Abhidharmakosa-bhasya of the Sarvastivada School, Fascicle 2

方獸地光言，金剛眼天水，

Direction, beast, earth, light, speech, thunderbolt, eye, heaven, and water:

於斯九種義，智者立瞿聲。

for these nine kinds of meaning, the wise establish the sound "go."

諸有執名能顯義者，亦定應許如是義名，謂共立為能詮定量。若此句義由名能顯，但由音聲顯用已辦，何須橫計別有實名？又未了此名，如何由語發，為由語顯、為由語生？若由語生，語聲性故，聲應一切皆能生名。若謂生名聲有差別，此足顯義，何待別名？若由語顯，語聲性故，聲應一切皆能顯名。若謂顯名，聲有差別，此足顯義，何待別名？又諸念聲不可聚集，亦無一法分分漸生，如何名生可由語發？云何待過去諸表剎那？最後表剎那能生無表。若爾，最後位聲乃生名，但聞最後聲應能了義。若作是執：語能生文、文復生名、名方顯義。此中過難應同前說，以諸念文不可集故。語顯名過，應例如生。又異語文，諸明慧者注心思擇莫辯其相。又文由語若顯若生，準語於名皆不應理。又若有執：名如生等與義俱生，現在世名目去來義不應得有。又父母等隨意所欲立子等名，云何可言名如生等與義俱起？又無為法應無有名，無生義故而不應許。然世尊說頌依於名及文生者，此於諸義共立分量。聲即是名，此名安布差別為頌。由如是義，說頌依名。此頌是名安布差別，執有實物不應正理，如樹等行及心次第。或唯應執別有文體，即總集此為名等身。更執有餘便為無用。毘婆沙師說有別物為名等身，心不相應行蘊所攝。實而非假。所以者何？非一切法皆是尋思所能了故。此名身等何界所繫？為是有情數、為非有情數？為是異熟生、為是所長養、為是等流性？為善、為不善、為無記？此皆應辯。頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) Those who hold that names can show meanings must also admit that this meaning of "name" is that which is jointly established as the fixed standard of expression. If this meaning of a sentence is made clear by names, and the function of showing is already accomplished through the sound, what need is there to claim recklessly that there is a separate real name? Moreover, since one does not understand this name, how is it produced by speech: is it revealed by speech, or generated by speech? If it is generated by speech, then because speech is of the nature of sound, every sound should be able to generate names. If you say that sounds that generate names have differences and that this suffices to show meaning, what need is there to wait for a separate name? If it is revealed by speech, then because speech is of the nature of sound, every sound should be able to reveal names. If you say that sounds that reveal names have differences and that this suffices to show meaning, what need is there to wait for a separate name? Furthermore, successive sounds of thought cannot be gathered together, and no dharma arises gradually part by part, so how can the arising of a name be produced from speech? How can one wait for the past momentary expressions? The last moment of expression would generate unexpressed action. If so, the sound at the last position would generate the name, and merely hearing the last sound would enable one to understand the meaning. If you hold that speech generates syllables, syllables again generate names, and names then show meanings, the faults and difficulties here should be the same as above, because successive syllables cannot be gathered. The fault of speech revealing names should be treated like that of generating them. Moreover, when the wise concentrate their minds on analyzing speech and syllables as different, they cannot distinguish their characteristics. Also, if syllables are either revealed or generated by speech, then with speech and names the same reasoning is unreasonable. Again, if someone holds that names, like birth and the rest, arise together with their meanings, then in the present a name that designates a past or future meaning could not exist. Moreover, parents and others name their sons and so on according to their wishes; how can one say that names, like birth and the rest, arise together with meanings? Also, the unconditioned would have no names, since it has no meaning of birth, and this is not admitted. Furthermore, the World-Honored One spoke of verse as depending on names and syllables; this is a measure jointly established for various meanings. Sound is itself the name, and the particular arrangement of this name is verse. Given this meaning, one says verse depends on names. This verse is the particular arrangement of names; to cling to a real entity is not right reasoning, like the order of trees and so on, or of mind and thoughts. Or else one should cling only to a separate substance of syllables, and the collection of these is called name-group and the like; to cling to anything more would be useless. The Vaibhasika masters say there are separate entities that are the name-group and the like, included in the aggregate of conditioned factors not associated with mind, real and not merely nominal. Why? Because not all dharmas can be understood by reasoning and reflection. To what realm are these name-groups and the like bound? Are they counted among sentient beings, or not? Are they produced by maturation, nourished by growth, or of the nature of outflow? Are they wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral? All of this should be analyzed. A verse says:

欲色有情攝，等流無記性。

They are included among sentient beings of the desire and form realms, of the nature of outflow, and neutral.

論曰：此名身等唯是欲色二界所繫。有說：亦通無色界繫，然不可說。又名身等有情數攝，能說者成非所顯義。又名身等唯是等流，又唯無覆無記性攝。如上所說，餘不相應所未說義今當略辯。頌曰：

The treatise says: These name-groups and the like are bound only to the desire and form realms. Some say they may also be bound to the formless realm, but this cannot be said. Furthermore, name-groups and the like are counted among sentient beings, since the speaker is of that kind and the meaning expressed is not. Also, name-groups and the like are only of the nature of outflow, and are included only in the unobstructed neutral nature. As for the meanings of the other non-associated factors not yet discussed above, I shall now explain them briefly. A verse says:

同分亦如是，並無色異熟，

Homogeneity is also so, and without the formless realm, maturation,

得相通三類，非得定等流。

acquisition and characteristics are of three kinds; the two attainments are only outflow.

論曰：亦如是言，為顯同分如名身等，通於欲色有情等流無覆無記。並無色言，顯非唯欲色。言並異熟，顯非唯等流。是界通三，類通二義。得及諸相類並通三，謂有剎那等流異熟，非得二定唯是等流。唯言為明非異熟等。已說如是所未說義。無想、命根如前已辯。何緣不說得等唯是有情數攝？已說有情所成等故。何緣不說相通有情非有情數？已說一切有為俱故。餘所未說，隨應準知。

The treatise says: The word "also so" shows that homogeneity, like the name-group and so on, pervades sentient beings of the desire and form realms and is of the nature of outflow and unobstructed neutral. The words "without the formless realm" show that it is not only of the desire and form realms. The words "together with maturation" show that it is not only of outflow. Thus the realms are of three kinds, and the classes of two. Acquisition and the various characteristics are all of three kinds, that is, they include the momentary, outflow and maturation; the two attainments are only outflow. The word "only" is to show that they are not matured effects and so on. Thus the meanings not yet stated have now been stated. The state of non-perception and the life faculty were explained before. Why is it not said that acquisition and the like are only counted among sentient beings? Because it has been said that they are accomplished by sentient beings and so on. Why is it not said that the characteristics are of sentient beings and also of non-sentient things? Because it has been said that all conditioned things have them. As for the rest not stated, one should infer accordingly.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by imperial command.

分別根品第二之四

Chapter 2 on the Analysis of the Faculties, Part 4.

如是已說不相應行。前言生相生所生時，非離所餘因緣和合，此中何法說為因緣？且因六種，何等為六？頌曰：

Thus the conditioned factors not associated with mind have been explained. Earlier it was said that when the characteristic of birth gives birth to what is born, it is not apart from the union of other causes and conditions; what dharmas are here called causes and conditions? First, there are six kinds of causes. What are the six? A verse says:

能作及俱有，同類與相應，

The efficient cause and the co-existent cause, the homogeneous cause and the associated cause,

遍行並異熟，許因唯六種。

the universal cause and the cause of maturation: causes are admitted to be only these six.

論曰：因有六種，一能作因、二俱有因、三同類因、四相應因、五遍行因、六異熟因，對法諸師許因唯有如是六種。且初能作因相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: There are six kinds of cause: first the efficient cause, second the co-existent cause, third the homogeneous cause, fourth the associated cause, fifth the universal cause, and sixth the cause of maturation. The Abhidharma masters admit only these six kinds of cause. First, what is the nature of the efficient cause? A verse says:

除自餘能作。

Apart from itself, all others are efficient causes.

論曰：一切有為唯除自體，以一切法為能作因，由彼生時無障住故。雖餘因性亦能作因，然能作因更無別稱，如色處等總即別名。豈不未知諸漏當起，由已知故諸漏不生，智於漏生能為障礙；日光能障現覩眾星。如何有為唯除自體，以一切法為能作因？應知此生時，彼皆無障住，故彼於此是能作因。若於此生，彼能為障而不為障，可立為因。譬如國人以其國主不為損害，鹹作是言：我因國主而得安樂。若於此生彼無障用，設不為障何得為因？且如涅槃及不生法，普於一切有為生中；那落迦等有情相續於無色界諸蘊生中，有如非有無能障用，雖無障用而亦為因，如無力國王，亦得如前說。此即通說諸能作因，就勝為言非無生力。如眼色等於眼識等，生飲食於身種等於牙等。有作是難：若一切法無障住故皆能作因，何緣諸法非皆頓起？一殺生時，何緣一切非如殺者皆成殺業？此難不然。但由無障，許一切法為能作因，非由於生有親作力。有餘師說：諸能作因皆於果生有能作力。且涅槃等於眼識生，云何名為有能作力？意識緣彼為境而生或善或惡，因此意識後時眼識次第得生，展轉因故。彼涅槃等於眼識生有能作力，如是餘法由此方隅展轉應知有能生力。如是已說能作因相。第二俱有因相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: All conditioned things, excluding only their own substance, take all dharmas as efficient causes, because at the time of their arising these dharmas do not obstruct them. Although the other causes too are by nature efficient causes, the efficient cause has no separate name, just as the bases of form and the like have a general name that is also a particular name. Is it not so that, when one does not yet know the outflows that are about to arise, because one has already known them the outflows do not arise, and knowledge is an obstruction to the arising of outflows; just as sunlight obstructs our seeing the stars? Then how can all dharmas, excluding only their own substance, be efficient causes of conditioned things? One should know that at the time of this arising, those dharmas do not obstruct it, and therefore they are efficient causes for it. If something could obstruct this arising but does not, it can be set up as a cause. For example, the people of a country, because their ruler does not harm them, all say: We have peace and happiness because of our ruler. If it has no operation of obstruction toward this arising, how could it be a cause merely because it does not obstruct? Take nirvana and unborn dharmas, which with respect to the arising of all conditioned things, and the hell beings and so on, in the continuum of sentient beings with respect to the arising of aggregates in the formless realm, are as though non-existent and have no power of obstruction; although they have no obstructing operation, they are still causes, as a powerless king may also be spoken of as above. This is a general statement of the efficient causes, spoken in terms of the most prominent, and not that they lack the power of arising. For example, the eye and form for eye-consciousness, food for the arising of the body, seeds for sprouts, and so on. Someone raises this objection: If all dharmas are efficient causes because they do not obstruct, why do dharmas not all arise at once? When one kills a living being, why do all not become the karma of killing as the killer does? This objection does not hold. We admit all dharmas as efficient causes only because they do not obstruct, not because they have a direct power of producing the arising. Other masters say that all efficient causes have an efficient power with respect to the arising of the effect. Take nirvana and the like in relation to the arising of eye-consciousness: how are they said to have an efficient power? Mental consciousness takes nirvana as its object and arises as wholesome or unwholesome, and from this, at a later time, eye-consciousness arises in turn, through successive causes. Thus nirvana and the like have an efficient power for the arising of eye-consciousness, and in the same way, along these lines, one should know that other dharmas have the power to produce. Thus the characteristic of the efficient cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the second, the co-existent cause? A verse says:

俱有互為果，如大相所相，

Co-existent causes are mutual effects, like the great elements, characteristics and the thing characterized,

心於心隨轉。

and mind with what follows mind.

論曰：若法更互為士用果，彼法更互為俱有因。其相云何？如四大種更互相望為俱有因，如是諸相與所相法心與心隨轉亦更互為因。是則俱有因由互為果遍攝有為法，如其所應。法與隨相非互為果，然法與隨相為俱有因，非隨相於法。此中應辯。何等名為心隨轉法？頌曰：

The treatise says: If dharmas are effects of one another's personal operation, those dharmas are mutually co-existent causes. What is their nature? For example, the four great elements are co-existent causes with respect to one another, and likewise the characteristics and the thing characterized, and mind and what follows mind, are also causes of one another. Thus the co-existent cause, through the meaning of mutual effect, pervades conditioned dharmas, as appropriate in each case. A dharma and its secondary characteristics are not mutual effects, yet the dharma is a co-existent cause of its secondary characteristics, but the secondary characteristics are not so for the dharma. This should be analyzed here. What are called dharmas that follow mind? A verse says:

心所二律儀，彼及心諸相，

Mental factors, the two restraints, those and the characteristics of mind

是心隨轉法。

are dharmas that follow mind.

論曰：一切所有心相應法，靜慮無漏二種律儀，彼法及心之生等相，如是皆謂心隨轉法。如何此法名心隨轉？頌曰：

The treatise says: All mental factors associated with mind, the two kinds of restraint, that of meditation and the one free of outflows, those dharmas themselves, and the characteristics of birth and the rest of mind, all these are called dharmas that follow mind. Why are these dharmas called following mind? A verse says:

由時果善等。

By time, effect, wholesomeness and the like.

論曰：略說由時果等善等，故說此法名心隨轉。且由時者，謂此與心一生住滅及墮一世。由果等者，謂此與心一果異熟及一等流。應知此中前一後一，顯俱顯共其義不同。由善等者，謂此與心同善、不善、無記性故。由此十因名心隨轉。此中心王極少猶與五十八法為俱有因，謂十大地法彼四十本相、心八本隨相，名五十八法。五十八中除心四隨相，餘五十四為心俱有因。有說：為心因唯十四法，謂十大地法並心本相。此說非善。所以者何？違《品類足論》所說故。如彼論言：或有苦諦以有身見為因，非與有身見為因，除未來有身見及彼相應法生老住非常諸餘染汙苦諦。或有苦諦以有身見為因，亦與有身見為因，即所除法。有餘師不誦及彼相應法。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言：彼文必應作如是誦，或應準義知說有餘，諸由俱有因故成因彼必俱有。或有俱有非由俱有因故成因，謂諸隨相各於本法，此諸隨相各互相對。隨心轉法隨相於心，此諸隨相展轉相對。一切俱生有對造色展轉相對，少分俱生無對造色展轉相對。一切俱生造色大種展轉相對，一切俱生得與所得展轉相對。如是等諸法雖名俱有，而非由俱有因故成因，非一果異熟及一等流故。得與所得非定俱行，或前或後或俱生故。如是一切理且可然，而諸世間種等芽等極成因果相生事中，未見如斯同時因果，故今應說。云何俱起諸法聚中有因果義？豈不現見燈焰燈明芽影同時亦為因果。此應詳辯：為即燈焰與明為因、為由前生因緣和合焰明俱起？餘物障光明而有影現，如何說此影用芽為因？理不應然，隨有無故。善因明者說因果相，言若此有無，彼隨有無者，此定為因，彼定為果。俱有法中一有一切有、一無一切無，理成因果。俱起因果理且可然，如何可言互為因果？即由前說，此亦無違。若爾，如前所說造色互不相離，應互為因。

The treatise says: Briefly, they are called following mind because of time, effect and so on, and wholesomeness and so on. First, "by time" means that these arise, abide and cease together with the mind and fall within one same period. "By effect and so on" means that these have one and the same effect of maturation and one and the same effect of outflow as the mind. One should know that here "one" with respect to earlier and later shows both "shared" and "together," and the meanings differ. "By wholesomeness and so on" means that these are of the same nature as the mind, wholesome, unwholesome or neutral. For these ten reasons they are called following mind. Here, even the minimum mind-king has fifty-eight dharmas as its co-existent causes, namely the ten great-ground factors, their forty primary characteristics, and the eight primary and secondary characteristics of mind, which are called the fifty-eight dharmas. Of the fifty-eight, excluding the four secondary characteristics of mind, the other fifty-four are co-existent causes of mind. Some say that only fourteen dharmas are causes of mind, namely the ten great-ground factors and the primary characteristics of mind. This is not right. Why? Because it contradicts what the Prakaranapada says. As that treatise says: There may be a truth of suffering that has the view of a real self as its cause but is not a cause of the view of a real self, namely the other defiled truths of suffering, excluding the future view of a real self and the birth, aging, abiding and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it. There may be a truth of suffering that has the view of a real self as its cause and is also a cause of the view of a real self, namely the dharmas just excluded. Some other masters do not recite "and the dharmas associated with it." The Vaibhasika masters of Kashmir say: That text must be recited in this way, or else one should know by the meaning that there are others, because when something is a cause by reason of the co-existent cause, it must be co-existent. There may also be something co-existent that is not a cause by reason of the co-existent cause, namely the secondary characteristics each in relation to the primary dharma, and these secondary characteristics in relation to each other; the secondary characteristics in relation to mind among dharmas that follow mind; these secondary characteristics in relation to one another; all co-arisen resistant derived form in relation to one another; part of the co-arisen non-resistant derived form in relation to one another; all co-arisen derived form and great elements in relation to one another; and all co-arisen acquisition and what is acquired in relation to one another. Such dharmas, although called co-existent, are not causes by reason of the co-existent cause, because they do not have one and the same effect of maturation and one and the same effect of outflow. Acquisition and what is acquired are not necessarily concurrent, as they may be earlier, later or simultaneous. All this reasoning is acceptable so far, but in the well-established events of causes and effects giving rise to one another in the world, such as seeds and sprouts, one has not seen such simultaneous cause and effect, so I should now ask: how, in a gathering of dharmas that arise together, can there be a meaning of cause and effect? Do we not plainly see that a lamp flame and its light, and a sprout and its shadow, are simultaneous yet also cause and effect? This should be examined in detail: is it that the flame is the cause of the light, or that through the union of earlier-arisen causes and conditions flame and light arise together? When another object blocks the light and a shadow appears, how can it be said that the shadow has the sprout as its cause? Reasoning does not support this, since they follow one another in presence and absence. Those skilled in logic speak of the characteristics of cause and effect thus: when this exists the other exists, when this does not exist the other does not exist, then this is certainly the cause and that the effect. Among co-existent dharmas, if one exists all exist, and if one does not exist all do not exist, and so in reason they are cause and effect. Simultaneous cause and effect may be accepted so far, but how can one say they are mutually cause and effect? By what was said earlier, this too does not contradict. If so, as said before, derived forms that are inseparable from one another should be causes of one another.

如是造色與諸大種心隨相等與心等法皆不相離，應互為因。若謂如三杖互相依住，如是俱有法因果義成。此應思惟，如是三杖為由俱起相依力住？為由前生因緣合力令彼三杖俱起住耶？又於彼中亦有別物繩鉤地等連持令住，此亦有餘同類因等，是故俱有因義得成。如是已說俱有因相。第三同類因相云何？頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) In this way derived forms and the great elements, and the secondary characteristics of mind and the like with mind and the like, are all inseparable, and should be causes of one another. If you say they are like three staves leaning on one another and standing, so the meaning of cause and effect among co-existent dharmas is established, this should be considered: do the three staves stand through the power of arising together and leaning on one another, or does the power of the union of earlier causes and conditions make the three staves arise and stand together? Moreover, in that case there are also other things, such as rope, hook and ground, which hold them and make them stand, and there also are the other homogeneous causes and so on, so the meaning of the co-existent cause is established. Thus the characteristic of the co-existent cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the third, the homogeneous cause? A verse says:

同類因相似，自部地前生，

The homogeneous cause is similar, of the same division and ground, arisen before,

道展轉九地，唯等勝為果，

the path in succession across nine grounds, with only equal or superior as effect,

加行生亦然，聞思所成等。

and what arises from effort is also so: what is made of hearing, of thought, and so on.

