Abhidharmakosa-bhasya of the Sarvastivada School, Fascicle 2

論曰：得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就，應知非得與此相違。於何法中有得非得？於自相續及二滅中。謂有為法若有墮在自相續中有得非得，非他相續，無有成就他身法故。非非相續，無有成就非情法故。且有為法決定如是，無為法中唯於二滅有得非得。一切有情無不成就非擇滅者，故對法中傳說如是：誰成無漏法？謂一切有情，除初剎那具縛聖者及餘一切具縛異生，諸餘有情皆成擇滅。決定無有成就虛空，故於虛空不言有得，以得無故非得亦無。宗明得非得，相翻而立故。諸有得者亦有非得，義準可知，故不別釋。何緣知有別物名得？契經說故。如契經言：聖者於彼十無學法，以生以得以成就故，已斷五支，乃至廣說。若爾，非情及他相續亦應成就。所以者何？契經說故。如契經說：苾芻當知，有轉輪王成就七寶，乃至廣說。此中自在說名成就，謂轉輪王於彼七寶有自在力，隨樂轉故。此既自在說名成就，餘復何因知有別物？許有別物有何非理？如是非理，謂所執得無體可知，如色聲等或貪瞋等；無用可知，如眼耳等，故無容有別物名得。執有別物，是為非理。若謂此得亦有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，是則無為應無有得。又所得法未得已捨，界地轉易及離染故。彼現無得，當云何生？若俱生得為生因者，生與生生復何所作？又非情法應定不生。又具縛者，下中上品煩惱現起差別應無，得無別故。若由餘因有差別者，即應由彼諸法得生，得復何用？故彼所言得有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，理不成立。誰言此得作法生因？若爾，此得有何作用？謂於差別為建立因。所以者何？若無有得，異生聖者起世俗心，應無異生及諸聖者建立差別。豈不煩惱已斷、未斷有差別故，應有差別？若執無得，如何可說煩惱已斷及與未斷？許有得者斷未斷成，由煩惱得離未離故。

The treatise says: There are two kinds of possession: first, obtaining what was not yet obtained or what was lost, and now acquiring it; second, having obtained something and not losing it, so that one is in possession of it. It should be known that non-possession is the opposite of these. In which dharmas are there possession and non-possession? In one's own continuum and in the two cessations. That is, among conditioned dharmas, only those that fall within one's own continuum have possession and non-possession, not those in another's continuum, because one cannot be in possession of the dharmas of another person's body. Nor do they exist in what is not a continuum, because one cannot be in possession of dharmas belonging to non-sentient things. Such is definitely the case for conditioned dharmas; among unconditioned dharmas, possession and non-possession exist only with respect to the two cessations. There is no sentient being who is not in possession of cessation not due to deliberation, and so it is transmitted in the Abhidharma: Who possesses the untainted dharmas? All sentient beings, except noble ones still bound at the first moment, and all other bound ordinary beings; all other sentient beings possess cessation through deliberation. There is definitely no one in possession of space, and so no possession is spoken of with regard to space; since there is no possession, there is no non-possession either. Possession and non-possession are established as opposites, so where there is possession there is also non-possession; this can be understood by implication and is therefore not explained separately. How do we know there is a separate thing called possession? Because the sutras say so. As a sutra says: the noble one, because of birth, because of obtaining and because of possessing those ten dharmas of one beyond training, has cut off the five factors, and so on at length. If so, non-sentient things and the continuum of others should also be possessed. Why? Because a sutra says so. As a sutra says: Monks, you should know that a wheel-turning king possesses the seven treasures, and so on at length. Here, being sovereign is called possessing, that is, the wheel-turning king has the power of mastery over those seven treasures and turns them as he pleases. Since this sovereignty is called possession, how do we know that there is some other separate thing? What is unreasonable in admitting a separate thing? It is unreasonable in this way: the possession you hold to has no substance that can be known, as form and sound or craving and anger do; nor does it have a function that can be known, as eyes and ears do. Therefore there is no room for a separate thing called possession. To hold that there is a separate thing is unreasonable. If you say that this possession also has a function, namely acting as the cause of the arising of the dharmas possessed, then unconditioned dharmas should have no possession. Moreover, the dharmas possessed may be abandoned after being possessed, or changed in realm and ground, or left behind through detachment. Since the present one has no possession, how will it arise? If simultaneous possession is the cause of arising, what do arising and the arising of arising then do? Also, non-sentient dharmas should definitely not arise. Furthermore, among the bound, the differences in the arising of lower, middle and higher grades of affliction should not exist, since possession has no difference. If the difference arises from some other cause, then those dharmas should be produced by that cause, and what use is possession? Therefore your claim that possession has a function, namely acting as the cause for the arising of the dharmas possessed, is not established by reason. Who says that this possession acts as the cause of the arising of dharmas? If so, what function does this possession have? It is the cause for establishing distinctions. Why? If there were no possession, then when ordinary beings and noble ones produce worldly minds, there should be no establishment of the distinction between ordinary beings and noble ones. Surely there is a difference because afflictions are either already cut off or not yet cut off? If you hold that there is no possession, how can one speak of afflictions as cut off or not cut off? If you admit possession, then being cut off or not is established, because of whether one is separated from the possession of affliction or not.

此由所依有差別故，煩惱已斷未斷義成。謂諸聖者見修道力，令所依身轉變異本，於彼二道所斷惑中無復功能令其現起。猶如種子火所焚燒，轉變異前無能生用。如是聖者所依身中無生惑能名煩惱斷。或世間道損所依中煩惱種子亦名為斷，與上相違名為未斷。諸未斷者說名成就，諸已斷者名不成就，如是二種但假非實。善法有二：一者不由功力修得、二者要由功力修得，即名生得及加行得。不由功力而修得者，若所依中種未被損名為成就，若所依中種已被損名不成就。謂斷善者由邪見力損所依中善根種子應知名斷，非所依中善根種子畢竟被害說名為斷。要由功力而修得者，若所依中彼法已起生彼功力自在無損說名成就，與此相違名不成就。如是二種亦假非實。故所依中唯有種子未拔未損增長自在，於如是位立成就名，無有別物。此中何法名為種子？謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別。何名轉變？謂相續中前後異性。何名相續？謂因果性三世諸行。何名差別？謂有無間生果功能。然有處說，若成就貪便不能修四念住者。彼說：耽著貪煩惱者，不能厭捨，故名成就。由隨耽著貪愛時分，於四念住必不能修。如是成就遍一切種，唯假非實。唯遮於此名不成就，亦假非實。毘婆沙師說：此二種皆有別物實而非假。如是二途皆為善說。所以者何？不違理故、我所宗故。已辯自性，差別云何？且應辯得。頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) This is because of the difference in the basis, and so the meaning of afflictions being cut off or not yet cut off is established. That is, through the power of the paths of seeing and cultivation, noble ones cause the body that serves as their basis to be transformed and changed from what it was, so that in the afflictions to be cut off by those two paths it no longer has any capacity to make them arise. It is like a seed burned by fire, which, having been transformed and changed from before, has no power to sprout. Thus, in the basis-body of the noble ones, there is no capacity to produce afflictions, and this is called the cutting off of afflictions. Or else, when the seeds of affliction in the basis are weakened by the worldly path, this too is called cutting off; the opposite of this is called not yet cut off. Those not yet cut off are said to be possessed, and those already cut off are said not to be possessed; these two are only provisional and not real. Wholesome dharmas are of two kinds: first, those obtained without effort, and second, those obtained only through effort; that is, innate and acquired through practice. For those obtained without effort, if the seeds in the basis have not been damaged, one is called in possession of them, and if the seeds in the basis have been damaged, one is called not in possession. It should be understood that the cutting off of wholesome roots occurs through the power of wrong views damaging the seeds of wholesome roots in the basis; it does not mean that the seeds of wholesome roots in the basis are completely destroyed and thus called cut off. For those obtained only through effort, if those dharmas have already arisen in the basis and the power of effort that gives rise to them is sovereign and undamaged, one is called in possession, and the opposite is called not in possession. These two are also provisional and not real. Therefore, it is only when the seeds in the basis have not been uprooted or damaged and are growing freely that the name of possession is established in that condition; there is no separate thing. What dharma is called a seed here? It is the successive, proximate capacity of name and form to produce their own fruit, which is the result of a particular transformation of the continuum. What is called transformation? It is the difference between earlier and later moments within a continuum. What is called continuum? It is the conditioned formations of the three times in the nature of cause and effect. What is called particularity? It is the capacity to produce a fruit without interval. However, in some places it is said that if one is in possession of craving, one cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness. That statement means: one who is attached to the affliction of craving cannot feel weariness and abandon it, and so is called in possession. Because of the period in which one clings to craving and love, one certainly cannot cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness. Such possession extends to all kinds and is only provisional and not real. Likewise, merely negating this and calling it non-possession is also provisional. The Vaibhashikas say that both kinds are real separate things and not provisional. Both of these paths are well said. Why? Because they do not contradict reason, and because they accord with my own school. The nature has been discussed; what about the distinctions? Let us first discuss possession. The verse says:

三世法各三，善等唯善等，

Dharmas of the three times each have three kinds; wholesome and the like have only the wholesome and the like,

有繫自界得，無繫得通四，

bound dharmas have possession only in their own realm; the possession of unbound dharmas extends to four,

非學無學三，非所斷二種。

neither training nor beyond training has three; the not-to-be-cut-off has two kinds.

