Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, Fascicle 15, of the Sarvastivada school

未斷遍隨眠，於自地一切，

The pervasive latent afflictions not yet abandoned, toward everything in their own plane,

非遍於自部，所緣故隨增，

the non-pervasive only in their own group, increase through their objects,

非無漏上緣，無攝有違故，

not toward the unconditioned or higher objects, because there is no inclusion and there is opposition,

隨於相應法，相應故隨增。

and toward associated dharmas they increase through association.

論曰：遍行隨眠普於自地五部諸法所緣隨增，以能遍緣自地法故。所餘五部非遍隨眠，所緣隨增唯於自部，唯以自部為所緣故。此據總說。別分別者，六無漏緣、九上緣惑，於所緣境無隨增義。所以者何？無漏上境非所攝受及相違故。謂若有法為此地中身見及愛攝為己有，可有為此身見愛地中所有隨眠所緣隨增理，如衣潤濕埃塵隨住。非諸無漏及上地法，為諸下身見愛攝為己有，故緣彼下惑，非所緣隨增。住下地心求上地等，是善法欲，非謂隨眠。聖道涅槃及上地法與能緣彼下惑相違故，彼二亦無所緣隨增理，如於炎石足不隨住。有說：隨眠是隨順義，非無漏上境，順諸下隨眠，故雖是所緣而無隨增理。如風病者服乾澁藥，病者於藥非所隨增。已約所緣辯隨增義。今次應辯相應隨增。謂隨何隨眠於自相應法，由相應故於彼隨增。諸說隨增，謂至未斷，故初頌首標未斷言。頗有隨眠不緣無漏、不緣上界，而彼隨增但於相應非所緣不？有，謂緣上地諸遍行隨眠。九十八隨眠中，幾不善、幾無記？頌曰：

The Treatise says: The pervasive latent afflictions increase through their objects across all dharmas of the five groups of their own plane, because they can pervasively take the dharmas of their own plane as objects. The other, non-pervasive latent afflictions increase through their objects only in their own group, because they take only their own group as their object. This is the general statement. Distinguished in particular, the afflictions that take the six unconditioned objects and the nine higher objects have no meaning of increase through objects toward those objects. Why? Because unconditioned and higher objects are not appropriated by them, and because they are opposed. That is, if there is a dharma that the view of self and craving in this plane appropriate as their own, then there can be the principle of the latent afflictions in the plane of this view of self and craving increasing through their objects, like dust that stays on a garment that is moist. The unconditioned and higher-plane dharmas are not appropriated as their own by the lower view of self and craving, and so the lower afflictions that take them do not increase through their objects. When a mind in a lower plane seeks a higher plane and so on, that is the wish for wholesome dharmas and not a latent affliction. The noble path, nirvana, and higher-plane dharmas are opposed to the lower afflictions that take them, and so for those two as well there is no principle of increase through objects, as a foot does not stay on a hot stone. Some say: The latent afflictions have the meaning of following along; the unconditioned and higher objects do not accord with lower latent afflictions, and so although they are objects there is no principle of increase. Like a person with a wind disease taking a dry and astringent medicine, the patient does not increase in connection with the medicine. Having explained increase through objects, next we should explain increase through association. That is, whatever latent affliction increases toward its own associated dharmas does so because of association. All talk of increase refers to what is not yet abandoned, so the first verse begins with the word "not yet abandoned." Is there a latent affliction that neither takes the unconditioned nor takes higher realms, and whose increase is only toward associated dharmas and not toward objects? There is: namely, the pervasive latent afflictions that take higher planes. Among the ninety-eight latent afflictions, how many are unwholesome and how many are neutral? The verse says:

上二界隨眠，及欲身邊見，

The latent afflictions of the upper two realms, and the views of self and extremes of the desire realm,

彼俱痴無記，此餘皆不善。

with their coexisting ignorance, are neutral; all the others are unwholesome.

論曰：色無色界一切隨眠唯無記性，以染汙法若是不善有苦異熟，苦異熟果上二界無，他逼惱因彼定無故。身邊二見及相應痴，欲界繫者亦無記性。所以者何？此與施等不相違故，為我當樂現在勤脩施戒等故。執斷邊見能順解脫，故世尊說：於諸外道諸見趣中此見最勝，謂我不有、我所亦不有。我當不有、我所當不有。又此二見迷自事故、非欲逼害他有情故。若爾，貪求天上快樂及起我慢，例亦應然。先軌範師作如是說：俱生身見是無記性，如禽獸等身見現行。若分別生是不善性。餘欲界繫一切隨眠，與上相違皆不善性。於上所說不善惑中，幾是不善根、幾非不善根？頌曰：

The Treatise says: All latent afflictions of the form and formless realms are only of neutral nature, because if a defiled dharma were unwholesome it would have a painful ripened result, and the upper two realms have no painful ripened result, since there is certainly no cause there of oppression of others. The two views of self and extremes and the ignorance associated with them, if belonging to the desire realm, are also of neutral nature. Why? Because these do not contradict giving and so on, since one diligently practices giving and morality now in order to be happy in future. The view of extremes that clings to annihilation can accord with liberation, and so the World-Honored One said: Among the views and tendencies of the non-Buddhists, this view is the best, namely: I do not exist, and what is mine does not exist; I will not exist, and what will be mine will not exist. Also, these two views are deluded about one's own affairs and do not desire to oppress or harm other sentient beings. If so, greed for heavenly happiness and giving rise to the pride of "I am" would likewise be so by analogy. The earlier teachers said thus: The innate view of self is of neutral nature, as in the active view of self in birds and beasts. If it is born of discrimination, it is of unwholesome nature. All other latent afflictions belonging to the desire realm, in contrast to the above, are of unwholesome nature. Among the unwholesome afflictions spoken of above, how many are roots of the unwholesome and how many are not? The verse says:

不善根欲界，貪瞋不善痴。

The roots of the unwholesome in the desire realm are greed, anger, and unwholesome delusion.

論曰：唯欲界繫一切貪瞋及不善痴不善根攝。如其次第，世尊說為貪瞋痴三不善根。性唯不善煩惱，為不善法根立不善根。餘則不爾，所餘煩惱非不善根，義準已成，故頌不說。於上所說無記惑中，幾是無記根、幾非無記根？頌曰：

The Treatise says: Only all the greed and anger belonging to the desire realm and the unwholesome delusion are included in the roots of the unwholesome. In order, the World-Honored One called them the three unwholesome roots of greed, anger, and delusion. Afflictions whose nature is only unwholesome become the root of unwholesome dharmas and are established as unwholesome roots. The others are not so; the other afflictions are not roots of the unwholesome, and since this follows by implication, the verse does not mention it. Among the neutral afflictions spoken of above, how many are neutral roots and how many are not? The verse says:

無記根有三，無記愛痴慧，

There are three neutral roots, neutral craving, delusion, and wisdom,

非餘二高故，外方立四種，

not the other two, because of loftiness; outside teachers establish four kinds,

中愛見慢痴，三定皆痴故。

in the middle craving, views, pride, and delusion, because the three concentrations are all delusion.

