Cheng Weishi Lun, Fascicle One
此識唯是異熟性故，善、染汙等亦不相應。
Because this consciousness is only of the nature of maturation, it also does not correspond with good, defiled and other factors.
惡作等四無記性者，有間斷故，定非異熟。
The four of remorse and the like that are neutral in nature are definitely not maturation because they are interrupted.
法有四種：謂善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記，阿賴耶識何法攝耶？
There are four kinds of dharma: good, not good, obscured neutral and unobscured neutral. Which kind of dharma is the alaya consciousness included in?
此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故。
This consciousness is only unobscured neutral, because it is of the nature of maturation.
異熟若是善、染汙者，流轉還滅應不得成，又此識是善、染依故，若善、染者，互相違故，應不與二俱作所依；又此識是所燻性故，若善、染者，如極香臭，應不受燻。
If maturation were good or defiled, going around in rebirth and turning back to cessation could not be accomplished; and this consciousness is the basis of good and defiled dharmas, and if it were good or defiled, because they contradict each other, it should not serve as basis for both; moreover this consciousness is of the nature of what is perfumed, and if it were good or defiled, like extremely fragrant or foul things, it would not receive perfuming.
無燻習故，染、淨因果俱不成立，故此唯是無覆無記。
Without perfuming, the causes and effects of the defiled and the pure could not be established, so this is only unobscured neutral.
「覆」謂染法障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故；此識非染，故名「無覆」。「記」謂善、惡，有愛、非愛果，及殊勝自體可記別故；此非善、惡，故名「無記」。
"Obscured" means that defiled dharmas obstruct the sacred path and also cloud the mind, making it impure; this consciousness is not defiled, and so is called "unobscured." "Neutral" means that good and evil have loved or unloved fruits and a superior self-substance that can be distinguished; this is neither good nor evil, and so is called "neutral."
「觸等亦如是」者，謂如阿賴耶識，唯是無覆無記性攝，觸、作意、受、想、思亦爾，諸相應法，必同性故。
"Contact and the rest are also like this": that is, like the alaya consciousness, which is only of unobscured neutral nature, contact, attention, feeling, perception and volition are also so, because all corresponding dharmas must be of the same nature.
又，觸等五，如阿賴耶，亦是異熟，所緣、行相俱不可知，緣三種境，五法相應，無覆無記，故說「觸等亦如是」言。
Moreover, the five, contact and so on, like the alaya, are also maturation, with objects and aspects both unknowable, cognizing three kinds of objects, the five dharmas corresponding, unobscured neutral, and so it is said "contact and the rest are also like this."
有義：觸等如阿賴耶，亦是異熟及一切種，廣說乃至無覆無記，「亦如是」言，無簡別故。
One view is that contact and so on, like the alaya, are also maturation and all seeds, and so on up to unobscured neutral, with "also like this" being said because there is no qualification.
彼說非理。
What they say is unreasonable.
所以者何？
Why?
觸等依識，不自在故。如貪、信等不能受燻，如何同識，能持種子？
Contact and so on depend on consciousness and are not independent. Like greed, faith and so on, which cannot be perfumed, how could they, like consciousness, hold seeds?
又，若觸等亦能受燻，應一有情有六種體。
Moreover, if contact and so on could also be perfumed, then one sentient being would have six kinds of substance.
若爾，果起從何種生？理不應言從六種起，未見多種生一芽故。
If so, from which seed does the fruit arise? It is not reasonable to say it arises from six seeds, since one never sees many seeds produce one sprout.
若說果生唯從一種，則餘五種便為無用；亦不可說次第生果，燻習同時，勢力等故；又不可說六果頓生，勿一有情一剎那頃，六眼識等俱時生故。
If one says the fruit arises from only one seed, then the other five would be useless; nor can one say that fruits arise in sequence, since the perfuming is simultaneous and the power equal; nor can one say that six fruits arise at once, lest one sentient being in one moment have six eye consciousnesses and so on arising together.
誰言觸等亦能受燻持諸種子？不爾，如何觸等如識名一切種？
Who says that contact and so on can also be perfumed and hold seeds? If not, how can contact and so on, like consciousness, be called all-seeds?
謂觸等五，有似種相，名一切種，觸等與識所緣等故，無色觸等有所緣故，親所緣緣定應有故，此似種相不為因緣生現識等，如觸等上似眼根等非識所依，亦如似火無能燒用，彼救非理，觸等所緣似種等相，後執受處方應與識而相例故。
That is, the five, contact and so on, have aspects like seeds and are called all-seeds, because contact and so on and the objects of consciousness are the same, and contact and so on without form have objects, and the directly cognized object condition must exist; this seed-like aspect does not serve as causal condition to give rise to manifest consciousness and so on, like the aspect of eye faculty and so on on contact and so on, which is not the basis of consciousness, and also like fire without the function of burning; that defense is unreasonable, and the seed-like aspects on the objects of contact and so on should only be compared later with consciousness in apprehending and sustaining and place.
