Cheng Weishi Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), Fascicle 1

護法等菩薩造

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala and others.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by imperial command by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang.

稽首唯識性、滿、分清淨者，我今釋彼說，利樂諸有情。

I bow to the nature of consciousness-only, to those who are perfectly pure and to those who are partially pure; I now explain what they have taught, for the benefit and happiness of all sentient beings.

今造此論，為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。生解為斷二重障故，由我、法執二障具生，若證二空，彼障隨斷。斷障為得二勝果故，由斷續生煩惱障故，證真解脫；由斷礙解所知障故，得大菩提。

This treatise is composed in order to give rise to right understanding in those who are confused and mistaken about the two emptinesses (the absence of self in persons and the absence of self in dharmas). Understanding arises in order to cut off the two kinds of obstruction: because of attachment to self and attachment to dharmas, the afflictive obstruction and the cognitive obstruction arise together, and when the two emptinesses are realized, the two obstructions are cut off with them. Cutting off obstructions is in order to attain two excellent fruits: by cutting off the afflictive obstruction that can continue rebirth, one realizes true liberation; by cutting off the cognitive obstruction that blocks right understanding, one attains great Bodhi. The consciousness-only taught in this treatise is a set of interlocking terms: its basis is the eight consciousnesses (the vipaka alaya consciousness, the thinking manas consciousness, and the first six consciousnesses that discriminate objects), mental factors are associated with mind, the image-part and the seeing-part arise depending on self-witnessing, and the perfuming of seeds, the three natures and the two kinds of selflessness run through the whole treatise. The members below lock together, and at the first time each is argued I will point out its place in this set, not annotating word by word.

又為開示謬執我、法，迷唯識者，令達二空，於唯識理如實知故。

It is also to reveal to those who wrongly cling to self and dharmas and are deluded about consciousness-only, so that they may penetrate the two emptinesses and know the principle of consciousness-only as it truly is.

復有迷、謬唯識理者，或執外境如識非無；或執內識如境非有；或執諸識用別體同；或執離心無別心所。為遮此等種種異執，令於唯識深妙理中得如實解，故作斯論。

There are also those who are deluded and mistaken about the principle of consciousness-only: some cling to external objects as being not nonexistent, like consciousness; some cling to inner consciousness as being not existent, like objects; some cling to the functions of the consciousnesses as different while their substance is the same; some cling to there being no separate mental factors apart from the mind. In order to stop these various different attachments, and to let people attain a true understanding of the profound and wondrous principle of consciousness-only, this treatise is composed.

若唯有識，云何世間及諸聖教說有我、法？

If there is only consciousness, why does the world, as well as the holy teachings, say there are self and dharmas?

頌曰：

The verse says:

１由假說我、法，有種種相轉。

1. Because of the provisional designation of self and dharmas, there are various aspects that evolve.

彼依識所變，此能變唯三：

These depend on the transformation of consciousness, and the transformers here are only three:

２謂異熟、思量，及了別境識。

2. Namely the vipaka, the thinking, and the consciousness that discriminates objects.

論曰：世間、聖教說有我、法，但由假立，非實有性。我謂主宰，法謂軌持。

The treatise says: What the world and the holy teachings say of self and dharmas is established only provisionally and is not really existent by its own nature. Self means mastery, and dharma means to uphold a pattern.

彼二俱有種種相轉：「我種種相」謂有情、命者等，預流、一來等。「法種種相」謂實、德、業等；蘊、處、界等。「轉」謂隨緣施設有異。

Both have various aspects that evolve: the "various aspects of self" refers to sentient being, life-possessor and so on, to stream-enterer, once-returner and so on. The "various aspects of dharmas" refers to substance, quality, action and so on; to aggregates, sense-bases, elements and so on. "Evolve" means they are set up differently according to conditions.

如是諸相若由假說，依何得成？

If these aspects are provisionally spoken, on what are they established?