論曰：迦濕彌羅國諸毘婆沙師說無記根亦有三種，謂諸無記愛、痴、慧三，下至異熟生亦無記根攝。何緣疑、慢非無記根？疑二趣轉，慢高轉故。彼師謂疑二趣相轉，性動搖故，不應立根。慢於所緣高舉相轉，異根法故，亦不立根。為根必應堅住下轉，世間共了，故彼非根。外方諸師立此有四，謂諸無記愛、見、慢、痴。無記名中遮善惡故，何緣此四立無記根？以諸愚夫脩上定者，不過依託愛見慢三，此三皆依無明力轉，故立此四為無記根。諸契經中說十四無記事，彼亦是此無記攝耶？不爾。云何？彼經但約應捨置問立無記名，謂問記門總有四種。何等為四？頌曰：

The Treatise says: The Vaibhashika masters of Kashmir say that there are also three neutral roots, namely neutral craving, delusion, and wisdom; down to the ripened result, they are also included in the neutral roots. Why are doubt and pride not neutral roots? Because doubt turns toward two paths and pride turns toward loftiness. Those masters say that doubt operates as wavering between two paths and is of an unstable nature, so it should not be established as a root; pride operates by raising itself above its object and is a dharma unlike a root, so it too is not established as a root. A root must be firm and abiding and turn downward, which the world knows in common, so those are not roots. The teachers outside establish four of these, namely neutral craving, views, pride, and delusion. Among the neutral, wholesome and evil are excluded, so why are these four established as neutral roots? Because when ordinary fools cultivate higher concentrations, they do not go beyond relying on the three of craving, views, and pride, and these three all turn by the power of ignorance, and so these four are established as neutral roots. The sutras speak of fourteen unanswered matters; are they also included in this neutrality? Not so. How then? Those sutras establish the name "neutral" only in terms of questions that should be set aside. The ways of answering a question are in total four kinds. What are the four? The verse says:

應一向分別，反詰捨置記，

Answering definitively, analytically, by counter-question, or by setting aside,

如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等。

as in death and birth, the superior, self and aggregates being one or different, and so on.

論曰：且問四者，一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記。此四如次。如有問者，問死生勝我一異等。記有四者，謂答四問。若作是問：一切有情皆當死不？應一向記一切有情皆定當死。若作是問：一切死者皆當生不？應分別記：有煩惱者當生非餘。若作是問：人為勝劣？應反詰記：為何所方？若言方天，應記人劣；若言方下，應記人勝。若作是問：蘊與有情為一為異？應捨置記：有情無實故，一異性不成，如石女兒白黑等性。如何捨置而立記名？以記彼問言，此不應記故。有作是說：彼第二問，亦應一向記，非一切當生。然問者言：一切死者皆當生不？理應分別記彼所問總答不成，雖令總知仍未解故。又作是說：彼第三問亦應一向記，人亦勝亦劣，所待異故，如識果因。然彼問者一向為問，非一向記故，應成分別記。但此應詰問意所方，故此名為應反詰記。又作是說：彼第四問既全不記蘊與有情若異若一，云何名記？然彼所問，理應捨置。記言應捨置，如何不名記？對法諸師作如是說：一向記者，若有問言：世尊是如來、應、正等覺耶？所說法要是善說耶？諸弟子眾行妙行耶？色乃至識皆無常耶？苦乃至道善施設耶？應一向記，契實義故。分別記者，若有直心請言：願尊為我說法。應為分別：法有眾多，謂去來今，欲說何者？若言為我說過去法。應復分別：過去法中亦有眾多，色乃至識。若請說色，應分別言：色中有三，善、惡、無記。若請說善，應分別言：善中有七，謂離殺生，廣說乃至離雜穢語。若彼復請說離殺生，應分別言：此有三種，謂無貪、瞋、痴三善根所發。若彼請說無貪發者，應分別言：此復有二，謂表、無表，欲說何者？反詰記者，若有諂心請言：願尊為我說法。應反詰彼：法有眾多，欲說何者？不應分別。乃至令彼默然而住，或令自記無便求非。

The Treatise says: First, the four questions: first, one should answer definitively; second, one should answer analytically; third, one should answer with a counter-question; fourth, one should set aside. These four correspond in order. For example, when asked about death and birth, superiority, and whether self and aggregates are one or different, there are four answers, answering the four questions. If asked: Will all sentient beings die? One should answer definitively that all sentient beings will surely die. If asked: Will all who die be reborn? One should answer analytically: Those with afflictions will be reborn, not others. If asked: Are humans superior or inferior? One should answer with a counter-question: Compared with what? If compared with the gods, one should answer that humans are inferior; if compared with the lower realms, one should answer that humans are superior. If asked: Are the aggregates and the sentient being one or different? One should set aside, because a sentient being has no reality, and so oneness or difference is not established, like the whiteness or blackness of the child of a barren woman. How can one set aside and yet establish the name "answer"? Because to answer that question and say something is not proper to answer. Some say: The second question too should be answered definitively, since it is not that all will be born. But the questioner asks: Will all who die be reborn? In principle one should answer analytically, because a general answer to what he asks is not valid, and even if it made him know in general, he would still not understand. Some also say: The third question too should be answered definitively, since humans are both superior and inferior depending on what they are compared to, like consciousness as cause and effect. But that questioner asks purely, and it is not a pure answer, so it becomes an analytical answer. But here one should question the direction of his intention, and so this is called the answer with a counter-question. Some also say: As for the fourth question, since one does not answer at all whether the aggregates and the sentient being are different or one, how is it called an answer? But what he asks should in principle be set aside. If "answer" means setting aside, why is it not called an answer? The Abhidharma masters say thus: A definitive answer, as when someone asks: Is the World-Honored One the Tathagata, an arhat, a perfectly enlightened one? Is the Dharma taught well taught? Do the disciples practice well? Are form up to consciousness all impermanent? Are suffering up to the path well established? One should answer definitively, since it accords with the true meaning. An analytical answer, as when someone with an upright mind requests: May the Venerable explain the Dharma for me. One should analyze: The Dharma is manifold, namely past, future, and present; which do you wish to hear? If he says: Please explain the past Dharma for me. One should further analyze: Within past Dharma there are many too, form up to consciousness. If he asks for form, one should analyze: Within form there are three, wholesome, evil, and neutral. If he asks for the wholesome, one should analyze: Within the wholesome there are seven, namely abstaining from killing, and so on at length up to abstaining from frivolous speech. If he again asks to speak of abstaining from killing, one should analyze: This has three kinds, namely arising from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-anger, and non-delusion. If he asks to speak of that arising from non-greed, one should analyze: This again has two, namely manifest and unmanifest; which do you wish to hear? An answer with a counter-question, as when someone with a flattering mind requests: May the Venerable explain the Dharma for me. One should counter-question him: The Dharma is manifold, which do you wish to hear? One should not analyze, even up to making him remain silent, or making him declare himself, so that there is no opening for him to seek fault.