由此前說一切種言，定目受燻、能持種義；不爾，本頌有重言失。
Therefore the earlier statement of "all seeds" definitely refers to the meaning of being perfumed and holding seeds; otherwise, the root verse would have the fault of repetition.
又彼所說，「亦如是」言，無簡別故，鹹相例者，定不成證，勿觸等五，亦能了別，觸等亦與觸等相應。
Moreover, their saying "also like this," because there is no qualification, applies by analogy to all, and is definitely not established as proof, lest contact and so on, the five, also be able to discern, and contact and so on also correspond with contact and so on.
由此故知「亦如是」者，隨所應說，非謂一切。
From this one knows that "also like this" is said as appropriate and does not mean all.
阿賴耶識為斷？為常？
Is the alaya consciousness discontinuous or permanent?
非斷、非常，以「恆轉」故。「恆」謂此識無始時來，一類、相續，常無間斷，是界、趣、生施設本故，性堅、持種令不失故。「轉」謂此識無始時來，念念生滅前後變異，因滅果生，非常、一故，可為轉識燻成種故。
It is neither discontinuous nor permanent, because it is "constantly flowing." "Constant" means that this consciousness from beginningless time is of one kind and continuous, always uninterrupted, because it is the basis for establishing realms, destinies and births, firm in nature, and holds seeds so that they are not lost. "Flowing" means that this consciousness from beginningless time arises and ceases moment by moment, changing before and after, with the cause ceasing and the effect arising, because it is neither permanent nor one, and can be perfumed by the active consciousnesses to form seeds.
「恆」言遮斷，「轉」表非常，猶如瀑流，因果法爾。
"Constant" excludes discontinuity, and "flowing" indicates non-permanence, like a rushing stream, with cause and effect naturally so.
如瀑流水，非斷、非常，相續長時有所漂溺，此識亦爾，從無始來生滅相續，非常、非斷，漂溺有情令不出離。
Like a rushing stream of water, neither broken nor permanent, continuing for a long time and sweeping things away, this consciousness is also like this: from beginningless time it arises and ceases in continuity, neither permanent nor broken, sweeping sentient beings along so that they do not escape.
又如瀑流，雖風等擊，起諸波浪而流不斷，此識亦爾，雖遇眾緣，起眼識等而恆相續。
Also like a rushing stream, though struck by wind and so on, raising waves, the flow is not broken; this consciousness is also like this: though it meets many conditions and gives rise to eye consciousness and so on, it continues constantly.
又如瀑流，漂水下上魚、草等物，隨流不捨，此識亦爾，與內習氣外觸等法恆相隨轉。
Also like a rushing stream, which carries fish, grass and other things up and down, following the flow and not leaving them, this consciousness is also like this, constantly turning along with inner habit-energies and outer contact and other dharmas.
如是法喻，意顯此識無始因果非斷、常義。謂此識性無始時來，剎那剎那果生因滅。果生故非斷，因滅故非常，非斷、非常是緣起理，故說此識恆轉如流。
This simile and its application is meant to show that the beginningless cause and effect of this consciousness is neither discontinuous nor permanent. That is, the nature of this consciousness from beginningless time, moment after moment, has the effect arising and the cause ceasing. The effect's arising is why it is not discontinuous, and the cause's ceasing is why it is not permanent, and neither discontinuous nor permanent is the principle of dependent origination, and so it is said that this consciousness constantly flows like a stream.
過去、未來既非實有，非常可爾；非斷如何？斷豈得成緣起正理？
Since the past and future are not really existent, non-permanence is acceptable; but how can it be non-discontinuous? Can discontinuity be the right principle of dependent origination?
過去、未來若是實有，可許非斷；如何非常？常亦不成緣起正理。
If the past and future are really existent, non-discontinuity can be allowed; but how can it be non-permanent? Can permanence also be the right principle of dependent origination?
豈斥他過，己義便成？
Does refuting their faults establish one's own meaning?
若不摧邪難以顯正。前因滅位後果即生，如秤兩頭低、昂時等，如是因果相續如流，何假去、來，方成非斷？
If one does not crush the wrong, it is hard to reveal the right. When the cause ceases, the later effect arises at once, like the two ends of a scale, one low and one high at the same time; this continuation of cause and effect like a stream, what need is there to posit past and future in order to be non-discontinuous?