論曰：同類因者，謂相似法與相似法為同類因，謂善五蘊與善五蘊展轉相望為同類因，染汙與染汙、無記與無記五蘊相望應知亦爾。有餘師說：淨無記蘊五是色果，四非色因。有餘師說：五是四果，色非四因。有餘師說：色與四蘊相望展轉皆不為因。又一身中羯剌藍位，能與十位為同類因。頞部曇等九位，一一皆除前位與餘為因，若對餘身同類十位，一一皆與十位為因。由此方隅外麥稻等，自類自類應廣思擇。若不許色為色同類因，彼執便違本論文所說。故本論說：過去大種、未來大種因增上等。為諸相似於相似法皆可得說為同類因？不爾。云何？自部自地唯與自部自地為因，是故說言自部自地。部謂五部，即見苦所斷乃至修所斷。地謂九地，即欲界為一靜慮、無色八。此中見苦所斷法還與見苦所斷為同類因非餘，如是乃至修所斷還與修所斷法為同類因非餘。於中一一，若欲界地還與欲界為同類因，初靜慮地與初靜慮為同類因，乃至有頂與有頂地為同類因；異地相望皆無因義。又此非一切。何者？謂前生唯諸前生與後相似生未生法為同類因。云何知然？本論說故。如《發智論》說：云何同類因？謂前生善根與後生自界善根及彼相應法為同類因。如是過去與餘二世，過去現在與未來等皆應廣說。然即彼論作是問言：若法與彼法為因，或時此法與彼非因耶？彼即答言：無時非因者，此依俱有、相應、異熟三因密說，故無有過。有謂未來正生位法定能與彼為同類因，是故彼文依最後位密作是答無時非因。彼於所難非為善釋。以未來法正生位前非同類因，後方成故。又若爾者，彼復問言：若法與彼法為等無間，或時此法與彼非等無間耶？彼即答言：若時此法未至已生。若如彼釋，應亦答言無時非緣，如何乃答若時此法未至已生。然彼復釋，為現二門，如彼處說，此亦應爾；如此處說，彼亦應爾。如是作文獲何功德？

The treatise says: The homogeneous cause means that a similar dharma is the homogeneous cause of a similar dharma; for example, the wholesome five aggregates are homogeneous causes of the wholesome five aggregates with respect to one another, and one should know that the same is true of the defiled with the defiled and the neutral with the neutral five aggregates. Some other masters say that of the pure neutral aggregates, the five are the effect of form and the four non-form aggregates are its cause. Other masters say that the five are the effect of the four, and form is not a cause of the four. Other masters say that form and the four aggregates are not causes of one another at all. Furthermore, within one body, in the kalala stage, it can be the homogeneous cause of the ten stages; in the arbuda stage and the others, each of the nine stages, excluding the earlier stage, is a cause for the others, and if one faces the ten stages of another body of the same kind, each is a cause for all ten stages. By this direction, wheat, rice and the like outside, each of their own kind with its own kind, should be thought through widely. If one does not allow that form is the homogeneous cause of form, that view contradicts what the basic treatise says. Therefore the basic treatise says: Past great elements, future great elements, causes of increase, and so on. Can all similar dharmas be called homogeneous causes of similar dharmas? No. How, then? Only the same division and the same ground are causes for the same division and the same ground, therefore it says "same division, same ground." Division means the five divisions, from what is abandoned by seeing suffering to what is abandoned by cultivation. Ground means the nine grounds, namely the desire realm as one, the meditations as four, and the formless as eight. Here a dharma abandoned by seeing suffering is again a homogeneous cause only of what is abandoned by seeing suffering and not of others, and likewise up to what is abandoned by cultivation, which is again a homogeneous cause only of dharmas abandoned by cultivation and not of others. Within each, the desire-realm ground is a homogeneous cause only of the desire realm, the first meditation ground of the first meditation, and so on up to the peak of existence, which is a homogeneous cause only of the peak of existence ground; between different grounds there is no meaning of cause. Also, this does not apply to everything. Why? It means that only what arose earlier is the homogeneous cause of similar dharmas that arise later and have not yet arisen. How do we know this? Because the basic treatise says so. As the Jnanaprasthana says: What is the homogeneous cause? It is that earlier-arisen wholesome roots are homogeneous causes of later-arisen wholesome roots of the same realm and the dharmas associated with them. In this way, past with the other two times, and past and present with future, and so on, should all be explained in detail. Yet that very treatise asks: If a dharma is a cause of that dharma, is there a time when this dharma is not its cause? It answers: There is no time when it is not a cause. This is said on the basis of the three causes, co-existent, associated and maturation, as a hidden statement, so there is no fault. Some say that a future dharma that is about to arise is certain to be a homogeneous cause of that dharma, so that text answers, relying on the final stage, as a hidden statement, that there is no time when it is not a cause. That is not a good explanation of what it was asked, because a future dharma before the stage of actual arising is not a homogeneous cause, and becomes one only afterward. Also, if so, that treatise again asks: If a dharma is the immediately preceding condition of that dharma, is there a time when this dharma is not its immediately preceding condition? It answers: When this dharma has not yet arrived but has already arisen. If one explains as they do, one should also answer that there is no time when it is not a condition, so why does it answer, when this dharma has not yet arrived but has already arisen? Yet they again explain that, in order to show two doors, as stated there, so too here, and as stated here, so too there. What merit is gained by composing a text like this?

唯顯論主非善於文。是故應知前釋為善。若爾，何故《品類足》說：或有苦諦以有身見為因，非與有身見為因，除未來有身見及彼相應苦諦諸餘染汙苦諦。或有苦諦以有身見為因，亦與有身見為因，即所除法。彼文應說，除未來有身見相應苦諦。設有如彼說，由義應知非。復云何通《施設足論》？彼說諸法四事決定，所謂因、果、所依、所緣。應知彼文，因者謂能作、俱有、相應、異熟因。果者，謂增上、士用、異熟果。所依者謂眼等六根。所緣者謂色等六境。若爾，同類因應本無而有，許故無過。約位非體，由和合作用位果非體果。若同類因未來世有，如異熟因，當有何過？未來若有，本論應說。本論唯說能取與果諸同類因，故無有失。無如是義，以同類因引等流果此未來有，理必不然，無前後故。不應已生法為未生等流，如過去法非現在果。勿有果先因後過失故，未來世無同類因。若爾，異熟因應未來非有，不應異熟果因前及俱故。未來世法無前後故，無如是失，不相似故。謂同類因與果相似，若無前後應互為因，既互為因應互為果，互為因果與理相違。非異熟因與果相似，雖離前後而無上過，故同類因就位建立未來非有，若異熟因就相建立未來非無。言同類因唯自地者，定依何說？定依有漏。若無漏道展轉相望一一皆與九地為因，謂未至定、靜慮中間、四本靜慮、三本無色，九地道諦皆互為因。所以者何？此於諸地皆如客住不墮界攝，非諸地愛執為己有，是故九地道雖地不同而展轉為因，由同類故。然唯得與等勝為因，非為劣因，加行生故。且如已生苦法智忍還與未來苦法智忍為同類因，是名為等。又即此忍復能與後從苦法智至無生智為同類因，是名為勝。如是廣說，乃至已生諸無生智唯與等類為同類因，更無勝故。又諸已生見道修道及無學道，隨其次第與三二一為同類因。

(The treatise continues:) This only shows that the author of the treatise is not skilled in writing. Therefore one should know that the former explanation is the good one. If so, why does the Prakarana say: There may be a truth of suffering that has the view of a real self as its cause but is not a cause of the view of a real self, namely the other defiled truths of suffering, excluding the future view of a real self and the truth of suffering associated with it. There may be a truth of suffering that has the view of a real self as its cause and is also a cause of the view of a real self, namely the dharmas just excluded. That text should say: excluding the truth of suffering associated with the future view of a real self. If it is said as that text says, one should know by the meaning that it is not so. How, then, is the Prajnapti-pada to be reconciled? It says that for dharmas, four matters are determined, namely cause, effect, support and object. One should know that in that text, cause means the efficient, co-existent, associated and maturation causes; effect means the effect of dominance, the effect of personal operation and the effect of maturation; support means the six faculties such as the eye; and object means the six objects such as form. If so, the homogeneous cause should be something that did not exist and now exists, and since you allow that, there is no fault. This is according to stage and not substance; it is by the stage of union and operation, the effect being a stage effect and not a substance effect. If the homogeneous cause existed in the future, as the cause of maturation does, what fault would there be? If it existed in the future, the basic treatise would have said so. The basic treatise says only that those that take and give effects are homogeneous causes, so there is no fault. There is no such meaning, and it is surely not reasonable that a homogeneous cause that draws an effect of outflow should exist in the future, since there would be no before and after. A dharma that has already arisen should not be the not-yet-arisen effect of outflow, just as a past dharma is not the effect of the present. To avoid the fault of the effect coming before the cause, there is no homogeneous cause in the future. If so, the cause of maturation should not exist in the future, since the matured effect should not be before or simultaneous with its cause. A future dharma has no before and after, so there is no such fault, because they are not similar. The homogeneous cause is similar to its effect, and if there were no before and after, they would be causes of one another, and being causes of one another they would be effects of one another, and for them to be mutually cause and effect contradicts reason. The cause of maturation is not similar to its effect, so although it is without before and after, it has none of the faults above; therefore the homogeneous cause is established by stage as non-existent in the future, whereas the cause of maturation is established by characteristic as not non-existent in the future. When it is said that the homogeneous cause is only of its own ground, on what basis is this definitely said? It is said definitely with reference to the defiled. As for the undefiled path, each, in succession and relation, is a cause for all nine grounds: the preparatory concentration, the intermediate meditation, the four basic meditations and the three basic formless attainments; the truth of the path in all nine grounds is cause for one another. Why? Because in all these grounds they dwell as guests and do not fall within any realm, and the craving of the grounds does not cling to them as its own. So although the grounds of the path differ, they are causes of one another, since they are of the same kind. Yet they can be causes only for equals and superiors, not for inferiors, because they arise from effort. For example, the already arisen patient acceptance of the knowledge of suffering is again a homogeneous cause of the future patient acceptance of the knowledge of suffering, and this is called equal. Again, this same acceptance can be the homogeneous cause of later states from the knowledge of suffering up to the knowledge of non-arising, and this is called superior. Explained in this way in detail, up to the already arisen knowledges of non-arising, which are homogeneous causes only for their equals, since there is nothing superior. Also, the already arisen paths of seeing, cultivation and no more learning are homogeneous causes for three, two and one respectively, in order.