豈不二中都無有問，唯有請說，亦無有記唯反詰言欲說何者，如何此二成問記耶？如有請言為我說道，豈非問道？即由反詰記彼所問，豈非記道？若爾，應俱是反詰記。不爾，問意直諂有殊，記有分別無分別故。捨置記者，若有問言：世為有邊、為無邊等？此應捨置不應為說。今依契經辯問記相。如大眾部契經中言：苾芻當知，問記有四。何等為四？謂或有問應一向記，乃至有問但應捨置。云何有問應一向記？謂問：諸行皆無常耶？此問名為應一向記。云何有問應分別記？謂若有問：諸有故思造作業已為受何果？此問名為應分別記。云何有問應反詰記？謂若有問：士夫想與我為一為異耶？應反詰言：汝依何我作如是問？若言依麁我，應記與想異。此問名為應反詰記。云何有問但應捨置？謂若有問：世為常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常？世為有邊、無邊、亦有邊亦無邊、非有邊非無邊？如來死後為有、非有、亦有亦非有、非有非非有？為命者即身、為命者異身。此問名為但應捨置。

(The Treatise continues:) Is it not so that in the second and third there is no question at all, only a request to speak, and no answer, only a counter-question saying "which do you wish to hear"? How then do these two count as question and answer? For example, a request such as "explain the path for me," is it not a question about the path? And it is exactly by counter-questioning that one answers what he asks, is it not an answer about the path? If so, both should be answers with a counter-question. Not so: the question differs as to whether the intent is upright or flattering, and the answer differs as to whether it analyzes or does not. An answer by setting aside: if someone asks: Is the world finite or infinite, and so on? This should be set aside and not explained. Now, according to the sutras, let us explain the characteristics of questions and answers. As in the sutra of the Mahasamghika school it says: Bhikshus, know that there are four kinds of questions and answers. What are the four? Namely, there are questions that should be answered definitively, and so on up to questions that should only be set aside. How is there a question that should be answered definitively? When asked: Are all formations impermanent? This question is called one that should be answered definitively. How is there a question that should be answered analytically? If someone asks: Having deliberately created karma, what result will one receive? This question is called one that should be answered analytically. How is there a question that should be answered with a counter-question? If someone asks: Are the perception of a person and the self one or different? One should counter: Relying on which self do you ask this? If he says he relies on the coarse self, one should answer that it is different from perception. This question is called one that should be answered with a counter-question. How is there a question that should only be set aside? If someone asks: Is the world permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, neither permanent nor impermanent? Is the world finite, infinite, both finite and infinite, neither finite nor infinite? After death does the Tathagata exist, not exist, both exist and not exist, neither exist nor not exist? Is the one who has life the same as the body, or is the one who has life different from the body? This question is called one that should only be set aside.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang under imperial command

分別隨眠品第五之二

Chapter Five, Part Two: Analysis of the Latent Afflictions

諸有情類於此事中隨眠隨增，名繫此事。應說過去現在未來何等隨眠能繫何事？頌曰：

When latent afflictions increase in sentient beings with regard to a matter, it is called being bound to that matter. We should explain which latent afflictions of the past, present, and future can bind which matters. The verse says:

若於此事中，未斷貪瞋慢，

If in this matter greed, anger, and pride are not yet abandoned,

過現若已起，未來意遍行，

those of the past and present, if already arisen; those of the future, associated with mind, and pervasive,

五可生自世，不生亦遍行，

the five that can arise in their own time, and those that do not arise too, and the pervasive,

餘過未遍行，現正緣能繫。

the others of the past and future, and the pervasive; those taking the present as object can bind.

論曰：且諸隨眠總有二種：一者自相，謂貪、瞋、慢；二者共相，謂見、疑、痴。事雖有多，此說所繫。如應未斷，流至後門。若此事中有貪瞋慢，於過去世已生未斷，現在已生能繫此事。以貪瞋慢是自相惑，非諸有情定遍起故。若未來世意識相應貪瞋慢三遍於三世，乃至未斷皆能繫縛。未來五識相應貪瞋，若未斷可生，唯繫未來世。未來五識相應貪瞋，若未斷不生，亦能繫三世。所餘一切見疑無明，去來未斷遍縛三世。由此三種是共相惑，一切有情俱遍縛故。若現在世正緣境時，隨其所應能繫此事。應辯諸事過去未來，為實有無方可說繫。若實是有，則一切行恆時有故應說為常；若實是無，如何可說有能所繫及離繫耶？毘婆沙師定立實有，然彼諸行不名為常，由與有為諸相合故。為此所立決定增明，應略標宗顯其理趣。頌曰：

The Treatise says: First, the latent afflictions are of two kinds in total: first, the own-characteristic ones, namely greed, anger, and pride; second, the shared-characteristic ones, namely views, doubt, and delusion. Although there are many matters, this speaks of what binds. As for "not yet abandoned," it flows to the following gate. If in this matter there are greed, anger, and pride, those that have already arisen in the past and not yet been abandoned, and those that have already arisen in the present, can bind this matter. This is because greed, anger, and pride are own-characteristic afflictions, and sentient beings do not necessarily give rise to them pervasively. The greed, anger, and pride associated with the mind-consciousness in the future pervade the three times and, until abandoned, can all bind. The greed and anger associated with the five sense consciousnesses in the future, if not yet abandoned and able to arise, bind only the future; the greed and anger associated with the five sense consciousnesses in the future, if not yet abandoned and not arising, can also bind the three times. All the other views, doubt, and ignorance, past and future, if not yet abandoned, pervasively bind the three times, because these three are shared-characteristic afflictions that all sentient beings are pervasively bound by. When it is the present, as an object is being taken, they can bind this matter as is appropriate. We should analyze whether the past and future of the various matters are really existent or not before we can speak of binding. If they are really existent, then all formations exist at all times and should be said to be permanent; if they are really non-existent, how could one speak of what binds, what is bound, and release from bondage? The Vaibhashika masters definitely establish that they really exist, yet those formations are not called permanent, because they are joined with the marks of the conditioned. In order that what is established here becomes decisive and clear, we should briefly state the thesis and show its reasoning. The verse says:

三世有由說，二有境果故，

The three times exist because of what is said, and because of two, object and result,

說三世有故，許說一切有。

and because the three times are spoken of as existing, it is admitted to be the teaching that all exists.