因現有位，後果未生，因是誰因？果現有時，前因已滅，果是誰果？既無因果，誰離斷、常？
When the cause is present, the later effect has not yet arisen, so whose cause is the cause? When the effect is present, the earlier cause has already ceased, so whose effect is the effect? Since there is no cause and effect, who is free of discontinuity and permanence?
若有因時，已有後果，果既本有，何待前因？因義既無，果義寧有？無因無果，豈離斷、常？
If at the time of the cause, the later effect already exists, then since the effect is originally existent, why wait for the earlier cause? Since the meaning of cause does not exist, how can the meaning of effect exist? With no cause and no effect, how is one free of discontinuity and permanence?
因果義成，依法作用，故所詰難，非預我宗。
Since the meaning of cause and effect is established, and it operates in dependence on dharmas, what they question does not concern my school.
體既本有，用亦應然，所待因緣，亦本有故。
Since the substance is originally existent, the function should also be so, and the conditions it depends on should also be originally existent.
由斯汝義因果定無，應信大乘緣起正理。謂此正理深妙離言，因果等言皆假施設。觀現在法有引後用，假立當果對說現因；觀現在法有酬前相，假立曾因對說現果。假謂現識似彼相現。
From this, in your doctrine cause and effect definitely do not exist, and you should believe in the right principle of dependent origination of the Mahayana. This right principle is profound and wondrous and beyond words, and words like cause and effect are all provisional. Observing that a present dharma has the function of leading to a later one, one provisionally establishes a future effect as correlative to the present cause; observing that a present dharma has the aspect of repaying an earlier one, one provisionally establishes a past cause as correlative to the present effect. "Provisional" means that the present consciousness appears as that aspect.
如是因果，理趣顯然，遠離二邊，契會中道，諸有智者應順修學。
Cause and effect in this way, with the principle clear, far from the two extremes and in accord with the Middle Way, should be followed and studied by all the wise.
有餘部說：雖無去、來而有因果恆相續義。
Other schools say: although there is no going or coming, there is still the meaning of cause and effect continuing constantly.
謂現在法極迅速者，猶有初、後，生、滅二時，生時酬因，滅時引果，時雖有二，而體是一，前因正滅，後果正生，體相雖殊，而俱是有。
That is, a present dharma that is extremely swift also has two moments, beginning and end, arising and ceasing; at the time of arising it repays the cause, and at the time of ceasing it leads to the effect; though there are two moments, the substance is one; the earlier cause is just ceasing and the later effect is just arising, and though the substance and characteristics differ, both exist.
如是因果非假施設，然離斷、常，又無前難，誰有智者捨此信餘？
Such cause and effect is not provisional, yet is free of discontinuity and permanence, and has none of the earlier difficulties; who among the wise would abandon this and believe others?
彼有虛言，都無實義，何容一念而有二時？生、滅相違，寧同現在？滅若現在，生應未來。有故名生，既是現在，無故名滅，寧非過去？滅若非無，生應非有；生既現有，滅應現無，又二相違，如何體一？非苦、樂等見有是事，生、滅若一，時應無二；生、滅若異，寧說體同？故生、滅時俱現在有，同依一體，理必不成。
They have empty words with no real meaning; how can they allow two moments in a single thought? Arising and ceasing contradict each other, so how can they be in the present together? If ceasing is present, arising should be future. Because there is existence it is called arising; if it is present, then because there is non-existence it is called ceasing, so how is it not past? If ceasing is not non-existence, arising should not be existence; since arising is presently existent, ceasing should be presently non-existent, and the two contradict each other, so how can their substance be one? It is not like suffering and pleasure and the like, where this is seen; if arising and ceasing are one, there should be no two moments; if arising and ceasing are different, how can one say their substance is the same? Therefore the claim that arising and ceasing are both present at the time and rely on one substance cannot be established in principle.
經部師等因果相續，理亦不成，彼不許有阿賴耶識能持種故。
The continuation of cause and effect according to the Sautrantikas and others also cannot be established in principle, because they do not allow an alaya consciousness that can hold seeds.
由此應信大乘所說因果相續緣起正理。
From this one should believe the right principle of dependent origination, the continuation of cause and effect, taught by the Mahayana.
此識無始恆轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？
This consciousness, from beginningless time, constantly flows like a stream; at what stage should it be finally abandoned?
阿羅漢位方究竟捨。
Only at the stage of the arhat is it finally abandoned.
謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時，名阿羅漢。爾時，此識煩惱麁重永遠離故，說之為「捨」。
That is, when the sages finally exhaust the obstruction of afflictions, they are called arhats. At that time, the coarse heaviness of afflictions in this consciousness is permanently left behind, and this is said to be "abandoning."
