Cheng Weishi Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), Fascicle 1
故彼所執實法不成，但是妄情計度為有。
Therefore the real dharmas they cling to are not established and are merely imagined as existing by false feelings and calculation.
勝論所執實等句義，多實有性，現量所得。
The categories of substance and so on clung to by the Vaisheshika school (the Indian Vaisheshika school) mostly have a nature of real existence and are obtained by direct perception.
彼執非理。
Their attachment is not reasonable.
所以者何？
Why?
諸句義中且常住者，若能生果，應是無常，有作用故，如所生果；若不生果，應非離識實有自性，如兔角等。諸無常者，若有質礙，便有方分，應可分析，如軍、林等，非實有性；若無質礙，如心、心所，應非離此有實自性。
Among the categories, take the permanent ones first: if they can produce effects, they should be impermanent, because they have function, like the effects they produce; if they do not produce effects, they should not have a real own-nature existing apart from consciousness, like the horn of a rabbit and so on. As for impermanent ones: if they have resistance, they have spatial parts and should be divisible, like an army or forest, and are not of real existence; if they have no resistance, like mind and mental factors, they should not have a real own-nature apart from this.
又彼所執地、水、火、風應非有礙，實句義攝，身根所觸故，如堅、濕、煖、動。即彼所執堅、濕、煖等，應非無礙，德句義攝，身根所觸故，如地、水、火、風，地、水、火三，對青色等，俱眼所見，准此應責。故知無實地、水、火、風與堅、濕等各別有性，亦非眼見實地、水、火。
Moreover, the earth, water, fire and wind they cling to should not be obstructive, but be included in the category of substance, because they are touched by the body faculty, like hardness, wetness, warmth and motion. Likewise the hardness, wetness, warmth and so on that they cling to should not be non-obstructive but be included in the category of quality, because they are touched by the body faculty, like earth, water, fire and wind; and earth, water and fire, regarding blue and other colors, are all seen by the eye; by analogy one should raise the same objection. So we know there is no real earth, water, fire or wind existing separately from hardness, wetness and so on with their own nature, and no real earth, water or fire seen by the eye.
又彼所執實句義中，有礙、常者，皆有礙故，如麁地等，應是無常。諸句義中，色根所取，無質礙法，應皆有礙，許色根取故，如地、水、火、風。又彼所執非實德等，應非離識有別自性，非實攝故，如石女兒，非有實等，應非離識有別自性，非有攝故，如空花等。
Moreover, among the real categories they cling to, those with resistance and permanence all have obstruction, like coarse earth and so on, which should be impermanent. Among the categories, dharmas that are taken by the faculty of form and have no resistance should all have obstruction, because they are conceded to be taken by the faculty of form, like earth, water, fire and wind. Moreover, the non-substance categories they cling to such as quality should not have a separate own-nature apart from consciousness, because they are not included in substance, like the child of a barren woman; and the nonexistent substance and so on should not have a separate own-nature apart from consciousness, because they are not included in existence, like flowers in the sky.
彼所執有，應離實等無別自性，許非無故，如實、德等。若離實等，應非有性，許異實等故，如畢竟無等。如有非無，無別有性，如何實等有別有性？若離有法，有別有性，應離無法，有別無性，彼既不然，此云何爾？故彼有性唯妄計度。
The existence they cling to should have no separate own-nature apart from substance and so on, because it is conceded not to be nonexistent, like substance and quality. If it is apart from substance and so on, it should not have the nature of existence, because it is conceded to be different from substance and so on, like the utterly nonexistent. Like existence, which is not nonexistence and has no separate existence-nature, how can substance and so on have a separate existence-nature? If, apart from existent dharmas, there is a separate existence-nature, then apart from nonexistent dharmas there should be a separate nonexistence-nature; since that is not so, how can this be so? Therefore their existence-nature is merely false imagination.