論曰：三世實有。所以者何？由契經中世尊說故。謂世尊說：苾芻當知，若過去色非有，不應多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。以過去色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。若未來色非有，不應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求。以未來色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求。又具二緣識方生故，謂契經說：識二緣生。其二者何？謂眼及色。廣說乃至意及諸法。若去來世非實有者，能緣彼識應闕二緣。已依聖教證去來有，當依正理證有去來，以識起時必有境故。謂必有境，識乃得生，無則不生，其理決定。若去來世境體實無，是則應有無所緣識，所緣無故識亦應無。又已謝業有當果故，謂若實無過去體者，善惡二業當果應無，非果生時有現因在。由此教理，毘婆沙師定立去來二世實有。若自謂是說一切有宗，決定應許實有去來世，以說三世皆定實有故，許是說一切有宗。謂若有人說三世實有，方許彼是說一切有宗。若人唯說有現在世及過去世未與果業，說無未來及過去世已與果業，彼可許為分別說部，非此部攝。今此部中差別有幾？誰所立世最善可依？頌曰：

The Treatise says: The three times really exist. Why? Because the World-Honored One said so in the sutras. The World-Honored One said: Bhikshus, know that if past form did not exist, the well-taught noble disciples should not diligently practice weariness and renunciation toward past form. Because past form exists, the well-taught noble disciples should diligently practice weariness and renunciation toward past form. If future form did not exist, the well-taught noble disciples should not diligently cut off longing toward future form. Because future form exists, the well-taught noble disciples should diligently cut off longing toward future form. Also, because consciousness arises only when two conditions are complete, the sutra says: Consciousness arises from two conditions. What are the two? Namely the eye and form, and so on at length up to the mind and dharmas. If the past and future did not really exist, the consciousness that takes them as objects would lack two conditions. Having established the existence of past and future by the holy teaching, we should now establish by correct reasoning that past and future exist, because when consciousness arises there must be an object. That is, only when there is an object can consciousness arise; without it, it does not arise, and this principle is decisive. If the essence of the past and future realms were really non-existent, then there would be consciousness without an object, and since the object does not exist, the consciousness should not exist either. Also, because past karma has a future result: if the past essence really did not exist, the future results of the two kinds of karma, wholesome and evil, would not exist, and it is not the case that a present cause exists at the time the result is born. By this teaching and reasoning, the Vaibhashika masters definitely establish that the past and future really exist. If one claims to be of the school that says all exists, one must admit that the past and future really exist, because it is by saying that the three times all definitely really exist that one is admitted as the school that says all exists. That is, if someone says the three times really exist, only then is he admitted to be of the school that says all exists. If someone says only that the present and the past karma that has not yet given its result exist, and that the future and the past karma that has already given its result do not exist, he may be admitted as of the Vibhajyavada school and not included in this school. How many differences are there within this school? Whose establishment of the times is the best and most reliable? The verse says:

此中有四種，類相位待異，

Among these there are four kinds: difference of kind, of mark, of state, and of relation;

第三約作用，立世最為善。

the third, by function, establishes the times most excellently.

論曰：尊者法救作如是說：由類不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，由類有殊非體有異。如破金器作餘物時，形雖有殊而體無異。又如乳變成於酪時，捨味勢等，非捨顯色。如是諸法行於世時，從未來至現在、從現在入過去，唯捨得類，非捨得體。尊者妙音作如是說：由相不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，過去正與過去相合，而不名為離現未相。未來正與未來相合，而不名為離過現相。現在正與現在相合，而不名為離過未相。如人正染一妻室時，於餘姬媵不名離染。尊者世友作如是說：由位不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，至位位中作異異說，由位有別非體有異。如運一籌，置一名一、置百名百、置千名千。尊者覺天作如是說：由待有別，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，前後相待立名有異，如一女人名母名女。此四種說一切有中，第一執法有轉變故，應置數論外道朋中。第二所立世相雜亂，三世皆有三世相故。人於妻室貪現行時，於餘境貪唯有成就。現無貪起，何義為同？第四所立前後相待，一世法中應有三世。謂過去世前後剎那應名去來，中為現在。未來現在類亦應然。故此四中第三最善，以約作用位有差別，由位不同立世有異。彼謂諸法作用未有名為未來，有作用時名為現在，作用已滅名為過去，非體有殊。此已具知。彼應復說，若去來世體亦實有，應名現在，何謂去來？豈不前言約作用立。若爾，現在有眼等根，彼同分攝有何作用？彼豈不能取果與果？是則過去同類因等既能與果，應有作用。有半作用，世相應雜。已略推徵，次當廣破。頌曰：

The Treatise says: The Venerable Dharmatrata says thus: The three times differ because of difference of kind. He holds that when dharmas pass through the times, they differ by mode of being, not in substance. Just as when a golden vessel is broken and made into something else, the shape differs but the substance does not differ. Or as milk, when changing into curd, gives up its taste and potency and so on but does not give up its color. In the same way, when dharmas pass through the times, from the future to the present and from the present into the past, they only give up one mode of being and not the substance. The Venerable Ghosaka says thus: The three times differ because of difference of mark. He holds that when dharmas pass through the times, the past is joined with the past mark, and yet is not called separated from the present and future marks; the future is joined with the future mark, and yet is not called separated from the past and present marks; the present is joined with the present mark, and yet is not called separated from the past and future marks. As when a man is attached to one wife, he is not called detached from the other consorts. The Venerable Vasumitra says thus: The three times differ because of difference of state. He holds that when dharmas pass through the times, in each state they are given a different designation, and this is by difference of state and not difference of substance. Like moving a single counting rod, placing it in the ones place makes it one, in the hundreds place makes it a hundred, in the thousands place makes it a thousand. The Venerable Buddhadeva says thus: The three times differ because of difference of relation. He holds that when dharmas pass through the times, names differ according to what is earlier and later in relation to each other, as one woman is called a mother and also a daughter. Among these four views in the school that says all exists, the first holds that dharmas have transformation, and so it should be placed among the camp of the Samkhya non-Buddhists. In the second, the marks of the times that are established are mixed up, since all three times have the marks of the three times. When a person's greed for his wife is active, with respect to other objects his greed only remains as possession. Since no greed is arisen in the present, in what sense is it the same? In the fourth, the establishment is by earlier and later relation, so within a single time there should be three times. That is, the earlier and later moments of the past should be called past and future, and the middle one present; the future and the present should likewise be so. Therefore among these four the third is best, because it is by function that the states differ, and by the difference of state the times are established as different. He holds that a dharma whose function has not yet occurred is called future, one with function occurring is called present, and one whose function has ceased is called past, and the substance does not differ. This is now fully known. He should further say: if the past and future also really have substance, they should be called present, so why call them past and future? Was it not said earlier that they are established by function? If so, in the present the faculties such as the eye are included in the homogeneous class; what function do they have? Are they not able to take a result and give a result? Then the homogeneous cause and so on in the past, since they can give results, should have function. If they have half a function, the marks of the times would be mixed. This is briefly examined; next we shall refute it at length. The verse says:

何礙用云何？無異世便壞，

What obstructs the function? How is it? Without a different time, it falls apart;

有誰未生滅？此法性甚深。

who is unborn or ceased? The nature of this dharma is very profound.