又於此中諸鈍根道與鈍及利為同類因。若利根道唯利道因，如隨信行及信勝解時解脫道，隨其次第與六四二為同類因。若隨法行及見至非時解脫道，隨其次第與三二一為同類因。諸上地道為下地因。云何名為或等或勝？由因增長及由根故。謂見道等下下品等，後後位中因轉增長。雖一相續中無容可得隨信隨法行二道現起，而已生者為未來因。為唯聖道但與等勝為同類因？不爾。云何？餘世間法加行生者亦與等勝為因非劣。加行生法其體云何？謂聞所成、思所成等。等者等取。修所成等，因聞思修所生功德，名彼所成，加行生故唯與等勝為因非劣。如欲界繫，聞所成法能與自界聞思所成為同類因，非修所成因，欲界無故。思所成法與思所成為同類因，非聞所成因，以彼劣故。若色界繫聞所成法，能與自界聞修所成為同類因，非思所成因，色界無故。修所成法唯與自界修所成法為同類因，非聞所成因，以彼劣故。無色界繫修所成法，唯與自界修所成法為同類因，非聞思所成因，以無故劣故。如是諸法復有九品，若下下品為九品因，下中八因，乃至上上唯上上因，除前劣故。生得善法九品相望展轉為因，染汙亦爾。無覆無記總有四種，謂異熟生、威儀路、工巧處、化心俱品，隨其次第，能與四三二一為因。又欲界化心有四靜慮果，非上靜慮果下靜慮果因，非加行因得下劣果，如勤功力種稻麥等。勿設劬勞而無所獲。因如是義，故有問言：頗有已生諸無漏法非未生位無漏法因？有，謂已生苦法智品於未生位苦法忍品，又一切勝於一切劣。頗有一身諸無漏法前所定得非後生因？有，謂未來苦法忍品於後已生苦法智品，以果必無在因前故，或同類因未來無故。頗有前生諸無漏法非後已起無漏法因？有，謂前生勝無漏法於後已起劣無漏法，如退上果下果現前。又前已生苦法智得，於後已生苦法忍得非同類因，以彼劣故。

(The treatise continues:) Moreover, here the paths of dull faculties are homogeneous causes for both dull and sharp. As for the paths of sharp faculties, they are causes only of sharp paths. For example, the liberated path of one who follows faith and of one who is liberated by faith are homogeneous causes for six, four and two, in order. The liberated path of one who follows the Dharma and of one who has attained by seeing, and one not liberated by time, are homogeneous causes for three, two and one, in order. The paths of higher grounds are causes of lower grounds. How are they called either equal or superior? By the growth of the cause and by the faculties. In the lower-lower grade and the others of the path of seeing and so on, the cause grows in each later stage. Although in one continuum it is not possible for the two paths of following faith and following the Dharma to appear together, the one already arisen is a cause for the future. Is it only the noble path that is a homogeneous cause for equals and superiors? No. How, then? Other worldly dharmas arising from effort are also causes for equals and superiors and not for inferiors. What is the substance of dharmas arising from effort? It is what is made of hearing, what is made of thought, and so on. "And so on" includes what is made of cultivation and the like; the merits born from hearing, thought and cultivation are called made of them, and because they arise from effort they are causes only for equals and superiors and not for inferiors. For example, what is made of hearing, bound to the desire realm, can be a homogeneous cause of what is made of hearing and of thought in its own realm, but not a cause of what is made of cultivation, since the desire realm has none. What is made of thought is a homogeneous cause of what is made of thought but not a cause of what is made of hearing, because that is inferior. What is made of hearing, bound to the form realm, can be a homogeneous cause of what is made of hearing and of cultivation in its own realm but not a cause of what is made of thought, since the form realm has none. What is made of cultivation is a homogeneous cause only of what is made of cultivation in its own realm and not a cause of what is made of hearing, because that is inferior. What is made of cultivation, bound to the formless realm, is a homogeneous cause only of what is made of cultivation in its own realm and not a cause of what is made of hearing or thought, because it has none and because they are inferior. These dharmas further have nine grades: the lower-lower grade is a cause for nine grades, the lower-middle for eight, and so on up to the upper-upper, which is a cause only for the upper-upper, excluding what is inferior to it. Innate wholesome dharmas of nine grades are causes of one another in succession, and so too the defiled. Unobstructed neutral dharmas are of four kinds, namely those born of maturation, those of deportment, those of craft, and those accompanying transformation mind, which are causes for four, three, two and one respectively. Also, the transformation mind of the desire realm has four fruits of meditation; it is not a cause of the fruits of higher meditation or of lower meditation, and what is not an effortful cause does not obtain a lowly effect, as with those who sow rice and wheat through diligent labor; let it not be that one toils and gains nothing. Because of this meaning, there are questions: Is there an already arisen undefiled dharma that is not a cause of an undefiled dharma of a not yet arisen stage? There is: the already arisen grade of the knowledge of suffering of the dharma with respect to the not yet arisen grade of the acceptance of suffering of the dharma, and all superior ones with respect to all inferior ones. Is there, in one body, an undefiled dharma that was surely attained earlier but is not a cause of what arises later? There is: the future grade of the acceptance of suffering with respect to the later already arisen grade of the knowledge of suffering, since an effect cannot precede its cause, or because there is no homogeneous cause in the future. Is there an earlier arisen undefiled dharma that is not a cause of an undefiled dharma that arises later? There is: an earlier arisen superior undefiled dharma with respect to a later arisen inferior undefiled dharma, as when one regresses and the fruit of a lower stage appears. Also, the previously arisen acquisition of the knowledge of suffering of the dharma is not a homogeneous cause of the later arisen acquisition of the acceptance of the knowledge of suffering, because the latter is inferior.

如是已說同類因相。第四相應因相云何？頌曰：

Thus the characteristic of the homogeneous cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the fourth, the associated cause? A verse says:

相應因決定，心心所同依。

The associated cause is determined: mind and mental factors share the same support.

論曰：唯心心所是相應因。若爾，所緣行相別者，亦應更互為相應因。不爾，所緣行相同者乃可得說為相應故。若爾，異時所緣行相同者應說為相應因。不爾，要須所緣行相及時同者乃相應故。若爾，異身所緣行相及時同者應說相應，如眾同觀初月等事，為以一言總遮如是眾多妨難，故說同依。謂要同依心心所法，方得更互為相應因。此中同言顯所依一，謂若眼識用此剎那眼根為依，相應受等亦即用此眼根為依，乃至意識及相應法同依意根，應知亦爾。相應因體即俱有因，如是二因義何差別？由互為果義立俱有因，如商侶相依共遊險道。由五平等共相應義立相應因，即如商侶同受同作食等事業，其中闕一皆不相應，是故極成互為因義。如是已說相應因相。第五遍行因相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: Only mind and mental factors are associated causes. If so, those with different objects and modes of apprehension should also be mutually associated causes. Not so; only those with the same objects and modes of apprehension can be said to be associated. If so, those with the same object and mode but at different times should be called associated causes. Not so; only those with the same object, mode and time are associated. If so, those in different bodies with the same object, mode and time should be called associated, as when many together look at the new moon and the like. In order to rule out these many difficulties in one word, it says "same support." That is, only mind and mental factors that have the same support can be associated causes for one another. Here the word "same" shows that the support is one: if eye-consciousness takes this moment's eye faculty as its support, the associated feelings and so on also take this eye faculty as their support, and so on up to mental consciousness and its associates, which share the mind faculty as support; one should know the same of these. The substance of the associated cause is the co-existent cause itself, so what is the difference between these two causes? The co-existent cause is established through the meaning of mutual effect, like merchants who depend on one another in traveling together through a dangerous road. The associated cause is established through the meaning of the five equalities in mutual association, like merchants who together share the same feeling, the same activity and the same meals; if any one is lacking they are not associated, and so the meaning of mutual cause is well established. Thus the characteristic of the associated cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the fifth, the universal cause? A verse says:

遍行謂前遍，為同地染因。

Universal means what is universal and earlier, a cause of defilement in the same ground.