論曰：三世法得各有三種，謂過去法有過去得、有未來得、有現在得，如是未來及現在法各有三得。又善等法得唯善等，謂善不善及無記法，如其次第，有善不善無記三得。又有繫法得唯自界，謂欲色界無色界法，如其次第唯有欲色無色三得。若無繫法得通四種，謂無漏法總而言之得有四種，即三界得及無漏得。別分別者，非擇滅得，通三界繫。若擇滅得，色無色繫及與無漏。道諦得，唯無漏故。無繫法得，有四種。又有學法得唯有學，若無學法得唯無學，非學非無學得有差別，謂此法得總說有三，別分別者一切有漏及三無為皆名非學非無學法。且有漏法唯有非學非無學得，非擇滅得。及非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是，若有學道所引擇滅得即有學，若無學道所引擇滅得即無學。又見修所斷法，如其次第有見修所斷得。非所斷法得有差別，謂此法得總說有二，別分別者，諸無漏法名非所斷，非擇滅得唯修所斷。若非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是。聖道所引擇滅之得及道諦得，皆非所斷。前雖總說三世法各三，今應簡別其中差別相。頌曰：

The treatise says: The possession of dharmas of the three times has three kinds each; that is, a past dharma has past possession, future possession and present possession, and likewise future and present dharmas each have three possessions. Moreover, the possession of wholesome and other dharmas is only of wholesome and so on; that is, wholesome, unwholesome and neutral dharmas have, respectively, wholesome, unwholesome and neutral possession. Furthermore, the possession of bound dharmas is only of their own realm; that is, dharmas of the desire realm, form realm and formless realm have only possession of the desire, form and formless realms respectively. The possession of unbound dharmas extends to four kinds; that is, in general the possession of untainted dharmas is of four kinds, namely possession of the three realms and untainted possession. Analyzed separately, the possession of cessation not due to deliberation extends to the bound states of the three realms. The possession of cessation through deliberation is of the form and formless realm bound states and of the untainted. The possession of the truth of the path is only untainted. Thus the possession of unbound dharmas is of four kinds. Further, the possession of dharmas of training is only of training; the possession of dharmas beyond training is only beyond training. The possession of what is neither training nor beyond training has differences: in general this possession is of three kinds, and analyzed separately, all tainted dharmas and the three unconditioned dharmas are called neither training nor beyond training. Tainted dharmas have only possession that is neither training nor beyond training, as does cessation not due to deliberation, and likewise cessation through deliberation not induced by the noble path. If cessation through deliberation is induced by the path of training, it is of training; if induced by the path beyond training, it is beyond training. Moreover, dharmas to be cut off by seeing and by cultivation have, respectively, possession to be cut off by seeing and by cultivation. The possession of dharmas not to be cut off has differences: in general this possession is of two kinds, and analyzed separately, all untainted dharmas are called not to be cut off; the possession of cessation not due to deliberation is to be cut off only by cultivation, and so is cessation through deliberation not induced by the noble path. The possession of cessation through deliberation induced by the noble path and the possession of the truth of the path are all not to be cut off. Although it was said in general above that dharmas of the three times each have three, we should now distinguish the differences among them. The verse says:

無記得俱起，除二通變化，

The possession of neutral dharmas arises together, except for the two, which extend to transformation,

有覆色亦俱，欲色無前起。

the obscured form also arises together; in the desire and form realms there is no earlier arising.

論曰：無覆無記得唯俱起，無前後生，勢力劣故。法若過去得亦過去，法若未來得亦未來，法若現在得亦現在。一切無覆無記法得皆如是耶？不爾。云何？除眼耳通及能變化。謂眼耳通慧及能變化心，勢力強故、加行差別所成辦故，雖是無覆無記性收，而有前後及俱起得。若工巧處及威儀路極數習者，得亦許爾。唯有無覆無記法得但俱起耶？不爾。云何？有覆無記色得亦爾。謂諸有覆無記表色得亦如前，但有俱起。雖有上品而亦不能發無表故勢力微劣，由此定無法前後得。如無記法得有別異，善不善得亦有異耶？亦有。云何？謂欲界繫善不善色得無前起，唯有俱生及後起得。非得如得，亦有如上品類別耶？不爾。云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: The possession of unobscured neutral dharmas arises only together, with no earlier or later arising, because their power is weak. If a dharma is past, its possession is also past; if a dharma is future, its possession is also future; if a dharma is present, its possession is also present. Is this so for the possession of all unobscured neutral dharmas? It is not. How then? Excepting the divine eye and divine ear, and the capacity for transformation. That is, the wisdom of the divine eye and ear and the mind capable of transformation, being powerful and accomplished through the distinctions of preparatory effort, although included in the unobscured neutral nature, have earlier, later and simultaneous possession. In the case of the sphere of crafts and the postures, when they are practiced extremely often, their possession may also be so. Is it only the possession of unobscured neutral dharmas that arises together? It is not. How then? The possession of obscured neutral form is also so. That is, the possession of obscured neutral manifest form is also as above, and only arises together. Although it may be of a high grade, it still cannot give rise to unmanifest form because its power is weak, and for this reason there is definitely no earlier or later possession of such dharmas. Just as the possession of neutral dharmas has differences, does the possession of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas also have differences? It does. How? The possession of wholesome and unwholesome form bound to the desire realm has no earlier arising, and has only simultaneous and later possession. Is non-possession like possession, also having such varieties as those above? It is not. How? The verse says:

非得淨無記，去來世各三，

Non-possession is pure and neutral; the past and future each have three,

三界不繫三，許聖道非得，

the three realms and the unbound have three; the noble path is said to have non-possession,

說名異生性，得法易地捨。

called the state of ordinary beings; possession of a dharma is abandoned when the ground changes.

論曰：性差別者，一切非得皆唯無覆無記性攝。世差別者，過去未來各有三種，謂現在法決定無有現在非得，唯有過去未來非得，過去未來一一各有三世非得。界差別者，三界繫法及不繫法各三非得，謂欲界繫法有三界非得，色無色界繫及不繫亦爾。定無非得是無漏者。所以者何？由許聖道非得，說名異生性故。如本論言：云何異生性？謂不獲聖法。不獲即是非得異名，非說異生性是無漏應理。不獲何聖法名異生性？謂不獲一切，不別說故。此不獲言，表離於獲。若異此者，諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，應名異生。若爾，彼論應說純言不要須說，此一句中含純義故，如說此類食水食風。有說：不獲苦法智忍及俱生法名異生性。不可難言道類智時捨此法故應成非聖，前已永害彼非得故。若爾，此性既通三乘，不獲何等名異生性？此亦應言不獲一切。若爾，此應同前有難。此難復應如前通釋。若爾，重說唐捐其功。如經部師，所說為善。經部所說其義云何？謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性。如是非得何時當捨？此法非得，得此法時或轉易地捨此非得。如聖道非得說名異生性，得此聖道時或易地便捨。餘法非得，類此應思。若非得得斷，非得非得生，如是名為捨於非得。得與非得，豈復有餘得與非得？應言此二各復有餘得及非得。若爾，豈不有無窮過？無無窮過，許得展轉更相成故。以法生時並其自體三法俱起，第一本法、第二法得、第三得得。謂相續中法得起故成就本法及與得得，得得起故成就法得，是故此中無無窮過。如是若善若染汙法，一一自體初生起時並其自體三法俱起，第二剎那六法俱起，謂三法得及三得得，第三剎那十八俱起，謂於第一第二剎那所生諸法，有九法得及九得得。如是諸得後後轉增。

The treatise says: Regarding differences of nature, all non-possession is included only in the unobscured neutral nature. Regarding differences of time, the past and future each have three kinds; that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-possession but only past and future non-possession, and past and future non-possession each has non-possession of the three times. Regarding differences of realm, dharmas bound to the three realms and unbound dharmas each have three kinds of non-possession; that is, a dharma bound to the desire realm has non-possession of the three realms, and so do those bound to the form and formless realms and the unbound. There is definitely no untainted non-possession. Why? Because the noble path is said to have non-possession, which is called the state of ordinary beings. As the root treatise says: What is the state of ordinary beings? It is not obtaining the noble dharmas. Not obtaining is another name for non-possession; it is not said that the state of ordinary beings is untainted, which would be reasonable only if it were. Which noble dharmas does one fail to obtain to be called an ordinary being? One fails to obtain all of them, since no distinction is made. This word not obtaining expresses separation from obtaining. If it were otherwise, the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, would also not possess the noble dharmas of the nature of the hearers and solitary realizers, and should be called ordinary beings. If so, that treatise should say simply all, and there would be no need to say not; but this one phrase contains the meaning of all, as when one says such persons eat water and eat wind. Some say: not obtaining the forbearance of the knowledge of suffering and the dharmas that arise together with it is called the state of ordinary beings. One cannot object that at the time of the knowledge of the path by category this dharma is abandoned and so one should be a non-noble one, because that non-possession was already permanently destroyed earlier. If so, since this nature is shared by the three vehicles, what does one fail to obtain in being called an ordinary being? This too should be said to be not obtaining all. If so, this has the same difficulty as before. This difficulty should again be answered by the same general explanation. If so, repeating it is wasted effort. As the Sutra masters say, their explanation is good. What is their explanation? It is that the distinct condition of a continuum in which the noble dharmas have never arisen is called the state of ordinary beings. When will this non-possession be abandoned? When one obtains that dharma, or when the ground changes, this non-possession is abandoned. For example, the non-possession of the noble path is called the state of ordinary beings, and on obtaining this noble path or on changing ground, it is abandoned. The non-possession of other dharmas should be thought of in the same way. If possession is cut off, non-possession arises as non-possession; this is called abandoning non-possession. Are there further possessions and non-possessions of possession and non-possession? It should be said that these two each have further possession and non-possession. If so, would there not be the fault of infinite regress? There is no infinite regress, because possessions are admitted to establish one another reciprocally. When a dharma arises, three dharmas arise together with its own substance: first the root dharma, second the possession of the dharma, and third the possession of possession. That is, the arising of the possession of the dharma in the continuum establishes possession of the root dharma and of the possession of possession, and the arising of the possession of possession establishes possession of the possession of the dharma, and so there is no infinite regress here. Thus, whether wholesome or defiled, at the first arising of each dharma itself, three dharmas arise together with it; at the second moment, six dharmas arise together, namely three possessions of dharmas and three possessions of possession; at the third moment, eighteen arise together, namely nine possessions of dharmas and nine possessions of possession with respect to the dharmas arisen in the first and second moments. In this way, possessions increase more and more.

一切過去未來煩惱及隨煩惱並生得善剎那剎那相應，俱有無始無終生死輪轉有無邊得，且一有情生死相續剎那剎那起無邊得，如是一切有情相續一一各別，剎那剎那無量無邊諸得俱起。如是諸得極多集會，無對礙故互相容受。若不爾者，一有情得虛空不容，況第二等。

(The treatise continues:) All past and future afflictions and secondary afflictions, together with innate wholesome states, are associated with each moment; together with the beginningless and endless wheel of birth and death there are boundless possessions, and for a single sentient being the continuum of birth and death gives rise to boundless possessions in each moment. Since the continuum of each sentient being is distinct, countless and boundless possessions arise together in every moment. Because these many possessions gather together without obstructing one another, they accommodate one another. If this were not so, the possessions of one sentient being would not fit in space, let alone those of a second and so on.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by imperial order.

分別根品第二之三

Chapter 2 on the Analysis of the Faculties, Part 3.