彼相皆依識所轉變而假施設。

These aspects all depend on the transformation of consciousness and are provisionally set up.

「識」謂了別，此中識言亦攝心所，定相應故。

"Consciousness" means discrimination; when consciousness is spoken of here, it also includes mental factors, because they are necessarily associated.

「變」謂識體轉似二分，相、見俱依自證起故，依斯二分施設我、法，彼二離此無所依故。

"Transformation" means that the substance of consciousness evolves to appear as two parts; the image-part and the seeing-part both arise depending on self-witnessing, and self and dharmas are set up based on these two parts, and those two have nothing to rely on apart from this.

或復內識轉似外境。

Or else, inner consciousness evolves to appear as external objects.

我、法分別燻習力故，諸識生時變似我、法，此我、法相雖在內識，而由分別似外境現，諸有情類無始時來緣此執為實我、實法，如患夢者，患夢力故，心似種種外境相現，緣此執為實有外境。

Because of the perfuming force of the discrimination of self and dharmas, when the consciousnesses arise they transform to appear as self and as dharmas; although these aspects of self and dharmas are within inner consciousness, because of discrimination they appear as external objects, and sentient beings since beginningless time, taking these as objects, cling to them as real self and real dharmas, like people who are sick or dreaming: because of the power of sickness or dream, the mind appears as various external objects, and, taking these as objects, they cling to them as really existing external objects.

愚夫所計實我、實法都無所有，但隨妄情而施設故，說之為假。內識所變似我、似法雖有，而非實我、法性，然似彼現，故說為假。

The real self and real dharmas conceived by fools do not exist at all and are only set up following false feelings, so they are said to be provisional. The apparent self and apparent dharmas transformed by inner consciousness, although existing, do not have the nature of a real self or real dharmas, yet they appear like them, so they are said to be provisional.

外境隨情而施設故，非有如識；內識必依因緣生故，非無如境，由此便遮增、減二執。

External objects are set up following feelings and do not exist as consciousness does; inner consciousness must arise from causes and conditions and is not nonexistent as objects are; from this the two attachments, of adding and of subtracting, are stopped.

境依內識而假立故，唯世俗有；識是假境所依事故，亦勝義有。

Objects are provisionally established depending on inner consciousness and exist only conventionally; consciousness is the basis on which the provisional objects rest, and also exists in the ultimate sense.

云何應知實無外境，唯有內識似外境生？

How does one know that there are in reality no external objects and only inner consciousness arising as if external objects?

實我、實法不可得故。

Because a real self and real dharmas cannot be found.

如何實我不可得耶？

How is it that a real self cannot be found?

諸所執我，略有三種：一者執我體常、周遍，量同虛空，隨處造業受苦、樂故；二者執我，其體雖常，而量不定，隨身大小有卷、舒故；三者執我體常、至細，如一極微，潛轉身中作事業故。

The selves that are clung to are, in brief, of three kinds: first, those who cling to a self whose substance is permanent and all-pervading, its extent equal to space, creating karma wherever it is and receiving suffering and pleasure; second, those who cling to a self whose substance, although permanent, has an indefinite extent, contracting and expanding according to the size of the body; third, those who cling to a self whose substance is permanent and extremely subtle, like one atom, which operates secretly within the body and performs actions.

初且非理，所以者何？執我常、遍，量同虛空，應不隨身受苦、樂等；又常、遍故，應無動轉，如何隨身能造諸業？又所執我，一切有情為同為異？若言同者，一作業時一切應作，一受果時一切應受，一得解脫時一切應解脫，便成大過；若言異者，諸有情我更相遍故，體應相雜，又一作業、一受果時，與一切我處無別故，應名一切所作、所受。若謂作、受各有所屬無斯過者，理亦不然，業、果及身，與諸我合，屬此非彼不應理故；一解脫時一切應解脫，所修、證法一切我合故。

