Cheng Weishi Lun, Fascicle One

護法等菩薩造

Composed by Bodhisattva Dharmapala and others.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by imperial command.

復如何知，諸有為相異色、心等，有實自性？

And how do they know that the characteristics of conditioned things are real in self-nature and different from form, mind and so on?

契經說故。如契經說：有三有為之有為相，乃至廣說。

Because the sutras say so. As the sutra says: there are three characteristics of the conditioned, and so on at length.

此經不說異色、心等有實自性，為證不成。

These sutras do not say that they are real in self-nature and different from form, mind and so on, so the proof is not established.

非第六聲便表異體，色、心之體即色、心故。

It is not that the sixth case ending indicates a different substance; the substance of form and mind is just form and mind.

非能相體定異所相，勿堅相等異地等故。

It is not that the substance of the characterizing is definitely different from the characterized; do not let hardness and so on differ from earth and so on.

若有為相異所相體，無為相體應異所相。

If the characteristics of the conditioned were different from the substance of what is characterized, the substance of the characteristics of the unconditioned should also be different from what is characterized.

又生等相，若體俱有，應一切時齊興作用；若相違故，用不頓興，體亦相違，如何俱有？又住、異、滅用不應俱。

Moreover, if the characteristics of arising and so on all existed in substance, they should all exert function at all times at once; if they contradict each other and so their functions do not arise at once, their substances also contradict each other, so how can they coexist? Also the functions of abiding, change and cessation should not coexist.

能相、所相體俱本有，用亦應然，無別性故。若謂彼用更待因緣，所待因緣應非本有。又執生等便為無用。

If the substances of the characterizing and the characterized are both originally existent, then their functions should be so too, because there is no other nature. If it is said that function again waits for causes and conditions, the causes and conditions awaited should not be originally existent. Moreover, maintaining arising and so on would be useless.

所相恆有而生等合，應無為法亦有生等，彼此異因，不可得故。

If the characterized always exists and joins with arising and so on, then unconditioned dharmas too should have arising and so on; different causes for this and that cannot be found.

又去、來世，非現、非常，應似空花，非實有性。生名為有，寧在未來？滅名為無，應非現在。滅若非無，生應非有。又滅違住，寧執同時？住不違生，何容異世。故彼所執，進退非理。

Moreover, past and future times, being neither present nor permanent, should be like sky flowers and not have real nature. Arising is called existence; how can it be in the future? Cessation is called non-existence, so it should not be in the present. If cessation is not non-existence, arising should not be existence. Also cessation contradicts abiding; how can they maintain they are simultaneous? Abiding does not contradict arising; how can they allow them to be in different times? So what they maintain is unreasonable in advance and in retreat.

然有為法，因緣力故，本無今有，暫有還無，表異無為，假立四相。

Rather, conditioned dharmas, by the power of causes and conditions, are originally non-existent and now exist, exist briefly and then are non-existent again, which shows their difference from the unconditioned, and four characteristics are provisionally established.

本無今有，有位名生；生位暫停，即說為住；住別前後，復立異名；暫有還無，無時名滅。

Originally non-existent and now existent, the state of existing is called arising; when the state of arising pauses, it is said to be abiding; abiding differs before and after, and another name, change, is established; briefly existing and again non-existent, the time of non-existence is called cessation.

前三有故，同在現在，後一是無，故在過去。

The first three are existence, together in the present; the last is non-existence, so it is in the past.

如何無法與有為相？表此後無，為相何失？生表有法先非有，滅表有法後是無，異表此法非凝然，住表此法暫有用。故此四相，於有為法，雖俱名錶，而表有異。

How can a non-existent dharma serve as a characteristic of the conditioned? What fault is there in using this later non-existence as the characteristic? Arising shows that the dharma was not existent before; cessation shows that the dharma is non-existent afterward; change shows that this dharma is not unmoving; abiding shows that this dharma briefly has function. So with regard to conditioned dharmas, though all four are called indications, what they indicate differs.