如是已辯得非得相。同分者何？頌曰：

The characteristics of possession and non-possession have now been explained. What is homogeneity? The verse says:

同分有情等。

Homogeneity is of sentient beings and the like.

論曰：有別實物名為同分，謂諸有情展轉類等，本論說此名眾同分。此復二種：一無差別、二有差別。無差別者，謂諸有情有情同分，一切有情各等有故。有差別者，謂諸有情界地趣生種姓、男女近事苾芻學無學等各別同分，一類有情各等有故。復有法同分，謂隨蘊處界。若無實物無差別相名同分者，展轉差別諸有情中，有情有情等無差別，覺及施設不應得有。如是蘊等等無差別覺及施設，如理應知。頗有死生不捨不得有情同分？應作四句。第一句者，謂是處死還生是處。第二句者，謂入正性離生位時，捨異生同分，得聖者同分。第三句者，謂是趣死生餘趣等。第四句者，謂除前相。若別有實物名異生同分，何用別立異生性耶？非異人同分，別有人性故。又非世間現見同分，以非色故。亦非覺慧所能了別，無別用故。世雖不了有情同分，而於有情謂無差別，故設有體亦何所用？又何因不許有無情同分？諸穀麥豆、金鐵菴羅半娜娑等，亦有自類互相似故。又諸同分展轉差別，如何於彼更無同分，而起無別覺施設耶？又應顯成勝論所執，彼宗執有總同句義，於一切法總同言智由此發生。彼復執有同異句義，於異品類同異言智由此發生。毘婆沙師作如是說：彼執與此義類不同，以說一物於多轉故。又縱於彼若顯不顯，然此同分必有實物，契經說故。如世尊言：若還來此得人同分，乃至廣說。雖有是說，而不說言別有實物名為同分。若爾，所說同分是何？即如是類諸行生時，於中假立人同分等，如諸穀麥豆等同分。此非善說，違我宗故。已辯同分。無想者何？頌曰：

The treatise says: There is a separate real entity called homogeneity (sabhagata), namely the mutual likeness among sentient beings; the root treatise calls this common sameness of beings. It is again of two kinds: first without distinction, second with distinction. Without distinction means the sameness of sentient beings as sentient beings, since all sentient beings are equally so. With distinction means the separate homogeneities of sentient beings by realm, ground, destiny, birth, lineage, male and female, lay devotee, monk, those in training and beyond training, and so on, since each class of sentient beings is equally so. There is also homogeneity of dharmas, namely that of aggregates, sense bases and elements. If there were no real entity called homogeneity, with or without distinction, then among sentient beings who are mutually distinct, the cognition and designation that sentient beings are alike as sentient beings should not occur. Thus the cognition and designation of equality in the aggregates and so on should likewise be understood according to reason. Is there a case of dying and being reborn without abandoning or obtaining the homogeneity of sentient beings? This should be answered with four alternatives. The first is where one dies and is reborn in the same place. The second is when one enters the state of certainty of the right path, abandoning the homogeneity of ordinary beings and obtaining the homogeneity of the noble. The third is dying in one destiny and being reborn in another, and so on. The fourth is the case other than the foregoing. If there were a separate real entity called the homogeneity of ordinary beings, what use would there be in separately establishing the state of ordinary beings? Because there is no separate human nature apart from the homogeneity of humans. Moreover, homogeneity is not seen in the world, because it is not form, nor can it be discerned by cognition, because it has no separate function. Although the world does not discern the homogeneity of sentient beings, it still regards sentient beings as undifferentiated, so even if it had a substance, what use would it be? And why do you not admit a homogeneity of non-sentient things? Grains, wheat, beans, gold, iron, mango and jackfruit also resemble their own kinds. And since homogeneities are mutually distinct, how could the cognition and designation of undifferentiated sameness arise in them without any further homogeneity? Furthermore, this would establish the position held by the Vaisheshikas, who hold that there is a category of universal sameness, from which the words and cognition of general sameness arise with regard to all dharmas. They also hold a category of sameness and difference, from which the words and cognition of sameness and difference arise among different classes. The Vaibhashikas say: Their view differs in kind from ours, because they say that one thing operates in many. Even if it is made clear or unclear there, this homogeneity must nonetheless be a real entity, because a sutra says so. As the World-Honored One said: If one returns here and obtains homogeneity with humans, and so on at length. Although this is said, it does not say that there is a separate real entity called homogeneity. If so, what is the homogeneity that is spoken of? It is that when formations of such a kind arise, human homogeneity and so on is provisionally established in them, just as with the homogeneity of grains, wheat and beans. This is not well said, because it contradicts my school. Homogeneity has been explained. What is the non-percipient state? The verse says:

無想無想中，心心所法滅，

In the non-percipient state, in the non-percipient gods, minds and mental factors cease,

異熟居廣果。

it is a result of maturation, dwelling in Brihatphala.

論曰：若生無想有情天中，有法能令心心所滅，名為無想。是實有物，能遮未來心心所法令暫不起，如堰江河。此法一向是異熟果。誰之異熟？謂無想定。無想有情居在何處？居在廣果，謂廣果天中有高勝處，如中間靜慮，名無想天。彼為恆無想、為亦有想耶？生死位中多時有想。言無想者，由彼有情中間長時想不起故。如契經說：彼諸有情由想起故從彼處沒，然彼有情如久睡覺還起於想，從彼沒已必生欲界非餘處所，先修定行勢力盡故、於彼不能更修定故，如箭射空力盡便墮。若諸有情應生彼處，必有欲界順後受業。如應生彼北俱盧洲，必定應有生天之業。已辯無想。二定者何？謂無想定及滅盡定。初無想定其相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: If one is born among the non-percipient sentient gods, there is a dharma that causes minds and mental factors to cease, called non-percipience. It is a real entity that blocks future minds and mental factors so that they temporarily do not arise, like a dam on a river. This dharma is invariably a result of maturation. Whose maturation is it? It is the maturation of the non-percipient attainment. Where do the non-percipient sentient beings dwell? They dwell in Brihatphala, that is, in the Brihatphala heaven there is a high and excellent place, like the intermediate dhyana, called the non-percipient heaven. Are they always non-percipient there, or do they also have perception? During the interval of death and rebirth they have perception for much of the time. They are called non-percipient because for a long period perception does not arise in those sentient beings. As a sutra says: those sentient beings pass away from that place because perception arises; yet those beings, like one waking from a long sleep, again give rise to perception, and having passed away from there, they are necessarily reborn in the desire realm and no other place, because the power of their prior practice of the attainment is exhausted and they can no longer cultivate the attainment there, like an arrow shot into the sky which falls when its force is spent. If sentient beings are to be born there, they must have karma of the desire realm that ripens in a later life. Just as one who is to be born in Uttarakuru must definitely have karma leading to birth in the heavens. The non-percipient state has been explained. What are the two attainments? They are the non-percipient attainment and the attainment of cessation. How is the first, the non-percipient attainment, characterized? The verse says:

如是無想定，後靜慮求脫，

This non-percipient attainment is sought as liberation in the later dhyana,

善唯順生受，非聖得一世。

is only wholesome and ripens in the next life; it is not attained by noble ones, and is obtained in one lifetime.

論曰：如前所說有法能令心心所滅名為無想，如是復有別法能令心心所滅名無想定。無想者定名無想定，或定無想名無想定。說如是聲，唯顯此定滅心心所與無想同。此在何地？謂後靜慮，即在第四靜慮非餘。修無想定為何所求？謂求解脫。彼執無想是真解脫，為求證彼修無想定。前說無想是異熟故，無記性攝，不說自成。今無想定一向是善，此是善故，能招無想有情天中五蘊異熟。既是善性，為順何受？唯順生受，非順現後及不定受。若起此定後雖退失，傳說現身必還能起，當生無想有情天中，故得此定必不能入正性離生。又許此定唯異生得非諸聖者，以諸聖者於無想定如見深坑不樂入故。要執無想為真解脫，起出離想而修此定；一切聖者不執有漏為真解脫及真出離故，於此定必不修行。若諸聖者修得第四靜慮定時，為如靜慮亦得去來無想定不？餘亦不得。所以者何？彼雖曾習，以無心故，要大加行方便修得，故初得時唯得一世，謂得現在，如初受得別解脫戒。得此定已，第二念等乃至未捨亦成過去，以無心故，無未來修。次滅盡定其相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: As stated above, there is a dharma that causes minds and mental factors to cease, called non-percipience; likewise there is another dharma that causes minds and mental factors to cease, called the non-percipient attainment. The attainment of non-perception is the non-percipient attainment, or the attainment in which perception is absent is called the non-percipient attainment. The word thus only shows that this attainment is like non-percipience in extinguishing minds and mental factors. In which ground is it? It is in the later dhyana, that is, the fourth dhyana and no other. For what purpose is the non-percipient attainment cultivated? It is for seeking liberation. Those who hold non-percipience to be true liberation cultivate the non-percipient attainment in order to realize it. It was said earlier that non-percipience is a result of maturation and is included in the neutral nature, so it was not said to be accomplished by itself. The non-percipient attainment, however, is invariably wholesome; because it is wholesome, it can bring about the five aggregates matured in the non-percipient sentient heaven. Since it is of a wholesome nature, which feeling does it lead to? It leads only to feeling in the next life, not to feeling in the present life, in a later life, or at an indefinite time. Even if one who has produced this attainment later loses it, it is said that in this very life he will certainly be able to produce it again and will be born in the non-percipient sentient heaven; therefore one who has obtained this attainment can certainly not enter the state of certainty of the right path. It is also admitted that only ordinary beings obtain this attainment and not noble ones, because noble ones regard the non-percipient attainment as a deep pit and take no pleasure in entering it. Only those who hold non-percipience to be true liberation and produce the thought of renunciation cultivate this attainment; since all noble ones do not regard the tainted as true liberation or true renunciation, they certainly do not practice this attainment. When noble ones cultivate and obtain the attainment of the fourth dhyana, do they also obtain a past and future non-percipient attainment, as they do with the dhyanas? They do not obtain it. Why? Although they have practiced it before, because it has no mental factors and can only be accomplished by great preparatory effort, at its first attainment they obtain it only for one time, namely the present, just as one first receives the individual liberation precepts. Once this attainment is obtained, from the second moment on, until it is abandoned, it also becomes past, but since it has no mental factors, there is no future cultivation. Next, how is the attainment of cessation characterized? The verse says:

滅盡定亦然，為靜住有頂，

The attainment of cessation is likewise, for tranquil abiding, at the Peak of Existence,

善二受不定，聖由加行得，

wholesome, with two feelings and indefinite; noble ones obtain it through preparatory effort,

成佛得非前，三十四念故。

a Buddha obtains it not earlier, because of thirty-four moments of thought.