論曰：應說若法自體恆有，應一切時能起作用，以何礙力令此法體所起作用時有時無？若謂眾緣不和合者，此救非理，許常有故。又此作用云何得說為去來今？豈作用中而得更立有餘作用？若此作用非去來今而復說言作用是有，則無為故應常非無，故不應言作用已滅，及此未有法名去來。若許作用異法體者，可有此失，然無有異，故不應言有此過失。若爾，所立世義便壞，謂若作用即是法體，體既恆有用亦應然。何得有時名為過未？故彼所立世義不成。何為不成？以有為法未已生名未來，若已生未已滅名現在，若已滅名過去。彼復應說，若如現在法體實有，去來亦然，誰未已生？誰復已滅？謂有為法體實恆有，如何可得成，未已生已滅。先何所闕？彼未有故，名未已生。後復闕何？彼已無故，名為已滅。故不許法本無今有、有已還無，則三世義應一切種皆不成立。然彼所說，恆與有為諸相合故。行非常者，此但有虛言，生滅理無故。許體恆有說性非常，如是義言所未曾有。依如是義，故有頌言：

The Treatise says: One should say: if the self-essence of a dharma always exists, it should be able to perform its function at all times; by what obstructing power is the function that this dharma essence performs sometimes present and sometimes absent? If it is said that the multitude of conditions have not come together, this defense is unreasonable, because they admit that it always exists. Also, how can this function be called past, future, or present? Can one establish within a function yet another function? If this function is not past, future, or present and yet is said to exist, then, being unconditioned, it should be permanent and not non-existent, so one should not say that the function has ceased and that a dharma without it is called past or future. If it is admitted that the function differs from the dharma's essence, this fault may follow, but since there is no difference, one should not say that there is this fault. If so, the meaning of the times that they establish falls apart: if function is the essence of the dharma, then since the essence always exists the function should be likewise; how can there be times when it is called past or future? Therefore the meaning of the times as they establish it is not established. Why not established? Because a conditioned dharma that has not yet arisen is called future, one that has arisen and not yet ceased is called present, and one that has ceased is called past. They should also say: if the essence of a dharma really exists as in the present, and the past and future are likewise, then who has not yet arisen? Who has already ceased? If the essence of conditioned dharmas really always exists, how can it be established as not yet arisen or already ceased? What did it formerly lack? Because it does not yet exist it is called not yet arisen. What does it lack afterwards? Because it no longer exists it is called already ceased. Therefore if they do not admit that a dharma did not exist originally, exists now, and having existed returns to non-existence, then the meaning of the three times would fail to be established in every way. But they say that it is always joined to the marks of the conditioned and so formations are not permanent; this is only an empty word, since in principle there is no arising and ceasing. To admit that the essence always exists and yet say that the nature is impermanent is a meaning and statement never heard before. Because of this meaning, there is a verse:

許法體恆有，而說性非常，

They admit that the essence of dharmas always exists, yet say the nature is impermanent;

性體復無別，此真自在作。

and the nature and essence are again not different; this is truly an act of the self-existent.

又彼所言，世尊說故去來二世體實有者，我等亦說有去來世。謂過去世曾有名有，未來當有，有果因故。依如是義說有去來，非謂去來如現實有。誰言彼有如現在世？非如現世彼有云何？彼有去來二世自性。此復應詰：若俱是有，如何可言是去來性故說彼有？但據曾當因果二性，非體實有。世尊為遮謗因果見，據曾當義說有去來，有聲通顯有無法故。如世間說，有燈先無、有燈後無。又如有言：有燈已滅，非我今滅。說有去來，其義亦應爾。若不爾者，去來性不成。若爾，何緣世尊依彼杖髻外道說業過去盡滅變壞而猶是有。豈彼不許業曾有性？而今世尊重為說有，依彼所引現相續中與果功能密說為有。若不爾者，彼過去業現實有性，過去豈成？理必應爾。以薄伽梵於勝義空契經中說：眼根生位無所從來，眼根滅時無所造集。本無今有、有已還無。去來眼根若實有者，經不應說本無等言。若謂此言依現世說，此救非理，以現世性與彼眼根體無別故。若許現世本無今有、有已還無，是則眼根去來無體義已成立。又彼所說，要具二緣識方生故。去來二世體實有者，應共尋思，意法為緣生意識者，為法如意作能生緣？為法但能作所緣境？若法如意作能生緣，如何未來百千劫後當有彼法？或當亦無為能生緣生今時識。又涅槃性違一切生，立為能生，不應正理。若法但能為所緣境，我說過未亦是所緣，若無如何成所緣境？我說彼有，如成所緣。如何成所緣？謂曾有、當有。非憶過去色受等時，如現分明觀彼為有，但追憶彼曾有之相；逆觀未來當有亦爾，謂如曾現在所領色相，如是追憶過去為有，亦如當現在所領色相，如是逆觀未來為有。若如現有應成現世。若體現無，則應許有緣無境識，其理自成。若謂去來極微散亂有而非現，理亦不然，取彼相時非散亂故。又若彼色有同現在，唯有極微散亂為異，則極微色其體應常。