The first is not reasonable. Why? If one clings to a self that is permanent and all-pervading, equal to space, it should not receive suffering and pleasure along with the body; and since it is permanent and all-pervading, it should have no movement, so how can it, following the body, create all karma? Moreover, regarding the self that is clung to: is the self of all sentient beings the same or different? If it is said to be the same, then when one acts all should act, when one receives the fruit all should receive it, and when one is liberated all should be liberated, which is a great fault; if it is said to be different, the selves of the various sentient beings all pervade one another, so their substances should be mixed, and when one performs karma or receives its fruit, with no distinction of location from all other selves, it should be called what is done and received by all. If it is said that acting and receiving each belong to someone and so there is no such fault, that too is not correct: karma and its fruit and the body are joined with all the selves, so that they belong to this one and not to that one is not reasonable; and when one is liberated all should be liberated, because the dharmas practiced and realized are joined with all selves.

中亦非理，所以者何？我體常住，不應隨身而有舒、卷，既有舒、卷如槖籥風，應非常住，又我隨身應可分析，如何可執我體一耶？故彼所言如童竪戲。

The middle one is also not reasonable. Why? The self's substance is permanent and abiding and should not expand or contract with the body; since it expands and contracts like the air in a bellows (tuoyue), it should be not permanent, and also the self should be divisible along with the body, so how can one cling to the self's substance as one? Therefore what they say is like children playing.

後亦非理，所以者何？我量至小如一極微，如何能令大身遍動？若謂雖小而速巡身，如旋火輪，似遍動者，則所執我非一、非常，諸有往來，非常、一故。

The last one is also not reasonable. Why? If the self's extent is extremely small like one atom, how can it make the great body move everywhere? If it is said that although small it quickly circles the body, like a whirling firebrand, appearing to move everywhere, then the self that is clung to is not one and not permanent; whatever comes and goes is not permanent and not one.

又所執我，復有三種：一者即蘊；二者離蘊；三者與蘊非即非離。

Moreover, the self that is clung to is of three further kinds: first, it is itself the aggregates; second, it is apart from the aggregates; third, it is neither identical with nor apart from the aggregates.

初即蘊我，理且不然，我應如蘊非常、一故；又內諸色定非實我，如外諸色有質礙故；心、心所法亦非實我，不恆相續，待眾緣故；餘行、餘色亦非實我，如虛空等，非覺性故。

The first, the self that is the aggregates, is not correct in principle; the self should then be like the aggregates, not permanent and not one; moreover, the inner forms are definitely not a real self, like outer forms they have resistance; mind and mental factors are also not a real self, as they do not continue constantly and depend on many conditions; other formations and other forms are also not a real self, like space and so on, not being of the nature of awareness.

中離蘊我，理亦不然，應如虛空，無作、受故。

The middle one, the self apart from the aggregates, is also not correct in principle; it should be like space, without action and without reception.

後俱非我，理亦不然，許依蘊立，非即、離蘊，應如瓶等，非實我故。又既不可說有為、無為，亦應不可說是我、非我。

The last, that is neither, is also not correct in principle: it is conceded to be established depending on the aggregates, and being neither identical with nor apart from the aggregates, it should be like a pot and so on, not a real self. Moreover, since it cannot be said to be conditioned or unconditioned, it also should not be said to be self or non-self.

故彼所執實我不成。

Therefore the real self that they cling to is not established.

又諸所執實有我體，為有思慮？為無思慮？若有思慮，應是無常，非一切時有思慮故；若無思慮，應如虛空，不能作業，亦不受果。故所執我，理俱不成。

Moreover, regarding the substance of a real self that is clung to: does it have thought or not? If it has thought, it should be impermanent, because it does not have thought at all times; if it has no thought, it should be like space, unable to perform karma and unable to receive its fruit. Therefore the self that is clung to is not established in principle on either side.

又諸所執實有我體，為有作用？為無作用？若有作用，如手足等，應是無常。若無作用，如兔角等，應非實我，故所執我，二俱不成。

Moreover, regarding the substance of a real self that is clung to: does it have function or not? If it has function, like hands and feet, it should be impermanent. If it has no function, like the horn of a rabbit, it should not be a real self; so the self that is clung to is not established on either side.