論曰：如無想定，滅定亦然。此亦然聲，為例何義？例無想定心心所滅。如說復有別法能令心心所滅名無想定，如是復有別法能令心心所滅名滅盡定。如是二定差別相者，前無想定為求解脫，以出離想作意為先；此滅盡定為求靜住，以止息想作意為先。前無想定在後靜慮；此滅盡定唯在有頂，即是非想非非想處。此同前定，性唯是善非無記染，善等起故。前無想定唯順生受；此滅盡定通順生後及不定受，謂約異熟有順生受、或順後受、或不定受、或全不受。謂若於下得般涅槃，此定所招何地幾蘊？唯招有頂四蘊異熟。前無想定唯異生得；此滅盡定唯聖者得，非異生能起，怖畏斷滅故、唯聖道力所能起故、現法涅槃勝解入故。此亦如前，非離染得。由何而得？由加行得，要由加行方證得故。又初得時唯得現在，不得過去不修未來，要由心力方能修故。第二念等乃至未捨亦成過去。世尊亦以加行得耶？不爾。云何？成佛時得，謂佛世尊盡智時得，佛無一德由加行得，暫起欲樂現在前時，一切圓德隨樂而起，故佛眾德皆離染得。世尊曾未起滅盡定，得盡智時云何得成俱分解脫？於起滅定得自在故，如已起者成俱解脫。西方師說：菩薩學位先起此定後得菩提。云何此中不許彼說？若許彼說，便順尊者鄔波毱多《理目足論》。如彼論說：當言如來先起滅定、後生盡智。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說：非前起滅定後方生盡智。所以者何？傳說菩薩三十四念得菩提故。諦現觀中有十六念，離有頂貪有十八念，謂斷有頂九品煩惱起九無間九解脫道，如是十八足前十六成三十四。一切菩薩決定先於無所有處已得離貪方入見道，不復須斷下地煩惱，於此中間無容得起不同類心，故諸菩薩學位不應起滅盡定。外國諸師作如是說：若中間起不同類心，斯有何過？若爾，便有越期心過。然諸菩薩不越期心。

The treatise says: Just as the non-percipient attainment, so too is the attainment of cessation. What meaning does the word likewise take as an example? It takes as an example the cessation of minds and mental factors in the non-percipient attainment. Just as it was said that another dharma that causes minds and mental factors to cease is called the non-percipient attainment, so there is another dharma that causes minds and mental factors to cease, called the attainment of cessation. The differences between these two attainments are these: the earlier non-percipient attainment is for seeking liberation and is preceded by the attention of renunciation-perception; this attainment of cessation is for seeking tranquil abiding and is preceded by the attention of calming perception. The earlier non-percipient attainment is in the later dhyana; this attainment of cessation is only at the Peak of Existence, that is, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. Like the earlier attainment, its nature is only wholesome and not neutral or defiled, because it arises from wholesome causes. The earlier non-percipient attainment leads only to feeling in the next life; this attainment of cessation extends to feeling in the next life, in a later life and at an indefinite time, that is, in terms of maturation it may be felt in the next life, or in a later life, or at an indefinite time, or not felt at all. If one attains parinirvana in a lower ground, which ground and how many aggregates does this attainment bring about? It brings about only the four aggregates matured at the Peak of Existence. The earlier non-percipient attainment is obtained only by ordinary beings; this attainment of cessation is obtained only by noble ones and cannot be produced by ordinary beings, because they fear annihilation, because it can only be produced by the power of the noble path, and because one enters it with the conviction of nirvana in this very life. This also is, as before, not obtained through detachment. By what is it obtained? It is obtained through preparatory effort, since it can only be realized through preparatory effort. Moreover, at its first attainment one obtains it only in the present, not in the past, and one does not cultivate the future, because it can only be cultivated by the power of mind. From the second moment on, until it is abandoned, it also becomes past. Does the World-Honored One also obtain it through preparatory effort? He does not. How then? He obtains it at the time he becomes a Buddha, that is, when the Buddha, the World-Honored One, obtains the knowledge of exhaustion; the Buddha has no virtue obtained through preparatory effort, and when he briefly arouses a wish, all perfect virtues arise at his pleasure, so all the virtues of the Buddha are obtained through detachment. The World-Honored One never produced the attainment of cessation; how, then, on obtaining the knowledge of exhaustion, did he become one liberated in both ways? Because he has mastery over arising from the attainment of cessation, he is like one who has already arisen from it and become liberated in both ways. The Western masters say: while a Bodhisattva is still in the stage of training, he first produces this attainment and afterward attains enlightenment. Why is that view not admitted here? If one admits their view, it would accord with the Venerable Upagupta's Treatise on the Feet of Principle. As that treatise says: It should be said that the Tathagata first produced the attainment of cessation and afterward gave rise to the knowledge of exhaustion. The Vaibhashikas of Kashmir say: It is not that he first produced the attainment of cessation and only afterward produced the knowledge of exhaustion. Why? It is said that a Bodhisattva attains enlightenment in thirty-four moments of thought. In the direct realization of the truths there are sixteen moments of thought, and in detachment from the Peak of Existence there are eighteen moments, that is, cutting off the nine grades of affliction of the Peak of Existence by producing nine paths of no interval and nine paths of liberation; these eighteen added to the earlier sixteen make thirty-four. All Bodhisattvas, without exception, first attain detachment in the sphere of nothingness and only then enter the path of seeing, and have no need to cut off the afflictions of the lower grounds again; in the interval there is no room for a mind of a different kind to arise, and so Bodhisattvas in the stage of training should not produce the attainment of cessation. Foreign masters say: What fault is there if a mind of a different kind arises in the interval? If so, there would be the fault of exceeding the appointed time. Yet Bodhisattvas do not exceed the appointed time.

理實菩薩不越期心，然非不越無漏聖道。若爾，期心如何不越？謂我未得諸漏永盡，終不解斯結加趺坐。決定不越如是期心，唯於一坐時諸事究竟故。前說為善，我所宗故。雖已說二定有多同異相，而於其中復有同異。頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) In truth a Bodhisattva does not exceed the appointed time, but it is not that he does not delay the untainted noble path. If so, how does he not exceed the appointed time? He resolves: Until I have attained the complete extinction of the outflows, I will not undo this cross-legged posture. He definitely does not exceed such an appointed time, because all matters are completed in a single sitting. What was said earlier is well said, because it accords with my school. Although the many similarities and differences of the two attainments have been explained, there are further similarities and differences among them. The verse says:

二定依欲色，滅定初人中。

The two attainments rely on the desire and form realms; the attainment of cessation first arises among humans.

論曰：言二定者，謂無想定及滅盡定。此二俱依欲色二界而得現起。若有不許亦依色界起無想定，便違此文。謂本論言：或有是色有，此有非五行。謂色纏有情或生有想天，住不同類心，若入無想定、若入滅盡定。或生無想天已得入無想，是謂是色有，此有非五行。由此證知，如是二定俱依欲色而得現起，是名同相。言異相者，謂無想定欲色二界皆得初起，滅定初起唯在人中。此在人中初修起已，由退為先方生色界，依色界身後復修起。此滅盡定亦有退耶？應言亦有。若不爾者，即便違害《鄔陀夷經》。經言：具壽！有諸苾芻先於此處具淨屍羅、具三摩地、具般羅若，能數入出滅受想定斯有是處。應如實知，彼於現法或臨終位，不能勤修令解滿足，從此身壞超段食天，隨受一處意成天身。於彼生已，復數入出滅受想定亦有是處。應如實知，此意成天身，佛說是色界，滅受想定唯在有頂。若得此定必無退者，如何得往色界受生？有餘部執：第四靜慮亦有滅定。依彼所執，滅定無退，此義亦成。第四靜慮有滅盡定，義必不成。所以者何？九次第定，契經說故。此若必然，如何得有超越定義？此定次第依初學說，得自在時隨樂超入。如是二定有多種異：謂地有異，第四靜慮有頂地故；加行有異，出離止息想，作意為先故；相續有異，異生聖者相續起故；異熟有異，無想有頂異熟果故；順受有異，順定不定生二受故；初起有異，二界人中最初起故。二定總以心心所滅為其自性，何緣但說名為無想、滅受想耶？二定加行中，唯厭逆此故，如亦知受等，唯名他心智。今二定中心久時斷，如何於後心復得生？毘婆沙師許過去有前心為後等無間緣。有餘師言：如生無色，色久時斷，如何於後色復得生？彼生定應由心非色，如是出定心亦應然，由有根身非由心起。故彼先代諸軌範師，鹹言二法互為種子。

The treatise says: The two attainments spoken of are the non-percipient attainment and the attainment of cessation. Both can be produced in reliance on the desire and form realms. If anyone does not admit that the non-percipient attainment can also be produced in reliance on the form realm, he contradicts this passage. That is, the root treatise says: There is a form existence, and this existence is not of five kinds of conduct. That is, a being of the form realm, or one born in a perceiving heaven, abiding in a mind of a different kind, enters the non-percipient attainment or enters the attainment of cessation; or one born in the non-percipient heaven has entered non-percipience. This is called a form existence that is not of five kinds of conduct. From this it is known that both attainments can be produced in reliance on the desire and form realms, and this is their common characteristic. As for the differing characteristics, the non-percipient attainment may first arise in either the desire or form realm, while the attainment of cessation first arises only among humans. After first cultivating and producing it among humans, one is born in the form realm by way of falling away from it, and relying on a body in the form realm, cultivates and produces it again. Can this attainment of cessation also be lost? It should be said that it can. If not, it would contradict the Udayin Sutra. The sutra says: Venerable one, there are monks who in this place were complete in morality, complete in concentration and complete in wisdom, and who could repeatedly enter and emerge from the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception. It is possible that in the present life or at the time of death they cannot diligently cultivate to bring it to fulfillment; when their body breaks up, they pass beyond the gods who live on coarse food and are born in some place as a mind-made divine body. Having been born there, they can again repeatedly enter and emerge from the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception. It should be truly known that this mind-made divine body is said by the Buddha to be of the form realm, and the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception is only at the Peak of Existence. If one who has obtained this attainment could never lose it, how could he go to be born in the form realm? Some other schools hold that the fourth dhyana also has the attainment of cessation. According to their view, the attainment of cessation cannot be lost, and this meaning would also be established. But that the fourth dhyana has the attainment of cessation is certainly not established. Why? Because the sutras speak of the nine successive attainments. If that were so, how could there be the meaning of leaping over attainments? This sequence of attainments is spoken of in reliance on beginners; when one has mastery, one may leap over and enter at will. These two attainments have many differences: they differ in ground, since one is the fourth dhyana and the other the Peak of Existence; they differ in preparatory effort, since one is preceded by the attention of renunciation-perception and the other by calming perception; they differ in continuum, since they arise in the continuum of ordinary beings and of noble ones respectively; they differ in maturation, since one has the non-percipient result and the other the Peak of Existence result; they differ in the feeling they lead to, since one leads to the feeling of the next life and the other to feeling in the next life or indefinite; and they differ in first arising, since one first arises in two realms and the other among humans. The two attainments both take the cessation of minds and mental factors as their own nature; why are they only called the non-percipient and the cessation of feeling and perception? In the preparatory effort of the two attainments one is only weary of and opposed to these, just as feeling and so on are also known and yet it is only called the knowledge of others' minds. In these two attainments the mind is cut off for a long time; how can a later mind arise again? The Vaibhashikas admit that a past earlier mind is the immediately antecedent condition of the later one. Some other teachers say: just as when one is born in the formless realm, form is cut off for a long time, how can later form arise again? Their birth in the attainment must be from mind and not from form; likewise the mind on emerging from the attainment must also be from a body with faculties and not from mind. Therefore the earlier masters of old all said that two dharmas are mutually each other's seeds.

