Libo

Madhyamaka Treatise (Zhong Lun), Fascicle One

Later Qin (姚秦) · Long Shuzao, translated by Jiu Moluoshen (龍樹造,鳩摩羅什譯) · Volume 12 / 28

自作、他作猶尚有過,何況無因作。無因多過,如〈破作作者品〉中說。復次:

Self-made and other-made already have faults, how much more without cause. The faults of being without cause are even more, as stated in the chapter on refuting action and agent. Furthermore:

「非但說於苦,四種義不成;

"Not only in speaking of suffering are the four kinds of principle not established;

一切外萬物,四義亦不成。」

for all external things, the four kinds of principle are not established either."

佛法中雖說五受陰為苦,有外道人謂苦受為苦,是故說不但說於苦四種義不成,外萬物地水山木等一切法皆亦不成。

Although in the Buddha's teaching the five grasping aggregates are called suffering, there are outsiders who take the feeling of pain as suffering, so it is said: not only in speaking of suffering are the four kinds of principle not established; for external things such as earth, water, mountains, trees and all dharmas, they are not established either.

中論觀行品第十三(九偈)

Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 13: Examination of Conditioned Things (nine verses)

問曰:

The questioner says:

「如佛經所說,虛誑妄取相,

"As the Buddha's sutra says, what is false is the characteristic of mistaken grasping,

諸行妄取故,是名為虛誑。」

and because conditioned things are mistakenly grasped, they are called false."

佛經中說,虛誑者,即是妄取相;第一實者,所謂涅槃,非妄取相。以是經說故,當知有諸行虛誑妄取相。

The Buddha's sutra says: what is called false is the characteristic of mistaken grasping; the first reality, called nirvana, is not the characteristic of mistaken grasping. Because the sutra says so, one should know that there are conditioned things that are false and have the characteristic of mistaken grasping.

答曰:

The answerer says:

「虛誑妄取者,是中何所取?

"False, mistakenly grasped: what is grasped in this?

佛說如是事,欲以示空義。」

The Buddha says such things in order to reveal the meaning of emptiness."

若妄取相法即是虛誑者,是諸行中為何所取?佛如是說,當知說空義。

If the dharma of mistakenly grasping characteristics is false, what is grasped within these conditioned things? When the Buddha says this, one should know he is speaking of the meaning of emptiness.

問曰:云何知一切諸行皆是空?

The questioner says: How do you know that all conditioned things are empty?

答曰:一切諸行虛妄相故空。諸行生滅不住,無自性故空。諸行名五陰,從行生故。五陰名行,是五陰皆虛妄無有定相。何以故?如嬰兒時色非匍匐時色、匍匐時色非行時色、行時色非童子時色、童子時色非壯年時色、壯年時色非老年時色。如色念念不住故,分別決定性不可得。嬰兒色為即是匍匐色乃至老年色,為異,二俱有過。何以故?若嬰兒色即是匍匐色乃至老年色者,如是則是一色皆為嬰兒,無有匍匐乃至老年。又如泥團常是泥團,終不作瓶。何以故?色常定故。若嬰兒色異匍匐色者,則嬰兒不作匍匐、匍匐不作嬰兒。何以故?二色異故。如是童子、少年、壯年、老年色不應相續有,失親屬法無父無子。若爾者,唯有嬰兒應得父,餘則匍匐乃至老年不應有分。是故二俱有過。

