Libo

Cheng Weishi Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), Volume 4

Tang (唐) · Hu Fadengzao, translated by Xuan Zang (護法等造,玄奘譯) · Volume 20 / 39

謂觀德、失、俱非境中,由定令心專注不散,依斯便有決擇智生。

That is, in observing objects of merit, fault, or neither, by concentration the mind is made focused and undistracted, and depending on this there is the arising of discriminating wisdom.

「心專注」言,顯所欲住,即便能住,非唯一境。不爾,見道歷觀諸諦,前後境別,應無等持。

The words "the mind is focused" show that it wishes to dwell, and even though it can dwell, it is not a single object only. Otherwise, in the path of seeing, in successively observing the truths, the earlier and later objects differ, and there should be no samadhi.

若不繫心,專注境位,便無定起,故非遍行。

If the mind is not tied and in a state of focus on an object, there is no arising of concentration, so it is not omnipresent.

有說:爾時亦有定起,但相微隱。應說誠言。

Some say: at that time concentration also arises, only its aspect is slight and hidden. They should speak honestly.

若定能令心等和合,同趣一境,故是遍行,理亦不然,是觸用故。

If one says concentration makes the mind and so on come together and tend to one object, so it is omnipresent, it is also not reasonable, because that is the function of contact.

若謂此定,令剎那頃,心不易緣,故遍行攝,亦不應理;一剎那心,自於所緣,無易義故。

If one says that this concentration makes the mind not shift its object for a moment, so it is subsumed in the omnipresent, this too is unreasonable; in one moment of mind, there is no meaning of shifting in relation to its own object.

若言由定,心取所緣,故遍行攝,彼亦非理;作意令心取所緣故。

If one says that by concentration the mind takes its object, so it is subsumed in the omnipresent, this too is unreasonable; attention causes the mind to take its object.

有說:此定體即是心。經說為心學,心一境性故。彼非誠證,依定攝心,令心一境,說彼言故。

Some say: the substance of this concentration is just the mind. The sutra speaks of the training of the mind as one-pointedness of mind. That is not a true proof; it speaks those words about gathering the mind through concentration and making the mind one-pointed.

根、力、覺支、道支等攝。如念、慧等,非即心故。

It is subsumed by the faculties, powers, factors of awakening, and factors of the path. Like mindfulness and wisdom, it is not simply the mind.

云何為慧?於所觀境,簡擇為性,斷疑為業。

What is wisdom? With respect to the object observed, its nature is discrimination, and its function is to cut off doubt.

謂觀德、失、俱非境中,由慧推求,得決定故。於非觀境,愚昧心中,無簡擇故,非遍行攝。

That is, in observing objects of merit, fault, or neither, through wisdom one investigates and reaches decision. In objects not observed, in a deluded and dim mind, there is no discrimination, so it is not subsumed by the omnipresent.

有說:爾時,亦有慧起,但相微隱。天愛寧知?對法說為大地法故;諸部對法,展轉相違,汝等如何執為定量?

Some say: at that time wisdom also arises, only its aspect is slight and hidden. How does Tianai know? The Abhidharma speaks of the great-ground dharmas; the Abhidharma of the various schools contradict each other in turn, so how can you hold them as a decisive standard?

唯觸等五,經說遍行。說十非經,不應固執。然欲等五,非觸等故,定非遍行,如信、貪等。

Only the five of contact and so on are called omnipresent by the sutra. The statement of ten is not from a sutra, and one should not hold fast to it. But the five of desire and so on, not being contact and the rest, are definitely not omnipresent, like faith, greed, and so on.

有義:此五定互相資。隨一起時,必有餘四。

One view holds: these five definitely support one another. When any one arises, the other four are necessarily present.

有義:不定。《瑜伽》說此四一切中,無後二故。又說此五,緣四境生,所緣、能緣,非定俱故。

One view holds: not necessarily. The Yogacara says that of the four universals, these lack the last two. It also says these five arise taking four kinds of objects as conditions; the objects and the taking are not definitely simultaneous.

應說此五,或時起一:謂於所樂,唯起希望;或於決定,唯起印解;或於曾習,唯起憶念;或於所觀,唯起專注。謂愚昧類,為止散心,雖專注所緣,而不能簡擇。世共知彼有定無慧。

One should say that of these five, sometimes only one arises: that is, with respect to what is desired, only hope arises; or with respect to what is determined, only firm conviction arises; or with respect to what is habituated, only recollection arises; or with respect to what is observed, only focus arises. For example, the deluded kind, in order to stop a scattered mind, though they focus on the object, cannot discriminate. The world generally knows that they have concentration and no wisdom.