二法者，謂心、有根身。尊者世友問論中說：若執滅定全無有心，可有此過。我說滅定猶有細心，故無此失。尊者妙音說此非理。所以者何？若此定中猶有識者，三和合故必應有觸，由觸為緣應有受想。如世尊說：意及法為緣生於意識，三和合觸俱起受想思。則此定中受想等法亦應不滅。若謂如經說受緣愛，然阿羅漢雖有諸受而不生愛，觸亦應爾，非一切觸皆受等緣。此例不然，有差別故。經自簡言：若無明觸所生諸受為緣生愛。曾無有處簡觸生受，故有差別。由此道理，毘婆沙師說滅定中諸心皆滅。若都無心，如何名定？此令大種平等行故說名為定，或由心力平等至此故名為定。如是二定為是實有、為是假有？應言實有，能遮礙心令不生故。有說：此證理不應然，由前定心能遮礙故。謂前定心與所餘心相違而起，由此起故，唯令餘心暫時不轉。此能引發違心所依令相續故，唯不轉位假立為定，無別實體。此唯不轉分位假定，入前出後兩位皆無，故假說此是有為攝。或即所依由定心引令如是起，假立為定。應知無想亦復如是，謂由前心與所餘心相違而起，由此起故，唯令餘心暫時不轉，唯不轉位假立無想，餘說如前。此非善說，違我宗故。已辯二定。命根者何？頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) The two dharmas are mind and the body with faculties. The Venerable Vasumitra said in the Treatise: If one holds that there is no mind at all in the attainment of cessation, this fault may exist. I say that there is still a subtle mind in the attainment of cessation, so there is no such fault. The Venerable Ghoshaka said this is not reasonable. Why? If consciousness is still present in this attainment, then because of the combination of the three there must be contact, and because of contact there should be feeling and perception. As the World-Honored One said: Thought and dharmas are the conditions for the arising of mind-consciousness, and the three combine as contact, which arises together with feeling, perception and volition. Then in this attainment feeling, perception and other dharmas should also not be extinguished. If you say that, as a sutra says, feeling conditions craving, yet arhats have feelings without giving rise to craving, then contact should likewise be so, and not all contact is the condition for feeling and so on. This example does not work, because there is a difference. The sutra itself specifies: feelings produced by contact with ignorance are the condition for the arising of craving. Nowhere does it specify that contact produces feeling, and so there is a difference. By this reasoning, the Vaibhashikas say that in the attainment of cessation all minds are extinguished. If there is no mind at all, how can it be called an attainment? It is called an attainment because it brings about the equal functioning of the great elements, or because the power of mind brings one to this state of equilibrium. Are these two attainments real or provisional? It should be said that they are real, because they can block mind so that it does not arise. Some say: this reasoning should not be so, because the mind of the earlier attainment blocks it. That is, the mind of the earlier attainment arises in opposition to the other minds, and because of its arising it only causes the other minds to temporarily not proceed. This can induce the basis that is opposed to mind to continue, and the attainment is only provisionally established in the state where mind does not proceed, with no separate substance. Because this is only a provisional attainment consisting of a condition of non-proceeding, and because it is absent in both the preceding entry and the following emergence, it is said provisionally to be included among the conditioned. Or else it is the basis itself, induced by the mind of attainment to arise in this way, and the attainment is provisionally established. It should be known that non-percipience is also like this, that is, because the mind of the earlier state arises in opposition to the other minds, it only causes the other minds to temporarily not proceed; non-percipience is provisionally established only in the state where they do not proceed, and the rest is as above. This is not well said, because it contradicts my school. The two attainments have been explained. What is the life faculty? The verse says:

命根體即壽，能持煖及識。

The substance of the life faculty is lifespan, which sustains warmth and consciousness.

論曰：命體即壽，故對法言：云何命根？謂三界壽。此復未了何法名壽？謂有別法能持煖識說名為壽。故世尊言：

The treatise says: The substance of life is lifespan, and so the Abhidharma says: What is the life faculty? It is lifespan in the three realms. But what dharma is it that is called lifespan? It is a separate dharma that sustains warmth and consciousness and is called lifespan. Therefore the World-Honored One said:

壽煖及與識，三法捨身時，

Lifespan, warmth and consciousness, when these three leave the body,

所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺。

the abandoned body lies stiff, like a log without thought or feeling.

故有別法，能持煖識相續住因說名為壽。若爾，此壽何法能持？即煖及識還持此壽。若爾，三法更互相持，相續轉故，何法先滅？由此滅故，餘二隨滅。是則此三應常無謝，既爾此壽應業能持，隨業所引相續轉故。若爾，何緣不許唯業能持煖識而須壽耶？理不應然，勿一切識從始至終恆異熟故。既爾，應言業能持煖，煖復持識，何須此壽？如是識在無色界中應無能持，彼無煖故。應言彼識業為能持，豈得隨情數為轉計？或說此識唯煖能持，或復說言唯業持識。又前已說。前說者何？謂前說言，勿一切識從始至終皆是異熟，是故定應許有別法，能持煖識說名為壽。今亦不言全無壽體，但說壽體非別實物。若爾，何法說名壽體？謂三界業所引同分住時勢分說為壽體。由三界業所引同分住時勢分相續決定隨應住時，爾所時住故，此勢分說為壽體。如穀種等所引乃至熟時勢分，又如放箭所引乃至住時勢分。有謂有行是德差別，依箭等生，由彼力故。乃至未墮恆行不息，彼體一故、無障礙故。往趣餘方急緩至時分位差別應不得有，又應畢竟無墮落時。若謂由風所障礙故，應初即墮或無墮時，能障礙風無差別故。有別實物能持煖識名為壽體，是說為善。為壽盡故死、為更有餘因？《施設論》說：有壽盡故死，非福盡故死。廣作四句。第一句者，感壽異熟業力盡故。第二句者，感富樂果業力盡故。第三句者，能感二種業俱盡故。第四句者，不能避脫抂橫緣故。又亦應言捨壽行故。壽盡位中，福盡於死無復功能，故俱盡時有死，說為俱盡故死。《發智論》說：此壽當言隨相續轉、為復當言一起便住？欲纏有情不入無想定、不入滅盡定，當言此壽隨相續轉。若入無想定、若入滅盡定及色無色纏一切有情，當言此壽一起便住。彼言何義？若所依身可損害故壽隨損害，是名第一隨相續轉。

(The treatise continues:) Therefore the separate dharma that is the cause for warmth and consciousness continuing to abide is called lifespan. If so, what dharma sustains this lifespan? Warmth and consciousness in turn sustain this lifespan. If so, the three dharmas sustain one another and continue to proceed; which of them ceases first? Because it ceases, the other two cease along with it. Then these three would be everlasting and never decay; and being so, this lifespan should be sustained by karma, since it proceeds as drawn by karma. If so, why do you not admit that karma alone sustains warmth and consciousness, so that lifespan is unnecessary? This is not reasonable, lest all consciousness from beginning to end be always a result of maturation. Since it is so, it should be said that karma sustains warmth, and warmth in turn sustains consciousness, so what need is there of this lifespan? Then consciousness in the formless realm would have nothing to sustain it, since there is no warmth there. It should be said that consciousness there is sustained by karma; how can one turn and calculate as one pleases? Or one says that this consciousness is sustained only by warmth, or again says that only karma sustains consciousness. Moreover, this was already refuted. What was said before? It was said earlier: lest all consciousness from beginning to end be a result of maturation, one must admit a separate dharma that sustains warmth and consciousness and is called lifespan. Now too we do not say that there is no substance of lifespan at all, but that the substance of lifespan is not a separate real thing. If so, what dharma is called the substance of lifespan? It is the potential for the homogeneity drawn by the karma of the three realms to abide for a time, which is called the substance of lifespan. Because the homogeneity drawn by the karma of the three realms is certain to abide for as long a time as it should abide, this potential is called the substance of lifespan. It is like the potential of a grain seed and so on, drawn forth until the time of ripening, or like the potential drawn by an arrow shot until the time it stops. Some say that there is a motion that is a distinct quality, arising in reliance on the arrow and so on because of the force imparted to it, and which continues to travel without ceasing until the arrow falls, since its substance is one and unobstructed. But then differences in the stages of swiftness and slowness in going to other places should not exist, and there would be no time of falling at all. If you say that it is because it is obstructed by wind, then it would fall at the very beginning or never fall, since the obstructing wind makes no difference. That there is a separate real thing that sustains warmth and consciousness and is called the substance of lifespan is said to be well put. Does one die because lifespan is exhausted, or is there some other cause? The Prajnapti Treatise says: There is dying because lifespan is exhausted, and not dying because merit is exhausted. It makes four alternatives at length. The first is because the power of the karma that brings about the maturation of lifespan is exhausted. The second is because the power of the karma that brings about the fruit of wealth and happiness is exhausted. The third is because the karma that brings about both is exhausted together. The fourth is because one cannot escape an untimely calamitous condition. Moreover, it should also be said that it is because of abandoning the life formations. In the state in which lifespan is exhausted, the exhaustion of merit no longer has any capacity regarding death, and so when both are exhausted there is death, which is said to be dying because both are exhausted. The Jnanaprasthana says: Should this lifespan be said to proceed in continuity, or should it be said to abide from the moment it arises? Sentient beings of the desire realm who have not entered the non-percipient attainment or the attainment of cessation: it should be said that this lifespan proceeds in continuity. If they have entered the non-percipient attainment or the attainment of cessation, or are sentient beings of the form and formless realms, it should be said that this lifespan abides from the moment it arises. What does this mean? If the body that is its basis can be harmed, lifespan is harmed along with it; this is called the first, proceeding in continuity.