論曰：遍行因者，謂前已生遍行諸法，與後同地染汙諸法為遍行因。遍行諸法，隨眠品中遍行義處當廣分別。此與染法為通因故，同類因外更別建立。亦為餘部染法因故，由此勢力餘部煩惱及彼眷屬亦生長故。聖者身中諸染汙法，豈亦用此為遍行因？迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師說：一切染汙法，見所斷為因。故《品類足》說如是言：云何見所斷為因法？謂諸染汙法及見所斷法所感異熟。云何無記為因法？謂諸無記有為法及不善法。或有苦諦以有身見為因，非與有身見為因，廣說乃至，除未來有身見及彼相應法生老住無常諸餘染汙苦諦。若爾，云何通《施設足論》說？如彼論說：頗有法是不善唯不善為因耶？有，謂聖人離欲退最初已起染汙思，依未斷因密作是說。見所斷法雖是此因，而由已斷故廢不說。如是已說遍行因相。第六異熟因相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: The universal cause means that earlier arisen universal dharmas are universal causes of later defiled dharmas of the same ground. The universal dharmas will be explained in detail in the passage on the meaning of universality in the chapter on latent tendencies. This is established as a general cause of defiled dharmas, apart from the homogeneous cause. It is also the cause of defiled dharmas of other divisions, because by its power the afflictions of other divisions and their retinues also grow. Do defiled dharmas in the bodies of noble ones also take this as the universal cause? The Vaibhasika masters of Kashmir say: Of all defiled dharmas, those abandoned by seeing are the cause. Therefore the Prakarana says: What are the dharmas that have what is abandoned by seeing as cause? They are all defiled dharmas, and the matured effect of what is abandoned by seeing. What are the dharmas that have the neutral as cause? They are the neutral conditioned dharmas and unwholesome dharmas. There may be a truth of suffering that has the view of a real self as its cause but is not a cause of the view of a real self, and so on up to, excluding the future view of a real self and the birth, aging, abiding and impermanence of the dharmas associated with it, the other defiled truths of suffering. If so, how is the Prajnapti-pada reconciled? As that treatise says: Is there a dharma that is unwholesome and has only the unwholesome as cause? There is: the first defiled thought arisen when a noble one regresses from freedom from desire, said as a hidden statement with respect to the cause not yet cut off. Although the dharmas abandoned by seeing are its cause, they are set aside and not mentioned because they have already been cut off. Thus the characteristic of the universal cause has been explained. What is the characteristic of the sixth, the cause of maturation? A verse says:

異熟因不善，及善唯有漏。

The cause of maturation is the unwholesome, and the wholesome only with outflows.

論曰：唯諸不善及善有漏是異熟因，異熟法故。何緣無記不招異熟？由力劣故，如朽敗種。何緣無漏不招異熟？無愛潤故，如貞實種無水潤沃。又非繫地，如何能招繫地異熟？餘法具二，是故能招，如貞實種、水所沃潤。異熟因義如何可了？為異熟之因名異熟因？為異熟即因名異熟因？義兼兩釋，斯有何過？若異熟之因名異熟因，聖教不應言異熟生眼。若異熟即因名異熟因，聖教不應言業之異熟。兩釋俱通，已如前辯。所言異熟其義云何？毘婆沙師作如是釋：異類而熟是異熟義，謂異熟因唯異類熟。俱有等因唯同類熟，能作一因兼同異熟，故唯此一名異熟因。熟果不應餘因所得，果具二義方得熟名：一由相續轉變差別其體得生，二由隨因勢力勝劣時有分限。非彼俱有、相應二因所生果體，要由相續轉變差別方乃得生，由取果時即與果故。又非能作同類、遍行三因之果，亦由隨因勢力勝劣、時有分限，由善惡等窮生死邊果數數生、時無限故。由此但應作如是釋。變異而熟是異熟義，不應但異簡別餘因。於欲界中有時一蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂有記得及彼生等。有時二蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂善不善身業語業及彼生等。有時四蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂善不善心心所法及彼生等。於色界中有時一蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂有記得、無想等至及彼生等。有時二蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂初靜慮善有表業及彼生等。有時四蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂非等引善心心所及彼生等。有時五蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂是等引心心所法並隨轉色及彼生等。無色界中有時一蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂有記得、滅盡等至及彼生等。有時四蘊為異熟因共感一果，謂一切善心心所法及彼生等。有業唯感一處異熟，謂感法處，即命根等。若感意處，定感二處，謂意與法。若感觸處應知亦爾。若感身處，定感三處，謂身觸法。感色香味應知亦爾。

The treatise says: Only the unwholesome and the wholesome with outflows are causes of maturation, because they are dharmas of maturation. Why does the neutral not bring about maturation? Because its power is weak, like a rotten seed. Why does the undefiled not bring about maturation? Because it has no moistening by craving, like a sound seed that is not watered. Moreover, what is not bound to a ground, how could it bring about maturation bound to a ground? Other dharmas that possess both conditions can bring it about, like a sound seed that is watered and moistened. How should the meaning of the cause of maturation be understood? Is the cause of maturation called so because it is the cause of maturation, or because the maturation itself is the cause? The meaning includes both explanations, and what fault is there in that? If it is called the cause of maturation because it is the cause of maturation, the holy teaching should not speak of a maturation-born eye. If it is called so because the maturation itself is the cause, the holy teaching should not speak of the maturation of action. Both explanations hold, as already explained. What is the meaning of the word "maturation"? The Vaibhasika masters explain thus: Ripening as another kind is the meaning of maturation; that is, the cause of maturation ripens only as another kind. Co-existent and other causes ripen only as the same kind, and the efficient cause covers both same and different maturation, so only this one cause is called the cause of maturation. A matured effect cannot be obtained from the other causes, because an effect must have two meanings to be called ripened: first, its substance arises through the difference of transformation in continuity; second, by following the power of the cause its superiority or inferiority has a limit in time. The effects produced by the co-existent and associated causes are not so, for their substance must arise by the difference of transformation in continuity, since the effect is given at the time it is taken. And neither are the effects of the efficient, homogeneous and universal causes, for they too follow the power of the cause in superiority and inferiority and have a limit in time, but the effects of wholesome and unwholesome actions arise repeatedly to the end of birth and death and have no limit in time. Thus one should explain only like this: ripening as transformed is the meaning of maturation, and it is not appropriate to distinguish it from the other causes merely by difference. In the desire realm, at times one aggregate is a cause of maturation that jointly brings about one effect, namely the acquisition of what is declared, and what arises with it. At times two aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely wholesome and unwholesome bodily and verbal action and what arises with them. At times four aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely wholesome and unwholesome mind and mental factors and what arises with them. In the form realm at times one aggregate is a cause of maturation that jointly brings about one effect, namely the acquisition of what is declared, the attainment of non-perception and what arises with them. At times two aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely the wholesome manifest action of the first meditation and what arises with it. At times four aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely wholesome mind and mental factors that are not in equipoise and what arises with them. At times five aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely the mind and mental factors in equipoise together with the form that follows them and what arises with them. In the formless realm at times one aggregate is a cause of maturation that jointly brings about one effect, namely the acquisition of what is declared, the attainment of cessation and what arises with them. At times four aggregates are causes of maturation that jointly bring about one effect, namely all wholesome mind and mental factors and what arises with them. There are actions that bring about the maturation of only one base, namely the dharma base, which means the life faculty and the like. If it brings about the mind base, it certainly brings about two bases, namely the mind and dharma bases. If it brings about the touch base, one should know that it is the same. If it brings about the body base, it certainly brings about three bases, namely body, touch and dharma. One should know the same of what brings about form, smell and taste.

若感眼處定感四處、謂感眼處及身觸法。感耳鼻舌應知亦爾。有業能感或五或六或七或八或九或十或十一處，業或少果或多果故。如外種果或少或多，種果少者如穀麥等，種果多者如蓮石榴諾瞿陀等。有一世業三世異熟，無三世業一世異熟，勿設劬勞果減因故。有一念業多念異熟，無多念業一念異熟，此中所以如上應知。然異熟果無與業俱，非造業時即受果故。亦非無間，由次剎那等無間緣力所引故。又異熟因感異類果必待相續方能辦故。如是六因定居何世？因居世定。義雖已說而未頌攝，故應重辯。頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) If it brings about the eye base, it certainly brings about four bases, namely the eye base together with body, touch and dharma. One should know the same of what brings about the ear, nose and tongue. There are actions that can bring about five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten or eleven bases, because action may have few effects or many effects. It is like outer seeds, whose fruit may be few or many: seeds with few fruits are like grain and wheat, and seeds with many fruits are like the lotus, pomegranate, nyagrodha and the like. There is action of one lifetime with maturation in three lifetimes, but there is no action of three lifetimes with maturation in one lifetime, so that no effect is less than its cause after toil. There is action of one thought moment with maturation in many thought moments, but no action of many moments with maturation in one moment; the reason here should be understood as above. However, the matured effect is never simultaneous with the action, because one does not receive the effect at the time of creating the action. Nor is it immediate, because it is drawn out by the power of the immediately preceding condition of the next moment and so on. Also, because the cause of maturation brings about an effect of a different kind, it must wait for the continuity in order to accomplish it. Thus in which time do the six causes definitely reside? The causes are fixed in respect of time. Although the meaning has been stated, it has not yet been gathered into a verse, so it should be explained again. A verse says:

遍行與同類，二世三世三。

Universal and homogeneous are in two times; the three are in three times.

論曰：遍行、同類唯居過現，未來世無，理如前說。相應、俱有、異熟三因，於三世中皆悉遍有。頌既不說能作因所居，義準應知通三世非世。已說六因相別世定。何等為果對彼成因？頌曰：

The treatise says: The universal and homogeneous causes reside only in the past and present, and do not exist in the future, as explained above. The three causes of associated, co-existent and maturation exist pervasively in all three times. Since the verse does not state where the efficient cause resides, one should know by the meaning that it extends through the three times and beyond time. The distinctions of the six causes and their times have been explained. What are the effects that these are causes of? A verse says:

果有為離繫，無為無因果。

Effects are the conditioned and disjunction; the unconditioned has no cause and no effect.