彼加行位,少有聞、思,故說等持,緣所觀境;或依多分,故說是言。如「戲忘天」,專注一境,起貪、瞋等,有定無慧,諸如是等,其類寔繁。

In their stage of preparatory practice, they have little hearing and reflection, so concentration is spoken of as taking the object observed; or it speaks according to the majority, and so says this. Like the "gods of forgetful play," focusing on a single object and giving rise to greed, anger, and so on, having concentration without wisdom; such cases are truly many.

或於所觀,唯起簡擇,謂不專注,馳散推求。

Or with respect to what is observed, only discrimination arises, namely not focusing, but racing and scattering in searching.

或時起二:謂於所樂、決定境中,起欲、勝解;或於所樂、曾習境中,起欲及念。如是乃至於所觀境,起定及慧,合有十二。

Or sometimes two arise: for example, with respect to what is desired and what is determined, desire and resolve arise; or with respect to what is desired and what is habituated, desire and mindfulness arise. And so on up to, with respect to the object observed, concentration and wisdom arise, making twelve in total.

或時起三:謂於所樂、決定、曾習,起欲、解、念;如是乃至於曾、所觀起念、定、慧,合有十三。

Or sometimes three arise: for example, with respect to what is desired, determined, and habituated, desire, resolve, and mindfulness arise; and so on up to, with respect to what is habituated and observed, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom arise, making thirteen in total.

或時起四:謂於所樂、決定、曾習、所觀境中,起前四種;如是乃至於定、曾習、所觀境中,起後四種,合有五四。

Or sometimes four arise: for example, with respect to what is desired, determined, habituated, and observed, the first four arise; and so on up to, with respect to concentration, the habituated, and the observed, the last four arise, making five fours in total.

或時起五:謂於所樂、決定、曾習、所觀境中,具起五種。

Or sometimes five arise: for example, with respect to what is desired, determined, habituated, and observed, all five arise together.

如是於四,起欲等五,總、別合有三十一句。

Thus with respect to four objects, the five of desire and so on arise, and in total and in particular there are thirty-one combinations.

或有心位,五皆不起,如非四境,率爾墮心,及藏識俱,此類非一。

Or there are mental states in which none of the five arises, such as in non-four-object cases, the abruptly falling mind, and the mind arising together with the storehouse consciousness, which are of more than one kind.

第七、八識,此別境五,隨位有無,如前已說。

In the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, these five object-specific factors are present or absent according to the stage, as previously explained.

第六意識諸位容俱,依轉、未轉,皆不遮故。

In the sixth, mind-consciousness, they may arise together in all stages, and whether it is transformed or not is not excluded.

有義:五識,此五皆無;緣已得境,無希望故;不能審決,無印持故;恆取新境,無追憶故;自性散動,無專注故;不能推度,無簡擇故。

One view holds: the five consciousnesses lack all these five; taking an already obtained object, they have no hope; they cannot examine and decide, so have no firm conviction; they always take new objects, so have no recollection; their nature is scattered and moving, so have no focus; they cannot reason, so have no discrimination.

有義:五識,容有此五:雖無於境增上希望,而有微劣樂境義故;於境雖無增上審決,而有微劣印境義故;雖無明記曾習境體,而有微劣念境類故。

One view holds: the five consciousnesses may have these five: although they have no intensified hope toward the object, they have the slight meaning of delighting in the object; although they have no intensified examination toward the object, they have the slight meaning of holding the object firmly; although they have no clear memory of the substance of the habituated object, they have the slight meaning of mindfulness of the kind of object.

雖不作意繫念一境,而有微劣專注義故。遮等引故,說性散動,非遮等持,故容有定。

Although they do not attend and fix thought on a single object, they have the slight meaning of focus. The denial of balanced meditation and the statement that their nature is scattered and moving does not deny samadhi, so concentration may exist.

雖於所緣不能推度,而有微劣簡擇義故。由此聖教說眼、耳通,是眼、耳識相應智性。餘三準此有慧無失。

Although they cannot reason about their object, they have the slight meaning of discrimination. Thus the holy teachings say that the eye and ear penetrate, which is the wisdom nature associated with eye- and ear-consciousness. The other three follow by analogy, and there is no fault in having wisdom.

未自在位,此五或無;得自在時,此五定有。

In the state not yet at ease, these five may be absent; when ease is attained, these five are definitely present.

樂觀諸境,欲無減故;印境勝解,常無減故;憶習曾受,念無減故;又佛五識,緣三世故;如來無有不定心故;五識皆有作事智故。

In delighting in objects, desire does not diminish; in holding objects firmly, resolve is always undiminished; in recalling what was previously experienced, mindfulness is undiminished; moreover the Buddha's five consciousnesses take the three times as objects; the Tathagata has no unsettled mind; and all five consciousnesses have the wisdom of accomplishing what is to be done.