(The Treatise continues:) Moreover, as for what they say, that the past and future really exist because the World-Honored One spoke of them: we too say there are past and future times. That is, the past is said to exist because it once existed, and the future is said to exist because it will exist and because there is a cause of the result. It is by this meaning that past and future are said to exist, and not that past and future exist as the present really exists. Who says they exist as the present time exists? If they do not exist like the present, how do they exist? They exist as the own-nature of the two times, past and future. This should also be questioned: if both exist, how can one say that they exist because they are of the nature of past and future? This is only by the two natures of cause and effect, having been and going to be, and not the real existence of an essence. The World-Honored One, in order to block views that slander cause and effect, spoke of the existence of past and future by the meaning of having been and going to be, because the word "exist" commonly shows both existent and non-existent dharmas. As the world says: there was a lamp that did not exist before, there is a lamp that will not exist later. And as when someone says: the lamp has gone out, it is not that I have gone out now. The meaning of speaking of past and future as existing should likewise be so. If it were not so, the natures of past and future would not be established. If so, why did the World-Honored One, in addressing the non-Buddhist Jatila (name of a non-Buddhist teacher), say that karma is past, exhausted, ceased, and destroyed, and yet still exists? Did that one not admit the nature of karma as having been, and now the World-Honored One is again saying it exists? It refers to the present continuum, where the capacity to give results is secretly said to exist. If it were not so, the past karma's nature of really existing now would not make it past; this must be the case. Because the Bhagavan said in the sutra on ultimate emptiness: When the eye faculty arises, it comes from nowhere; when the eye faculty ceases, it goes nowhere to be stored. It did not exist originally, now it exists, and having existed it ceases again. If the eye faculties of the past and future really existed, the sutra should not say "did not exist originally" and the like. If it is said that these words speak of the present time, this defense is unreasonable, because the nature of the present time and that eye faculty are not different in essence. If it is admitted that the present time did not exist originally, now exists, and having existed ceases again, then it is already established that the eye faculty of the past and future has no substance. Also, as for what they say, that consciousness arises only with two conditions, so the past and future really exist: let us reflect together on whether, when a mind-consciousness arises with mind and dharmas as conditions, a dharma serves as a generating condition like the mind, or serves only as an object. If a dharma serves as a generating condition like the mind, how could a dharma be present a hundred thousand eons from now in the future? Or how could a non-existent one serve as the generating condition to give rise to present consciousness? Also, the nature of nirvana is opposed to all arising, and establishing it as a generator is not correct reasoning. If a dharma serves only as an object, we too say that the past and future are also objects; if they do not exist, how could they become objects? We say they exist, in the way they become objects. How do they become objects? Namely by having been and going to be. When one recalls past form, feeling, and so on, one does not see them as existing clearly as in the present, but only recalls their having-been aspect; looking ahead to the future is likewise, as if recalling the form that one once experienced in the present and thus regarding the past as existing, and also as if looking ahead to the form that one will experience in the present and thus regarding the future as existing. If they existed as the present exists, they would become the present. If their essence does not exist now, then it must be admitted that there is a consciousness that takes a non-existent object, and this principle is established by itself. If it is said that the atoms of the past and future exist scattered and not as present, this principle is also not so, because when one grasps their aspect it is not scattered. Moreover, if that form exists the same as in the present, and only the atoms are scattered and different, then the essence of atom-forms should be permanent.

又色唯應極微聚散，竟無少分可名生滅。是則遵崇邪命者論，棄背善逝所說契經。如契經說：眼根生位無所從來，乃至廣說，又非受等極微集成。如何可言去來散亂？然於受等追憶逆觀，亦如未滅已生時相。若如現有體應是常，若體現無，還應許有緣無境識，理亦自成。若體全無是所緣者，第十三處應是所緣，諸有達無第十三處。此能緣識為何所緣？若謂即緣彼名為境，是則應撥彼名為無。又若緣聲先非有者，此能緣識為何所緣？若謂即緣彼聲為境，求聲無者應更發聲。若謂聲無住未來位，未來實有如何謂無？若謂去來無現世者，此亦非理，其體一故。若有少分體差別者，本無今有其理自成。故識通緣有非有境。然菩薩說，世間所無我知我見無是處者，意說他人懷增上慢，亦於非有現相謂有，我唯於有方觀為有。若異此者，則一切覺皆有所緣，何緣於境得有猶豫或有差別。理必應然。以薄伽梵於餘處說：善來苾芻！汝等若能為我弟子，無諂無誑有信有勤，我旦教汝令暮獲勝，我暮教汝令旦獲勝。便知有是有、非有是非有、有上是有上、無上是無上。由此彼說，識有境故有去來者，亦不成因。又彼所言，業有果故有去來者，理亦不然。非經部師作如是說，即過去業能生當果，然業為先所引相續，轉變差別令當果生。彼我品中當廣顯示。若執實有過去未來，則一切時果體常有，業於彼果有何功能？若謂能生，則所生果本無今有，其理自成。若一切法一切時有，誰於誰有能生功能？又應顯成雨眾外道所黨邪論。彼作是說：有必常有，無必常無。無必不生，有必不滅。若謂能令果成現在，如何令果成現在耶？若謂引令至餘方所，則所引果其體應常。又無色法當如何引？又此所引應體本無。若謂但令體有差別，本無今有其理自成。是故此說一切有部，若說實有過去未來，於聖教中非為善說。

(The Treatise continues:) Also, form should only be the gathering and scattering of atoms, with not even a small part that could be called arising or ceasing. Then this would be to honor the doctrine of the wrong-livelihood teachers and abandon and turn away from the sutras spoken by the Sugata. As the sutra says: When the eye faculty arises it comes from nowhere, and so on at length; and feeling and the like are not formed by the gathering of atoms. How can one say that the past and future are scattered? Yet in recalling and looking ahead to feeling and so on, it is also as in the time of arising when not yet ceased. If it existed as the present, its essence would be permanent; if its essence does not exist now, then again it must be admitted that there is a consciousness taking a non-existent object, and the principle is established by itself. If what is entirely non-existent is an object, the thirteenth base would be an object, and those who understand there is no thirteenth base, what do they take as the object of the consciousness that knows it? If it is said that they take that very name as the object, then one should deny that that name is non-existent. Also, if a sound that did not exist before is taken as an object, what does this consciousness that takes it take as the object? If it is said that it takes that sound as the object, then one who seeks a sound that is non-existent should utter another sound. If it is said that the sound that does not exist stays in the state of the future, how could the future, which really exists, be called non-existent? If it is said that the past and future do not have the present, this too is not reasonable, because their essence is one. If there is a slight difference of essence, then that it did not exist originally and now exists is established by itself. Therefore consciousness takes both existent and non-existent objects. But the Bodhisattva said: That in the world there is what I do not know and do not see, this is impossible; he means that others who harbor overweening pride also take a non-existent appearance as existing, and I only regard what exists as existing. If it were otherwise, all awareness would have an object, and why, with respect to objects, could there be hesitation or difference? It must be so in principle. Because the Bhagavan said elsewhere: Come, bhikshus! If you can be my disciples, without flattery or deceit, with faith and diligence, if I teach you in the morning you will gain superiority by evening, if I teach you in the evening you will gain superiority by morning. Then you will know the existent as existent, the non-existent as non-existent, the superior as superior, the unsurpassed as unsurpassed. By this, what they say, that the past and future exist because consciousness has an object, is also not an established reason. Also, as for what they say, that the past and future exist because karma has a result, this too is not reasonable. It is not that the Sautrantika masters say that past karma itself can give rise to the future result; rather karma is a continuum first drawn forth, and its transformations and differences cause the future result to arise. This will be shown at length in the chapter on the person. If one clings to the really existing past and future, then the essence of the result would always exist at all times, and what capacity would karma have toward that result? If it is said that it can give rise to it, then the result that is produced did not exist originally and now exists, and this is established by itself. If all dharmas exist at all times, who has the capacity to generate toward whom? Also this would plainly establish the wrong doctrine of the Rain-Assembly non-Buddhists (Samkhya): They say thus: What exists always exists, and what does not exist always does not exist; what does not exist surely does not arise, and what exists surely does not cease. If it is said that karma can cause the result to become present, how does it cause the result to become present? If it is said to draw it to another place, then the drawn result would have a permanent essence. Moreover, how can one draw a formless dharma? Also, what is drawn should be one whose essence did not exist originally. If it is said that it only causes the essence to differ, then that it did not exist originally and now exists is established by itself. Therefore, in this Sarvastivada school, to say that the past and future really exist is not well said in the holy teaching.

