Libo

Cheng Weishi Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only), Volume 4

Tang (唐) · Hu Fadengzao, translated by Xuan Zang (護法等造,玄奘譯) · Volume 19 / 39

「餘三」定是樂、喜、憂根,以彼必成現行捨故。

"The other three" are definitely the roots of pleasure, joy, and sorrow, because they would necessarily be accomplished as active equanimity.

豈不客捨彼定不成?

Could it be that guest equanimity is definitely not accomplished by them?

寧知彼文,唯說客受?應不說彼定成意根,彼六客識有時無故。不應彼論唯說客受,通說意根,無異因故。

How do we know that this passage speaks only of guest feeling? One should not say that they definitely accomplish the mind faculty, because those six guest consciousnesses are sometimes absent. That treatise should not speak only of guest feeling but speak of the mind faculty generally, because there is no different reason.

又若彼論依客受說,如何說彼定成八根?

Moreover, if that treatise speaks in terms of guest feeling, how does it say they definitely accomplish eight faculties?

若謂五識不相續故,定說憂根為第八者,死、生、悶絕寧有憂根?

If one says the five consciousnesses do not continue, one would definitely say the root of sorrow is the eighth; how could there be the root of sorrow in death, birth, and unconsciousness?

有執苦根為第八者,亦同此破。

If someone holds that the root of pain is the eighth, it is refuted in the same way.

設執一形為第八者,理亦不然,形不定故。彼惡業招,容無形故。彼由惡業,令五根門恆受苦故,定成眼等。必有一形,於彼何用?非於無間大地獄中,可有希求婬欲事故。

Even if one holds that one form is the eighth, it is not reasonable by principle, because form is not fixed. Their evil karma summons, and there may be no form. Because of their evil karma the gates of the five organs constantly suffer pain, and the eye and others are definitely accomplished. What use is a necessary form to them? It is not that in the great Avici hell there can be hope for sexual matters.

由斯第八定是捨根,第七、八識捨相應故。

Therefore the eighth is definitely the root of equanimity, because the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are associated with equanimity.

如極樂地,意悅名樂,無有喜根。故極苦處,意迫名苦,無有憂根。

As in the land of utmost bliss, mental pleasure is called pleasure, and there is no root of joy. Thus in the place of utmost pain, mental affliction is called pain, and there is no root of sorrow.

故「餘三」言,定憂、喜、樂。

Therefore the words "the other three" definitely refer to sorrow, joy, and pleasure.

餘處說彼有等流樂,應知彼依隨轉理說。或彼通說:餘雜受處,無異熟樂,名純苦故。

Elsewhere it is said they have pleasure of equal flow; one should know that these are spoken according to the principle of ordinary evolving. Or they speak in general: in other places of mixed feeling, where there is no maturing pleasure, it is called purely painful.

然諸聖教,意地慼受,名憂根者,依多分說,或隨轉門,無相違過。

As for the holy teachings in which distress on the level of mind is called the root of sorrow, they speak according to the majority, or according to the gate of ordinary evolving, with no fault of contradiction.

《瑜伽論》說:生地獄中諸有情類,異熟無間有異熟生,苦、憂相續。又說:地獄尋、伺憂俱。一分鬼趣,傍生亦爾者,亦依隨轉門。

The Yogacara says: among the sentient beings born in hell, for the interval of the maturing result there is born the maturing result, and pain and sorrow continue in succession. It also says: in hell, investigation and analysis are accompanied by sorrow. In part of the hungry ghost realm and among animals it is also like this, also according to the gate of ordinary evolving.

又彼苦根,意識俱者,是餘憂類,假說為憂。

Moreover, that root of pain which arises with mind-consciousness is of the type of the remaining sorrow, and is provisionally called sorrow.

或彼苦根,損身心故,雖苦根攝,而亦名憂。如近分喜,益身心故,雖是喜根,而亦名樂。《顯揚論》等,具顯此義。然未至地定無樂根,說彼唯有十一根故。

Or that root of pain, which harms body and mind, though subsumed by the root of pain, is also called sorrow. It is like the joy of the access stage, which benefits body and mind, and though it is the root of joy, is also called pleasure. The Xianyang treatise and others clearly show this meaning. But the meditation of the not-yet-arrived stage has no root of pleasure, because it is said they have only eleven faculties.

由此應知,意地慼受,純受苦處,亦苦根攝。

From this we should know that distress on the level of mind, and places of purely painful feeling, are also subsumed by the root of pain.

此等聖教,差別多門,恐文增廣,故不繁述。

These and other holy teachings, with their many gates of difference, I do not describe at length for fear of making the text too long.