此中所說阿羅漢者，通攝三乘無學果位，皆已永害煩惱賊故；應受世間妙供養故；永不復受分段生故。
The arhat spoken of here includes the fruits of no more learning of all Three Vehicles; they have permanently killed the thieves of afflictions, are worthy of the world's wondrous offerings, and will never again receive segmented birth and death.
云何知然？
How do we know this is so?
〈決擇分〉說：諸阿羅漢、獨覺、如來皆不成就阿賴耶故；《集論》復說：若諸菩薩得菩提時，頓斷煩惱及所知障，成阿羅漢及如來故。
The Section of Determination says: arhats, Pratyekabuddhas and Tathagatas all do not possess the alaya; and the Compendium again says: when Bodhisattvas attain Bodhi, they at once cut off the afflictions and the obstruction to knowledge, and become arhats and Tathagatas.
若爾，菩薩煩惱種子未永斷盡非阿羅漢，應皆成就阿賴耶識，何故即彼〈決擇分〉說不退菩薩亦不成就阿賴耶識？
If so, Bodhisattvas whose seeds of afflictions have not been permanently cut off are not arhats and should all possess the alaya consciousness; why does that same Section of Determination say that non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas also do not possess the alaya consciousness?
彼說二乘無學果位迴心趣向大菩提者，必不退起煩惱障故，趣菩提故，即復轉名不退菩薩，彼不成就阿賴耶識。
They say that those at the stage of no more learning in the Two Vehicles who turn their minds toward great Bodhi will surely not regress to give rise to the obstruction of afflictions, and as they head toward Bodhi they are again renamed non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas, and they do not possess the alaya consciousness.
即攝在此阿羅漢中，故彼論文不違此義。
They are included in this arhat category, so that treatise does not contradict this meaning.
又不動地已上菩薩，一切煩惱永不行故，法駛流中任運轉故；能諸行中起諸行故；剎那剎那轉增進故，此位方名不退菩薩。
Moreover, Bodhisattvas from the Immovable Ground upward never again act with any afflictions, turn spontaneously in the swift flow of the Dharma, can give rise to all practices within each practice, and advance further moment by moment; only this stage is called the non-retrogressing Bodhisattva.
然此菩薩雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子，而緣此識我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我，由斯永捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。
But although these Bodhisattvas have not yet cut off the seeds of afflictions in the maturation consciousness, they no longer grasp the self-view, craving and so on that cognize this consciousness as an inner self, and from this they permanently abandon the name alaya, so it is said they do not possess the alaya consciousness, and this too speaks of them being called arhats.
有義：初地已上菩薩，已證二空所顯理故；已得二種殊勝智故；已斷分別二重障故；能一行中起諸行故；雖為利益起諸煩惱，而彼不作煩惱過失故，此亦名不退菩薩。
One view: Bodhisattvas from the first ground upward have already realized the principle shown by the two emptinesses, have attained the two kinds of superior wisdom, have already cut off the two heavy layers of discriminating obstructions, and can give rise to all practices in one practice; though they give rise to afflictions for the sake of benefiting others, they do not commit the faults of afflictions, and so this too is called a non-retrogressing Bodhisattva.
然此菩薩雖未斷盡俱生煩惱，而緣此識所有分別我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我，由斯亦捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。
But although these Bodhisattvas have not yet cut off the innate afflictions, they no longer grasp the discriminating self-view, craving and so on that cognize this consciousness as an inner self, and from this they also abandon the name alaya, so it is said they do not possess the alaya consciousness, and this too speaks of them being called arhats.
故《集論》中作如是說：十地菩薩雖未永斷一切煩惱，然此煩惱猶如呪、藥所伏諸毒，不起一切煩惱過失。一切地中，如阿羅漢已斷煩惱，故亦說彼名阿羅漢。
So the Compendium says as follows: Bodhisattvas of the ten grounds, though they have not yet permanently cut off all afflictions, have those afflictions subdued like poisons by spells and medicines, and do not give rise to any faults of afflictions. In all grounds, they are like arhats who have cut off afflictions, and so they too are called arhats.
彼說非理。七地已前猶有俱生我見、愛等，執藏此識為自內我，如何已捨阿賴耶名？
What they say is unreasonable. Before the seventh ground there are still innate self-view, craving and so on, which grasp this consciousness as an inner self; how could they have abandoned the name alaya?
若彼分別我見、愛等，不復執藏，說名為捨，則預流等諸有學位，亦應已捨阿賴耶名，許便違害諸論所說。
If they say that the discriminating self-view, craving and so on no longer grasp it, and call that abandoning, then those in the stages of learning such as stream-enterers should also have abandoned the name alaya, and allowing this would contradict what the treatises say.