The answerer says: All conditioned things are empty because they have the characteristic of falsity. Conditioned things arise and cease without abiding and have no self-nature, so they are empty. Conditioned things refer to the five aggregates, which arise from formation. The five aggregates are called formations, and all five are false, without determinate characteristics. Why? The form of the infant is not the form of the crawling stage, the form of the crawling stage is not the form of the walking stage, the form of the walking stage is not the form of the child, the form of the child is not the form of the prime of life, and the form of the prime of life is not the form of old age. Form does not abide from moment to moment, so one cannot find a determinate nature to distinguish. Is the form of the infant the same as the form of the crawling stage up to old age, or different? Both have faults. Why? If the form of the infant is the form of the crawling stage up to old age, then it is only one form, all would be infants, and there would be no crawling up to old age. Also, like a lump of clay being always a lump of clay, it would never become a pot. Why? Because form would be always fixed. If the form of the infant were different from the form of the crawling stage, the infant would not become the crawler and the crawler would not become the infant. Why? The two forms are different. Then the forms of the child, youth, prime of life and old age should not continue to exist in succession, and the dharma of kinship would be lost, with no father and no son. If so, only the infant could be a father, and from the crawling stage to old age none could have a share. So both have faults.

問曰:色雖不定,嬰兒色滅已,相續更生乃至老年色,無有如上過。

The questioner says: Although form is not determinate, after the form of the infant ceases, it continues to arise in succession up to the form of old age, and there are none of the above faults.

答曰:嬰兒色相續生者,為滅已相續生?為不滅相續生?若嬰兒色滅,云何有相續?以無因故。如雖有薪可燃,火滅故無有相續。若嬰兒色不滅而相續者,則嬰兒色不滅,常住本相亦無相續。

The answerer says: When it is said that the infant's form arises in continuity, does it arise in continuity after ceasing, or arise in continuity without ceasing? If the infant's form has ceased, how can there be continuity? Because there is no cause. Like firewood that can burn: once the fire has gone out, there is no continuity. If the infant's form continues without ceasing, the infant's form does not cease and always abides in its original form, and there is no continuity either.

問曰:我不說滅不滅故相續生,但說不住相似生,故言相續生。

The questioner says: I am not saying that it continues because of ceasing or not ceasing, only that it arises similarly without abiding, so it is called arising in continuity.

答曰:若爾者,則有定色而更生,如是應有千萬種色。但是事不然,如是亦無相續。如是一切處求色無有定相,但以世俗言說故有。如芭蕉樹求實不可得,但有皮葉。如是智者求色相念念滅,更無實色可得,不住色形色相。相似次第生難可分別,如燈炎分別定色不可得,從是定色更有色生不可得。是故色無性故空,但以世俗言說故有。受亦如是,智者種種觀察,次第相似故生滅難可別知,如水流相續,但以覺故說三受在身。是故當知,受同色說。想因名相生,若離名相則不生。是故佛說,分別知名字相故名為想。非決定先有,從眾緣生無定性,無定性故如影隨形。因形有影、無形則無影,影無決定性。若定有者,離形應有影。而實不爾,是故從眾緣生,無自性故不可得。想亦如是,但因外名相,以世俗言說故有。識因色聲香味觸等、眼耳鼻舌身等生,以眼等諸根別異故,識有別異。是識為在色、為在眼、為在中間?無有決定。但生已識塵識此人、識彼人。知此人識為即是知彼人識。為異是二,難可分別。如眼識,耳識亦難可分別。以難分別故,或言一或言異,無有決定分別,但從眾緣生故,眼等分別故空無自性。如伎人含一珠出已復示人則生疑,為是本珠、為更有異?識亦如是,生已更生,為是本識、為是異識?是故當知,識不住故無自性,虛誑如幻。諸行亦如是。諸行者,身、口、意。行有二種:淨、不淨。何等為不淨?惱眾生、貪著等,名不淨。不惱眾生、實語、不貪著等,名淨,或增或減。淨行者,在人中、欲天、色天、無色天受果報已則減,還作故名增。不淨行者亦如是,在地獄、畜生、餓鬼、阿修羅中受果報已則減,還作故名增。是故諸行有增有減故不住。如人有病,隨宜將適病則除愈,不將適病則還集。諸行亦如是,有增有減故不決定,但以世俗言說故有,因世諦故得見第一義諦。