若欲善說一切有者，應如契經所說而說。經如何說？如契經言：梵志當知，一切有者，唯十二處或唯三世。如其所有而說有言。若去來無，如何可說有能所繫及離繫耶？彼所生因，隨眠有故，說有去來能繫煩惱。緣彼煩惱隨眠有故，說有去來所繫縛事。若隨眠斷，得離繫名。毘婆沙師作如是說：如現實有過去未來。所有於中不能通釋，諸自愛者應如是知，法性甚深非尋思境，豈不能釋便撥為無？有異門故此生此滅，謂色等生即色等滅。有異門故異生異滅，謂未來生現在世滅。有異門故即世名生，以正生時世所攝故。有異門故說世有生，未來世有多剎那故。傍論已了，今應思擇，諸事已斷彼離繫耶？設事離繫彼已斷耶？若事離繫彼必已斷，有事已斷而非離繫。斷非離繫其事云何？頌曰：

(The Treatise continues:) If one wishes to speak well of the school that says all exists, one should speak as the sutra says. How does the sutra say it? As the sutra says: Brahmin, know that "all that exists" is only the twelve sense-bases or only the three times. One speaks of existence according to what there is. If past and future did not exist, how could one speak of what binds, what is bound, and release from bondage? Because the latent afflictions that are the cause of what arises there exist, one says that past and future afflictions can bind; because the latent afflictions take that affliction as object, one says that there are past and future matters that are bound. If the latent afflictions are cut off, it is called release from bondage. The Vaibhashika masters say thus: As the past and future really exist. What cannot be explained in this, those who are self-regarding should know thus: the nature of dharmas is very profound and not an object of reflection; how can one deny them as non-existent just because one cannot explain them? Because there are different expressions, this arises and this ceases means that form and the like arise and form and the like cease. Because there are different expressions, one is born differently and ceases differently, namely, arises in the future and ceases in the present time. Because there are different expressions, a time is itself called arising, because at the very moment of arising it is included in time. Because there are different expressions, one says that a time has arising, because the future time has many moments. The side discussion is finished; now we should consider: for the various matters that have been abandoned, are they released? Or, supposing a matter is released from bondage, has it been abandoned? If a matter is released from bondage, it must have been abandoned; there are matters that have been abandoned but not released. What is the case of abandonment without release? The verse says:

於見苦已斷，餘遍行隨眠，

For what is abandoned by seeing suffering, the other pervasive latent afflictions,

及前品已斷，餘緣此猶繫。

and, for what was abandoned in the earlier grade, those others that take it as object still bind.

論曰：且見道位苦智已生、集智未生，見苦所斷諸事已斷，見集所斷遍行隨眠若未永斷，能緣此者於此猶繫。及脩道位隨何道生？九品事中前品已斷，餘未斷品所有隨眠，能緣此者於此猶繫。斷非離繫，如是應知。何事有幾隨眠隨增？若隨事別答，便費多言論，是故應造略毘婆沙，由此雖勞少少功力，而能越渡大大問流。謂法雖多，略為十六種，即三界、五部及無漏法。能緣彼識名數亦然。但應了知何法何識境，易思何事何隨眠隨增。此中且應知，何法何識境？頌曰：

The Treatise says: First, in the stage of the path of seeing, when the knowledge of suffering has arisen and the knowledge of origin has not yet arisen, the matters abandoned by seeing suffering have been abandoned, but the pervasive latent afflictions abandoned by seeing origin, if not yet cut off forever, those that take them as objects still bind regarding these. And in the stage of the path of cultivation, whichever path arises, among the nine grades of matters, the earlier grade has been abandoned, but the latent afflictions of the other grades not yet abandoned, those that take them as objects still bind regarding these. Abandonment without release should be understood thus. Which matter has how many latent afflictions increasing in it? If one answered case by case, it would take many words; therefore one should compose a brief Vibhasha, whereby, though one expends little effort, one can cross great streams of questions. That is, though dharmas are many, they can be summarized into sixteen kinds, namely the three realms, the five groups, and the unconditioned dharmas. The names and numbers of the consciousnesses that take them are likewise so. One need only understand which dharma is the object of which consciousness, and it will be easy to reflect on which latent afflictions increase in which matter. Here, first, one should know which dharma is the object of which consciousness. The verse says:

見苦集脩斷，若欲界所繫，

What is abandoned by seeing suffering, origin, and cultivation, if belonging to the desire realm,

自界三色一，無漏識所行，

three of its own realm and one of form, the unconditioned, are the range of consciousness,

色自下各三，上一淨識境，

form its own and lower each three, and one of the upper, pure consciousness is the object,

無色通三界，各三淨識緣，

the formless pervades the three realms, each three, pure consciousness takes them,

見滅道所斷，皆增自識行，

what is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, each adds the consciousness of its own,

無漏三界中，後三淨識境。

among the unconditioned of the three realms, the last three are the object of pure consciousness.