此依剎那假立四相，一期分位亦得假立。初有名生；後無名滅；生已相似相續名住；即此相續轉變名異。

This provisionally establishes four characteristics on the basis of moments, and they can also be provisionally established on the stage of a lifetime. The first existence is called arising; the later non-existence is called cessation; the continuation of similar succession after arising is called abiding; and the transformation of this succession is called change.

是故四相皆是假立。

So the four characteristics are all provisionally established.

復如何知異色、心等，有實詮表名、句、文身？

And how do they know that names, sentences and letters (nama, pada, vyanjana-kaya) that really express are different from form, mind and so on?

契經說故。如契經說，佛得希有名、句、文身。

Because the sutras say so. As the sutra says, the Buddha attained rare names, sentences and letters.

此經不說異色、心等有實名等，為證不成。

These sutras do not say that real names and so on are different from form, mind and so on, so the proof is not established.

若名、句、文異聲實有，應如色等，非實能詮。

If names, sentences and letters were different from sound and real, they should be like form and so on and not be real expressers.

謂聲能生名、句、文者，此聲必有音韻屈曲，此足能詮，何用名等。

That is, sound can produce names, sentences and letters, and this sound must have tonal modulation, which suffices to express; what use are names and so on?

若謂聲上音韻屈曲即名、句、文，異聲實有，所見色上形量屈曲，應異色處別有實體。

If it is said that the tonal modulation on sound is itself names, sentences and letters, different from sound and real, then the shape, measure and curves seen on form should have a real substance elsewhere apart from the place of form.

若謂聲上音韻屈曲，如絃管聲非能詮者，此應如彼聲，不別生名等。又誰說彼定不能詮？聲若能詮，風鈴聲等應有詮用，此應如彼不別生實名、句、文身。若唯語聲能生名等，如何不許唯語能詮。

If it is said that the tonal modulation on sound, like the sounds of strings and pipes, cannot express, then this should be like that sound and not separately produce names and so on. Also who says that that definitely cannot express? If sound can express, the sound of wind bells and so on should have expressive function; this should be like that and not separately produce real names, sentences and letters. If only speech sounds can produce names and so on, why not grant that only speech can express?

何理定知能詮即語？寧知異語別有能詮？語不異能詮，人天共了，執能詮異語，天愛非餘。

By what principle do you definitely know that the expresser is just speech? How do you know that there is a separate expresser different from speech? That speech is not different from the expresser is understood by humans and devas alike; to maintain that the expresser differs from speech is only the "beloved of heaven" (a sarcastic term for the foolishly obstinate), and no one else.

然依語聲分位差別，而假建立名、句、文身。

Rather, names, sentences and letters are provisionally established on the differences in the stages of speech sound.

名詮自性；句詮差別；文即是字，為二所依。

A name expresses the self-nature; a sentence expresses the particular qualities; a letter is the syllable, the support of the two.

此三離聲雖無別體，而假、實異，亦不即聲。由此法、詞二無礙解，境有差別；聲與名等，蘊、處、界攝亦各有異。

These three, though apart from sound they have no separate substance, are different as conventional and real, and are not sound itself. For this reason the objects of the unobstructed understanding of dharma and of expression differ; and sound and names and so on, as included in aggregates, sense bases and elements, also each differ.

且依此土說名、句、文依聲假立，非謂一切；諸餘佛土亦依光明、妙香、味等假立三故。

Moreover, here in this land it is said that names, sentences and letters are provisionally established on sound, which is not said of all; in other buddha lands the three are provisionally established on light, wonderful fragrance, taste and so on.

有執隨眠異心、心所，是不相應行蘊所攝。

Some maintain that latent tendencies (anushaya) are different from mind and mental factors and are included in the aggregate of non-associated conditioned factors.

彼亦非理，名貪等故，如現貪等，非不相應。

This too is unreasonable, because they are called greed and so on, like manifest greed and so on, and are not non-associated.

執別有餘不相應行，準前理趣皆應遮止。

The maintenance of other non-associated factors should all be refuted according to the principles above.