又彼所執實、德、業性，異實、德、業，理定不然，勿此亦非實、德、業性，異實等故，如德、業等。又應實等非實等攝，異實等性故，如德、業、實等。地等諸性對地等體，更相徵詰，准此應知。如實性等，無別實等性，實等亦應無別實性等。若離實等有實等性，應離非實等，有非實等性。彼既不爾，此云何然？故同異性唯假施設。
Moreover, the natures of substance, quality and action that they cling to, being different from substance, quality and action, are definitely not correct in principle; let it not be that these too are not natures of substance, quality and action, because they are different from substance and so on, like quality and action. Also, substance and so on should not be included in substance and so on, because they are different from the nature of substance and so on, like quality, action and substance. The natures of earth and so on, toward the substance of earth and so on, interrogate each other in turn; by analogy this should be understood. Like the nature of substance and so on, there is no other nature of substance and so on, and substance and so on should have no other nature of substance and so on. If apart from substance and so on there is a nature of substance and so on, then apart from non-substance and so on there should be a nature of non-substance and so on. Since that is not so, how can this be so? Therefore sameness-and-difference is merely a provisional designation.
又彼所執和合句義定非實有，非有、實等諸法攝故，如畢竟無。彼許實等現量所得，以理推徵尚非實有，況彼自許和合句義非現量得，而可實有？設執和合是現量境，由前理故，亦非實有。
Moreover, the category of inherence that they cling to is definitely not real, because it is not included in existence, substance and the other dharmas, like the utterly nonexistent. They concede that substance and so on are obtained by direct perception, but when examined by reason they are not real; how much more could inherence, which they themselves concede is not obtained by direct perception, be real? Even if one clings to inherence as an object of direct perception, by the above reasoning it is not real.
然彼實等，非緣離識實有自體現量所得，許所知故，如龜毛等。又緣實智，非緣離識實句自體現量智攝，假合生故，如德智等。廣說乃至緣和合智，非緣離識和合自體現量智攝，假合生故，如實智等。
Moreover, their substance and so on are not obtained by direct perception of a real self-substance apart from consciousness, because they are conceded to be objects of knowledge, like the hair of a tortoise. Also, the cognition that takes substance as object is not included in direct-perception cognition of a real categorical self-substance apart from consciousness, because it arises from provisional combination, like the cognition of quality. Extensively, up to the cognition that takes inherence as object, it is not included in direct-perception cognition of a self-substance of inherence apart from consciousness, because it arises from provisional combination, like the cognition of substance.
故勝論者實等句義，亦是隨情妄所施設。
Therefore the categories of substance and so on of the Vaisheshikas are also set up falsely following feelings.
有執有一大自在天，體實、遍、常，能生諸法。
Some cling to the existence of a great Isvara, whose substance is real, all-pervading and permanent, and who can produce all dharmas.
彼執非理，所以者何？
Their attachment is not reasonable. Why?
若法能生，必非常故；諸非常者，必不遍故；諸不遍者，非真實故。體既常、遍，具諸功能，應一切處、時，頓生一切法。待欲或緣方能生者，違一因論。或欲及緣亦應頓起，因常有故。
If a dharma can produce, it must be impermanent; whatever is impermanent must not be all-pervading; whatever is not all-pervading is not real. Since the substance is permanent and all-pervading and possesses all powers, it should produce all dharmas at once in all places and times. That which can produce only after waiting for desire or conditions contradicts the theory of a single cause. Or else desire and conditions should also arise at once, because the cause is always present.
餘執有一大梵、時、方、本際、自然、虛空、我等，常住、實有，具諸功能，生一切法，皆同此破。
Others cling to a great Brahma, time, space, original limit, nature, space, self and so on as permanent, real, possessing all powers and producing all dharmas; all are refuted in the same way.
有餘偏執，明論聲常，能為定量，表詮諸法；有執一切聲皆是常，待緣顯發，方有詮表。
Others hold one-sidedly that the sound of the Vedas (the Vedic treatises) is permanent and can serve as a fixed measure, expressing and explaining all dharmas; some cling to all sounds as permanent, waiting for conditions to manifest before there is expression.
彼俱非理，所以者何？
All of these are not reasonable. Why?
且明論聲，許能詮故，應非常住，如所餘聲。
Take the sound of the Vedas first: because it is conceded to be able to express, it should not be permanently abiding, like other sounds.
餘聲亦應非常聲體，如瓶、衣等，待眾緣故。
Other sounds also should not be permanent sound-substances, like pots and clothes, because they depend on many conditions.
