,若無二寶云何當有佛寶?汝以如是因緣,說諸法定性,則壞三寶。
By practicing the Four Noble Truths one attains the Dharma of nirvana; without the Four Truths there is no Dharma Jewel, and without two jewels how could there still be the Buddha Jewel? By using such causes and conditions to say that dharmas have a fixed nature, you destroy the Three Jewels.
問曰:汝雖破諸法,究竟道阿耨多羅三藐三菩提應有,因是道故名為佛。
The questioner says: Although you break all dharmas, the ultimate path of anuttara-samyaksambodhi (unsurpassed perfect enlightenment) should exist, because by this path one is called a Buddha.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「汝說則不因,菩提而有佛;
"By what you say, there would be no Buddha because of bodhi;
亦復不因佛,而有於菩提。」
nor would there be bodhi because of the Buddha."
汝說諸法有定性者,則不應因菩提有佛、因佛有菩提,是二性常定故。復次:
You say that dharmas have a fixed nature, so there should be no Buddha because of bodhi nor bodhi because of the Buddha, because the nature of these two is always fixed. Moreover:
「雖復勤精進,修行菩提道,
"Even if one diligently and vigorously practices the path of bodhi,
若先非佛性,不應得成佛。」
if one was not of Buddha-nature before, one should not be able to become a Buddha."
以先無性故,如鐵無金性,雖復種種鍛煉終不成金。復次:
Because there was no nature before, like iron has no nature of gold, though it is refined in various ways it will never become gold. Moreover:
「若諸法不空,無作罪福者,
"If dharmas were not empty, there would be no one who creates sin and merit,
不空何所作?以其性定故。」
if not empty, what would one make? Because its nature would be fixed."
若諸法不空,終無有人作罪福者。何以故?罪福性先已定故,又無作作者故。復次:
If dharmas were not empty, in the end there would be no one who creates sin and merit. Why? The nature of sin and merit would already have been fixed earlier, and there would be no doing and no doer. Moreover:
「汝於罪福中,不生果報者,
"If within sin and merit you produce no retribution,
是則離罪福,而有諸果報。」
then retributions would exist apart from sin and merit."
汝於罪福因緣中皆無果報者,則應離罪福因緣而有果報。何以故?果報不待因出故。
If in the causes and conditions of sin and merit there is no retribution, then retribution should exist apart from the causes and conditions of sin and merit. Why? Because retribution would come out without waiting for a cause.
問曰:離罪福可無善惡果報,但從罪福有善惡果報。
The questioner says: apart from sin and merit there can be no retribution of good and evil, and only from sin and merit are there good and evil retributions.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若謂從罪福,而生果報者,
"If you say retribution is produced from sin and merit,
果從罪福生,云何言不空?」
the result arising from sin and merit, how can you still say it is not empty?"
若離罪福無善惡果,云何言果不空?若爾,離作者則無罪福。汝先說諸法不空,是事不然。復次:
If apart from sin and merit there are no good or evil results, how can you say the results are not empty? If so, apart from the doer there is no sin or merit. What you said earlier, that dharmas are not empty, is wrong. Moreover:
「汝破一切法,諸因緣空義,
"If you break the meaning of emptiness of all dharmas and all causes and conditions,
則破於世俗,諸餘所有法。」
you break all the other worldly dharmas."
汝若破眾因緣法第一空義者,則破一切世俗法。何以故?
If you break the primary meaning of emptiness of the dharmas of many causes and conditions, you break all worldly dharmas. Why?
「若破於空義,即應無所作;
"If the meaning of emptiness is broken, there should be nothing done;
無作而有作,不作名作者。」
with no doing yet there is doing, and the one who does not do is called the doer."
若破空義,則一切果皆無作無因,又不作而作,又一切作者不應有所作,又離作者應有業、有果報、有受者。但是事皆不然,是故不應破空。復次:
If the meaning of emptiness is broken, all results would have no doing and no cause, and there would be doing without doing, and no doer should do anything, and apart from the doer there should be karma, retribution and a receiver. But all these are wrong, so emptiness should not be broken. Moreover:
「若有決定性,世間種種相,
"If there were a fixed nature, the various characteristics of the world
則不生不滅,常住而不壞。」
would be unborn and unceasing, abiding forever and indestructible."
若諸法有定性,則世間種種相,天、人、畜生、萬物,皆應不生不滅常住不壞。何以故?有實性不可變異故。而現見萬物各有變異相生滅變易,是故不應有定性。復次:
If dharmas had a fixed nature, the various characteristics of the world, gods, humans, animals and all things, should be unborn and unceasing, abiding forever and indestructible. Why? Because they would have a real nature that cannot change. Yet what we see before us is that all things have changing characteristics, arising, ceasing and changing, so there should not be a fixed nature. Moreover:
「若無有空者,未得不應得,
"If there were no emptiness, what has not been attained should not be attained,
亦無斷煩惱,亦無苦盡事。」
and there would be no cutting off of afflictions and no ending of suffering."
若無有空法者,則世間、出世間所有功德,未得者皆不應得,亦不應有斷煩惱者,亦無苦盡。何以故?以性定故。
If there were no dharma of emptiness, then all the merits of the world and beyond the world, what has not been attained should not be attained, there should be no one who cuts off afflictions, and no ending of suffering. Why? Because the nature would be fixed.
「是故經中說,若見因緣法,
"So the sutra says, if one sees the dharma of dependent origination,
則為能見佛,見苦集滅道。」
one can see the Buddha and see suffering, origin, cessation and the path."
若人見一切法從眾緣生,是人即能見佛法身,增益智慧,能見四聖諦苦集滅道,見四聖諦得四果滅諸苦惱,是故不應破空義。若破空義則破因緣法,破因緣法則破三寶,若破三寶則為自破。
If a person sees that all dharmas arise from many conditions, this person can see the Dharma body of the Buddha, increase in wisdom, and can see the Four Noble Truths of suffering, origin, cessation and path; seeing the Four Noble Truths, he attains the four fruits and extinguishes all suffering and distress. So the meaning of emptiness should not be broken. If the meaning of emptiness is broken, the dharma of dependent origination is broken; if the dharma of dependent origination is broken, the Three Jewels are broken, and if the Three Jewels are broken, one is breaking oneself.
中論觀涅槃品第二十五(二十四偈)
Madhyamaka Treatise: Examination of Nirvana, Chapter 25 (twenty-four verses)
問曰:
The questioner says:
「若一切法空,無生無滅者,
"If all dharmas are empty, without arising and without ceasing,
何斷何所滅,而稱為涅槃?」
what is cut off and what is extinguished that it is called nirvana?"