諸無為法離色、心等決定實有，理不可得。且定有法，略有三種：一、現所知法，如色、心等。二、現受用法，如瓶、衣等，如是二法，世共知有，不待因成。三、有作用法，如眼、耳等，由彼彼用證知是有。無為非世共知定有，又無作用，如眼、耳等。設許有用，應是無常，故不可執無為定有。然諸無為所知性故，或色、心等所顯性故，如色、心等，不應執為離色、心等實無為性。

The unconditioned dharmas, apart from form, mind and so on, cannot be found to be definitely real in principle. There are in general three kinds of dharmas that definitely exist: first, dharmas presently known, like form and mind; second, dharmas presently used, like jars and clothes, and these two kinds of dharmas are commonly known by people to exist and do not wait for proof by reasons; third, dharmas that have function, like eye and ear, which are known to exist by their functions. The unconditioned is not commonly known by people to definitely exist, and has no function like the eye and ear. Even if function is granted, it would have to be impermanent, so one cannot maintain that the unconditioned definitely exists. Rather, the unconditioned, because they have the nature of being known, or the nature of being manifested by form, mind and so on, like form and mind, should not be maintained to be the nature of real unconditioned apart from form, mind and so on.

又虛空等為一、為多？

Moreover, are space and the like one or many?

若體是一，遍一切處，虛空容受色等法故，隨能合法，體應成多，一所合處餘不合故。不爾，諸法應互相遍。若謂虛空不與法合，應非容受，如餘無為。又色等中有虛空不？有應相雜，無應不遍。一部、一品結法斷時，應得餘部、餘品擇滅；一法緣闕得不生時，應於一切得非擇滅。執彼體一，理應爾故。

If the substance is one and pervades all places, space accommodates form and other dharmas, and it should become many according to the dharmas it joins with, because where one joins the others do not. Otherwise all dharmas would pervade each other. If it is said that space does not join with dharmas, it should not accommodate, like the other unconditioned. Also, is there space within form and so on? If there is, they should be mixed; if not, it should not be pervasive. When the bonds of one class and one category are cut, one should obtain cessation by discrimination of other classes and other categories; when the condition of one dharma is lacking so that it does not arise, one should obtain cessation without discrimination for all. If one maintains its substance is one, reason requires this.

若體是多，便有品類，應如色等，非實無為。虛空又應非遍容受。

If the substance is many, there would be categories, and it should be like form and so on, not a real unconditioned. Also space should not be pervasive in accommodating.

餘部所執離心、心所實有無為，準前應破。

What other schools maintain, that unconditioned dharmas are real apart from mind and mental factors, should be refuted according to the above.

又諸無為許無因果故，應如兔角，非異心等有。

Moreover, since the unconditioned are allowed to have no cause or effect, they should be like rabbit horns and not exist differently from mind and so on.

然契經說，有虛空等諸無為法，略有二種：

Rather, the sutras say there are space and other unconditioned dharmas, which in general are of two kinds:

一、依識變假施設有。謂曾聞說虛空等名，隨分別有虛空等相，數習力故，心等生時，似虛空等無為相現。此所現相，前後相似，無有變易，假說為常。

First, they exist by provisional designation depending on the transformation of consciousness. That is, having once heard the names of space and so on, one discriminates appearances of space and so on accordingly, and by the force of repeated habit, when mind and so on arise, appearances of the unconditioned such as space appear. These manifested appearances are similar before and after, without change, and are provisionally spoken of as permanent.

二、依法性，假施設有。

Second, they exist by provisional designation depending on the nature of dharmas.

謂空、無我所顯真如，有、無、俱非，心言路絕，與一切法非一、異等，是法真理，故名法性。

That is, suchness manifested by emptiness and selflessness, which is neither existent nor non-existent nor both nor neither, where the path of mind and words is cut off, and which is neither one nor different with respect to all dharmas and so on, is the true principle of dharmas, so it is called the nature of dharmas (dharmata).

離諸障礙，故名虛空；由簡擇力，滅諸雜染，究竟證會，故名擇滅；不由擇力，本性清淨，或緣闕所顯，故名非擇滅；苦、樂受滅，故名不動；想、受不行，名想受滅。

Being apart from all obstructions, it is called space; by the power of discrimination, extinguishing all defilements and finally realizing it, it is called cessation by discrimination; not by the power of discrimination, its nature being originally pure, or manifested by lack of conditions, it is called cessation without discrimination; the cessation of pleasant and painful sensations is called immovability; the non-operation of perception and sensation is called the cessation of perception and sensation.