若所依身不可損害如起而住，是名第二一起便住。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言：初顯有障，後顯無障，由此決定有非時死。故契經說：有四得自體，謂有得自體唯可自害非可他害。廣作四句。唯可自害非他害者，謂生欲界戲忘念天意憤恚天，彼由發起增上喜怒，是故於彼殞沒非餘。又應說諸佛自般涅槃故。唯可他害非自害者，謂處胎卵諸有情類。俱可害者，謂餘多分欲界有情。俱非害者，謂在中有、色無色界一切有情及在欲界一分有情，如那落迦、北俱盧洲、正住見道、慈定、滅定及無想定，王仙、佛使，佛所記別——達弭羅、嗢怛羅、殑耆羅、長者子耶舍、鳩磨羅時婆——，最後身菩薩，及此菩薩母懷菩薩胎時，一切轉輪王及此輪王母懷輪王胎時。若爾，何故契經中言：大德！何等有情所得自體非可自害非可他害。舍利子！謂在非想非非想處受生有情。傳說所餘無色靜慮所得自體，可為自地聖道所害，亦上他地近分所害。有頂自上二害俱無，是故說為俱非可害。豈不有頂亦為他地聖道所害，應名他害？如是應說舉後顯初，如或有處舉初顯後，或復有處舉後顯初。云何有處舉初顯後？如契經說：如梵眾天是名第一樂生天。云何有處舉後顯初？如契經說：如極光淨天是名第二樂生天。彼經如聲顯譬喻義，可作是說舉一顯餘，喻法舉一顯同類故。此無如聲，不可例彼。若顯喻義方得有，如聲是則如聲，餘經應不有。如餘經說：有色有情身異想異，如人一分，天是第一識住。故知非喻亦有如聲。傍論且止。已辯命根，諸相者何？頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) If the body that is the basis cannot be harmed and remains as it arose, this is called the second, abiding from the moment it arises. The Vaibhashikas of Kashmir say: the first shows that there is obstruction, and the latter shows that there is none; from this it is certain that there is untimely death. Therefore a sutra says: There are four ways of obtaining a self-existence: first, a self-existence that can be harmed only by oneself and not by others. It makes four alternatives at length. That which can be harmed only by oneself and not by others is, for example, those born in the desire realm among the gods of playful forgetfulness and the gods of angry minds; because they give rise to excessive joy or anger, they perish there for that reason and no other. It should also be said that Buddhas enter parinirvana of their own will. That which can be harmed only by others and not by oneself is, for example, those sentient beings who are in the womb or in the egg. That which can be harmed by both is, for example, most other sentient beings of the desire realm. That which can be harmed by neither is, for example, those in the intermediate existence and all sentient beings of the form and formless realms, and some sentient beings in the desire realm, such as those in the hells and Uttarakuru, and those abiding in the path of seeing, the attainment of loving-kindness, the attainment of cessation and the non-percipient attainment, royal sages, those sent by the Buddha, those whom the Buddha predicted, namely Dharmila, Uttara, Gangila, the elder's son Yashas and Kumarajiva, the Bodhisattva in his last body, and the mother of this Bodhisattva while she carries the Bodhisattva in her womb, and all wheel-turning kings and the mother of a wheel-turning king while she carries him in her womb. If so, why does a sutra say: Venerable one, what sentient beings obtain a self-existence that can be harmed neither by oneself nor by others? Shariputra, those sentient beings born in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception. It is said that the self-existence obtained in the other formless and dhyana grounds can be harmed by the noble path of their own ground and also by the access of higher and other grounds. At the Peak of Existence neither is possible from above or from itself, and so it is said to be harmed by neither. But is the Peak of Existence not also harmed by the noble path of other grounds, so that it should be called harmed by others? Thus it should be said that the latter is mentioned to show the former, just as in some places the former is mentioned to show the latter. How is the former mentioned in some places to show the latter? As a sutra says: Like the gods of the Brahma assembly, this is called the first happy birth heaven. How is the latter mentioned in some places to show the former? As a sutra says: Like the gods of Abhasvara, this is called the second happy birth heaven. The word like in that sutra shows the meaning of an analogy, and one may say that mentioning one shows the others, since in an analogy mentioning one shows its like. This passage has no word like, so it cannot be compared with that. If the meaning of an analogy could be shown only where there is the word like, then the word like would not occur in other sutras. As another sutra says: There are sentient beings with form, whose bodies are different and whose perceptions are different, like humans and some gods; this is the first station of consciousness. So it is known that an analogy need not have the word like. This digression may rest here. The life faculty has been explained. What are the characteristics? The verse says:

相謂諸有為，生住異滅性。

The characteristics of all the conditioned are the natures of arising, abiding, change and cessation.

論曰：由此四種是有為相，法若有此應是有為，與此相違是無為法。此於諸法能起名生，能安名住，能衰名異，能壞名滅。性是體義。豈不經說有三有為之有為相？於此經中應說有四，不說者何？所謂住相。然經說住異，是此異別名。如生名起，滅名為盡。如是應知，異名住異。若法令行三世遷流，此經說為有為之相，令諸有情生厭畏故。謂彼諸行生力所遷，令從未來流入現在。異及滅相力所遷迫，令從現在流入過去，令其衰異及壞滅故。傳說如有人處稠林，有三怨敵欲為損害，一從稠林牽之令出、一衰其力、一壞命根。三相於行應知亦爾。住於彼行攝受安立，常樂與彼不相捨離，故不立在有為相中。又無為法有自相住，住相濫彼故經不說。有謂：此經說住與異總合為一名住異相。何用如是總合說為？住是有情所愛著處，為令厭捨與異合說，如示黑耳與吉祥俱，是故定有四有為相。此生等相既是有為，應更別有生等四相。若更有相便致無窮，彼復有餘生等相故。應言更有，然非無窮。所以者何？頌曰：

The treatise says: These four are the characteristics of the conditioned; if a dharma has these, it should be conditioned, and what is contrary to this is an unconditioned dharma. Among dharmas, that which can cause them to arise is called arising, that which can make them stay is called abiding, that which can make them decline is called change, and that which can destroy them is called cessation. Nature means substance. Does a sutra not speak of three characteristics of the conditioned? In this sutra there should be four; why is it not said which is missing? It is the characteristic of abiding. However, the sutra speaks of abiding-change, which is another name for change here, as arising is called rising and cessation is called ending. So it should be known that change is called abiding-change. If a dharma causes formations to drift through the three times, this sutra calls it the characteristic of the conditioned, because it makes sentient beings feel weariness and fear. That is, the power of arising carries those formations, making them flow from the future into the present. The power of change and cessation presses them, making them flow from the present into the past, causing them to decline, change and be destroyed. It is said that it is like a man in a thick forest with three enemies who wish to harm him: one drags him out of the forest, one weakens his strength, and one destroys his life faculty. The three characteristics of formations should be known to be likewise. Abiding takes hold of and establishes those formations; since one constantly delights in it and does not wish to be separated from it, it is not established among the characteristics of the conditioned. Moreover, the unconditioned dharmas also have a characteristic of abiding by their own nature, and the characteristic of abiding would be confused with that, so the sutra does not speak of it. Some say: this sutra speaks of abiding and change combined as one characteristic called abiding-change. Abiding is where sentient beings are attached and attracted; to make them feel weariness and abandon it, it is spoken of together with change, as one shows a black-eared one together with an auspicious one. Therefore there are definitely four characteristics of the conditioned. Since these characteristics of arising and so on are themselves conditioned, there should be further four characteristics of arising and so on. If there were further characteristics, it would lead to infinite regress, because those would again have their own arising and so on. It should be said that there are further ones, but it is not infinite. Why? The verse says:

此有生生等，於八一有能。

These have secondary arising and so on; of the eight, one has the capacity.

論曰：此謂前說四種本相。生生等者，謂四隨相，生生、住住、異異、滅滅。諸行有為由四本相，本相有為由四隨相，豈不本相如所相法一一應有四種隨相，此復各四展轉無窮？無斯過失，四本四隨於八於一功能別故。何謂功能？謂法作用或謂士用。四種本相一一皆於八法有用，四種隨相一一皆於一法有用。其義云何？謂法生時並其自體九法俱起，自體為一相隨相八。本相中生除其自性生餘八法，隨相生生於九法內唯生本生。謂如雌雞，有生多子有唯生一。生與生生，生八生一其力亦爾。本相中住亦除自性住餘八法，隨相住住於九法中唯住本住。異及滅相隨應亦爾。是故生等相復有相，隨相唯四無無窮失。經部師說何緣如是分析虛空？非生等相有實法體如所分別。所以者何？無定量故。謂此諸相非如色等有定現、比或至教量證體實有。若爾，何故契經中言：有為之起亦可了知，盡及住異亦可了知。天愛！汝等執文迷義，薄伽梵說義是所依。何謂此經所說實義？謂愚夫類無明所盲，於行相續執我我所，長夜於中而生耽著。世尊為斷彼執著故，顯行相續體是有為及緣生性，故作是說有三有為之有為相，非顯諸行一剎那中具有三相，由一剎那起等三相不可知故。非不可知應立為相，故彼契經復作是說：有為之起亦可了知，盡及住異亦可了知。然經重說有為言者，令知此相表是有為，勿謂此相表有為有，如居白鷺表水非無。亦勿謂表有為善惡，如童女相表善非善。諸行相續初起名生，終盡位中說名為滅，中間相續隨轉名住，此前後別名為住異。世尊依此說難陀言：是善男子善知受生、善知受住及善知受衰異壞滅。故說頌言：