此別境五,何受相應?

With what feelings are these five object-specific factors associated?

有義:欲三,除憂、苦受,以彼二境,非所樂故。餘四通四,唯除苦受,以審決等,五識無故。

One view holds: desire is associated with three, excluding sorrow and pain, because those two objects are not objects of delight. The other four pervade four, excluding only painful feeling, because the five consciousnesses lack examination and decision.

有義:一切,五受相應。論說憂根於無上法,思慕愁慼,求欲證故。純受苦處,希求解脫,意有苦根,前已說故。論說貪愛,憂、苦相應。此貪愛俱,必有欲故。苦根既有,意識相應,審決等四,苦俱何咎?又五識俱,亦有微細印境等四,義如前說。

One view holds: all are associated with the five feelings. The treatise says that the root of sorrow, toward the unsurpassed Dharma, yearns, grieves, and seeks to realize it with desire. In places of purely painful feeling, one seeks liberation; the mind has the root of pain, as explained earlier. The treatise says that craving is associated with sorrow and pain. With this craving there must be desire. Since the root of pain exists, the four of examination and decision and so on, associated with mind-consciousness, arising with pain, what fault is there? Moreover, those arising with the five consciousnesses also have the subtle four of holding objects firmly and so on, with the meaning as explained before.

由斯欲等,五受相應。

Therefore desire and the rest are associated with the five feelings.

此五復依性、界、學等諸門分別,如理應思。

These five may also be distinguished according to nature, realm, learning, and other gates; one should reflect on them according to principle.

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 5

Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 6

護法等菩薩造

Composed by Dharmapala and other Bodhisattvas.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by imperial command by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang.

已說遍行、別境二位。善位心所,其相云何?

The omnipresent and object-specific categories have been explained. What are the characteristics of the wholesome mental factors?

頌曰:

The verse says:

11善謂信、慚、愧、無貪等三根,

11. The wholesome are faith, shame, embarrassment, the three roots such as non-greed,

勤、安、不放逸、行捨及不害。

Diligence, tranquility, non-negligence, equanimity of practice, and non-harming.

論曰:唯善心俱,名善心所。謂信、慚等,定有十一。

The treatise says: Only those that arise together with the wholesome mind are called wholesome mental factors. They are faith, shame, and so on, definitely eleven in number.

云何為信?於實、德、能,深忍、樂、欲,心淨為性;對治不信,樂善為業。

What is faith? With respect to reality, virtue, and ability, its nature is deep acceptance, delight, and aspiration, with a pure mind; its function is to counteract lack of faith and to delight in the good.

然信差別,略有三種:一、信實有,謂於諸法實事、理中,深信忍故;二、信有德,謂於三寶真淨德中,深信樂故;三、信有能,謂於一切世、出世善,深信有力,能得能成,起希望故。

The kinds of faith are roughly three: first, faith in reality, meaning deep faith and acceptance of the actual facts and principles of all dharmas; second, faith in virtue, meaning deep faith and delight in the true and pure virtue of the Three Jewels; third, faith in ability, meaning deep faith that one has the power regarding all worldly and supramundane good, able to attain and accomplish it, giving rise to hope.

由斯對治彼不信心,愛樂證修世、出世善。

Therefore it counteracts that mind of lack of faith, and loves and delights in realizing and cultivating worldly and supramundane good.

忍謂勝解,此即信因;樂欲謂欲即是信果。礭陳此信,自相是何?

"Acceptance" means resolve, which is the cause of faith; "delight and aspiration" means desire, which is the effect of faith. So what, exactly, is the self-characteristic of this faith?

豈不適言,心淨為性?

Was it not just said that its nature is a pure mind?

此猶未了,彼「心淨」言,若淨即心,應非心所;若令心淨,慚等何別?心俱淨法,為難亦然。

This is not yet understood. If the "pure mind" meant that purity itself is the mind, it would not be a mental factor; if it means making the mind pure, how does it differ from shame and the rest? The same objection is raised about the pure dharmas arising with the mind.

此性澄清,能淨心等。以心勝故,立心淨名。如水清珠,能清濁水。慚等雖善,非淨為相。此淨為相,無濫彼失。又諸染法,各別有相。唯有不信,自相渾濁,復能渾濁餘心、心所。如極穢物,自穢穢他。信正翻彼,故淨為相。

This nature is clear and can purify the mind and the rest. Because the mind is superior, the name "pure mind" is established. It is like a water-clearing pearl, which can clear turbid water. Though shame and the rest are wholesome, they do not take purity as their characteristic. Taking this purity as its characteristic, it has no fault of being confused with those. Moreover all defiled dharmas have their separate characteristics. Only lack of faith has a turbid self-characteristic, and can also make other minds and mental factors turbid. It is like an utterly filthy thing, which is itself filthy and makes others filthy. Faith is exactly the opposite of that, and so takes purity as its characteristic.