又諸所執實有我體，為是我見所緣境不？若非我見所緣境者，汝等云何知實有我？若是我見所緣境者，應有我見非顛倒攝，如實知故。若爾，如何執有我者所信至教皆毀我見，稱讚無我，言無我見能證涅槃；執著我見，沈淪生死。豈有邪見能證涅槃，正見翻令沈淪生死？

Moreover, regarding the substance of a real self that is clung to: is it an object of the view of self or not? If it is not an object of the view of self, how do you know there is a real self? If it is an object of the view of self, then the view of self should not be included in inversion, because it knows things as they are. If so, how is it that the scriptures believed by those who cling to a self all condemn the view of self and praise non-self, saying that the view of non-self can realize nirvana, while clinging to the view of self sinks one in birth and death? Could it be that a wrong view can realize nirvana, while a right view makes people sink in birth and death?

又諸我見不緣實我，有所緣故，如緣餘心；我見所緣定非實我，是所緣故，如所餘法。是故我見不緣實我，但緣內識變現諸蘊，隨自妄情，種種計度。

Moreover, the views of self do not take a real self as object, because they have an object, like taking other minds as objects; what the view of self takes as object is definitely not a real self, because it is an object, like other dharmas. Therefore the view of self does not take a real self as object, but only takes the aggregates transformed and manifested by inner consciousness, and according to their own false feelings, calculates in various ways.

然諸我執略有二種：

The attachments to self are, in brief, of two kinds:

一者俱生；二者分別。

First, innate; second, discriminative.

俱生我執無始時來虛妄燻習，內因力故，恆與身俱；不待邪教及邪分別，任運而轉，故名俱生。

The innate attachment to self arises from false perfuming since beginningless time; because of the power of internal cause, it is always together with the body; it does not wait for wrong teachings or wrong discrimination and operates spontaneously, so it is called innate.

此復二種：一、常相續，在第七識，緣第八識，起自心相，執為實我；二、有間斷，在第六識，緣識所變五取蘊相，或總、或別，起自心相，執為實我。

This again has two kinds: first, the constantly continuous one, in the seventh consciousness, which takes the eighth consciousness as object, produces an aspect of one's own mind, and clings to it as a real self; second, the intermittent one, in the sixth consciousness, which takes as object the aspect of the five clinging aggregates transformed by consciousness, whether in general or in particular, produces an aspect of one's own mind, and clings to it as a real self.

此二我執，細故難斷，後修道中，數數修習勝生空觀，方能除滅。

These two kinds of attachment to self are subtle and so hard to cut off; later, on the path of cultivation, only by repeatedly practicing the excellent contemplation of the emptiness of beings can they be removed.

分別我執亦由現在外緣力故，非與身俱，要待邪教及邪分別然後方起，故名分別，唯在第六意識中有。

The discriminative attachment to self also arises from the power of present external conditions and is not together with the body; it arises only after waiting for wrong teachings and wrong discrimination, so it is called discriminative, and exists only in the sixth, mental consciousness.

此亦二種：一、緣邪教所說蘊相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實我；二、緣邪教所說我相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實我。

This too has two kinds: first, taking as object the aspects of the aggregates spoken of in wrong teachings, producing an aspect of one's own mind, discriminating and calculating, and clinging to it as a real self; second, taking as object the aspect of self spoken of in wrong teachings, producing an aspect of one's own mind, discriminating and calculating, and clinging to it as a real self.

此二我執麁故易斷，初見道時，觀一切法生空真如，即能除滅。

These two kinds of attachment to self are coarse and so easily cut off; when one first sees the Way, contemplating the true suchness of the emptiness of beings in all dharmas, one can remove them.