論曰：若欲界繫見苦見集脩所斷法，各五識緣，謂自界三即如前說，及色界一即脩所斷，無漏第五，皆容緣故。若色界繫，即前所說三部諸法，各八識緣，謂自下三皆如前說，及上界一即脩所斷，無漏第八，皆容緣故。若無色繫，即前所說三部諸法，各十識緣，謂三界三皆如前說，無漏第十，皆容緣故。見滅見道所斷諸法，應知一一增自識緣。此復云何？謂欲界繫見滅所斷為六識緣，五即如前，增見滅斷。見道所斷為六識緣，五亦如前，增見道斷。色無色界見滅道斷，隨應為九十一識緣。若無漏法為十識緣，謂三界中各後三部，即見滅道脩所斷識，無漏第十，皆容緣故。為攝前義，復說頌言：

The Treatise says: If dharmas belonging to the desire realm that are abandoned by seeing suffering, seeing origin, and cultivation, each is taken by five consciousnesses, namely three of its own realm as said before, and one of the form realm, namely what is abandoned by cultivation, and the fifth, the unconditioned, all of which may take them. If dharmas belonging to the form realm, namely the three groups said before, each is taken by eight consciousnesses, namely three of its own and lower as said before, and one of the upper realm, namely what is abandoned by cultivation, and the eighth, the unconditioned, all of which may take them. If dharmas belonging to the formless realm, namely the three groups said before, each is taken by ten consciousnesses, namely three of the three realms as said before, and the tenth, the unconditioned, all of which may take them. The dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and seeing the path should be known to each add the consciousness of their own as taking them. How is this? The desire realm dharma abandoned by seeing cessation is taken by six consciousnesses, the five as before adding what is abandoned by seeing cessation. The desire realm dharma abandoned by seeing the path is taken by six consciousnesses, the five also as before adding what is abandoned by seeing the path. For the dharmas of the form and formless realms abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, they should be taken by nine or ten consciousnesses as is appropriate. The unconditioned dharma is taken by ten consciousnesses, namely the last three groups in the three realms, which are the consciousnesses abandoned by seeing cessation, the path, and cultivation, and the tenth, the unconditioned, all of which may take them. To gather the preceding meaning, a verse is given again:

見苦集脩斷，欲色無色繫，

What is abandoned by seeing suffering, origin, and cultivation, belonging to the desire, form, and formless realms,

應知如次第，五八十識緣。

should be known in order as taken by five, eight, and ten consciousnesses.

見滅道所斷，各增自識緣，

What is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path each adds the consciousness of its own as taking it;

無漏法應知，能為十識境。

the unconditioned dharma should be known to be able to be the object of ten consciousnesses.

如是了知十六種法為十六識所緣境已，今應思何事何隨眠隨增。若別疏條恐文煩廣，故我於此略示方隅。且有問言：所繫事內樂根有幾隨眠隨增？應觀樂根總有七種，謂欲界一即脩所斷，色界五部，無漏第七。一切無漏非諸隨眠之所隨增，如前已說。此中前六隨其所應欲脩所斷及諸遍行色界一切隨眠隨增。若有問言：緣樂根識復有幾種隨眠隨增？應觀此識總有十二，謂欲界四除見滅斷，色界五部，無色界二即見道諦及脩所斷，無漏第十二，皆能緣樂根。此隨所應欲界四部，色界有為緣，無色界二部，及諸遍行隨眠隨增。若復有問言：緣緣樂根識復有幾種隨眠隨增？應觀此識總有十四，於前十二更加二種，即無色界見苦集斷。如是十四識能緣緣樂根，此隨所應欲色如上，無色四部隨眠隨增。准此方隅，餘應思擇。若心由彼名有隨眠，彼於此心定隨增不？此不決定，或有隨眠，謂與心相應，及緣心未斷相應已斷則不隨增。依此義門應作是說。頌曰：

(The Treatise continues:) Having thus understood the sixteen kinds of dharmas as the objects of sixteen consciousnesses, we should now consider which latent afflictions increase in which matter. If I were to itemize them separately, I fear the text would become verbose, so I briefly show the direction here. First, if someone asks: Among the bound matters, how many latent afflictions increase in the faculty of pleasure? One should observe that the faculty of pleasure has seven kinds in total, namely one of the desire realm, abandoned by cultivation, five groups of the form realm, and the seventh, the unconditioned. All the unconditioned are not increased by latent afflictions, as already said before. Of these, the first six, as is appropriate, are increased by the latent afflictions abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, and by all the pervasive latent afflictions and all the latent afflictions of the form realm. If someone asks: How many kinds of latent afflictions increase in the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as its object? One should observe that this consciousness has twelve in total, namely four of the desire realm excluding what is abandoned by seeing cessation, five groups of the form realm, two of the formless realm, namely what is abandoned by seeing the path and by cultivation, and the twelfth, the unconditioned, all of which can take the faculty of pleasure. These are increased, as is appropriate, by the latent afflictions of the four groups of the desire realm, the conditioned ones of the form realm, the two groups of the formless realm, and the pervasive latent afflictions. If someone further asks: How many kinds of latent afflictions increase in the consciousness that takes as object the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure? One should observe that this consciousness has fourteen in total, adding two kinds to the previous twelve, namely what is abandoned by seeing suffering and origin in the formless realm. These fourteen consciousnesses can take the consciousness that takes the faculty of pleasure as object; this is increased, as is appropriate, by the latent afflictions of the desire and form realms as above, and of the four groups of the formless realm. The rest should be considered according to this direction. If a mind is said to have latent afflictions by reason of them, does it definitely have them increasing in it? This is not fixed: there may be latent afflictions that are associated with the mind, and those that take the mind as object; if not yet abandoned they increase, but if the association has been abandoned they do not increase. By this gate of meaning one should say thus. The verse says:

有隨眠心二，謂有染無染，

Minds that have latent afflictions are of two kinds, namely defiled and undefiled,

有染心通二，無染局隨增。

the defiled mind includes both, the undefiled is limited to increase through objects.

論曰：有隨眠心總有二種，有染、無染心差別故。於中有染或有隨增，謂相應緣隨眠未斷，相應已斷則不隨增，仍說有隨眠，以恆相應故。若無染者，唯局隨增。緣此隨眠必未永斷，此唯據隨增名有隨眠故。如上所說十種隨眠次第生時，誰前誰後？頌曰：

The Treatise says: Minds that have latent afflictions are of two kinds in total, because of the difference between defiled and undefiled minds. Among them, the defiled may or may not have increase: if the associated and object-taking latent afflictions are not yet abandoned they increase, but if the association has been abandoned they do not increase, yet it is still said to have latent afflictions because they are constantly associated. As for the undefiled, it is limited only to increase through objects. The latent afflictions that take it as an object are surely not yet cut off forever; here it is said to have latent afflictions only by reference to increase. When the ten latent afflictions described above arise in sequence, which comes first and which after? The verse says:

無明疑邪身，邊見戒見取，

Ignorance, doubt, wrong view, self-view, extreme view, clinging to rules, clinging to views,

貪慢瞋如次，由前引後生。

greed, pride, anger, in order, each drawn forth by the preceding to arise.