論曰：如本論說：果法雲何？謂諸有為及與擇滅。若爾，無為許是果故則應有因，要對彼因乃可得說此為果故。又此無為許是因故亦應有果，要對彼果乃可得說此為因故。唯有為法有因有果，非諸無為。所以者何？無六因故、無五果故。何緣不許諸無間道與離繫果為能作因？於生不障立能作因，無為無生道何所作？若爾，誰果？果義如何？謂是道果，道力得故。若爾，道果應唯是得，道於得有能，非於擇滅故。不爾，於得於擇滅中，道之功能有差別故。云何於得道有功能？謂能生故。云何於滅道有功能？謂能證故。由此理故，道雖非滅因，而可得說擇滅為道果。既諸無為無增上果，如何可說為能作因？以諸無為於他生位不為障故立能作因。然無果者，由離世法無能取果與果用故。經部師說：無為非因，無經說因是無為故，有經說因唯有為故。何處經說？如有經說：諸因諸緣能生色者皆是無常。無常因緣所生諸色如何是常？廣說乃至識亦如是。若爾，無為亦應不與能緣識等作所緣緣。唯說能生故得作所緣緣，謂經唯說諸因諸緣能生識者皆是無常，不說一切為識緣者皆是無常，故不成難。豈不亦說唯能生因是無常故，不撥無為唯不障故為能作因。有契經中說無為法為所緣緣，無契經中說無為法為能作因故。不應立為唯不障因性，雖無經說亦無處遮。又無量經今已隱沒，云何定判無經說耶？若爾，何法名為離繫？即本論中所說擇滅。豈不先問：何謂擇滅？答是離繫。今問何法名為離繫？答是擇滅。如是二答更互相依，於此自性竟不能顯，故應別門開顯自性。此法自性實有離言，唯諸聖者各別內證，但可方便總相說言是善是常，別有實物名為擇滅亦名離繫。經部師說：一切無為皆非實有，如色受等別有實物，此所無故。若爾，何故名虛空等？唯無所觸說名虛空，謂於闇中無所觸對，便作是說此是虛空。

The treatise says: As the original treatise says: What are fruits? They are conditioned dharmas and cessation through discrimination. If so, since the unconditioned is accepted as a fruit, it should have a cause, because only in relation to that cause can it be called a fruit. Also, since the unconditioned is accepted as a cause, it should have a fruit, because only in relation to that fruit can it be called a cause. Only conditioned dharmas have causes and fruits, not the unconditioned. Why? Because it has no six causes and no five fruits. Why is it not accepted that the uninterrupted paths are efficient causes of the fruit of disjunction? Efficient causes are established by not hindering arising; the unconditioned has no arising, so what could a path do to it? If so, whose fruit is it, and what is the meaning of fruit? It is the fruit of the path, obtained by the power of the path. If so, the fruit of the path should be only attainment, since the path has efficacy over attainment and not over cessation through discrimination. Not so: in attainment and in cessation through discrimination, the path's efficacy differs. How does the path have efficacy over attainment? Because it can produce it. How does the path have efficacy over cessation? Because it can realize it. By this reasoning, although the path is not the cause of cessation, cessation through discrimination can be called the fruit of the path. Since the unconditioned has no dominant fruit, how can it be called an efficient cause? Because the unconditioned does not obstruct the arising of others and so is established as an efficient cause. Yet it has no fruit, because apart from worldly dharmas there is nothing that can take a fruit or give the function of a fruit. The Sautrantika masters say: The unconditioned is not a cause, because no sutra says that a cause is unconditioned, while there are sutras saying that causes are only conditioned. Where does a sutra say so? As a sutra says: All causes and conditions that can produce form are impermanent. How could forms produced by impermanent causes and conditions be permanent? And so on at length, up to consciousness. If so, the unconditioned should also not be an object condition for consciousness and so on that apprehend it. It is said only that causes and conditions that produce are impermanent, because the sutra says only that all the causes and conditions that can produce consciousness are impermanent, and does not say that everything that is a condition for consciousness is impermanent; so the objection does not stand. Is it not also said that only producing causes are impermanent, so that one does not reject the unconditioned as an efficient cause merely by not obstructing? There are sutras that speak of unconditioned dharmas as object conditions, but no sutra that speaks of unconditioned dharmas as efficient causes. So it should not be established as merely the non-obstructing cause in nature; although no sutra says so, there is no passage that denies it. Also, countless sutras are now lost, so how can one definitively judge that there is no sutra saying so? If so, what dharma is called disjunction? It is the cessation through discrimination spoken of in the original treatise. Was it not first asked: What is cessation through discrimination? And answered: disjunction. Now it is asked: What dharma is called disjunction? And answered: cessation through discrimination. These two answers depend on each other, and its own nature is not revealed in this at all; so its own nature should be revealed by another approach. The own nature of this dharma truly exists but is beyond words and is realized internally by each noble one separately; it can only be expediently described in general terms as good and permanent, and there is a separate real thing called cessation through discrimination, also called disjunction. The Sautrantika masters say: All unconditioned dharmas are not truly existent, like form, feeling and so on, which have separate real things; this has none. If so, why is it called space and so on? It is called space only because there is nothing that touches; that is, in the dark when there is nothing that obstructs, one says this is space.

已起隨眠生種滅位，由簡擇力餘不更生，說名擇滅。離簡擇力，由闕緣故餘不更生，名非擇滅，如殘眾同分中夭者餘蘊。餘部師說：由慧功能隨眠不生，名為擇滅。隨眠緣闕後苦不生不由慧能，名非擇滅。離簡擇力此滅不成，故此不生即擇滅攝。有說：諸法生已後無，自然滅故，名非擇滅。如是所執非擇滅體應是無常，未滅無故。豈不擇滅擇為先故，先無後有應亦無常，非擇為先方有擇滅。如何擇滅亦是無常？所以者何？非先有擇後未生法方有不生。何者不生？本來自有，若無簡擇諸法應生，簡擇生時法永不起。於此不起，擇有功能，謂於先時未有生障，今為生障非造不生。若唯不生是涅槃者，此經文句當云何通？經言：五根若修若習若多修習，能令過去未來現在眾苦永斷。此永斷體即是涅槃，唯於未來有不生義非於過現，豈不相違？雖有此文而不違義。此經意說，緣過現苦煩惱斷故名眾苦斷。如世尊言：汝等於色應斷貪欲，貪欲斷時便名色斷及色遍智，廣說乃至識亦如是。過現苦斷義亦應然。設有餘經言斷過去未來現在諸煩惱者，準前理釋，義亦無違。或此經中別有意趣，過去煩惱謂過去生所起煩惱，現在煩惱謂現在生所起煩惱。如愛行中十八愛行，過去世起者依過去生說，未來現在應知亦爾。如是二世所起煩惱，為生未來諸煩惱故，於現相續引起種子，此種斷故彼亦名斷。如異熟盡時亦說名業盡，未來眾苦及諸煩惱，由無種故畢竟不生，說名為斷。若異此者，過去現在何緣須斷？非於已滅及正滅時，須設劬勞為令其滅。若無為法其體都無，何故經說：所有諸法，若諸有為若諸無為，於中離染最為第一。如何無法可於無中立為第一？我亦不說諸無為法其體都無，但應如我所說而有。如說此聲有先非有、有後非有，不可非有說為有故有義得成。說有無為，應知亦爾。

(The treatise continues:) In the stage where the latent tendencies that have arisen and their seeds of arising are extinguished, by the power of discrimination the rest no longer arise again, and this is called cessation through discrimination. Apart from the power of discrimination, because of a lack of conditions, the others no longer arise again, and this is called cessation not through discrimination, as with the other aggregates of one who dies young within a remaining group of beings. Masters of other schools say: By the efficacy of wisdom the latent tendencies do not arise, and this is called cessation through discrimination. When the conditions for latent tendencies are lacking and later suffering does not arise, not through the power of wisdom, this is called cessation not through discrimination. Apart from the power of discrimination this cessation cannot be established, and so this non-arising is included in cessation through discrimination. Some say: Dharmas, having arisen, later cease naturally, and so it is called cessation not through discrimination. If what is held to be cessation not through discrimination is of this kind, its substance should be impermanent, because it does not exist before ceasing. But is not cessation through discrimination also preceded by discrimination, so that having been absent before and present later it should also be impermanent; and only cessation not preceded by discrimination exists apart? How can cessation through discrimination also be impermanent? Why? It is not that discrimination exists first and only then do dharmas not yet arisen come to non-arising. What does not arise? Each dharma originally has its own existence; if there were no discrimination the dharmas would arise, but when discrimination arises the dharma never arises. With regard to this non-arising, discrimination has efficacy: namely, before, there was no obstruction to arising, but now it becomes an obstruction to arising; it does not produce non-arising. If non-arising alone is nirvana, how is this passage of scripture to be reconciled? The sutra says: If the five faculties are cultivated, practiced and repeatedly cultivated, they can forever cut off the many sufferings of past, future and present. The substance of this eternal cutting off is nirvana, yet non-arising applies only to the future and not to the past and present; is this not a contradiction? Although there is this passage, it does not contradict the meaning. The sense of the sutra is that the afflictions that take past and present suffering as their objects are cut off, and so it is called the cutting off of many sufferings. As the World-Honored One said: You should cut off desire for form, and when desire is cut off it is called the cutting off of form and complete knowledge of form, and so on at length up to consciousness. The meaning of the cutting off of past and present suffering should be understood the same way. If there are other sutras that speak of cutting off the afflictions of past, future and present, they should be explained according to the earlier reasoning, and there is no contradiction in meaning. Or in this sutra there is another intention: past afflictions are those arisen in past lives, and present afflictions are those arisen in the present life. As among the eighteen modes of craving in the conduct of craving, those arisen in the past are said with respect to the past life, and one should know the future and present are likewise. The afflictions arisen in these two times plant seeds in the present continuity for the arising of future afflictions, and when these seeds are cut off they too are said to be cut off. Just as when maturation is exhausted it is also said that karma is exhausted, the many sufferings and afflictions of the future, because they lack seeds, ultimately do not arise, and this is called cutting off. If it were otherwise, why would the past and present need to be cut off? There is no need to make effort to extinguish what has already ceased or is ceasing. If the unconditioned dharmas have no substance at all, why does the sutra say: Among all dharmas, whether conditioned or unconditioned, freedom from defilement is the foremost? How can nothing be established as foremost among nothings? I also do not say that the unconditioned dharmas have no substance at all, but they should exist as I explain. As it is said of this sound that before it, it did not exist, and after it, it does not exist; one cannot say that non-existence is existence, and thus the meaning of existence is established. One should understand the statement that the unconditioned exists in the same way.