若一切法空,則無生無滅。無生無滅者,何所斷何所滅,而名為涅槃?是故一切法不應空。以諸法不空故,斷諸煩惱滅五陰,名為涅槃。
If all dharmas are empty, there is no arising and no ceasing. With no arising and ceasing, what is cut off and what is extinguished, so as to be called nirvana? So all dharmas should not be empty. Because dharmas are not empty, cutting off the afflictions and extinguishing the five aggregates is called nirvana.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若諸法不空,則無生無滅;
"If dharmas are not empty, there is no arising and no ceasing;
何斷何所滅,而稱為涅槃?」
what is cut off and what is extinguished that it is called nirvana?"
若一切世間不空,則無生無滅,何所斷何所滅而名為涅槃?是故有無二門,則非至涅槃。所名涅槃者:
If all the world is not empty, there is no arising and no ceasing; what is cut off and what is extinguished to be called nirvana? So neither the door of being nor the door of non-being reaches nirvana. What is called nirvana:
「無得亦無至,不斷亦不常,
"Without attainment and without arrival, neither cut off nor permanent,
不生亦不滅,是說名涅槃。」
neither arising nor ceasing: this is called nirvana."
無得者,於行於果無所得。無至者,無處可至。不斷者,五陰先來畢竟空故,得道入無餘涅槃時亦無所斷。不常者,若有法可得分別者則名為常,涅槃寂滅無法可分別故,不名為常。生滅亦爾,如是相者名為涅槃。復次經說,涅槃非有、非無、非有無、非非有非非無,一切法不受,內寂滅名涅槃。何以故?
What is called no attainment: there is nothing attained in practice or in the result. What is called no arrival: there is no place to arrive at. What is called not cut off: the five aggregates have been ultimately empty from the beginning, and when one attains the Way and enters nirvana without remainder there is also nothing cut off. What is called not permanent: if there were a dharma that could be attained and distinguished, it would be called permanent; nirvana is quiescent and there is no dharma to distinguish, and so it is not called permanent. Arising and ceasing are likewise. Having such characteristics is called nirvana. Furthermore the sutra says: nirvana is neither existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, nor neither existent nor non-existent; it receives no dharma, and inner quiescence is called nirvana. Why?
「涅槃不名有,有則老死相;
"Nirvana is not called existence, for existence is the characteristic of aging and death;
終無有有法,離於老死相。」
in the end there is no existing dharma apart from the characteristic of aging and death."
眼見一切萬物皆生滅故,是老死相。涅槃若是有,則應有老死相。但是事不然,是故涅槃不名有。又不見離生滅老死別有定法而名涅槃。若涅槃是有,即應有生滅老死相;以離老死相故,名為涅槃。復次:
The eyes see all things arising and ceasing, and this is the characteristic of aging and death. If nirvana were existent, it should have the characteristic of aging and death. But this is wrong, so nirvana is not called existent. Also, one does not see any fixed dharma apart from arising, ceasing, aging and death that is called nirvana. If nirvana were existent, it should have the characteristics of arising, ceasing, aging and death; it is called nirvana because it is apart from the characteristic of aging and death. Moreover:
「若涅槃是有,涅槃即有為;
"If nirvana were existent, nirvana would be conditioned;
終無有一法,而是無為者。」
in the end there is no dharma that is unconditioned."
涅槃非是有。何以故?一切萬物從眾緣生,皆是有為。無有一法名為無為者,雖常法假名無為,以理推之,無常法尚無有,何況常法不可見不可得者。復次:
Nirvana is not existent. Why? All things arise from many conditions and are all conditioned. There is no dharma called unconditioned. Although a permanent dharma is provisionally called unconditioned, when one seeks according to reason, even an impermanent dharma is absent, let alone a permanent dharma that cannot be seen or found. Moreover:
「若涅槃是有,云何名無受?
"If nirvana were existent, how could it be called without grasping?
無有不從受,而名為有法。」
There is no existing dharma that does not come from grasping."
若謂涅槃是有法者,經則不應說無受是涅槃。何以故?無有有法不受而有,是故涅槃非有。
If one says nirvana is an existing dharma, the sutra should not say that non-grasping is nirvana. Why? There is no existing dharma that exists without grasping, so nirvana is not existent.
問曰:若有非涅槃者,無應是涅槃耶?
The questioner says: If existence is not nirvana, should non-existence be nirvana?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「有尚非涅槃,何況於無耶!
"Even existence is not nirvana, let alone non-existence!
涅槃無有有,何處當有無?」
Nirvana has no existence; how could there be non-existence?"
若有非涅槃,無云何是涅槃?何以故?因有故有無;若無有,何有無?如經說,先有今無則名無。涅槃則不爾。何以故?非有法變為無故。是故無亦不作涅槃。復次:
If existence is not nirvana, how can non-existence be nirvana? Why? Because there is existence there is non-existence; if there were no existence, where would non-existence be? As the sutra says, what was before and now is not is called non-existence. Nirvana is not like this. Why? It is not that an existing dharma turns into non-existence. So non-existence also is not made nirvana. Moreover:
「若無是涅槃,云何名不受?
"If non-existence were nirvana, how could it be called non-grasping?
未曾有不受,而名為無法。」
There has never been a non-grasping that is called a non-existing dharma."
若謂無是涅槃,經則不應說不受名涅槃。何以故?無有不受而名無法,是故知涅槃非無。
If one says non-existence is nirvana, the sutra should not say that non-grasping is called nirvana. Why? There is no non-grasping that is called a non-existent dharma, so we know nirvana is not non-existence.
問曰:若涅槃非有非無者,何等是涅槃?
The questioner says: If nirvana is neither existence nor non-existence, what is nirvana?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「受諸因緣故,輪轉生死中;
"Receiving the various causes and conditions, one revolves in birth and death;
不受諸因緣,是名為涅槃。」
not receiving the various causes and conditions, this is called nirvana."
不如實知顛倒故,因五受陰往來生死。如實知顛倒故,則不復因五受陰往來生死。無性五陰不復相續故,說名涅槃。復次:
Because one does not know things as they really are and is inverted, one comes and goes in birth and death relying on the five aggregates of grasping. Knowing the inversion as it really is, one no longer comes and goes in birth and death relying on the five aggregates of grasping. The five aggregates, being without nature, no longer continue, and so it is called nirvana. Moreover:
「如佛經中說,斷有斷非有;
"As is said in the Buddha's sutras, cut off existence and cut off non-existence;
是故知涅槃,非有亦非無。」
so know that nirvana is neither existence nor non-existence."
有名三有,非有名三有斷滅。佛說斷此二事故,當知涅槃非有亦非無。
Existence is called the three realms of existence; non-existence is called the cutting off and extinction of the three realms. The Buddha said to cut off these two things, so one should know that nirvana is neither existence nor non-existence.
問曰:若有若無非涅槃者,今有無共合是涅槃耶?
The questioner says: If neither existence nor non-existence is nirvana, is it then existence and non-existence combined that is nirvana?