有外道執地、水、火、風、極微實、常，能生麁色，所生麁色不越因量，雖是無常，而體實有。
Some non-Buddhists cling to the atoms of earth, water, fire and wind as real and permanent, able to produce coarse forms, and the coarse forms produced do not exceed the measure of their cause; although impermanent, their substance really exists.
彼亦非理，所以者何？
They too are not reasonable. Why?
所執極微，若有方分，如蟻行等，體應非實。若無方分，如心、心所應不共聚生麁果色，既能生果，如彼所生，如何可說極微常住？
If the atoms that are clung to have spatial parts, like ants walking and so on, their substance should not be real. If they have no spatial parts, like mind and mental factors, they should not jointly gather to produce coarse resultant forms; and since they can produce the result, like what they produce, how can it be said that atoms are permanent?
又所生果不越因量，應如極微，不名麁色，則此果色應非眼等色根所取，便違自執。若謂果色，量德合故，非麁似麁，色根能取。所執果色，既同因量，應如極微，無麁德合；或應極微亦麁德合；如麁果色，處無別故。若謂果色遍在自因，因非一故，可名麁者，則此果色體應非一，如所在因，處各別故。既爾，此果還不成麁，由此亦非色根所取。若果多分合故成麁，多因極微合應非細，足成根境，何用果為？既多分成，應非實有，則汝所執，前後相違。
Moreover, the resulting effect cannot exceed the measure of its cause; it should be like an ultimate particle and not be called gross form. Then this effect-form should not be grasped by the sense faculties such as the eye, which contradicts what they themselves maintain. If they say the effect-form has measure and its quality combines, and though not gross appears gross, so that the sense faculties can grasp it: since the effect-form maintained is the same in measure as its cause, it should be like an ultimate particle and have no combined gross quality; or else ultimate particles too should have combined gross quality; and like the apparently gross effect-form, there would be no distinction of place. If they say the effect-form pervades its own causes, and since the causes are not one it may be called gross, then this effect-form body should not be one, being like the causes where it resides, each in a different place. If so, this effect still does not become gross, and for this reason is also not grasped by the sense faculties. If the effect becomes gross by the combination of many parts, then since many causal ultimate particles combined should not be fine, and would suffice to form the sense faculty and its object, what is the use of the effect? Since it is formed from many parts, it should not be truly existent; then what you maintain contradicts itself from first to last.
又果與因俱有質礙，應不同處，如二極微。若謂果、因體相受入，如沙受水，藥入鎔銅。誰許沙、銅體受水、藥？或應離、變，非一、非常，又麁色果體若是一，得一分時應得一切，彼、此一故，彼應如此，不許違理，許便違事，故彼所執進、退不成，但是隨情虛妄計度。
Moreover, effect and cause both have material resistance, so they should not occupy the same place, like two ultimate particles. If they say the effect and cause bodies interpenetrate, like sand absorbing water or medicine entering molten copper, who grants that the body of sand or copper absorbs water or medicine? Otherwise they would separate and change, and would be neither one nor permanent. Moreover, if the body of the gross form-effect is one, then when one part is obtained all would be obtained, because that and this are one and that should be so. To deny it contradicts reason, to grant it contradicts fact; so what they maintain fails both in advancing and in retreating, and is merely false reckoning following feeling.
然諸外道品類雖多，所執有法不過四種：
Although the heretical schools are of many kinds, what they maintain regarding things possessing existence is no more than four.
一、執有法與有等性其體定一，如數論等。彼執非理，所以者何？勿一切法即有性故，皆如有性，體無差別，便違三德、我等體異，亦違世間諸法差別。又若色等即色等性，色等應無青、黃等異。
First, maintaining that the thing possessed (dharmin) and the nature of being (sattva and the like) are definitely one in substance, as in the Samkhya school and others. Their maintenance is unreasonable. Why? It would make all dharmas simply the nature of being, all alike the nature of being, with no difference of substance, which contradicts the difference in substance between the three qualities (gunas), the self and so on, and also contradicts the differences among worldly dharmas. Moreover, if form and so on are themselves the nature of form and so on, form and so on should have no differences such as blue and yellow.
二、執有法與有等性其體定異，如勝論等。彼執非理，所以者何？勿一切法非有性故，如已滅無，體不可得，便違實等自體非無，亦違世間現見有物。又若色等非色等性，應如聲等非眼等境。
Second, maintaining that the thing possessed and the nature of being are definitely different in substance, as in the Vaisheshika school and others. Their maintenance is unreasonable. Why? It would make all dharmas not the nature of being, like the non-existent that has ceased, whose substance cannot be obtained, which contradicts that the self-substance of substance and so on is not non-existent, and also contradicts the things visibly existing in the world. Moreover, if form and so on are not the nature of form and so on, they should be like sound and so on and not be objects of the eye and so on.
三、執有法與有等性亦一、亦異，如無慚等，彼執非理，所以者何？一、異同前一、異過故；二相相違，體應別故，一、異體同俱不成故。勿一切法皆同一體，或應一、異是假非實，而執為實理定不成。
Third, maintaining that the thing possessed and the nature of being are both one and different, as in the Nirgrantha and others (here referring to a class of heretics). Their maintenance is unreasonable. Why? The faults of one and different are the same as before; the two characteristics contradict each other, their substances should differ, and one and different having the same substance cannot be established on either side. Do not let all dharmas have the same substance; or if one and different are conventional and not real, yet maintained as real, it is definitely not established in principle.
四、執有法與有等性非一、非異，如邪命等。彼執非理，所以者何？非一、異執同異、一故。非一、異言為遮為表？若唯是表，應不雙非；若但是遮，應無所執；亦遮、亦表應互相違；非表、非遮應成戲論。又非一、異，違世共知有一、異物，亦違自宗色等有法決定實有。
Fourth, maintaining that the thing possessed and the nature of being are neither one nor different, as in the Ajivika (wrong-livelihood heretics) and others. Their maintenance is unreasonable. Why? The maintenance of neither one nor different is the same as that of different and one. Is the statement of neither one nor different a negation or an affirmation? If only an affirmation, it should not negate both; if only a negation, it should have nothing to maintain; if both negation and affirmation, they should contradict each other; if neither affirmation nor negation, it would become idle talk. Moreover, neither one nor different contradicts what everyone in the world knows, that there are things that are one and different, and also contradicts their own school, which holds that things possessing form and so on are definitely real.
是故彼言唯矯避過，諸有智者勿謬許之。
Therefore their words are merely twisting to avoid faults, and the wise should not wrongly accept them.
餘乘所執，離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？
As for what the other vehicles maintain, apart from consciousness there truly exist form and other dharmas; how is that not existence?
彼所執色、不相應行及諸無為，理非有故。
Because the form, non-associated conditioned factors, and unconditioned dharmas they maintain are not existent in principle.
且所執色總有二種：一者有對，極微所成；二者無對，非極微成。
Let us speak first of the form they maintain, which in general is of two kinds: first, that which has resistance, formed of ultimate particles; second, that which has no resistance and is not formed of ultimate particles.
彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。
That resistant form is definitely not real, because the ultimate particles that form it are not real.
謂諸極微，若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。
As for the ultimate particles, if they have material resistance, they should be like a jar and so on, conventional and not real.
若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶、衣等？
If they have no material resistance, they should be like non-form; how could they gather to form jars, clothes and so on?
又諸極微，若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。
Moreover, if the ultimate particles have spatial parts, they can surely be analyzed, and so are not real.
若無方分，則如非色，云何和合承光、發影？日輪才舉照柱等時，東、西兩邊光影各現，承光、發影處既不同，所執極微定有方分。又，若見、觸壁等物時，唯得此邊不得彼分。既和合物即諸極微，故此極微必有方分。又諸極微隨所住處，必有上、下、四方差別，不爾便無共和、集義。或相涉入應不成麁，由此極微定有方分。執有對色即諸極微，若無方分，應無障隔。若爾，便非障礙有對。
If they have no spatial parts, they are like non-form; how could they combine to receive light and cast shadows? When the sun's disc has just risen and shines on a pillar and the like, light and shadow each appear on the east and west sides; since the places receiving light and casting shadow differ, the ultimate particles they maintain definitely have spatial parts. Moreover, when one sees or touches a wall and such things, one gets only this side and not the part of the other side. Since the combined thing is just the ultimate particles, these particles must have spatial parts. Moreover, each ultimate particle wherever it dwells must have differences of up, down and the four directions; otherwise there would be no meaning of combining or gathering. Or if they interpenetrate, they could not form the gross; so ultimate particles definitely have spatial parts. If resistant form is just the ultimate particles and they had no spatial parts, there should be no obstruction. If so, then it would not be resistance.
是故汝等所執極微必有方分，有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。
So the ultimate particles you maintain must have spatial parts, and because they have spatial parts they can be analyzed and are definitely not real.
故有對色實有不成。
Therefore the real existence of resistant form is not established.
五識豈無所依、緣色？
Do the five consciousnesses have no supports and no objects of form?
雖非無色，而是識變。謂識生時。內因緣力，變似眼等、色等相現，即以此相為所依、緣。
Though they do not lack form, it is a transformation of consciousness. That is, when consciousness arises, by the power of its internal causes and conditions it transforms and gives rise to appearances such as eye and form, and uses this appearance as its support and as its object.
然眼等根非現量得，以能發識，比知是有，此但功能，非外所造。外有對色理既不成，故應但是內識變現，發眼等識，名眼等根，此為所依，生眼等識。
The sense faculties such as the eye are not obtained by direct perception, but are known by inference as existent because they can produce consciousness; this is only a capacity and not made by something external. Since the principle of external resistant form is not established, it should be only the transformation and manifestation of internal consciousness, giving rise to eye consciousness and so on, called eye faculty and so on, and this is the support that gives rise to eye consciousness and so on.
此眼等識外所緣緣，理非有故，決定應許自識所變為所緣緣，謂能引生似自識者，汝執彼是此所緣緣。
For these consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, an external objective condition is not existent in principle, and one must definitely accept that what is transformed by one's own consciousness is the object condition, that is, what can induce the arising of an image like one's own consciousness; you maintain that to be the object condition here.
非但能生，勿因緣等亦名此識所緣緣故。
It is not merely what can produce; do not let causal conditions and the like also be called the object condition of this consciousness.
眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故，非和合相異諸極微有實自體。分析彼時，似彼相識定不生故，彼和合相既非實有，故不可說是五識緣，勿第二月等能生五識故。
When the five consciousnesses such as eye consciousness cognize form and so on, they take only the combination, because it appears like that image, and it is not that the combined appearance differs from the ultimate particles and has a real self-nature. When it is analyzed, the consciousness that appears like that image definitely does not arise; since that combined appearance is not real, it cannot be said to be a condition for the five consciousnesses, and do not let a second moon and so on be able to produce the five consciousnesses.
非諸極微共和合位可與五識各作所緣，此識上無極微相故，非諸極微有和合相，不和合時無此相故。非和合位與不合時，此諸極微體相有異，故和合位如不合時，色等極微非五識境。
It is not that the ultimate particles in their common combined state can each serve as an object for the five consciousnesses, because on this consciousness there is no appearance of ultimate particles; it is not that ultimate particles have a combined appearance and have no such appearance when not combined. It is not that the ultimate particles differ in substance and appearance between the combined state and the uncombined state, so the form and other ultimate particles in the combined state, like those in the uncombined state, are not the object of the five consciousnesses.
有執色等一一極微不和集時，非五識境，共和集位，展轉相資，有麁相生，為此識境，彼相實有，為此所緣。彼執不然，共和集位與未集時，體相一故。瓶、甌等物極微等者，緣彼相識應無別故；共和集位一一極微，各各應捨微、圓相故；非麁相識緣細相境，勿餘境識緣餘境故；一識應緣一切境故。
Some maintain that when each ultimate particle of form and so on is not combined it is not an object of the five consciousnesses, but when gathered together in common they support one another in turn and a gross appearance arises, which serves as this consciousness's object, and that appearance is real and is the object here. Their maintenance is incorrect: the state of common gathering and the uncombined state have the same substance and appearance. The consciousness that cognizes things such as jars and bowls and the consciousness that cognizes ultimate particles and so on should have no distinction; each ultimate particle in the gathered state should give up its minute, round appearance; it is not that a consciousness with a gross appearance cognizes a fine object; do not let a consciousness that cognizes other objects cognize other objects; one consciousness would cognize all objects.
許有極微，尚致此失，況無識外真實極微。
If one grants the existence of ultimate particles, one already incurs this fault; how much more so since there are no real ultimate particles outside consciousness.
由此定知，自識所變似色等相為所緣緣，見託彼生，帶彼相故。然識變時，隨量大、小，頓現一相，非別變作眾多極微合成一物。為執麁色有實體者，佛說極微，令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。諸瑜伽師以假想慧，於麁色相漸次除析，至不可析，假說極微，雖此極微猶有方分，而不可析，若更析之便似空現，不名為色，故說極微是色邊際。
From this one definitely knows that the images of form and so on transformed by one's own consciousness are the object condition, and seeing arises depending on them, bearing that appearance. But when consciousness transforms, according to measure large or small, it displays one appearance at once, and does not separately transform into many ultimate particles combined into a single thing. For those who maintain that gross form has a real substance, the Buddha spoke of ultimate particles to make them analyze it away, and did not say that forms truly have ultimate particles. The yogis, using conceptual wisdom, gradually analyze gross form appearances, up to what cannot be analyzed, and provisionally speak of the ultimate particle; though this ultimate particle still has spatial parts, it cannot be analyzed, and if it were analyzed further it would appear like space and not be called form, so it is said that the ultimate particle is the limit of form.
由此應知，諸有對色，皆識變現，非極微成。
From this one should know that all resistant forms are the transformation and manifestation of consciousness and are not formed of ultimate particles.
餘無對色是此類故，亦非實有，或無對故，如心、心所，定非實色。諸有對色現有色相，以理推究，離識尚無，況無對色現無色相，而可說為真實色法？
The other, non-resistant forms are of this kind and are also not real; or because they are non-resistant, like mind and mental factors, they are definitely not real form. Resistant forms present the appearance of form, yet when examined by reason they do not exist apart from consciousness; how much less non-resistant forms, which present no appearance of form, can be called real form dharmas?
表、無表色豈非實有？
Are manifest form and non-manifest form not real?
此非實有，所以者何？
They are not real. Why?
且身表色若是實有，以何為性？
First, if bodily manifest form is real, what is its nature?
若言是形，便非實有，可分析故；長等極微不可得故。若言是動，亦非實有，才生即滅無動義故；有為法滅不待因故；滅若待因應非滅故。若言有色非顯、非形，心所引生，能動手等，名身表業，理亦不然。此若是動，義如前破；若是動因，應即風界，風無表示，不應名錶；又觸不應通善、惡性，非顯、香、味，類觸應知。
If it is said to be shape, it is not real, because it can be analyzed; ultimate particles of length and so on cannot be found. If it is said to be movement, it is also not real, because what perishes as soon as it is born has no meaning of movement; conditioned dharmas perish without waiting for a cause; if perishing waited for a cause it would not be perishing. If it is said that there is a form that is neither visible color nor shape, which is stirred up by mind and can move the hands and so on, called bodily manifest action, that is also unreasonable. If it is movement, the meaning is refuted as before; if it is the cause of movement, it should be just the wind element, and wind has no indication and should not be called manifest; moreover touch should not extend to good and evil natures, and it is not visible color, smell or taste; it should be known as of the kind of touch.
故身表業定非實有。
So bodily manifest action is definitely not real.
然心為因，令識所變手等色相，生滅相續，轉趣餘方，似有動作。表示心故，假名身表。
Rather, with mind as the cause, the appearances of hands and other forms transformed by consciousness arise and cease in succession and move toward other places, appearing like movement. Because it indicates the mind, it is provisionally called bodily manifest action.
語表亦非實有聲性，一剎那聲無詮表故，多念相續便非實故，外有對色，前已破故。
Verbal manifest action also is not a real nature of sound: a single moment of sound has no expression, and many moments in succession are not real; the external resistant form was refuted earlier.