有義:六識三受不俱,皆外門轉,互相違故。五俱意識,同五所緣,五三受俱,意亦應爾,便違正理,故必不俱。《瑜伽》等說:藏識一時與轉識相應,三受俱起者,彼依多念。如說一心,非一生滅,無相違過。

One view holds: the six consciousnesses do not have three feelings simultaneously, because they all operate in the outer gate and are contrary to each other. Mind-consciousness arising with the five has the same objects as the five, and with the five having three feelings together, mind should also be thus, which contradicts correct principle, so they must not be simultaneous. The Yogacara and others say: the storehouse consciousness is at one time associated with the evolving consciousnesses, and the three feelings arise together; these rely on many moments of thought. As when one speaks of a single mind, it is not one arising and ceasing, so there is no fault of contradiction.

有義:六識三受容俱。順、違、中境,容俱受故。意不定與五受同故。於偏注境,起一受故;無偏注者,便起捨故。由斯六識三受容俱。

One view holds: the six consciousnesses may have three feelings simultaneously. Agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects may be felt together. Mind is not fixed to be the same as the five feelings. It gives rise to one feeling with respect to the focused object; where there is no focus, it gives rise to equanimity. Therefore the six consciousnesses may have three feelings simultaneously.

得自在位,唯樂、喜、捨,諸佛已斷憂、苦事故。

In the state of ease there is only pleasure, joy, and equanimity, because the Buddhas have cut off the matters of sorrow and pain.

前所略摽六位心所,今應廣顯彼差別相。

The six categories of mental factors that were roughly indicated earlier should now be shown in full as to their different characteristics.

且初、二位,其相云何?

First, what are the characteristics of the first and second categories?

頌曰:

The verse says:

10初遍行觸等;次別境謂欲、

10. First, the omnipresent: contact and so on; next the object-specific: namely desire,

勝解、念、定、慧,所緣事不同。

Resolve, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom, whose objects differ.

論曰:六位中初遍行心所,即觸等五,如前廣說。

The treatise says: Among the six categories the first, the omnipresent mental factors, are the five of contact and so on, as explained at length before.

此遍行相,云何應知?

How should the characteristics of the omnipresent be known?

由教及理,為定量故。

Scripture and reasoning serve as the standard.

此中教者,如契經言:眼、色為緣,生於眼識,三和合觸,與觸俱生有受、想、思,乃至廣說。由斯觸等四是遍行。

As for scripture here: as the sutra says: with eye and form as conditions, eye-consciousness arises, and the three come together as contact, and arising together with contact there are feeling, perception, and volition, and so on at length. Therefore contact and the other four are omnipresent.

又契經說:若根不壞,境界現前,作意正起,方能生識。餘經復言:若於此作意,即於此了別。若於此了別,即於此作意。是故此二,恆共和合,乃至廣說,由此作意,亦是遍行。

The sutra also says: if the faculty is not impaired, the object appears before it, and attention properly arises, consciousness can then arise. Another sutra says: if one attends to this, one discerns this; if one discerns this, one attends to this. Therefore these two are always joined together, and so on at length; thus attention too is omnipresent.

此等聖教,誠證非一。

These and other holy teachings truly prove it, and are not found in only one place.

理謂識起必有三和。彼定生觸,必由觸有。若無觸者,心、心所法,應不和合觸一境故。

As for reasoning: it is that when consciousness arises there must be the harmony of three. That arises definitely with contact and must be due to contact. If there were no contact, mind and mental factor dharmas would not come together to make contact with a single object.

作意引心令趣自境。此若無者,心應無故。

Attention leads the mind to incline toward its own object. If this were absent, the mind would not exist.

受能領納順、違、中境,令心等起歡、慼、捨相。無心起時,無隨一故。

Feeling can receive agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral objects, causing the mind and the rest to give rise to the aspects of joy, distress, and equanimity. When the mind arises there is no case without one of them.

想能安立自境分齊。若心起時無此想者,應不能取境分齊相。

Perception can establish the boundaries of its object. If, when the mind arises, there were no such perception, it would not be able to take the characteristic of the object's boundaries.

思令心取正因等相,造作善等。無心起位,無此隨一,故必有思。

Volition causes the mind to take the characteristic of right cause and so on, and to produce wholesome and other karma. There is no state of the mind arising without one of these, so volition must exist.

由此證知,觸等五法,心起必有,故是遍行。餘非遍行,義至當說。

From this we prove that the five dharmas of contact and so on are necessarily present when the mind arises, and so are omnipresent. That the others are not omnipresent follows by implication of the meaning.

次別境者:謂欲至慧,所緣境事,多分不同,於六位中,次初說故。

Next the object-specific: namely from desire to wisdom, whose object-matters are mostly different; among the six categories, they are mentioned next after the first.

云何為欲?

What is desire?

於所樂境,希望為性,勤依為業。

With respect to a desired object, its nature is hope and its function is to be the support of diligence.

有義:所樂,謂可欣境。於可欣事,欲見、聞等,有希望故。

One view holds: "desired" means an object that can be delighted in. With respect to delightful things, there is hope to see, hear, and so on.

於可厭事,希彼不合,望彼別離,豈非有欲?

With respect to detestable things, one hopes not to meet them and wishes to be separated from them; is this not desire?

此但求彼不合離時,可欣自體,非可厭事。

This only seeks, when not meeting or separating, a delightful self-substance, and is not about the detestable thing.

故於可厭及中容境,一向無欲。緣可欣事,若不希望,亦無欲起。

So with regard to detestable and neutral objects, there is never desire. Taking a delightful thing as condition, if one does not hope for it, no desire arises either.

有義:所樂,謂所求境。於可欣、厭,求合、離等,有希望故。於中容境,一向無欲。緣欣、厭事,若不希求,亦無欲起。

One view holds: "desired" means an object sought. With respect to delightful and detestable things, there is hope to seek union, separation, and so on. With respect to neutral objects, there is never desire. Taking delightful and detestable matters as conditions, if one does not hope or seek, no desire arises either.

有義:所樂,謂欲觀境,於一切事,欲觀察者,有希望故。若不欲觀,隨因境勢,任運緣者,即全無欲。

One view holds: "desired" means an object one desires to observe; with respect to all things, there is hope in those one desires to examine. If one does not desire to observe, and takes things as condition spontaneously following the force of the causal object, then there is no desire at all.

由斯理趣,欲非遍行。

By these reasons, desire is not omnipresent.

有說:要由希望境力,諸心、心所方取所緣,故經說「欲為諸法本」。

Some say: only by the force of hoping for an object do the mind and mental factors take their objects, so the sutra says "desire is the root of all dharmas."

彼說不然。心等取境,由作意故。諸聖教說,作意現前能生識故。曾無處說由欲能生心、心所故。

Their saying is wrong. The mind and so on take objects through attention. The holy teachings say that with attention present consciousness can arise. Nowhere is it said that desire can give rise to mind and mental factors.

如說諸法,愛為根本,豈心、心所皆由愛生故?說欲為諸法本者,說欲所起一切事業。或說善欲,能發正勤。由彼助成一切善事,故論說此勤依為業。

Just as it is said that for all dharmas craving is the root, does that mean mind and mental factors all arise from craving? To say desire is the root of all dharmas means that all undertakings arise from desire. Or it speaks of wholesome desire, which can initiate right diligence. Since it assists in accomplishing all good deeds, the treatise says that this is the support of diligence in function.

云何勝解?於決定境,印持為性,不可引轉為業。

What is resolve? With respect to a determined object, its nature is to hold firmly, and its function is not to be drawn away.

謂邪、正等教、理、證力,於所取境,審決印持,由此異緣不能引轉。

That is, with respect to the object taken, by the force of right and wrong teachings, reasoning, and realization, one examines, decides, and holds firmly, and so other conditions cannot draw it away.

故猶豫境,勝解全無。非審決心,亦無勝解。由斯勝解,非遍行攝。

So with respect to doubtful objects, there is no resolve at all. Without a mind of careful judgment there is also no resolve. Thus resolve is not subsumed by the omnipresent.

有說:心等取自境時,無拘礙故,皆有勝解。

Some say: when the mind and so on take their own objects, without obstruction, they all have resolve.

彼說非理。所以者何?能不礙者,即諸法故。所不礙者,即心等故。勝發起者,根、作意故。若由此故,彼勝發起,此應復待餘,便有無窮失。

Their saying is unreasonable. Why? What can be unobstructing is all dharmas. What is not obstructed is the mind and the like. What gives rise to the superior are the faculties and attention. If because of this the other arises, then this would again depend on another, and so there is the fault of infinite regress.

云何為念?於曾習境,令心明記不忘為性,定依為業。

What is mindfulness? With respect to an object once experienced, its nature is to make the mind remember clearly without forgetting, and its function is to be the support of concentration.

謂數憶持曾所受境,令不忘失,能引定故;於曾未受體、類境中,全不起念。設曾所受,不能明記,念亦不生。故念必非遍行所攝。

That is, it repeatedly recollects and holds the objects previously experienced, so that they are not forgotten, and can lead to concentration; in objects of body and kind not previously experienced, mindfulness does not arise at all. Even for what was previously experienced, if it cannot be remembered clearly, mindfulness does not arise. So mindfulness is certainly not subsumed by the omnipresent.

有說:心起必有念俱,能為後時憶念因故。

Some say: when the mind arises, mindfulness is necessarily present with it, and can serve as the cause of later recollection.

彼說非理。勿於後時有痴、信等,前亦有故。前心、心所,或想勢力,足為後時憶念因故。

Their saying is unreasonable. Do not let later delusion, faith, and so on be present in the earlier too. The earlier mind and mental factors, or the force of perception, are sufficient to act as the cause of later recollection.

云何為定?於所觀境,令心專注不散為性,智依為業。

What is concentration? With respect to the object observed, its nature is to make the mind focused and undistracted, and its function is to be the support of wisdom.

The original text is in the public domain. The English is a machine-assisted translation of this library’s own Chinese paraphrase, checked against a fixed glossary so that technical terms match the definitions used elsewhere on this site. It is a reading aid and does not replace the original.