The treatise says: This refers to the four primary characteristics spoken of earlier. "Birth of birth" and the rest are what are called the four secondary characteristics: birth-of-birth, abiding-of-abiding, change-of-change, and ceasing-of-ceasing. Conditioned phenomena are conditioned through the four primary characteristics, and the primary characteristics are themselves conditioned through the four secondary characteristics. Then would not each primary characteristic, like the thing it characterizes, need four secondary characteristics, and each of those again four more, so that it goes on without end? There is no such fault, because the four primary and the four secondary differ in function with respect to eight and to one. What is meant by function? It means the activity of a dharma, or what is called its personal operation. Each of the four primary characteristics has an effect on eight dharmas, and each of the four secondary characteristics has an effect on one dharma. How so? When a dharma arises, together with its own substance nine dharmas arise at once: the substance is one, the primary characteristic is one, and the secondary characteristics are eight. Among the primary characteristics, birth gives birth to the other eight dharmas apart from its own nature, while the birth-of-birth, among the nine dharmas, gives birth only to the primary birth. It is like a hen, of which one may say that some lay many chicks and some produce only one. Such is the power of birth and of birth-of-birth, the one giving birth to eight and the other to one. Likewise among the primary characteristics, abiding makes the other eight dharmas abide apart from its own nature, while abiding-of-abiding, among the nine, makes only the primary abiding abide. Change and ceasing, with their secondary characteristics, should be understood in the same way. Therefore the characteristics of birth and the rest have further characteristics, but the secondary characteristics are only four, and there is no fault of infinite regress. The Sautrantika master says: Why do you analyze empty space in this way? The characteristics of birth and the rest do not have a real substance as you distinguish them. Why? Because there is no fixed means of valid knowledge. That is, these characteristics are not like form and the like, whose real existence can be proved by fixed means of knowledge such as direct perception, inference, or scriptural authority. If so, why does the sutra say: The arising of the conditioned can be known, its passing away can be known, and its abiding and change can be known? Beloved of the gods, you cling to the text and are confused about the meaning. The Bhagavan said that the meaning is what one should rely on. What, then, is the true meaning of this sutra? It is that foolish ordinary people, blinded by ignorance, grasp at a self and what belongs to a self in the continuity of phenomena, and through the long night become attached to them. In order to cut off their attachment, the World-Honored One showed that the continuity of phenomena is by nature conditioned and arisen from conditions, and for this reason he spoke of three characteristics of the conditioned. He did not mean to show that all three characteristics are present together in a single moment, because it is not possible to know three characteristics such as arising in one single moment. What cannot be known should not be established as a characteristic, and so that same sutra goes on to say: The arising of the conditioned can be known, its passing away can be known, and its abiding and change can be known. Yet the sutra repeats the word "conditioned" in order to let us know that these characteristics are signs of the conditioned; one should not suppose that these characteristics indicate the existence of the conditioned, as the presence of egrets is taken as a sign of water, as though water would not exist without them. Nor should one suppose that they indicate that the conditioned is good or bad, as the features of a young girl are taken as a sign of what is good or not good. The first arising of a continuity of phenomena is called birth; the position of its final exhaustion is called ceasing; the continuing and flowing on in between is called abiding; and the difference between earlier and later in that abiding is called change. Relying on this, the World-Honored One said to Nanda: That good man knows well the arising of sensation, knows well the abiding of sensation, and knows well the decline, change, destruction and ceasing of sensation. Therefore a verse says:

相續初名生，滅謂終盡位，

The first moment of a continuity is called birth; ceasing is its final position of exhaustion;

中隨轉名住，住異前後別。

flowing on in between is called abiding; change is the difference between earlier and later.

復有頌言：

Another verse says:

本無今有生，相續隨轉住，

What was not before and now is, is birth; flowing on in continuity is abiding;

前後別住異，相續斷名滅。

the difference between earlier and later is change; the cutting off of the continuity is ceasing.

又有頌言：

Yet another verse says:

由諸法剎那，無住而有滅，

Because all dharmas are momentary, there is ceasing without abiding;

彼自然滅故，執有住非理。

since they cease of themselves, to hold that there is abiding is not reasonable.

是故唯於相續說住，由斯對法所說理成。故彼論言：云何名住？謂一切行已生未滅，非生已不滅名剎那法性。雖《發智論》作如是說：於一心中誰起謂生？誰盡謂死？誰住異謂老？而彼論文依眾同分相續心說，非一剎那。又一一剎那諸有為法，離執實有物，四相亦成。云何得成？謂一一念本無今有名生，有已還無名滅，後後剎那嗣前前起名為住，即彼前後有差別故名住異。於前後念相似生時，前後相望非無差別。彼差別相云何應知？謂金剛等有擲未擲，及強力擲與弱力擲，速遲墮落時差別故。大種轉變差別義成。諸行相似相續生時，前後相望無多差別，故雖有異而見相似。若爾最後聲光剎那及涅槃時，最後六處無後念故應無住異，是則所立相應不遍有為。此不說住為有為相。其義云何？謂住之異。故若有住亦必有異，由此立相無不遍失。然此經中世尊所說，有為之相略顯示者，謂有為法本無今有，有已還無及相續住。即此前後相望別異，此中何用生等別物？云何所相法即立為能相？如何大士相非異於大士？角犎𩑶蹄尾牛相非異牛，又如堅等地等界相非異地等，遠見上升知是煙相非異煙體。此有為相，理亦應然。雖了有為色等自性，乃至未了先無後無相續差別，仍未知彼體是有為，故非彼性即有為相。然非離彼性，有生等實物。若離有為色等自性有生等物，復何非理？一法一時應即生住衰異壞滅，許俱有故。此難不然，用時別故，謂生作用在於未來，現在已生不更生故。諸法生已正現在時，住等三相作用方起，非生用時有餘三用，故雖俱有而不相違。且應思擇，未來法體為有為無，然後可成生於彼位有用無用。設許未來生有作用，如何成未來？應說未來相。法現在時生用已謝，如何成現在？應說現在相。又住等三用俱現在，應一法體一剎那中即有安住衰異壞滅。

(The treatise continues:) Therefore abiding is spoken of only with respect to the continuity, and in this way the principle taught in the Abhidharma is established. Hence that treatise says: What is abiding? It is all conditioned phenomena that have arisen and not yet ceased; it is not the nature of a moment that has arisen but does not cease. Although the Jnanaprasthana says: In a single mind, who arises, which is called birth? Who passes away, which is called death? Who abides and changes, which is called old age? That text speaks in reference to the continuity of mind of a group of beings of the same class, not to a single moment. Furthermore, for every conditioned dharma in each moment, without clinging to the existence of real entities, the four characteristics are also established. How are they established? In each single thought, what was not before and now is, is called birth; what has been and again is not, is called ceasing; the succession of later moments following earlier ones is called abiding; and the difference between earlier and later moments is called change. When similar moments arise in succession, there is not no difference between earlier and later. How should that difference be known? It is like a diamond and the like thrown or not yet thrown, thrown with great force or with weak force, and from the difference in the speed or slowness of its fall. In this way the meaning of the differing transformations of the great elements is established. When phenomena arise in similar continuity, there is not much difference between earlier and later, so although there is change we see similarity. If so, at the final moment of sound and of light, and at the time of nirvana, the last six sense bases have no subsequent thought, so they should have no abiding or change, and then the characteristics you set up would not cover all conditioned things. Here abiding is not said to be a characteristic of the conditioned. What is the meaning? It is the change of abiding. Therefore wherever there is abiding there is necessarily change, and thus the establishing of characteristics has no fault of failing to be universal. Moreover, in the sutra, what the World-Honored One said as a brief demonstration of the characteristics of the conditioned is this: conditioned dharmas were not before and now are; having been, they again are not; and they abide in continuity. It is precisely the difference between earlier and later that is meant here; what need is there for separate entities such as birth and the rest? How can the thing characterized be set up as its own characterizing mark? How is a great person's mark not different from the great person? The horn, hump, dewlap, hoof and tail marks of an ox are not different from the ox. Likewise the marks of earth and the other elements, such as solidity, are not different from earth and the others, and the smoke seen far off rising upward, by which we know fire, is not different from the substance of smoke. The characteristics of the conditioned should be understood in the same way. Even if one understands the own-nature of conditioned things such as form, until one understands the difference between the former non-existence, the later non-existence, and the continuity, one still does not know that their substance is conditioned; so their nature itself is not the characteristic of the conditioned. Yet it is not that there are real entities of birth and the rest apart from that nature. If, apart from the own-nature of conditioned things such as form, there were entities such as birth, what would be unreasonable about that? One dharma at one time would then be born, abide, decline, change, be destroyed and cease at once, since you admit they are simultaneous. This objection does not hold, because the times of their operation differ: the operation of birth lies in the future, and what has already been born in the present is not born again. Only when dharmas have been born and are actually present does the operation of the three characteristics of abiding and the rest begin; it is not that when birth is operating the other three operate too, so although they are simultaneous in existence they do not conflict. Moreover, one should first consider whether the substance of a future dharma exists or does not exist, and only then can it be established whether birth has an operation or not at that stage. If you allow that future birth has an operation, how is it future? You should then call it a present characteristic. If, when a dharma is present, the operation of birth has already lapsed, how is it present? You should then call it a past characteristic. And if the three operations of abiding and the rest are all present, then one single dharma would in a single moment be abiding, declining, changing, being destroyed and ceasing.