此五皆依真如假立，真如亦是假施設名。

These five are all provisionally established depending on suchness, and suchness is also a conventionally designated name.

遮撥為無，故說為有；遮執為有，故說為空；勿謂虛、幻，故說為實；理非妄倒，故名真如。不同餘宗離色、心等有實常法名曰真如。

It is said to exist to refute denying it as non-existent; it is said to be empty to refute clinging to it as existent; it is said to be real so that it is not taken as unreal or illusory; it is called suchness because its principle is not false or inverted. It is unlike the other schools which, apart from form, mind and so on, say there is a real permanent dharma called suchness.

故諸無為非定實有。

So the unconditioned are not definitely real.

外道、餘乘所執諸法異心、心所非實有性，是所取故，如心、心所。

The dharmas maintained by non-Buddhists and the other vehicles, being different from mind and mental factors, have no real nature, because they are grasped objects, like mind and mental factors.

能取彼覺亦不緣彼，是能取故，如緣此覺。

The cognition that grasps that also does not cognize that, because it is a grasping cognition, like the cognition that cognizes this cognition.

諸心、心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非真實有。

All minds and mental factors, being dependently arisen, are also like magical illusions, and are not truly existent.

為遣妄執心、心所外實有境故，說唯有識。

To dispel the false clinging to real objects outside mind and mental factors, it is said that there is only consciousness.

若執唯識真實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。

If one clings to consciousness-only as truly existing, as one clings to external objects, that too is attachment to dharmas.

然諸法執略有二種：

Attachment to dharmas is in general of two kinds:

一者俱生；二者分別。

First, innate; second, discriminated.

俱生法執，無始時來虛妄燻習，內因力故，恆與身俱，不待邪教及邪分別，任運而轉，故名俱生。

Innate attachment to dharmas, owing to false habituation since beginningless time, by the power of internal causes, is always together with the body, does not wait for heterodox teachings or heterodox discrimination, and operates spontaneously, and so is called innate.

此復二種：一、常相續，在第七識，緣第八識，起自心相，執為實法；二、有間斷，在第六識，緣識所變蘊、處、界相，或總、或別，起自心相，執為實法。

It is also of two kinds: first, constantly continuous, in the seventh consciousness, which takes the eighth consciousness as object and gives rise to the image of its own mind, clinging to it as a real dharma; second, with interruption, in the sixth consciousness, which takes as object the appearances of aggregates, sense bases and elements transformed by consciousness, generally or separately, gives rise to the image of its own mind, and clings to it as a real dharma.

此二法執細故難斷，後十地中數數修習勝法空觀，方能除滅。

These two kinds of attachment to dharmas are subtle and so hard to cut off, and only later in the ten stages, by repeatedly practicing the excellent contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas, can they be extinguished.

分別法執，亦由現在外緣力故，非與身俱，要待邪教及邪分別然後方起，故名分別。

Discriminated attachment to dharmas also arises from present external conditions, is not together with the body, and arises only after waiting for heterodox teachings and heterodox discrimination, so it is called discriminated.

唯在第六意識中有。此亦二種：一、緣邪教所說蘊、處、界相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實法。二、緣邪教所說自性等相，起自心相，分別、計度，執為實法。

It exists only in the sixth mental consciousness. It too is of two kinds: first, taking as object the appearances of aggregates, sense bases and elements spoken of in heterodox teachings, giving rise to the image of its own mind, discriminating and calculating, and clinging to it as a real dharma. Second, taking as object the appearances of primal nature and so on spoken of in heterodox teachings, giving rise to the image of its own mind, discriminating and calculating, and clinging to it as a real dharma.

此二法執麁故易斷，入初地時，觀一切法，法空真如，即能除滅。

These two kinds of attachment to dharmas are coarse and so easy to cut off, and upon entering the first stage, by contemplating all dharmas as suchness, the emptiness of dharmas, they can be extinguished.