The answerer says: If so, there would be determinate form that arises again, and then there should be thousands and tens of thousands of forms. But this is not so, and in this way there is no continuity either. So seeking form everywhere, there is no determinate characteristic, and it exists only through worldly convention. Like a plantain tree, where one seeks the core and cannot find it, finding only the skin and leaves. So when the wise seek the characteristic of form, it ceases moment by moment, no real form can be found, and there is no abiding form-shape or form-appearance. Arising in similar succession, it is hard to distinguish, like a lamp flame; seeking to distinguish a determinate form, one cannot find it; and from this determinate form arising again as form, one cannot find it either. So form has no nature, therefore is empty, and exists only through worldly convention. Feeling is also so: the wise observe in many ways, and because of the similarity of succession, arising and ceasing are hard to distinguish and know, like a flowing stream in continuity, and only because of awareness are three kinds of feeling said to be in the body. So one should know that feeling is spoken of like form. Perception arises depending on name and appearance, and if apart from name and appearance it does not arise. So the Buddha said: distinguishing and understanding name and appearance is what is called perception. It is not determinate that it existed before; it arises from many conditions with no fixed nature; having no fixed nature, it is like a shadow following a form. Depending on the form there is a shadow, and without the form there is no shadow, and the shadow has no determinate nature. If it were determinate, there should be a shadow apart from the form. But this is not so, so it arises from many conditions, has no self-nature, and therefore cannot be found. Perception is also so, depending only on external name and appearance, and exists through worldly convention. Consciousness arises depending on form, sound, smell, taste, touch and so on, and the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body and so on; because the eye and other faculties each differ, consciousness differs. Is this consciousness in the form, in the eye, or in between? There is no determinate answer. It is only that after arising, there is consciousness of the object, consciousness of this person, consciousness of that person. Is the consciousness knowing this person the same as the consciousness knowing that person, or different? These two are hard to distinguish. Like eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness is also hard to distinguish. Because they are hard to distinguish, some say they are one and some say they are different, with no determinate distinction, arising only from many conditions, and because of the differences among the eye and so on, it is empty and without self-nature. Like a performer holding a pearl in his mouth who takes it out and shows it to people again, they begin to doubt: is it the original pearl or another pearl? Consciousness is also so: arising and arising again, is it the original consciousness or another consciousness? So one should know that consciousness does not abide, and therefore has no self-nature, and is false and illusory. Conditioned things are also so. What are called conditioned things are body, speech and mind. Conditioned actions are of two kinds: pure and impure. What is impure? Troubling beings, greed and attachment and the like are called impure. Not troubling beings, truthful speech, non-attachment and the like are called pure. They may increase or decrease. For pure actions: after receiving their retribution among humans, desire-realm gods, form-realm gods and formless-realm gods, they decrease, and as they are done again they are called increasing. Impure actions are the same: after receiving retribution in hell, as animals, hungry ghosts and asuras, they decrease, and as they are done again they are called increasing. So conditioned actions increase and decrease, and therefore do not abide. Like a person who has an illness, which is cured if properly treated and gathers again if not treated. Conditioned things are also so, with increase and decrease, so they are not determinate, and exist only through worldly convention; relying on conventional truth, one can see the ultimate truth.

所謂無明緣諸行,從諸行有識著,識著故有名色,從名色有六入,從六入有觸,從觸有受,從受有愛,從愛有取,從取有有,從有有生,從生有老、死、憂悲苦惱、恩愛別苦、怨憎會苦等,如是諸苦皆以行為本。佛以世諦故說,若得第一義諦生真智慧者則無明息,無明息故諸行亦不集,諸行不集故見諦所斷身見、疑、戒取等斷,及思惟所斷貪、恚、色染、無色染、調戲無明亦斷。以是斷故一一分滅,所謂無明、諸行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生、老死憂悲苦惱恩愛別苦怨憎會苦等皆滅。以是滅故,五陰身畢竟滅更無有餘,唯但有空。是故佛欲示空義故,說諸行虛誑。復次諸法無性故虛誑,虛誑故空。如偈說:

What is called ignorance conditioning formations: from formations there is the clinging of consciousness, from the clinging of consciousness there is name and form, from name and form the six sense bases, from the six sense bases contact, from contact feeling, from feeling craving, from craving grasping, from grasping becoming, from becoming birth, and from birth old age, death, sorrow, grief, suffering and distress, the suffering of separation from loved ones, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and so on; all these sufferings take formations as their root. The Buddha speaks thus because of conventional truth. If one attains the ultimate truth and gives rise to true wisdom, ignorance ceases; when ignorance ceases, formations no longer gather; when formations no longer gather, what is severed by seeing the truth, namely view of self, doubt, clinging to precepts and rites and the like, is cut off, and what is cut off by meditation, namely greed, hatred, desire for form, desire for the formless, restlessness and ignorance, is also cut off. Because these are cut off, link by link they cease: ignorance, formations, consciousness, name and form, the six sense bases, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, old age and death, sorrow, grief, suffering and distress, the suffering of separation from loved ones, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and so on all cease. Because these cease, the body of five aggregates is ultimately extinguished, with no remainder, and only emptiness is left. So the Buddha, in order to reveal the meaning of emptiness, says that conditioned things are false. Furthermore, dharmas are false because they have no nature, and being false, they are empty. As the verse says:

「諸法有異故,知皆是無性;

"Because dharmas have differences, we know that they all have no nature;

無性法亦無,一切法空故。」

and dharmas without nature do not exist either, because all dharmas are empty."

諸法無有性。何以故?諸法雖生,不住自性,是故無性。如嬰兒定住自性者,終不作匍匐乃至老年。而嬰兒次第相續有異相現,匍匐乃至老年,是故說見諸法異相故知無性。

Dharmas have no nature. Why? Though dharmas arise, they do not abide on a self-nature, and so they are without nature. As if an infant definitely abided in his own nature, he would never become a crawler up to old age. But the infant succeeds in order and continues, with different characteristics appearing, from crawling up to old age, so it is said that seeing the different characteristics of dharmas, one knows they have no nature.

問曰:若諸法異相無性,即有無性法,有何咎?

The questioner says: If dharmas are without nature because of different characteristics, then there is the dharma of no-nature; what fault is there in that?

答曰:若無性,云何有法?云何有相?何以故?無有根本故。但為破性,故說無性。是無性法若有者,不名一切法空;若一切法空,云何有無性法?

The answerer says: If there is no nature, how can there be a dharma? How can there be characteristics? Why? Because there is no root. It is only in order to refute nature that no-nature is spoken. If this dharma of no-nature existed, it would not be called all dharmas being empty; if all dharmas are empty, how can there still be this dharma of no-nature?

問曰:

The questioner says:

「諸法若無性,云何說嬰兒,

"If dharmas have no nature, how can one say that from infancy

乃至於老年,而有種種異?」

to old age there are various differences?"

諸法若無性則無有異相,而汝說有異相,是故有諸法性。若無諸法性,云何有異相?

If dharmas have no nature, there would be no different characteristics; but you say there are different characteristics, so dharmas have nature. If there were no nature of dharmas, how could there be different characteristics?

答曰:

The answerer says:

「若諸法有性,云何而得異?

"If dharmas have nature, how can they still differ?

若諸法無性,云何而有異?」

If dharmas have no nature, how can they still have differences?"

若諸法決定有性,云何可得異?性名決定有,不可變異。如真金不可變,又如暗性不變為明、明性不變為暗。復次:

If dharmas definitely have nature, how can they still differ? Nature is called definitely existent and unchangeable. Like true gold, which does not change, and like the nature of darkness, which does not become light, and the nature of light, which does not become darkness. Furthermore:

「是法則無異,異法亦無異,

"This dharma itself does not differ, and a different dharma does not differ either,

如壯不作老,老亦不作壯。」

as a person in the prime of life does not become old, and an old person does not become a person in the prime of life."

若法有異者,則應有異相。為即是法異?為異法異?是二不然。若即是法異,則老應作老;而老實不作老。若異法異者,老與壯異,壯應作老;而壯實不作老。二俱有過。

If a dharma has differences, there should be different characteristics. Is it this very dharma that differs, or is it another dharma that differs? Neither is right. If it is this very dharma that differs, old age should become old age; but old age in fact does not become old age. If it is another dharma that differs, old age being different from the prime of life, the prime of life should become old age; but the prime of life in fact does not become old age. Both have faults.

問曰:若法即異,有何咎?如今眼見年少經日月歲數則老。

The questioner says: If it is this very dharma that differs, what fault is there? Now the eyes see that the young grow old as days, months and years pass.

答曰:

The answerer says:

「若是法即異,乳應即是酪;

"If it is this very dharma that differs, milk should itself be curd;

離乳有何法,而能作於酪?」

apart from milk, what other dharma could make curd?"

若是法即異者,乳應即是酪,更不須因緣。是事不然。何以故?乳與酪有種種異故。乳不即是酪,是故法不即異。若謂異法為異者,是亦不然,離乳更有何物為酪?如是思惟,是法不異、異法亦不異,是故不應偏有所執。

If it is this very dharma that differs, milk should itself be curd, with no need of causes and conditions. This is not right. Why? Milk and curd have various differences. Milk is not itself curd, so a dharma is not itself difference. If one says it is another dharma that differs, this is also not right: apart from milk, what thing is curd? Thinking in this way: this dharma does not differ, and a different dharma does not differ either, so one should not cling to either side.

問曰:破是、破異猶有空在,空即是法。

The questioner says: Having refuted "same" and refuted "different," there is still emptiness, and emptiness is a dharma.

答曰:

The answerer says:

「若有不空法,則應有空法;

"If there were a non-empty dharma, there should be an empty dharma;

實無不空法,何得有空法?」

in fact there is no non-empty dharma, so where is there an empty dharma?"

若有不空法,相因故應有空法。而上來種種因緣破不空法,不空法無故則無相待,無相待故何有空法?

If there were a non-empty dharma, then by mutual dependence there should be an empty dharma. But above we refuted the non-empty dharma by various causes and conditions; without a non-empty dharma there is no mutual reliance; without mutual reliance, where is there an empty dharma?

問曰:汝說不空法無故空法亦無。若爾者,即是說空但無相待,故不應有執。若有對應有相待、若無對則無相待,相待無故則無相,無相故則無執。如是即為說空。

The questioner says: You say the non-empty dharma does not exist and the empty dharma does not exist either. If so, this too is speaking of emptiness; it is only because there is no mutual reliance that there should be no clinging. If there is a counterpart, there should be mutual reliance; if there is no counterpart, there is no mutual reliance; without mutual reliance there is no characteristic; without characteristic there is no clinging. So this too is speaking of emptiness.

答曰:

The answerer says:

「大聖說空法,為離諸見故;

"The Great Sage speaks of the dharma of emptiness in order to leave all views;

若復見有空,諸佛所不化。」

if one again sees emptiness as existing, even the Buddhas cannot teach such a person."

大聖為破六十二諸見,及無明、愛等諸煩惱故說空。若人於空復生見者,是人不可化。譬如有病須服藥可治,若藥復為病則不可治。如火從薪出以水可滅,若從水生為用何滅?如空是水,能滅諸煩惱火,有人罪重貪著心深,智慧鈍故於空生見,或謂有空、或謂無空,因有無還起煩惱。若以空化此人者,則言我久知是空,若離是空則無涅槃道。如經說,離空無相無作門得解脫者,但有言說。

The Great Sage speaks of emptiness to refute the sixty-two views and the various afflictions such as ignorance and craving. If a person again gives rise to a view about emptiness, this person cannot be taught. It is like a person with an illness who must take medicine to be cured; if the medicine itself becomes the illness, it cannot be cured. Like fire that comes out of firewood, which water can extinguish; if it comes out of water, with what can it be put out? Emptiness is like water, able to put out the fire of various afflictions; but some people are heavy in guilt, deep in clinging and slow in wisdom, and give rise to a view about emptiness, saying there is emptiness or saying there is no emptiness, and because of being and non-being give rise to affliction again. If one teaches such a person with emptiness, he says: I already knew this emptiness; if one leaves this emptiness, there is no path to nirvana. As the sutra says: those who attain liberation apart from the three gates of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness have only words.

中論觀合品第十四(八偈)

Treatise on the Middle Way, Chapter 14: Examination of Combination (eight verses)

說曰:上〈破根品〉中說見、所見、見者皆不成。此三事無異法故則無合。無合義今當說。問曰:何故眼等三事無合?

The speaker says: In the chapter on refuting the faculties above, it was said that seeing, the seen and the seer are not established. These three matters have no different dharmas, so there is no combination. The meaning of there being no combination should now be explained. The questioner says: Why do the three, the eye and the others, have no combination?

答曰:

The answerer says:

「見可見見者,是三各異方;

"Seeing, the seen and the seer, these three are each in a different place;

如是三法異,終無有合時。」

and so the three dharmas differ, and they never have a time of combining."

見是眼根、可見是色塵、見者是我,是三事各在異處,終無合時。異處者,眼在身內,色在身外,我者或言在身內、或言遍一切處,是故無合。復次若謂有見法,為合而見、不合而見?二俱不然。何以故?若合而見者,隨有塵處應有根有我。但是事不然,是故不合。若不合而見者,根我塵各在異處亦應有見,而不見。何以故?如眼根在此,不見遠處瓶,是故二俱不見。

Seeing is the eye faculty, the seen is the object of form, and the seer is the self. These three matters are in different places, and never have a time of combining. What is called different places: the eye is inside the body, form is outside the body, and the self is said by some to be inside the body and by others to pervade everywhere, so there is no combination. Furthermore, if one says there is a dharma of seeing, does it see when combined, or also see when not combined? Neither is right. Why? If it sees when combined, then wherever there is an object there should be a faculty and a self. But this is not so, so they do not combine. If it sees even when not combined, the faculty, the self and the object, each in a different place, should also see, but they do not. Why? As the eye faculty is here, it cannot see a pot far away, so in both cases it cannot see.

問曰:我、意、根、塵四事合,故有知生,能知瓶衣等萬物,是故有見、可見、見者。

The questioner says: The four matters of self, mind, faculty and object combine, and so knowing arises and can know pots, clothes and the myriad things, so there are seeing, the seen and the seer.

答曰:是事〈根品〉中已破,今當更說。汝說四事合故知生,是知為見瓶衣等物已生、為未見而生?若見已生者,知則無用。若未見而生者,是則未合。云何有知生?若謂四事一時合而知生,是亦不然。若一時生則無相待。何以故?先有瓶、次見、後知生,一時則無先後。知無故,見、可見、見者亦無。如是諸法如幻如夢無有定相,何得有合?無合故空。復次:

The answerer says: This matter was already refuted in the chapter on faculties, but I will say it again. You say that the four matters combine and so knowing arises; does this knowing arise after seeing pots, clothes and so on, or arise before seeing? If it arises after seeing, knowing is of no use. If it arises before seeing, then it is not yet combined. How could knowing arise? If you say the four matters combine at the same moment and knowing arises, this is also not right. If they arise at the same moment, there is no dependence. Why? First there is the pot, then seeing, and then knowing arises; at the same moment there is no before and after. If knowing does not exist, seeing, the seen and the seer do not exist either. In this way all dharmas are like illusions and dreams, without determinate characteristics, so how could there be combination? With no combination, they are empty. Furthermore:

「染與於可染,染者亦復然,

"Defilement, what is defiled, and the defiler are likewise,

The original text is in the public domain. The English is a machine-assisted translation of this library’s own Chinese paraphrase, checked against a fixed glossary so that technical terms match the definitions used elsewhere on this site. It is a reading aid and does not replace the original.