有雖非有而可稱歎，故諸災橫畢竟非有名為離染。此於一切有非有中最為殊勝，為令所化深生欣樂，故應稱歎此為第一。若無為法唯非有者，無故不應名滅聖諦？且言聖諦其義云何？豈不此言屬無倒義。聖見有無皆無顛倒，謂聖於苦見唯是苦，於苦非有見唯非有，此於聖諦義有何違？如何非有而可立為第三聖諦？第二無間聖見及說，故成第三。若無為法其體唯無，空涅槃識應緣無境。此緣無境亦無有過，辯去來中當應思擇。若許無為別有實體，當有何失？復有何德？許便擁護毘婆沙宗是名為德，若有可護，天神定知自當擁護。然許實有，明虛妄計是名為失。所以者何？此非有體可得如色受等，亦非有用可得如眼耳等。又若別有，如何可立彼事之滅第六轉聲？由滅與事非互相屬，此彼相望非因果故。唯遮彼事，第六可成，彼事之無名為滅故。滅雖別有，而由彼事或得斷時方得此滅，可言此滅屬於彼事。何因此滅定屬此得？如契經言：苾蒭獲得現法涅槃。如何非有可言獲得？由得對治便獲永違煩惱，後有所依身故名得涅槃。復有聖教能顯涅槃唯以非有為其自性，謂契經言：所有眾苦皆無餘斷，各別捨棄盡、離染滅、靜息永沒。餘苦不續不取不生，此極寂靜、此極美妙，謂捨諸依及一切愛盡、離染滅，名為涅槃。云何不許言不生者依此無生故言不生？我等見此第七轉聲，於證滅有都無功力。何意故說依此無生？若依此言屬已有義，應本不生，涅槃常故。若依此言屬已得義，是則應許依道之得，故唯依道或依道得令苦不生。汝應信受。由此善釋經說喻言，如燈焰，涅槃心解脫亦爾。此經意說，如燈涅槃，唯燈焰謝，無別有物。如是世尊心得解脫，唯諸蘊滅，更無所有。阿毘達磨亦作是言：無事法雲何？謂諸無為法。言無事者，謂無體性。毘婆沙師不許此釋。若爾，彼釋事義云何？

(The treatise continues:) Although it is non-existent, it can still be praised, and so the ultimate non-existence of various calamities and misfortunes is called freedom from defilement. This is the most excellent among all existences and non-existences, and in order that those to be taught may give rise to deep delight, it should be praised as the foremost. If the unconditioned is only non-existence, then because it is non-existent, should it not be called the noble truth of cessation? Let us ask what the meaning of noble truth is. Does this word not belong to the sense of non-inverted? The noble see existence and non-existence without inversion: the noble see suffering only as suffering, and see the non-existence of suffering only as non-existence. What contradiction is there for the meaning of the noble truths? How can non-existence be established as the third noble truth? Because the second uninterrupted noble vision and the teaching establish it, it becomes the third. If the unconditioned is by nature only non-existence, then empty nirvana consciousness should have a non-existent object. There is no fault in cognizing a non-existent object either, which should be considered in discussing past and future. If one accepts that the unconditioned has a separate real substance, what fault is there, and what virtue? To accept it is said to protect the Vibhasa school, and that is called a virtue; if there is anything to protect, the gods will surely know and protect it themselves. Yet to accept real existence exposes a false notion, and that is called a fault. Why? Because this is not a substance that can be obtained like form and feeling, nor a function that can be obtained like that of the eye and ear. Moreover, if it exists separately, how can the sixth case ending be established for the cessation of that thing? Because cessation and the thing are not mutually belonging, and are not cause and effect to each other. Only by negating that thing can the sixth case be established, since the non-existence of that thing is called cessation. Although cessation exists separately, it is only when the thing is cut off or attained that this cessation is attained, and one can say this cessation belongs to that thing. Why does this cessation definitely belong to this attainment? As the sutra says: The bhikshu attains nirvana in this very life. How can non-existence be said to be attained? By attaining the antidote one gains permanent separation from the afflictions, and the body that is the basis of future existence is what is called attaining nirvana. There are also noble teachings showing that nirvana has non-existence alone as its own nature, as the sutra says: All the various sufferings are cut off without remainder, each separately given up, exhausted, free from defilement, ceased, stilled and forever submerged. The remaining suffering does not continue, is not taken up, does not arise; this is utterly tranquil, this is utterly exquisite, namely the abandonment of all supports and the exhaustion of all craving, freedom from defilement and cessation, called nirvana. How can one not accept the saying that what does not arise depends on this non-arising, so that one says it does not arise? We see that this seventh case ending has no power to realize cessation or existence at all. For what reason is it said that it depends on this non-arising? If "this" in the statement refers to what already exists, it should have been originally non-arising, and nirvana would be permanent. If "this" refers to what has been attained, then one should accept that it depends on the attainment of the path, and so suffering does not arise solely by depending on the path or on the attainment of the path. You should accept this. By this the sutra's simile is well explained: Like the flame of a lamp, the mind's liberation in nirvana is the same. The sense of this sutra is that, as with the nirvana of a lamp, the lamp's flame simply goes out and there is no separate thing. Thus when the World-Honored One's mind attained liberation, it was only that the aggregates ceased and nothing else remained. The Abhidharma also says: What are dharmas without a thing? They are the unconditioned dharmas. "Without a thing" means without own-nature. The Vibhasa masters do not accept this explanation. If so, how do they explain the meaning of "thing"?

彼言事者略有五種：一自性事，如有處言：若已得此事，彼成就此事。二所緣事，如有處言：一切法智所知隨其事。三繫縛事，如有處言：若於此事愛結所繫，彼於此事恚結繫耶？四所因事，如有處言：有事法雲何？謂諸有為法。五所攝事，如有處言：田事宅事妻子等事。今於此中說因名事，顯無為法都無有因，是故無為雖實有物，常無用故無因無果。總論已竟。於諸果中應說何果何因所得？頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) They say that "thing" is roughly of five kinds: first, a thing as own-nature, as in a passage that says: If one has attained this thing, he accomplishes this thing. Second, a thing as object, as in a passage that says: All dharmas known by wisdom are things accordingly. Third, a thing as bondage, as in a passage that says: If one is bound by the fetter of craving in this thing, is he also bound by the fetter of hatred in this thing? Fourth, a thing as cause, as in a passage that says: What are dharmas with a thing? They are all conditioned dharmas. Fifth, a thing as inclusion, as in a passage that says: fields, houses, wives, children and the like. Here, what is called a thing is a cause, showing that the unconditioned dharmas have no cause at all; therefore, although the unconditioned really exists as an entity, it is permanent and without function, and so has no cause and no effect. The general discussion is complete. Among the fruits, which fruit should be said to be obtained by which cause? The verse says:

後因果異熟，前因增上果，

The later cause, the fruit of maturation; the earlier cause, the dominant fruit,

同類遍等流，俱相應士用。

The homogeneous and the pervasive, the fruit of outflow; the co-existent and the associated, the fruit of human effort.

論曰：言後因者，謂異熟因，於六因中最後說故，初異熟果此因所得。言前因者，謂能作因，於六因中最初說故，後增上果此因所得。增上之果，名增上果。唯無障住，有何增上？即由無障得增上名。或能作因亦有勝力，如十處界於五識身，諸有情業於器世界，耳等對於眼識生等，亦有展轉增上生力，聞已便生欣見欲故。此等增上，如應當思。同類、遍行得等流果，此二因果皆似因故。俱有相應得士用果，非越士體有別士用，即此所得名士用果。此士用名為目何法？即目諸法所有作用，如士用故得士用名，如世間說鴉足藥草醉象將軍。為唯此二有士用果、為餘亦然？有說：餘因亦有此果，唯除異熟，由士用果與因俱生或無間生，異熟不爾。有餘師說：此異熟因亦有隔越遠士用果，譬如農夫所收果實。異熟等果其相云何？頌曰：

The treatise says: The "later cause" is the cause of maturation, mentioned last among the six causes, and the first, the fruit of maturation, is obtained by this cause. The "earlier cause" is the efficient cause, mentioned first among the six causes, and the last, the dominant fruit, is obtained by this cause. The fruit of dominance is called the dominant fruit. If there is merely no obstruction, what dominance is there? It is through non-obstruction that it receives the name of dominance. Or the efficient cause also has superior power: for example, the ten bases and elements with respect to the five groups of consciousness, the karma of sentient beings with respect to the world as vessel, and ear and so on in relation to the arising of eye-consciousness and so on, also have the power of mutual dominant arising, since having heard, one wishes to see. Such dominance should be considered thus. The homogeneous and pervasive causes obtain the fruit of outflow, because both cause and fruit resemble the cause. The co-existent and associated causes obtain the fruit of human effort, because it is not that there is a separate human effort beyond the body of the person; what is obtained from this is called the fruit of human effort. What dharmas does this name human effort refer to? It refers to the functions of all dharmas, so called human effort because it has the function of a person, as in the worldly sayings "crow-foot herb" and "drunken elephant general". Do only these two have the fruit of human effort, or do the others too? Some say: The other causes also have this fruit, except maturation, because the fruit of human effort arises together with or immediately after its cause, whereas maturation does not. Other masters say: The cause of maturation also has a fruit of human effort at a distance, like the harvest of a farmer. What are the characteristics of fruits such as maturation? The verse says:

異熟無記法，有情有記生，

Maturation is indeterminate dharma, born of sentient beings and of the determinate,

等流似自因，離繫由慧盡。

The outflow resembles its own cause, disjunction is exhausted by wisdom.