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若謂於有無,合為涅槃者,
"If one says that existence and non-existence combined are nirvana,
有無即解脫,是事則不然。」
then existence and non-existence would be liberation, and this is not right."
若謂於有無合為涅槃者,即有無二事合為解脫。是事不然。何以故?有無二事相違故,云何一處有?復次:
If one says existence and non-existence combined are nirvana, then these two things combined would be liberation. This is wrong. Why? Existence and non-existence are contradictory; how could they be in one place? Moreover:
「若謂於有無,合為涅槃者;
"If one says existence and non-existence combined are nirvana;
涅槃非無受,是二從受生。」
then nirvana would not be non-grasping, for both arise from grasping."
若謂有無合為涅槃者,經不應說涅槃名無受。何以故?有無二事從受生,相因而有。是故有無二事,不得合為涅槃。復次:
If one says existence and non-existence combined are nirvana, the sutra should not say that nirvana is called non-grasping. Why? Existence and non-existence arise from grasping and exist depending on each other. So existence and non-existence cannot combine to be nirvana. Moreover:
「有無共合成,云何名涅槃?
"Existence and non-existence together make up, how can it be called nirvana?
涅槃名無為,有無是有為。」
Nirvana is called unconditioned, whereas existence and non-existence are conditioned."
有無二事共合,不得名涅槃。涅槃名無為,有無是有為,是故有無非是涅槃。復次:
Existence and non-existence together made up cannot be called nirvana. Nirvana is called unconditioned, whereas existence and non-existence are conditioned, so existence and non-existence are not nirvana. Moreover:
「有無二事共,云何是涅槃?
"How can existence and non-existence together be nirvana?
是二不同處,如明暗不俱。」
These two do not occur in the same place, like light and darkness cannot coexist."
有無二事不得名涅槃。何以故?有無相違,一處不可得,如明暗不俱。是故有時無無、無時無有,云何有無共合而名為涅槃?
Existence and non-existence cannot be called nirvana. Why? Existence and non-existence contradict each other and cannot be found in one place, like light and darkness cannot be at the same time. So when there is existence there is no non-existence, and when there is non-existence there is no existence; how can existence and non-existence together make up what is called nirvana?
問曰:若有無共合非涅槃者,今非有非無應是涅槃。
The questioner says: If existence and non-existence together are not nirvana, then neither-existence-nor-non-existence should be nirvana.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「若非有非無,名之為涅槃;
"If neither existence nor non-existence is called nirvana;
此非有非無,以何而分別?」
by what is this neither existence nor non-existence distinguished?"
若涅槃非有非無者,此非有非無因何而分別?是故非有非無是涅槃者,是事不然。復次:
If nirvana is neither existent nor non-existent, by what is this neither-existent-nor-non-existent distinguished? So it is wrong that neither existence nor non-existence is nirvana. Moreover:
「分別非有無,如是名涅槃;
"Distinguishing neither existence nor non-existence, one calls it nirvana;
若有無成者,非有非無成。」
if existence and non-existence could be established, then neither existence nor non-existence would be established."
汝分別非有非無是涅槃者,是事不然。何以故?若有無成者,然後非有非無成。有相違名無、無相違名有,是有無第三句中已破。有無無故,云何有非有非無?是故涅槃非非有非非無。復次:
Your distinguishing neither existence nor non-existence as nirvana is wrong. Why? Only if existence and non-existence could be established could neither existence nor non-existence then be established. What contradicts existence is called non-existence, and what contradicts non-existence is called existence; this existence and non-existence has already been refuted in the third phrase. If existence and non-existence do not exist, how could there still be neither existence nor non-existence? So nirvana is not neither non-existence nor non-non-existence. Moreover:
「如來滅度後,不言有與無,
"After the Tathagata's extinction, one does not say existence or non-existence,
亦不言有無,非有及非無。
nor both existence and non-existence, nor neither existence nor non-existence.
如來現在時,不言有與無,
While the Tathagata is present, one does not say existence or non-existence,
亦不言有無,非有及非無。」
nor both existence and non-existence, nor neither existence nor non-existence."
若如來滅後、若現在,有如來亦不受,無如來亦不受,亦有如來亦無如來亦不受,非有如來非無如來亦不受。以不受故,不應分別涅槃有無等。離如來,誰當得涅槃?何時何處以何法說涅槃?是故一切時一切種、求涅槃相不可得。復次:
Whether after the Tathagata's extinction or now: one does not accept that a Tathagata exists, does not accept that a Tathagata does not exist, does not accept both that he exists and does not exist, and does not accept that he neither exists nor does not exist. Because one does not accept them, one should not distinguish nirvana as existent or non-existent and so on. Apart from the Tathagata, who should attain nirvana? At what time, in what place, and by what dharma would one speak of nirvana? So at all times and in all kinds, when one seeks the characteristic of nirvana it cannot be found. Moreover:
「涅槃與世間,無有少分別;
"Nirvana and the world have not the slightest distinction;
世間與涅槃,亦無少分別。」
the world and nirvana also have not the slightest distinction."
五陰相續往來因緣故,說名世間。五陰性畢竟空無受寂滅,此義先已說。以一切法不生不滅故,世間與涅槃無有分別,涅槃與世間亦無分別。復次:
The causes and conditions of the continued coming and going of the five aggregates are called the world. The nature of the five aggregates is ultimately empty, without grasping and quiescent; this meaning has been explained earlier. Because all dharmas are unborn and unceasing, the world and nirvana have no distinction, and nirvana and the world have no distinction. Moreover:
「涅槃之實際,及與世間際,
"The actual limit of nirvana and the limit of the world,
如是二際者,無毫釐差別。」
these two limits have not a hair's breadth of difference."
究竟推求世間、涅槃、實際、無生際,以平等不可得故,無毫釐差別。復次:
Seeking ultimately the world, nirvana, the actual limit and the limit of non-arising, they are equal and cannot be found, and there is not a hair's breadth of difference. Moreover:
「滅後有無等,有邊等常等,
"After extinction, existence and non-existence and the like, finite and the like, permanent and the like,
諸見依涅槃,未來過去世。」
the various views depend on nirvana, the future and the past."
如來滅後有如來、無如來、亦有如來亦無如來、非有如來非無如來。世間有邊、世間無邊、世間亦有邊亦無邊、世間非有邊非無邊。世間常、世間無常、世間亦常亦無常、世間非有常非無常。此三種十二見。如來滅後有無等四見,依涅槃起。世間有邊無邊等四見,依未來世起。世間常無常等四見,依過去世起。如來滅後有無等不可得,涅槃亦如是。如世間前際後際、有邊無邊、有常無常等不可得,涅槃亦如是。是故說世間、涅槃等無有異。復次:
After the Tathagata's extinction: a Tathagata exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, neither exists nor does not exist. The world is finite, the world is infinite, the world is both finite and infinite, the world is neither finite nor infinite. The world is permanent, the world is impermanent, the world is both permanent and impermanent, the world is neither permanent nor impermanent. These are three kinds of twelve views. The four views of existence and non-existence after the Tathagata's extinction arise in dependence on nirvana. The four views of the world being finite or infinite and so on arise in dependence on the future. The four views of the world being permanent or impermanent and so on arise in dependence on the past. The existence and non-existence and so on after the Tathagata's extinction cannot be found, and nirvana is likewise. Just as the world's earlier and later limits, finite and infinite, permanent and impermanent cannot be found, nirvana is likewise. So it is said that the world and nirvana and so on have no difference. Moreover:
「一切法空故,何有邊無邊,
"All dharmas are empty; where could there be finite or infinite,
亦邊亦無邊,非有非無邊?
both finite and infinite, neither finite nor infinite?
何者為一異,何有常無常,
What is one or different, where is permanent or impermanent,
亦常亦無常,非常非無常?
both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent?
諸法不可得,滅一切戲論,
Dharmas cannot be found, all conceptual proliferation is extinguished,
無人亦無處,佛亦無所說。」
there is no person and no place, and the Buddha has nothing that he taught."
一切法、一切時、一切種,從眾緣生故,畢竟空故無自性。如是法中,何者是有邊,誰為有邊?何者是無邊,亦有邊亦無邊,非有邊非無邊。誰為非有邊非無邊?何者是常,誰為是常?何者是無常,常無常非常非無常,誰為非常非無常?何者身即是神,何者身異於神?如是等六十二邪見,於畢竟空中皆不可得。諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。戲論滅故,通達諸法實相得安隱道。從〈因緣品〉來,分別推求諸法,有亦無、無亦無、有無亦無、非有非無亦無,是名諸法實相,亦名如,法性,實際,涅槃。是故如來無時無處為人說涅槃定相,是故說諸有所得皆息、戲論皆滅。
All dharmas, at all times and of all kinds, arise from many conditions, and so are ultimately empty and so have no self-nature. In such a dharma, what is finite, and who is finite? What is infinite, both finite and infinite, neither finite nor infinite? Who is neither finite nor infinite? What is permanent, and who is permanent? What is impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent, and who is neither permanent nor impermanent? What is that the body is the spirit, and what is that the body differs from the spirit? Such sixty-two wrong views cannot be found within ultimate emptiness. All that is attained is stilled and all conceptual proliferation is extinguished. With conceptual proliferation extinguished, one penetrates the real characteristic of dharmas and attains the path of peace. From the chapter on conditions onward, dharmas have been distinguished and sought: existence is not found, non-existence is not found, both existence and non-existence is not found, neither existence nor non-existence is not found; this is called the real characteristic of dharmas, also called suchness, Dharma-nature, the actual limit and nirvana. So the Tathagata has no time and no place in which he spoke to people of a fixed characteristic of nirvana, and so it is said that all that is attained is stilled and all conceptual proliferation is extinguished.
中論觀十二因緣品第二十六(九偈)
Madhyamaka Treatise: Examination of the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination, Chapter 26 (nine verses)
問曰:汝以摩訶衍說第一義道,我今欲聞說聲聞法入第一義道。
The questioner says: You have spoken of the path of the ultimate meaning by means of the Mahayana (Great Vehicle); I now wish to hear how one enters the path of the ultimate meaning by means of the shravaka Dharma.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「眾生痴所覆,為後起三行,
"Beings, covered by ignorance, for the sake of later existence produce the three kinds of activity,
以起是行故,隨行墮六趣。
because they produce these activities, they fall into the six destinies following their activities.
以諸行因緣,識受六道身,
Because of the conditions of the activities, consciousness receives and takes bodies in the six paths,
以有識著故,增長於名色。
because consciousness clings, name-and-form increases.
名色增長故,因而生六入,
When name-and-form has increased, the six entrances arise,
情塵識和合,而生於六觸。
and from the union of faculty, object and consciousness the six contacts arise.
因於六觸故,即生於三受,
Because of the six contacts, the three feelings arise,
以因三受故,而生於渴愛。
because of the three feelings, thirst arises.
因愛有四取,因取故有有,
Because of craving there are four kinds of grasping, because of grasping there is becoming,
若取者不取,則解脫無有。
if the grasper does not grasp, one is liberated and there is no becoming.
從有而有生,從生有老死,
From becoming there is birth, from birth there are aging and death,
從老死故有,憂悲諸苦惱。
from aging and death there are grief, sorrow and all kinds of suffering.
如是等諸事,皆從生而有,
All these various things exist from birth,
但以是因緣,而集大苦陰。
and only because of these causes and conditions does the great mass of suffering gather.
是謂為生死,諸行之根本,
This is called the root of birth and death and all activities,
無明者所造,智者所不為。
made by the ignorant, and not done by the wise.
以是事滅故,是事則不生,
Because this thing is extinguished, this thing does not arise,
但是苦陰聚,如是而正滅。」
and only the aggregation of the mass of suffering is thus truly extinguished."
凡夫為無明所盲故,以身口意業,為後身起六趣諸行。隨所起行有上中下,識入六趣隨行受身。以識著因緣故名色集,名色集故有六入,六入因緣故有六觸,六觸因緣故有三受,三受因緣故生渴愛,渴愛因緣故有四取,四取取時以身口意業起罪福,令後三有相續。從有而有生,從生而有老死,從老死有憂悲苦惱種種眾患,但有大苦陰集。是故知凡夫無智,起此生死諸行根本。智者所不起,以如實見故,則無明滅。無明滅故諸行亦滅,以因滅故果亦滅,如是修習觀十二因緣生滅智故是事滅,是事滅故乃至生老死憂悲大苦陰皆如實正滅,正滅者畢竟滅。是十二因緣生滅義,如阿毘曇、修多羅中廣說。
Ordinary people, blinded by ignorance, use the karma of body, speech and mind, for the sake of a later body, to produce the activities of the six destinies. According to the activities produced, which are superior, middling or inferior, consciousness enters the six destinies and receives a body following the activities. Because of the conditions of consciousness's clinging, name-and-form gathers; because name-and-form gathers, there are the six entrances; because of the six entrances, there are the six contacts; because of the six contacts, there are the three feelings; because of the three feelings, thirst arises; because of thirst, there are the four kinds of grasping; and in the grasping, one uses the karma of body, speech and mind to produce sin and merit, so that the later three realms of existence continue. From becoming there is birth, from birth there are aging and death, and from aging and death come grief, sorrow, suffering and distress and all manner of ills, simply the mass of great suffering gathering. So one knows that ordinary people are without wisdom and produce the root of these activities of birth and death. The wise do not produce them, because they see as it really is, and ignorance is extinguished. When ignorance is extinguished, activities too are extinguished; because the cause is extinguished, the result too is extinguished. In this way one practices the wisdom of contemplating the arising and ceasing of the twelve links of dependent origination: this thing is extinguished; and when this thing is extinguished, down to birth, aging and death, grief, sorrow and the great mass of suffering are truly extinguished as they really are. What is called true extinction is ultimate extinction. The meaning of the arising and ceasing of these twelve links is explained at length in the Abhidharma (treatises on the Dharma) and the sutras (Sutra Pitaka).
中論觀邪見品第二十七(三十一偈)
Madhyamaka Treatise: Examination of Wrong Views, Chapter 27 (thirty-one verses)
問曰:已聞大乘法破邪見,今欲聞聲聞法破邪見。
The questioner says: I have heard the Mahayana Dharma breaking wrong views; now I wish to hear how the shravaka Dharma breaks wrong views.
答曰:
The respondent says:
「我於過去世,為有為是無?
"In past lives, did I exist or not?
世間常等見,皆依過去世。
The views that the world is permanent and so on all depend on past lives.
我於未來世,為作為不作?
In future lives, will I be made or not made?
有邊等諸見,皆依未來世。」
The views of finiteness and so on all depend on future lives."
我於過去世,為有、為無、為有無、為非有非無?是名常等諸見依過去世。我於未來世,為作、為不作、為作不作、為非作非不作?是名邊無邊等諸見依未來世。如是等諸邪見,何因緣故名為邪見?是事今當說。
In past lives, did I exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist? These are called the views of permanence and so on, depending on past lives. In future lives, will I be made, not made, both made and not made, or neither made nor not made? These are called the views of finiteness and infiniteness and so on, depending on future lives. Such various wrong views, by what causes and conditions are they called wrong views? This matter should now be explained.
「過去世有我,是事不可得,
"That there was a self in past lives cannot be found,
過去世中我,不作今世我。
the self of past lives is not made into the self of this life.
若謂我即是,而身有異相,
If one says the self is the same, and the body has different characteristics,
若當離於身,何處別有我?
if it should leave the body, where else could the self be?
離身無有我,是事為已成,
Apart from the body there is no self, this matter has been established,
若謂身即我,若都無有我。
if one says the body is the self, or that there is no self at all.
但身不為我,身相生滅故,
But the body is not the self, because the characteristics of the body arise and cease,
云何當以受,而作於受者?
how can grasping make the grasper?
若離身有我,是事則不然,
If there were a self apart from the body, this would not be right,
無受而有我,而實不可得。
a self without grasping is truly not found.
今我不離受,亦不即是受,
Now the self is neither apart from grasping nor identical with grasping,
非無受非無,此即決定義。」
neither without grasping nor non-existent, this is the settled meaning."
我於過去世有者,是事不然。何以故?先世中我不即作今我,有常過故。若常則有無量過。何以故?如人修福因緣故作天而後作人,若先世我即是今我者,天即是人。又人以罪業因緣故作旃陀羅,後作婆羅門。若先世我即是今我者,旃陀羅即是婆羅門。譬如舍衛國婆羅門名提婆達,到王舍城亦名提婆達,不以至王舍城故為異。若先作天後作人,則天即是人,旃陀羅即是婆羅門。但是事不然。何以故?天不即是人,旃陀羅不即是婆羅門,有此等常過故。若謂先世我不作今我,如人浣衣時名為浣者,刈時名為刈者,而浣者與刈者雖不異,而浣者不即是刈者。如是我受天身名為天,我受人身名為人,我不異而身有異者,是事不然。何以故?若即是者,不應言天作人。今浣者於刈者,為異為不異?若不異,浣者應即是刈者,如是先世天即是人,旃陀羅即是婆羅門,我亦有常過。若異者,浣者即不作刈者,如是天不作人,我亦無常,無常則無我相。是故不得言即是。
That I existed in past lives is not right. Why? The self of the former life is not identical with the self of the present, because of the fault of permanence. If permanent there would be countless faults. Why? When a person, through the causes and conditions of cultivating merit, becomes a god and then a human, if the self of the former life were the self of the present, the god would be the human. Again, a person, through the causes and conditions of sin, becomes a chandala (low caste) and later a brahmin. If the self of the former life were the self of the present, the chandala would be the brahmin. It is like a brahmin in Sravasti named Devadatta, who is also called Devadatta when he goes to Rajagriha, and does not become another person by going to Rajagriha. If one earlier became a god and later became a human, the god would be the human, and the chandala would be the brahmin. But this is wrong. Why? A god is not identical with a human, and a chandala is not identical with a brahmin, because of such a fault of permanence. If one says that the self of the former life is not made into the self of the present, like a person who, when washing clothes, is called a clothes-washer and, when cutting grass, is called a grass-cutter, the clothes-washer and the grass-cutter, though not another person, yet the clothes-washer is not identical with the grass-cutter. So I receive a god's body and am called a god, I receive a human body and am called a human, my self has no difference while my body has difference: this is wrong. Why? If it is the same, one should not say a god becomes a human. Now, is the clothes-washer different or not different from the grass-cutter? If not different, the clothes-washer would be the grass-cutter, and thus the god of the former life would be the human, and the chandala the brahmin, and the self would have the fault of permanence. If different, the clothes-washer does not become the grass-cutter, so a god does not become a human, and the self is also impermanent, and what is impermanent has no characteristic of self. So one cannot say it is the same.
問曰:我即是,但因受故分別是天是人,受名五陰身,以業因緣故分別是天是人、是旃陀羅是婆羅門,而我實非天非人、非旃陀羅非婆羅門。是故無如是過。
The questioner says: The self is the same; only because of grasping is one distinguished as god or human. Grasping is called the body of the five aggregates; because of the conditions of karma one is distinguished as god or human, chandala or brahmin, while the self is truly not god or human, not chandala or brahmin. So there is no such fault.
答曰:是事不然。何以故?若身作天作人,作旃陀羅作婆羅門,非是我者,則離身別有我。今罪福生死往來,皆是身非是我。罪因緣故墮三惡道,福因緣故生三善道,若苦樂瞋喜憂怖等,皆是身非我者,何用我為?如治俗人罪,不豫出家人。五陰因緣相續罪福不失故有解脫,若皆是身非我者,何用我為?
The respondent says: This is wrong. Why? If the body becomes a god or human, a chandala or brahmin, and is not the self, then there is a self apart from the body. Now sin and merit, birth, death, coming and going, are all the body and not the self. Through the conditions of sin one falls into the three evil paths, and through the conditions of merit one is born in the three good paths; if suffering and joy, anger and delight, worry and fear and so on are all the body and not the self, what use is the self? It is like punishing a layperson's offense without implicating a monk. The five aggregates continue by conditions, sin and merit are not lost, and so there is liberation; if all is the body and not the self, what use is the self?
問曰:罪福等依止於我,我有所知、身無所知故,知者應是我。起業因緣罪福是作法,當知應有作者。作者是我,身是我所用,亦是我所住處。譬如舍主以草木泥塈等治舍,自為身故隨所用治舍有好惡。我亦如是,隨作善惡等得好醜身,六道生死皆我所作,是故罪福之身皆屬於我。譬如舍但屬舍主不屬他人。
The questioner says: Sin and merit rely on the self. The self has knowledge, and the body has no knowledge, so what can know should be the self. The conditions that give rise to karma, sin and merit, are acts, and one should know there is a doer. The doer is the self, and the body is used by the self and is also the place where the self dwells. It is like a house owner who uses wood, plaster and so on to build a house for his own body, and the houses built are good or bad according to what he uses. The self is likewise: according to doing good or evil and so on, it obtains a fine or ugly body, and birth and death in the six paths are all made by the self, so the bodies of sin and merit all belong to the self. It is like a house that belongs only to the house owner and not to others.
答曰:是喻不然。何以故?舍主有形,有觸有力,故能治舍。汝所說我,無形無觸故無作力,自無作力亦不能使他作。若世間有一法無形無觸能有所作者,則可信受知有作者。但是事不然。若我是作者,則不應自作苦事。若是念者,可貪樂事不應忘失。若我不作苦而苦強生者,餘一切皆亦自生,非我所作。若見者是我,眼能見色眼應是我。若眼見而非我,則違先言見者是我。若見者是我,我則不應得聞聲等諸塵。何以故?眼是見者,不能得聞聲等塵故。是故我是見者,是事不然。若謂如刈者用鎌刈草,我亦如是以手等能有所作者,是事不然。何以故?今離鎌別有刈者,而離身心諸根無別作者。若謂作者雖非眼耳等所得亦有作者,則石女兒能有所作,如是一切諸根皆應無我。若謂右眼見物而左眼識,當知別有見者。是事不然。今右手習作左手不能,是故無別有作者。若別有作者,右手所習左手亦應能,而實不能,是故更無作者。復次有我者言,見他食果口中涎出,是為我相。是事不然。何以故?是念力故,非是我力。又亦即是破我因緣。人在眾中愧於涎出,而涎強出不得自在,當知無我。復次又有顛倒過罪。先世是父今世為子,是父子我一,但身有異。如從一舍至一舍,父故是父,不以入異舍故便有異。若有我,是二應一,如是則有大過。若謂無我五陰相續中亦有是過。是事不然。何以故?五陰雖相續,或時有用、或時無用,如蒲桃漿持戒者應飲,蒲桃酒不應飲,若變為苦酒還復應飲。五陰相續亦如是,有用有不用,若始終一我,有如是過。五陰相續無如是過,但五陰和合故假名為我,無有決定。如梁椽和合有舍,離梁椽無別舍。如是五陰和合故有我,若離五陰實無別我,是故我但有假名無有定實。汝先說離受別有受者,以受分別受者是天是人,是皆不然。當知但有受無別受者,若謂離受別有我,是事不然。
The respondent says: This analogy is wrong. Why? The house owner has form, touch and strength, and so can build a house. The self you speak of has no form and no touch, and so has no strength to make anything; having no strength of making itself, it also cannot make another act. If in the world there were a single dharma without form and without touch that could accomplish something, one could believe and know that there is a doer. But this is wrong. If the self were the doer, it should not itself make suffering. If it is able to remember, things that are desirable and enjoyable should not be forgotten. If the self did not make suffering but suffering arises stubbornly, then everything else should arise of itself and not be made by me. If the seer is the self, the eye can see form, and the eye should be the self. If the eye sees yet is not the self, this contradicts what was said earlier that the seer is the self. If the seer is the self, the self should not be able to hear sounds and the other objects. Why? The eye is the seer and cannot obtain sound and the other objects. So that the self is the seer is wrong. If you say that, like a grass-cutter using a sickle to cut grass, I also use hands and so on to accomplish things, this is wrong. Why? Now apart from the sickle there is a separate grass-cutter, but apart from the body, mind and faculties there is no separate doer. If you say that though the doer cannot be obtained among the eyes, ears and so on, there is still a doer, then the daughter of a barren woman could also accomplish things, and so all the faculties would be without self. If you say that the right eye sees a thing and the left eye knows it, one should know there is a separate seer. This is wrong. Now what the right hand has practiced the left hand cannot do, so there is no separate doer. If there were a separate doer, what the right hand has practiced the left hand should also be able to do, yet in truth it cannot, so there is all the more no doer. Moreover, those who hold that there is a self say: seeing another eat fruit and saliva flowing from one's mouth is a characteristic of the self. This is wrong. Why? This is the power of memory, not the power of a self. This is itself a cause for refuting the self. A person is ashamed among others when saliva flows, and the saliva flows stubbornly, beyond his control; one should know there is no self. Further, there is the fault of inversion. Father in the former life and son in this life, the self of this father and son is one, only the body differs. Like going from one house to another, the father is still the father and does not differ because of entering a different house. If there were a self, these two people should be one, and then there would be a great fault. If you say there is no self and the continuity of the five aggregates also has this fault, this is wrong. Why? Though the five aggregates continue, sometimes they have use and sometimes no use, like grape juice which one who keeps the precepts should drink, grape wine which should not be drunk, and if it turns to vinegar it may be drunk again. The continuity of the five aggregates is likewise, with some use and some none; if there were a single self throughout, there would be this fault. The continuity of the five aggregates has no such fault; only when the five aggregates combine is the provisional name 'self' given, with nothing fixed. Like rafters and beams combining to make a house, and apart from rafters and beams there is no separate house. So the five aggregates combine to make a self, and apart from the five aggregates there is truly no other self, so the self has only a provisional name and nothing fixed or real. What you said earlier, that apart from grasping there is a separate grasper and that grasping is used to distinguish whether the grasper is a god or human, all of this is wrong. One should know there is only grasping and no separate grasper; if one says there is a self apart from grasping, this is wrong.
若離受有我,云何可得說是我相?若無相可說,則離受無我。若謂離身無我但身是我,是亦不然。何以故?身有生滅相,我則不爾。復次云何以受即名受者?若謂離受有受者,是亦不然。若不受五陰而有受者,應離五陰別有受者。眼等根可得,而實不可得,是故我不離受、不即是受,亦非無受、亦復非無,此是定義。是故當知,過去世有我者,是事不然。何以故?
If there were a self apart from grasping, how could one say this is a characteristic of self? If there is no characteristic that can be spoken of, then apart from grasping there is no self. If you say that apart from the body there is no self and only the body is the self, this too is wrong. Why? The body has the characteristics of arising and ceasing, while the self does not. Moreover, how can grasping itself be called the grasper? If you say that apart from grasping there is a grasper, this too is wrong. If there is a grasper who does not grasp the five aggregates, there should be a grasper separate from the five aggregates. The eyes and other faculties can be obtained, yet this is truly not found, so the self is neither apart from grasping nor identical with grasping, neither without grasping nor non-existent; this is the settled meaning. So one should know that it is not right that there was a self in past lives. Why?
「過去我不作,是事則不然;
"That the past self did not make it is not right;
過去世中我,異今亦不然。
that the self of past lives differs from the present is also not right.
若謂有異者,離彼應有今,
If one says there is a difference, apart from that one the present should exist,
我住過去世,而今我自生。
the self stays in the past life, and the present self arises by itself.
如是則斷滅,失於業果報,
Then there would be annihilation and the retribution of karma would be lost,
彼作而此受,有如是等過。
one person would make it and another receive it, with such various faults.
先無而今有,此中亦有過,
Not existing before and existing now has faults within it too,
我則是作法,亦為是無因。」
the self would become a made dharma and would also become without cause."
過去世中我不作今我,是事不然。何以故?過去世中我與今我不異。若今我與過去世我異者,應離彼我而有今我,又過去世我亦應住彼,此身自更生。若爾者,即墮斷邊,失諸業果報。又彼人作罪,此人受報。有如是等無量過。又是我應先無而今有,是亦有過。我則是作法,亦是無因生。是故過去我不作今我,是事不然。復次:
That the self of past lives is not made into the present self is wrong. Why? The self of past lives and the present self have no difference. If the present self differs from the self of past lives, then apart from that self there would be the present self, and the self of past lives would also dwell there, and this body would arise again by itself. If so, one falls into the extreme of annihilation and loses the retribution of all karma. Moreover, one person makes the sin and another receives the retribution. There would be such countless faults. Moreover, this self would not exist before and exist now, which also has a fault. The self would become a made dharma and also be born without cause. So it is wrong that the past self is not made into the present self. Moreover:
「如過去世中,有我無我見,
"Like the views that in past lives there is a self or no self,
若共若不共,是事皆不然。」
or both or neither, these matters are all not right."
如是推求過去世中邪見有、無、亦有亦無、非有非無,是諸邪見,先說因緣過故,是皆不然。
Thus, in seeking the wrong views of past lives, that there is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not, these wrong views, because of the faults of causes and conditions explained earlier, are all not right.
「我於未來世,為作為不作?
"In future lives, will I be made or not made?
如是之見者,皆同過去世。」
Such views are all the same as for past lives."
我於未來世中,為作為不作?如是四句,如過去世中過咎,應在此中說。復次:
In future lives, will I be made or not made? These four phrases are like the faults for past lives, and should be explained here. Moreover:
「若天即是人,則墮於常邊;
"If a god is the same as a human, one falls into the extreme of permanence;
天則為無生,常法不生故。」
a god would then become unborn, because a permanent dharma is not born."
若天即是人,是則為常。若天不生人中,云何名為人?常法不生故。常亦不然。復次:
If a god is the same as a human, this becomes permanence. If a god is not born among humans, how can he be called a human? Because a permanent dharma is not born. Permanence is also wrong. Moreover:
「若天異於人,是即為無常;
"If a god differs from a human, this becomes impermanence;
若天異人者,是則無相續。」
if a god differs from a human, there is no continuity."
若天與人異則為無常,無常則為斷滅等過,如先說過。若天與人異則無相續,若有相續不得言異。復次:
If a god and a human are different, this becomes impermanence, and impermanence has the faults of annihilation and so on, like the faults explained earlier. If a god and a human are different, there is no continuity; if there is continuity, one cannot say they are different. Moreover:
「若半天半人,則墮於二邊,
"If half god and half human, one falls into both extremes,
常及於無常,是事則不然。」
permanence and impermanence, and this is not right."
若眾生半身是天、半身是人,若爾則有常無常。半天是常、半人是無常,但是事不然。何以故?一身有二相過故。復次:
If a being were half god in body and half human, then there would be permanence and impermanence: the half god permanent and the half human impermanent. But this is wrong. Why? Because of the fault of one body having two characteristics. Moreover:
「若常及無常,是二俱成者,
"If both permanence and impermanence could be established,
如是則應成,非常非無常。」
then neither permanence nor impermanence should be established."
若常無常二俱成者,然後成非常非無常,與常無常相違故。今實常無常不成,是故非常非無常亦不成。復次今生死無始,是亦不然。何以故?
Only if permanence and impermanence could both be established could neither permanence nor impermanence then be established, because it contradicts permanence and impermanence. Now truly neither permanence nor impermanence is established, so neither permanence nor impermanence is also not established. Moreover, to say now that birth and death have no beginning is also wrong. Why?
「法若定有來,及定有去者,
"If a dharma definitely had a place it came from, and definitely had a place it went to,
生死則無始,而實無此事。」
birth and death would have no beginning, but truly there is no such thing."
法若決定有所從來、有所從去者,生死則應無始。是法以智慧推求,不得有所從來、有所從去。是故生死無始,是事不然。復次:
If a dharma definitely had a place it came from and a place it went to, birth and death would have no beginning. When this dharma is sought with wisdom, no place it came from or went to can be found. So that birth and death have no beginning is wrong. Moreover:
「今若無有常,云何有無常,
"If now there is no permanence, how could there be impermanence,
亦常亦無常,非常非無常?」
both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent?"
若爾者,以智慧推求,無法可得常者,誰當有無常?因常有無常故。若二俱無者,云何有亦有常亦無常?若無有常無常,云何有非有常非無常?因亦有常亦無常故,有非有常非無常。是故依止過去世,常等四句不可得。有邊無邊等四句,依止未來世,是事不可得,今當說。何以故?
If this is so, then searching with wisdom, no dharma can be found to be permanent, so who could have impermanence? Because impermanence depends on permanence. If both do not exist, how can there be both permanent and impermanent? If there is no permanent-and-impermanent, how can there be neither permanent nor impermanent? Because it depends on both permanent and impermanent that there is neither permanent nor impermanent. So the four alternatives of permanence and so on, resting on the past, cannot be found. The four alternatives of finite, infinite and so on rest on the future; this cannot be found either, and will now be discussed. Why?
「若世間有邊,云何有後世?
"If the world is finite, how can there be a later world?
若世間無邊,云何有後世?」
If the world is infinite, how can there be a later world?"
若世間有邊,不應有後世,而今實有後世,是故世間有邊不然。若世間無邊,亦不應有後世,而實有後世,是故世間無邊亦不然。復次是二邊不可得。何以故?
If the world is finite, there should be no later world, yet in fact there is a later world, so the world being finite is wrong. If the world is infinite, there should also be no later world, yet in fact there is a later world, so the world being infinite is also wrong. Moreover, these two extremes cannot be found. Why?
「五陰常相續,猶如燈火炎;
"The five aggregates continue in succession, like the flame of a lamp;
以是故世間,不應邊無邊。」
Because of this, one should not speak of the world as finite or infinite."
從五陰復生五陰,是五陰次第相續,如眾緣和合有燈炎。若眾緣不盡,燈則不滅,若盡則滅。是故不得說世間有邊無邊。復次:
From the five aggregates arise further five aggregates; these five aggregates continue in succession like a lamp flame that arises from the coming together of many conditions. If the many conditions are not exhausted, the lamp does not go out; if they are exhausted, it goes out. So one cannot say the world is finite or infinite. Furthermore:
「若先五陰壞,不因是五陰,
"If the earlier five aggregates are destroyed, and not relying on these five aggregates,
更生後五陰,世間則有邊。
The later five aggregates arise, the world would be finite.
若先陰不壞,亦不因是陰,
If the earlier aggregates are not destroyed, and also not relying on these aggregates,
而生後五陰,世間則無邊。」
The later five aggregates arise, the world would be infinite."
若先五陰壞,不因是五陰更生後五陰,如是則世間有邊。若先五陰滅已,更不生餘五陰,是名為邊,邊名末後身。若先五陰不壞,不因是五陰而生後五陰,世間則無邊,是則為常。而實不爾,是故世間無邊。是事不然。世間有二種:國土世間、眾生世間。此是眾生世間。復次如四百觀中說:
If the earlier five aggregates are destroyed, and later five aggregates arise without relying on these five aggregates, then the world is finite. If the earlier five aggregates cease and no other five aggregates arise, this is called the end; the end is called the final body. If the earlier five aggregates are not destroyed, and later five aggregates arise without relying on these aggregates, the world is infinite, and this becomes permanence. But in fact this is not so, so the world being infinite is wrong. There are two kinds of world: the world of lands and the world of beings. What is spoken of here is the world of beings. Moreover, as the Four Hundred Verses on Contemplation says:
「真法及說者,聽者難得故,
"The true Dharma, and one who teaches it and one who hears it, are hard to obtain,
如是則生死,非有邊無邊。」
So birth and death are neither finite nor infinite."
不得真法因緣故,生死往來無有邊。或時得聞真法得道故,不得言無邊。今當更破亦有邊亦無邊。
One cannot obtain the causes and conditions of the true Dharma, so going back and forth in birth and death has no end. At times one hears the true Dharma and attains the Way, so one cannot say it is infinite. Now both finite and infinite are to be refuted.
「若世半有邊,世間半無邊;
"If half of the world is finite, and half of the world is infinite,
是則亦有邊,亦無邊不然。」
Then it is both finite and infinite, which is not right."
若世間半有邊半無邊,則應是亦有邊亦無邊。若爾者,則一法二相,是事不然。何以故?
If half of the world is finite and half is infinite, it would be both finite and infinite. If so, one dharma would have two marks, which is wrong. Why?
「彼受五陰者,云何一分破?
"That person who receives the five aggregates, how could one part be destroyed
一分而不破,是事則不然。
And one part not destroyed; this is not right.
受亦復如是,云何一分破?
Receiving is also like this, how could one part be destroyed
一分而不破,是事亦不然。」
And one part not destroyed; this is also not right."
受五陰者,云何一分破、一分不破?一事不得亦常亦無常。受亦如是,云何一分破、一分不破?常無常二相過故。是故世間亦有邊亦無邊則不然。今當破非有邊非無邊見。
The person who receives the five aggregates, how could one part be destroyed and one part not destroyed? One thing cannot be both permanent and impermanent. Receiving is also like this: how could one part be destroyed and one part not? Because of the fault of the two marks of permanence and impermanence. So the world being both finite and infinite is wrong. Now the view of neither finite nor infinite is to be refuted.
「若亦有無邊,是二得成者,
"If both finite and infinite can be established,
非有非無邊,是則亦應成。」
Then neither finite nor infinite should also be established."
與有邊相違故有無邊,如長相違有短。與有無相違,則有亦有亦無。與亦有亦無相違故,則有非有非無。若亦有邊亦無邊定成者,應有非有邊非無邊。何以故?因相待故。上已破亦有邊亦無邊第三句,今云何當有非有邊非無邊?以無相待故。如是推求,依止未來世有邊等四見皆不可得。復次:
Because it is opposed to finite, there is infinite, as short exists because it is opposed to long. Because it is opposed to existence and non-existence, there is both existence and non-existence. Because it is opposed to both existence and non-existence, there is neither existence nor non-existence. If both finite and infinite were definitely established, there should be neither finite nor infinite. Why? Because of mutual dependence. Above, the third alternative, both finite and infinite, was refuted; how can there still be neither finite nor infinite? Because there is no mutual dependence. Inquiring in this way, the four views of finite and so on, resting on the future, are all unobtainable. Furthermore:
「一切法空故,世間常等見,
"All dharmas are empty, so views such as that the world is permanent,
何處於何時,誰起是諸見?」
Where, at what time, and by whom are these views produced?"
上以聲聞法破諸見,今此大乘法中說。諸法從本以來畢竟空性,如是空性法中無人無法,不應生邪見正見。處名土地,時名日月歲數,誰名為人?是名諸見體。若有常無常等決定見者,應當有人出生此見;破我故無人生是見。應有處所色法現見尚可破,何況時方!若有諸見者應有定實,若定則不應破。上來以種種因緣破,是故當知見無定體,云何得生?如偈說「何處於何時,誰起是諸見?」
Above, the views were refuted with the Hearer Dharma; now it is taught within the Great Vehicle Dharma. Dharmas are from the beginning ultimately of empty nature, and within such a Dharma of empty nature there is no person and no dharma, so wrong views and right views should not arise. Place is called land; time is called days, months and years; who is called a person. This is called the substance of views. If there were definite views of permanence, impermanence and so on, there should be a person who produces such a view; since the self has been refuted, there is no person who produces this view. There should be a place; things with form, directly visible before the eyes, can still be refuted, how much more time and direction! If there were views, there should be something definite and real; if definite, it should not be refuted. Above, it has been refuted with all kinds of reasons, so one should know that views have no definite substance; how could they arise? As the verse says: "Where, at what time, and by whom are these views produced?"
「瞿曇大聖主,憐愍說是法,
"Gautama, great holy lord, out of compassion taught this Dharma,
悉斷一切見,我今稽首禮。」
To cut off all views completely; I now bow my head in homage."
一切見者,略說則五見,廣說則六十二見,為斷是諸見故說法。大聖主瞿曇,是無量無邊不可思議智慧者,是故我稽首禮。
What are called all views: in brief they are the five views, and in detail the sixty-two views, and the Dharma was taught in order to cut them off. The great holy lord Gautama is a person of immeasurable, boundless and inconceivable wisdom, so I bow my head in homage.