有說:信者愛樂為相。應通三性,體應即欲。又應苦、集非信所緣。

Some say: faith takes love and delight as its characteristic. This would pervade the three natures, and its substance should be just desire. Also, suffering and its origin should not be objects of faith.

有執信者隨順為相。應通三性,即勝解、欲。若印順者,即勝解故。若樂順者,即是欲故。離彼二體,無順相故。由此應知,心淨是信。

Some hold that faith takes conformity as its characteristic. This would pervade the three natures, and be just resolve and desire. If it is conformity in the sense of accepting, it is resolve; if conformity in the sense of delighting, it is desire. Apart from those two substances, there is no such thing as a characteristic of conformity. From this we should know that a pure mind is faith.

云何為慚?依自、法力,崇重賢、善為性;對治無慚,止息惡行為業。謂依自、法尊、貴增上,崇重賢、善,羞恥過惡,對治無慚,息諸惡行。

What is shame (hri)? Relying on the power of oneself and the Dharma, its nature is to esteem the worthy and good; it counteracts shamelessness and its function is to stop evil conduct. That is, relying on the dignity and value of oneself and the Dharma, one esteems the worthy and good, is ashamed of faults and evil, counteracts shamelessness, and stops all evil conduct.

云何為愧?依世間力,輕拒暴惡為性;對治無愧,止息惡行為業。謂依世間訶、厭增上,輕拒暴惡,羞恥過罪,對治無愧,息諸惡業。

What is embarrassment (apatrapya)? Relying on the power of the world, its nature is to hold violence and evil in contempt and to reject them; it counteracts lack of embarrassment and its function is to stop evil conduct. That is, relying on the world's rebuke and disgust, one holds violence and evil in contempt, is ashamed of faults and sins, counteracts lack of embarrassment, and stops all evil karma.

羞恥過惡是二通相;故諸聖教,假說為體。

Being ashamed of faults and evil is the common characteristic of the two; therefore the holy teachings provisionally speak of it as their substance.

若執羞恥,為二別相,應慚與愧,體無差別。則此二法定不相應,非受、想等有此義故。若待自、他,立二別者,應非實有,便違聖教。若許慚、愧實而別起,復違論說十遍善心。

If being ashamed were held to be the particular characteristic of the two, shame and embarrassment would not differ in substance. Then these two dharmas would definitely not be associated together, which is not the case for feeling, perception, and so on, which have this meaning. If one waits upon oneself and others to establish the distinction of the two, they would not be real existents, contradicting the holy teaching. If one allowed that shame and embarrassment are real and arise distinctly, it would again contradict the treatise's statement that the ten pervade wholesome minds.

崇重、輕拒若二別相,所緣有異,應不俱生。二失既同,何乃偏責?誰言二法所緣有異?不爾,如何?善心起時,隨緣何境,皆有崇重善,及輕拒惡義。故「慚」與「愧」,俱遍善心,所緣無別。豈不我說亦有此義?汝執「慚」、「愧」自相既同,何理能遮前所設難?

If esteeming and rejecting were the particular characteristics of the two, their objects would differ and they should not arise together. Since the two faults are the same, why blame only one side? Who says that the objects of these two dharmas differ? It is not so. How is it then? When a wholesome mind arises, whatever object it takes, it has the meaning of esteeming good and rejecting evil. Therefore "shame" and "embarrassment" both pervade wholesome minds, and their objects do not differ. Do I not also say that this meaning exists? Since you hold that the self-characteristics of "shame" and "embarrassment" are the same, what reasoning can refute the objection raised before?

然聖教說:「顧自、他者」,自法名自,世間名他。或即此中,崇拒善惡,於己益損,名自、他故。

But the holy teaching says: "regarding oneself and others"; oneself and the Dharma are called self, and the world is called other. Or it is precisely here that, in esteeming good and rejecting evil, the benefit and harm to oneself are called self and other.

「無貪等」者,等無瞋、痴。此三名根,生善勝故。三不善根,近對治故。

"Non-greed and so on": "and so on" takes in non-hatred and non-delusion. These three are called roots because they are superior in producing good. They are the near antidote to the three unwholesome roots.

The original text is in the public domain. The English is a machine-assisted translation of this library’s own Chinese paraphrase, checked against a fixed glossary so that technical terms match the definitions used elsewhere on this site. It is a reading aid and does not replace the original.