若因彼力生，是果名士用，

If it arises by the power of a cause, it is called human effort,

除前有為法，有為增上果。

Except the earlier conditioned dharmas, conditioned dharmas have dominant fruit.

論曰：唯於無覆無記法中有異熟果。為此亦通非有情數、唯局有情？為通等流及所長養？應知唯是有記所生，一切不善及善有漏能記異熟，故名有記。從彼後時異熟方起，非俱無間，名有記生。如是名為異熟果相。非有情數亦從業生，何非異熟？以共有故。謂餘亦能如是受用。夫異熟果必無有餘共受用義，非餘造業餘可因斯受異熟果。其增上果亦業所生，何得共受？共業生故。似自因法名等流果，謂似同類、遍行二因。若遍行因亦得等流果，何不許此即名同類因？此果但由地等染故，與因相似不由種類，若由種類果亦似因，此果所因乃名同類。故作是問：若是同類因亦遍行因耶？應作四句。第一句者，非遍行法為同類因。第二句者，他部遍法為遍行因。第三句者，自部遍法為遍行因。第四句者，除前諸相。由慧盡法名離繫果。滅故名盡，擇故名慧，即說擇滅名離繫果。若法因彼勢力所生，即說此法名士用果。如因下地加行心力上地有漏無漏定生，及因清淨靜慮心力變化心生，如是等類擇滅應言由道力得。諸有為法，除前已生，是餘有為之增上果。士用、增上二果何殊？士用果名唯對作者，增上果稱通對此餘。如匠所成，對能成匠，具得士用、增上果名；對餘非匠，唯增上果。於上所說六種因中，何位何因取果與果？頌曰：

The treatise says: The fruit of maturation exists only among unobstructed neutral dharmas. Does this also extend to what is not counted among sentient beings, or is it limited to sentient beings? Does it extend to outflow and to what is nourished? One should know it is born only of the determinate: all unwholesome and wholesome dharmas with outflows can give rise to maturation and are therefore called determinate. Maturation arises later from them, not simultaneously or immediately; this is called born of the determinate. This is called the characteristic of the fruit of maturation. What is not counted among sentient beings also arises from karma, so why is it not maturation? Because it is held in common. That is, others can also enjoy it in this way. The fruit of maturation certainly has no meaning of being enjoyed in common by others, for it is not that others do the karma and others may receive its maturation as a result. The dominant fruit is also produced by karma, so how can it be enjoyed in common? Because it is produced by common karma. A dharma resembling its own cause is called the fruit of outflow, that is, resembling the two causes, the homogeneous and the pervasive. If the pervasive cause also gets the fruit of outflow, why not accept that it too is called the homogeneous cause? This fruit is due only to defilement of the same level and so on, resembling its cause not by kind; if the fruit resembled its cause by kind, the cause of this fruit would be called the homogeneous cause. Therefore this question is asked: If it is a homogeneous cause, is it also a pervasive cause? One should make four alternatives. The first: a non-pervasive dharma that is a homogeneous cause. The second: a pervasive dharma of another group that is a pervasive cause. The third: a pervasive dharma of its own group that is a pervasive cause. The fourth: the remaining cases apart from the previous. The dharma exhausted by wisdom is called the fruit of disjunction. It is called "exhausted" because it is ceased, and "wisdom" because it is by discrimination; this is the cessation through discrimination called the fruit of disjunction. If a dharma arises by the power of a cause, that dharma is called the fruit of human effort. For example, the concentrations of the higher levels with or without outflows arise by the power of the preparatory mind of the lower level, and a transformation mind arises by the power of a pure dhyana mind; such cessations through discrimination should be said to be obtained by the power of the path. The conditioned dharmas, apart from those already arisen earlier, are the dominant fruit of the other conditioned dharmas. How do the fruits of human effort and dominance differ? The name fruit of human effort applies only in relation to the agent, whereas the name dominant fruit is said in relation to this and also to the others. For example, what a craftsman makes, in relation to the craftsman who can make it, fully has the names of both the fruit of human effort and the dominant fruit; in relation to others who are not craftsmen, it is only the dominant fruit. Among the six causes spoken of above, in what stage does which cause take a fruit and give a fruit? The verse says:

五取果唯現，二與果亦然，

Five take a fruit only in the present, two give a fruit likewise,

過現與二因，一與唯過去。

In the past and present they give to two causes, and one gives only in the past.

論曰：五因取果唯於現在，定非過去，彼已取故；亦非未來，彼無用故。亦應如是說，能作因非定有果，故此不說。俱有、相應與果亦爾，唯於現在，由此二因取果與果必俱時故。同類、遍行二因與果通於過現，過去可然。如何現在與等流果？有等流果無間生故。若果已生，因便過去，名已與果，不應更與。善同類因有時取果而非與果，應作四句。第一句者，謂斷善根時最後所捨得。第二句者，謂續善根時最初所得得，應說爾時續者前得。第三句者，謂不斷善根於所餘諸位。第四句者，謂除前相。又於不善同類因中亦有四句。第一句者，謂離欲貪時最後所捨得。第二句者，謂退欲貪時最初所得得，應說爾時退者前得。第三句者，謂未離欲貪於所餘諸位。第四句者，謂除前相。有覆無記同類因中亦有四句，於阿羅漢得時、退時、未得及餘，如理應說。無覆無記同類因中有順後句，謂與果時必亦取果。或時取果而非與果，謂阿羅漢最後諸蘊，約有所緣剎那差別。善同類因亦有四句。第一句者，謂善心無間起染無記心。第二句者，謂與上相違。第三句者，謂善心無間還起善心。第四句者，謂除前相。不善心等如其所應，亦有四句，準例應說。取果、與果其義云何？能為彼種故名取果，正與彼力故名與果。異熟與果唯於過去，由異熟果無與因俱及無間故。復有餘師，前五果外別說四果：一安立果，謂如水輪為風輪果，乃至草等為大地果。二加行果，謂如無生智等遠為不淨等果。三和合果，謂如眼識等為眼根等果。四修習果，謂如化心等為諸靜慮果。如是四果皆是士用、增上果攝。說因果已。復應思擇，此中何法幾因所生？法略有四，謂染汙法、異熟生法、初無漏法、三所餘法。餘法者何？謂除異熟餘無記法，除初無漏諸餘善法。如是四法，頌曰：

The treatise says: The five causes take their fruit only in the present, definitely not in the past, because that has already been taken, and not in the future, because it has no function. It should also be said that the efficient cause does not definitely have a fruit, and so it is not mentioned here. The co-existent and associated causes also give fruits likewise only in the present, because by these two causes taking a fruit and giving a fruit must be simultaneous. The homogeneous and pervasive causes give fruits in both the past and the present; the past is thus possible. How does the present give the fruit of outflow? Because the fruit of outflow arises immediately after. If the fruit has already arisen, the cause has passed into the past and is called having already given the fruit, and should not give again. The wholesome homogeneous cause sometimes takes a fruit but does not give a fruit, and one should make four alternatives. The first: the last possession abandoned when the good roots are severed. The second: the first possession obtained when the good roots are reconnected, which should be said to be the prior possession that is reconnected at that time. The third: the remaining stages of one who does not sever the good roots. The fourth: the remaining cases apart from the above. Also, among the unwholesome homogeneous causes there are four alternatives. The first: the last possession abandoned when one becomes free from desire and craving. The second: the first possession obtained when one falls back from desire and craving, which should be said to be the prior possession that regresses at that time. The third: the remaining stages of one not yet free from desire and craving. The fourth: the remaining cases apart from the above. Among the obstructed neutral homogeneous causes there are also four alternatives, in the arhat's attainment, regression, non-attainment and other cases, which should be stated accordingly. Among the unobstructed neutral homogeneous causes there is only the last alternative: when it gives a fruit it must also take a fruit. Or sometimes it takes a fruit but does not give a fruit, namely the last aggregates of an arhat, which differ in respect of the moments of objects. The wholesome homogeneous cause also has four alternatives. The first: a wholesome mind immediately followed by a defiled or neutral mind. The second: the opposite of this. The third: a wholesome mind immediately followed again by a wholesome mind. The fourth: the remaining cases apart from the above. The unwholesome mind and others, as appropriate, also have four alternatives, and should be stated by analogy. What is the meaning of taking a fruit and giving a fruit? Being able to be the seed of that fruit is called taking a fruit; precisely giving that fruit its power is called giving a fruit. The maturation cause gives its fruit only in the past, because the fruit of maturation is neither simultaneous with its cause nor immediately after it. Some other masters speak separately of four fruits in addition to the above five: first, the fruit of establishment, as the water-wheel is the fruit of the wind-wheel, up to grass and so on being the fruit of the great earth. Second, the fruit of application, as the knowledge of non-arising is distantly the fruit of meditation on the impure and so on. Third, the fruit of combination, as eye-consciousness and so on are the fruit of the eye faculty and so on. Fourth, the fruit of cultivation, as the transformation mind and so on are the fruit of the dhyanas. These four fruits are all included in the fruits of human effort and dominance. Having spoken of causes and fruits, we should further consider, among these, which dharma arises from how many causes. Dharmas are roughly of four kinds: defiled dharmas, dharmas born of maturation, the first undefiled dharmas, and the three remaining. What are the remaining dharmas? They are the neutral dharmas other than maturation, and the other wholesome dharmas other than the first undefiled ones. As for these four kinds of dharmas, the verse says:

染汙異熟生，餘初聖如次，

Defiled, born of maturation, the remaining, the first noble, in order,

除異熟遍二，及同類餘生，

Except maturation, pervasive, the two, and homogeneous, the others arise,

此謂心心所，餘及除相應。

These are mind and mental factors, the others, and except the associated.