如是所說一切我執，自心外蘊，或有、或無；自心內蘊，一切皆有。是故我執皆緣無常五取蘊相，妄執為我。

Of all the attachments to self spoken of thus, the aggregates outside one's own mind may or may not exist; the aggregates within one's own mind all exist. Therefore all attachments to self take as object the aspects of the impermanent five clinging aggregates and falsely cling to them as self.

然諸蘊相，從緣生故，是如幻有；妄所執我，橫計度故，決定非有。故契經說：苾芻當知，世間沙門、婆羅門等所有我見，一切皆緣五取蘊起。

But the aspects of the aggregates arise from conditions and are illusory existents; the self that is falsely clung to, because it is calculated arbitrarily, definitely does not exist. Therefore the sutras say: Bhiksus should know that all the views of self held by shramanas, brahmins and others in the world all arise based on the five clinging aggregates.

實我若無，云何得有憶、識、誦、習、恩、怨等事？所執實我既常無變，後應如前，是事非有；前應如後，是事非無。以後與前，體無別故。若謂我用，前後變易，非我體者，理亦不然。用不離體，應常有故；體不離用，應非常故。然諸有情，各有本識，一類相續，任持種子，與一切法更互為因，燻習力故，得有如是憶、識等事。故所設難，於汝有失，非於我宗。

If a real self does not exist, how can there be such things as memory, recognition, recitation, practice, kindness and resentment? The real self that is clung to, being permanent and unchanging, should have the later like the former, which is not the case; or the former should be like the later, which is not so. For the later and the former have no distinction in substance. If it is said that the function of the self changes before and after and is not the self's substance, that too is not correct: function is not apart from substance and should be constant; substance is not apart from function and should be nonconstant. But sentient beings each have a fundamental consciousness, which continues as one kind, upholds seeds, and is the cause of all dharmas reciprocally, and because of the power of perfuming there are such matters as memory and recognition. So the objection you raise is a fault on your side and does not lie in our school.

若無實我，誰能造業？誰受果耶？所執實我，既無變易，猶如虛空，如何可能造業、受果？若有變易，應是無常。然諸有情心、心所法因緣力故，相續無斷，造業、受果，於理無違。

If there is no real self, who performs karma? Who receives the fruit? The real self you cling to, having no change, is like space; how could it perform karma and receive fruit? If it has change, it should be impermanent. But the minds and mental factors of sentient beings, through the power of causes and conditions, continue without break, performing karma and receiving fruit, and in principle there is no contradiction.

我若實無，誰於生死輪迴諸趣？誰復厭苦求趣涅槃？所執實我，既無生滅，如何可說生死輪迴？常如虛空，非苦所惱，何為厭捨求趣涅槃？故彼所言常為自害。然有情類，身、心相續，煩惱、業力輪迴諸趣，厭患苦故，求趣涅槃。

If a self is really nonexistent, who transmigrates in birth and death through the destinies? And who, weary of suffering, seeks and heads toward nirvana? The real self you cling to, having no arising or ceasing, how can it be said to transmigrate in birth and death? Being permanent like space and not troubled by suffering, why would it loathe and give up and seek nirvana? So what they say always harms themselves. But for the class of sentient beings, body and mind continue, and by the power of afflictions and karma they transmigrate through the destinies, are weary of suffering and seek nirvana.

由此故知定無實我，但有諸識無始時來前滅後生，因果相續，由妄燻習，似我相現，愚者於中妄執為我。

From this we know that there is definitely no real self; there are only consciousnesses, which since beginningless time have ceased in front and arisen behind, continuing as cause and effect, and through false perfuming appear as the aspect of a self, and fools falsely cling to it as self.

如何識外實有諸法不可得耶？

How is it that real dharmas outside consciousness cannot be found?

外道、餘乘所執外法，理非有故。

Because the external dharmas clung to by non-Buddhists and other vehicles are not existent in principle.

外道所執云何非有？

Why are those clung to by non-Buddhists not existent?

且數論者執我是思，受用薩埵、剌闍、答摩所成大等二十三法，然大等法三事合成，是實非假，現量所得。

Take the Samkhya school (the Indian Samkhya school): it clings to the self as thinker, who experiences the twenty-three dharmas beginning with mahat, made of sattva, rajas and tamas (the three gunas of joy, sorrow and darkness); but the dharmas beginning with mahat are formed by the combination of three things, are real and not provisional, and are obtained by direct perception.

彼執非理，所以者何？

Their attachment is not reasonable. Why?

大等諸法，多事成故，如軍、林等，應假非實，如何可說現量得耶？又大等法，若是實有，應如本事，非三合成。

The dharmas beginning with mahat, being formed from many things like an army or a forest, should be provisional and not real; how can it be said they are obtained by direct perception? Moreover, if the dharmas beginning with mahat are real, they should be like the primal substance, not formed by a combination of three.

薩埵等三，即大等故，應如大等，亦三合成，轉變非常，為例亦爾。又三本事，各多功能，體亦應多，能、體一故。三體既遍，一處變時，餘亦應爾，體無別故。許此三事體、相各別，如何和合共成一相？不應合時變為一相，與未合時，體無別故。若謂三事體異相同，便違己宗體、相是一，體應如相，冥然是一，相應如體，顯然有三，故不應言三合成一。

The three, sattva and the others, are themselves mahat and so on; like mahat and so on, they too are formed by a combination of three, with transformations that are impermanent, and the example is likewise. Moreover, the three primal substances each have many functions, so their substance should also be many, because function and substance are one. If the three substances are all-pervading, when one changes in one place the others should also be so, because their substances have no distinction. If the three things are conceded to have different substances and characteristics, how can they combine to jointly form one characteristic? They should not, on combining, become one characteristic with no distinction in substance from before combining. If it is said that the three things differ in substance but are the same in characteristic, this contradicts their own doctrine that substance and characteristic are one; the substance should be like the characteristic, obscurely one, and the characteristic should be like the substance, plainly three, so one should not say that three combine to form one.

又三是別，大等是總，總、別一故，應非一、三。此三變時，若不和合成一相者，應如未變，如何現見是一色等？若三和合成一相者，應失本別相，體亦應隨失。不可說三各有二相：一、總；二、別。總即別故，總亦應三，如何見一？若謂三體各有三相，和雜難知，故見一者，既有三相，寧見為一？復如何知三事有異？若彼一一皆具三相，應一一事能成色等，何所𨵗少，待三和合，體亦應各三，以體即相故，又大等法皆三合成，展轉相望，應無差別，是則因、果、唯量、諸大、諸根差別皆不得成。若爾，一根應得一切境，或應一境一切根所得，世間現見情與非情、淨穢等物，現、比量等，皆應無異，便為大失。

Moreover, the three are particulars and mahat and so on are the universal; universal and particular are one, so it should be neither one nor three. When these three transform, if they do not combine to form one characteristic, they should be as if not yet transformed; how are single forms and so on seen directly? If the three combine to form one characteristic, they should lose their original distinct characteristics, and substance should be lost as well. One cannot say that each of the three has two characteristics: one, universal, and two, particular. The universal is itself the particular, so the universal too should be three, so how is one seen? If it is said that each of the three substances has three characteristics, and the blending is hard to know, so that one is seen, then given there are three characteristics, how is it seen as one? And how does one know the three things are different? If each of them fully has three characteristics, each thing should be able to form forms and so on; what is lacking that they should wait for the three to combine? And the substance should also each be three, because substance is itself characteristic. Moreover, since the dharmas beginning with mahat are all formed by combinations of three and, looking at one another in turn, should have no distinctions, the distinctions among cause and effect, subtle elements, great elements and sense faculties could not be established. If so, one faculty should obtain all objects, or one object should be obtained by all faculties; and in the world, the directly seen sentient and insentient, pure and impure things, direct perception and inference and so on, should all be without difference, which is a great fault. In the source, the character 𨵗 means lacking.