若時住相能住此法，即時異滅能衰壞者，爾時此法為名安住、為名衰異、為名壞滅？諸說住等用不同時，彼說便違剎那滅義。若言我說一法諸相用，皆究竟名一剎那。汝今應說，何緣住相與二俱生，而住先能住所住法非異非滅？若住力強能先用者，後何成劣而並本法俱遭異滅所衰壞耶？若言住相已起作用不應更起猶如生者，生應可然。夫生用者，謂引所生令入現在，已入不應復引入故。住不應爾。夫住用者，謂安所住令不衰滅，已住可令永安住故。由斯住相用應常起，不可例生令無再用。又誰障住用，令暫有還無？若言異滅能為障者，異滅力應強，何不於先用？又住用息，異滅本法自然不住，異滅二相何處如何而起作用？復有何事須二用耶？由住攝持，諸法生已暫時不滅。住用既捨，法定不住即自然滅，故異滅用更無所為。又應一法生已未壞名住，住已壞時名滅。理且可然。異於一法，進退推徵理不應有。所以者何？異謂前後性相轉變，非即此法可言異此。故說頌言：

(The treatise continues:) If at the time the characteristic of abiding is able to make this dharma abide, the characteristics of change and ceasing are able to decline and destroy it, then at that time is this dharma called abiding, or called declining and changing, or called destroyed? Those who say the operations of abiding and the rest are not simultaneous contradict the meaning of momentary ceasing. If you say that, in my view, the operations of the characteristics of one dharma are all called a single moment in the final sense, then you must now say why the characteristic of abiding arises together with the other two, and why abiding, being first able to make the dharma abide, does not make it neither change nor cease. If the power of abiding is strong and acts first, how does it afterward become weak, so that it and the original dharma are both declined and destroyed by change and ceasing? If you say that once the characteristic of abiding has produced its operation it should not operate again, as with birth, then birth might be like that. The operation of birth is to draw what is to be born into the present, and what has already entered the present is not drawn in again. Abiding is not so. The operation of abiding is to make what abides secure so that it does not decline or cease, and what already abides can be made secure forever. Therefore the operation of the characteristic of abiding should always arise, and one cannot take birth as a model and say it has no further operation. Moreover, who obstructs the operation of abiding, so that it briefly exists and then ceases? If you say change and ceasing obstruct it, then the power of change and ceasing should be stronger, so why do they not operate first? And when the operation of abiding stops, the original dharma naturally does not abide of itself, so where, and how, do the two characteristics of change and ceasing operate? What further need is there for their two operations? Through the sustaining of abiding, dharmas that have been born do not cease for a time. Once the operation of abiding is given up, the dharma certainly does not abide and ceases of itself, so the operations of change and ceasing have nothing more to do. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to say that a dharma that has arisen and not yet been destroyed is called abiding, and that when it has abiding and is destroyed it is called ceasing; that much is acceptable. But as for change in a single dharma, on examination forward and backward there is no reason for it. Why? Change means the transformation of nature and characteristics between earlier and later; the same dharma cannot be said to differ from itself. Therefore a verse says:

即前異不成，異前非一法，

If the same as before, change is not established; if different from before, it is not one dharma;

是故於一法，立異終不成。

therefore, in one dharma, the establishing of change can never succeed.

雖餘部說遇滅因緣，滅相方能滅所滅法。而彼所說，應如有言：服瀉藥時天來令利。即滅因緣應滅所滅，何須別執有滅相為。又心心所許剎那滅，更不須待餘滅因緣，應滅與住用無先後。是則一法於一時中亦住亦滅不應正理，故依相續說有為相，不違正理善順契經。若生在未來生所生法，未來一切法何不俱生？頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) Although other schools say that when the conditions for ceasing are met, the characteristic of ceasing is then able to make the dharma cease, what they say is like saying: When one takes a purgative, Heaven comes and makes it work. If the conditions of ceasing can cause what is to cease to cease, what need is there to cling to a separate characteristic of ceasing? Moreover, mind and mental factors are admitted to cease moment by moment and need not wait for any other conditions of ceasing, so ceasing and abiding would have no priority between them. It would then follow that one dharma both abides and ceases at the same time, which does not accord with right reason. Therefore, speaking of the characteristics of the conditioned in reference to the continuity does not contradict right reason and agrees well with the sutras. If birth, in the future, gives birth to what is to be born, why do not all future dharmas arise at once? A verse says:

生能生所生，非離因緣合。

Birth gives birth to what is born, but not apart from the union of causes and conditions.

論曰：非離所餘因緣和合，唯生相力能生所生，故諸未來非皆頓起。若爾，我等唯見因緣有生功能，無別生相。有因緣合諸法即生，無即不生，何勞生相？故知唯有因緣力起。豈諸有法皆汝所知？法性幽微甚難知故，雖現有體而不可知。生相若無應無生覺，又第六轉言不應成，謂色之生、受之生等。如不應說色之色言。如責無生，乃至無滅皆如是責，隨其所應。若爾，為成空無我覺，法外應執空無我性。為成一二大小各別合離彼此有性等覺，應如外道法外執有數量各別合離彼此有等別性。又為成立第六轉言，應執別有色之聚性。又如說言色之自性，此第六轉言何得成？是故生等唯假建立，無別實物，為了諸行本無今有假立為生。如是本無今有生相，依色等法種類眾多，為簡所餘說第六轉言色之生受之生等，為令他知此生唯色非餘受等。餘例亦然。如世間說栴檀之香、石子之體，此亦應爾。如是住等隨應當知。若行離生相而得生者，虛空無為等何故不生？諸行名生由本無今有，無為體常有，何得言生？又如法爾不說一切皆有生，如是應許非一切法皆可生。又如有為同有生相，而許因緣望有為法或有功能或無功能。如是應許一切有為及無為法同無生相，而諸因緣望彼二法一有生用、一無生用。毘婆沙師說生等相別有實物，其理應成。所以者何？豈容多有設難者故便棄所宗？非恐有鹿而不種麥，懼多蠅附不食美團。故於過難應懃通釋，於本宗義應順修行。如是已辯諸有為相。名身等類其義云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: It is not apart from the union of the other causes and conditions that the power of the characteristic of birth alone gives birth to what is born; therefore future dharmas do not all arise suddenly. If so, we see only that causes and conditions have the capacity to give rise; we do not see a separate characteristic of birth. When causes and conditions come together dharmas are born, and when they do not, they are not born; what need is there for the characteristic of birth? So we know that things arise only by the power of causes and conditions. Is everything that exists known to you? The nature of dharmas is subtle and extremely hard to know, so although they exist with a substance they cannot be known. If there were no characteristic of birth, there would be no awareness of birth, and also the sixth case-ending could not be established, as in "the birth of form" and "the birth of feeling." It would be like saying one cannot say "the form of form." If you reproach us for having no birth, then the same reproach would apply all the way to having no ceasing, in each as appropriate. If so, to establish the awareness of emptiness and selflessness, you would have to cling to a nature of emptiness and selflessness apart from the dharmas. To establish the awareness of one and two, large and small, separate and combined, this and that, and so on, you would have to cling, like the non-Buddhists, to a separate nature of number, quantity, separateness, conjunction, this and that apart from the dharmas. And to establish the sixth case-ending you would have to cling to a separate aggregate nature of form as a heap. Again, when one says "the own-nature of form," how could this sixth case-ending be established? Therefore birth and the rest are only provisionally set up, and there is no separate real entity; to point out that conditioned things were not before and now are, one provisionally establishes birth. Thus the characteristic of birth, "not before and now is," depends on many kinds of dharmas such as form, and in order to distinguish it from the others one uses the sixth case-ending and says "the birth of form," "the birth of feeling," and so on, to let others know that this birth is only of form and not of feeling and the rest. The other cases are to be treated likewise. As in the world one says "the fragrance of sandalwood" and "the body of a stone," so here too. In the same way abiding and the rest should be understood. If conditioned things could be born apart from the characteristic of birth, why do space and the unconditioned not arise? Conditioned things are called born because they were not before and now are, while the unconditioned has a substance that is constant and existent, so how can one say it is born? Also, since by the nature of things it is not said that all arise, so one should allow that not all dharmas can be born. Again, as conditioned things all share the characteristic of birth, yet you allow that causes and conditions have some capacity in respect of some conditioned things and no capacity in respect of others, so too one should allow that all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas alike lack a characteristic of birth, and that causes and conditions have the operation of birth toward one of the two and not toward the other. The Vaibhasika masters say that birth and the other characteristics are separate real entities, and their reasoning should be accepted. Why? Is it permissible to abandon one's tenets just because many objections can be raised? One does not refrain from sowing wheat for fear of deer, nor refuse to eat fine food for fear that many flies will settle on it. Therefore one should diligently resolve difficulties and explain them, and practice in accord with the meaning of one's own tradition. Thus the characteristics of the conditioned have been explained. What is the meaning of the "name-group" and the like? A verse says:

名身等所謂，想章字總說。

Name-group and the like are called conception, section and syllable in general.

論曰：等者等取句身文身。應知此中名謂作想，如說色聲香味等想。句者謂章，詮義究竟，如說諸行無常等章。或能辯了業用德時相應差別，此章稱句。文者謂字，如說𧙃阿壹伊等字。豈不此字亦書分名？非為顯書分製造諸字，但為顯諸字製造書分。云何當令雖不聞說而亦得解，故造書分，是故諸字非書分名。云何名等身？謂想等總說。言總說者是合集義，於合集義中說嗢遮界故。此中名身者，謂色聲香等。句身者，謂諸行無常、一切法無我、涅槃寂靜等。文身者，謂迦佉伽等。豈不此三語為性故，用聲為體，色自性攝。如何乃說為心不相應行？此三非以語為自性，語是音聲，非唯音聲即令了義。云何令了？謂語發名，名能顯義，乃能令了。非但音聲皆稱為語，要由此故義可了知，如是音聲方稱語故。何等音聲令義可了？謂能說者於諸義中已共立為能詮定量，且如古者於九義中共立一瞿聲為能詮定量。故有頌言：

The treatise says: "And the like" includes sentence-group and syllable-group. One should know that here "name" means that which produces conception, as when one speaks of the conceptions of form, sound, smell, taste and so on. "Sentence" means a section, which explains a meaning to completion, as in the sections "All conditioned things are impermanent." Or it is what can distinguish the particular correspondences of action, function, quality and time; such a section is called a sentence. "Syllable" means a letter, as when one speaks of the letters a, i, i and so on. Is it not also true that a letter is called a part of writing? The letters were not made in order to show writing; rather writing was made in order to show the letters. How can one make people understand even when they have not heard it spoken? Hence writing was made, and therefore letters are not called writing. How is "group" in "name-group" and the like explained? It means a general statement of conception and the rest. "General statement" has the meaning of collection, and in the meaning of collection it is spoken of through the "udana" division. Here the "name-group" refers to form, sound, smell and the like; the "sentence-group" refers to such as "All conditioned things are impermanent, all dharmas are without self, nirvana is quiescent"; the "syllable-group" refers to ka, kha, ga and so on. Is it not that these three, because speech is their nature, take sound as their substance, and are included in the own-nature of form? Why, then, are they said to be conditioned factors not associated with mind? These three do not have speech as their own-nature; speech is sound, and not every sound causes understanding of meaning. How does it cause understanding? Speech brings forth names, names can show meanings, and so understanding is produced. Not all sounds are called speech; it is because a meaning can be known through it that such a sound is called speech. What kinds of sounds make a meaning understood? Those that, among various meanings, have been jointly established as the fixed standard of expression; for example, in ancient times the sound "go" was jointly established as the fixed standard of expression for nine meanings. Therefore a verse says: