Sarvastivada Abhidharmakosa-sastra, Fascicle 25

有持說行者，此便住世間。

When there are those who uphold, expound and practice it, it abides in the world.

論曰：世尊正法體有二種，一教、二證。教謂契經、調伏、對法，證謂三乘菩提分法。有能受持及正說者，佛正教法便住世間。有能依教正修行者，佛正證法便住世間。故隨三人住世時量，應知正法住爾所時。聖教總言唯住千載，有釋證法唯住千年，教法住時復過於此。此論依攝阿毘達磨，為依何理釋對法耶？頌曰：

The treatise says: The true Dharma of the World-Honored One is of two kinds, first teaching and second realization. Teaching is the sutras, the vinaya and the abhidharma; realization is the factors of enlightenment of the three vehicles. When there are those who can receive, uphold and rightly expound it, the Buddha's true teaching abides in the world. When there are those who can practice rightly in reliance on the teaching, the Buddha's true realization abides in the world. Therefore according to the time the three kinds of persons remain in the world, one should know the true Dharma abides for that long. The noble teaching generally says it abides only a thousand years; some explain that the Dharma of realization abides only a thousand years, and the Dharma of teaching abides longer than this. This treatise, which relies on and summarizes the Abhidharma, explains the Abhidharma on the basis of what principle? The verse says:

迦濕彌羅議理成，我多依彼釋對法，

The principles discussed in Kashmir are well established, and I mostly rely on them to explain the Abhidharma,

少有貶量為我失，判法正理在牟尼。

If there is slight disparagement, it is my own fault; the true principle for judging the Dharma lies with the Sage.

論曰：迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師議阿毘達磨理善成立，我多依彼釋對法宗，少有貶量為我過失。判法正理唯在世尊，及諸如來大聖弟子。

The treatise says: The Vibhasa masters of Kashmir have well established the principles of the Abhidharma, and I mostly rely on them to explain the Abhidharma school; if there is any slight disparagement it is my own fault. The true principle for judging the Dharma lies only with the World-Honored One and the great noble disciples of the Tathagata.

大師世眼久已閉，堪為證者多散滅，

The Great Teacher, the eye of the world, has long since closed, and those who could serve as witnesses have mostly scattered and perished,

不見真理無制人，由鄙尋思亂聖教。

Not seeing the true principle and with no one to restrain them, vulgar speculations confuse the noble teaching.

自覺已歸勝寂靜，持彼教者多隨滅，

The self-awakened one has returned to supreme tranquility, and those who uphold his teaching mostly follow in extinction,

世無依怙喪眾德，無鉤制惑隨意轉。

The world has no refuge and has lost many virtues, with no hook to restrain them, the afflictions turn as they please.

既知如來正法壽，漸次淪亡如至喉，

Knowing that the life of the Tathagata's true Dharma gradually declines as if reaching the throat,

是諸煩惱力增時，應求解脫勿放逸。

When the power of the afflictions grows, one should seek liberation and not be heedless.

破執我品第九之一

Chapter 9, Refutation of the Doctrine of Self, Part 1

越此依餘，豈無解脫？理必無有。所以者何？虛妄我執所迷亂故。謂此法外諸所執我，非即於蘊相續假立執有真實離蘊我故。由我執力諸煩惱生，三有輪迴無容解脫。以何為證？知諸我名，唯召蘊相續，非別目我體。於彼所計離蘊我中，無有真實現比量故。謂若我體別有實物，如餘有法。若無障緣，應現量得如六境意，或比量得如五色根。言五色根比量得者，如世現見，雖有眾緣，由闕別緣，果便非有，不闕便有，如種生芽。如是亦見，雖有現境作意等緣，而諸盲聾不盲聾等識不起起，定知別緣有闕不闕。此別緣者即眼等根，如是名為色根比量。於離蘊我二量都無，由此證知無真我體。然犢子部執有補特伽羅，其體與蘊不一不異。此應思擇，為實為假。實有假有相別云何？別有事物是實有相，如色聲等。但有聚集是假有相，如乳酪等。許實許假各有何失？體若是實應與蘊異，有別性故，如別別蘊。又有實體必應有因，或應是無為，便同外道見。又應無用，徒執實有。體若是假，便同我說。非我所立補特伽羅，如仁所徵實有假有？但可依內現在世攝有執受諸蘊立補特伽羅。如是謬言，於義未顯。我猶不了，如何名依？若攬諸蘊是此依義，既攬諸蘊成補特伽羅，則補特伽羅應成假有，如乳酪等攬色等成。若因諸蘊是此依義，既因諸蘊立補特伽羅，則補特伽羅亦同此失，不如是立。所立云何？此如世間依薪立火，如何立火可說依薪？謂非離薪可立有火，而薪與火非異非一。若火異薪，薪應不熱。若火與薪一，所燒即能燒。如是不離蘊立補特伽羅。然補特伽羅與蘊非異一，若與蘊異體應是常，若與蘊一體應成斷。仁今於此且應定說，何者為火？何者為薪？令我了知火依薪義。何所應說？若說應言所燒是薪、能燒是火。此復應說何者所燒、何者能燒、名薪名火？且世共了。諸不炎熾所然之物，名所燒薪。

Going beyond this and relying on others, is there no liberation? Reasonably there is none. Why? Because one is confused by the false clinging to a self. That is, the selves held to outside this Dharma are not a conventional designation on the continuity of aggregates, but are clung to as a real self apart from the aggregates. By the power of clinging to a self the afflictions arise, and for the cycle through the three existences there is no room for liberation. What is the proof? One knows that all names of a self merely refer to the continuity of aggregates and do not refer to a separate substance of a self. For the self apart from the aggregates that they posit, there is no real means of direct perception or inference. That is, if the substance of the self were a separate real thing, like other existent dharmas, then, if there were no obstructing conditions, it should be obtained by direct perception like the six objects and the mind, or by inference like the five material faculties. As for the five material faculties being obtained by inference: as is seen in the world, although there are many conditions, when a particular condition is lacking the fruit does not exist, and when it is not lacking it does, as a seed produces a sprout. Likewise, it is seen that although there are present objects, attention and other conditions, consciousness does not arise for the blind and deaf, and arises for those who are not blind or deaf, and so one knows that a particular condition is lacking or not lacking. This particular condition is the eye and other faculties, and so it is called inference of the material faculties. For a self apart from the aggregates neither of the two means of knowledge exists, and by this one knows there is no real substance of a self. However, the Vatsiputriya school (the name of a sect) holds that there is a person (pudgala) whose substance is neither the same as nor different from the aggregates. This should be examined: is it real or conventional? What is the difference between real existence and conventional existence? A separate thing is the characteristic of real existence, like form and sound; mere aggregation is the characteristic of conventional existence, like milk and curd. What faults are there in accepting it as real or as conventional? If its substance is real, it should differ from the aggregates, because it has a separate nature, like each separate aggregate. Also, a real substance must have a cause, or must be unconditioned, which would be the same as the view of the non-Buddhists. It should also be without function, and there would be only vain clinging to real existence. If its substance is conventional, it is the same as what I say. But is the person I establish not one you interrogate as real or conventional? One can only say that the person is established in dependence on the aggregates that are inner, present and appropriated. Such mistaken words do not make the meaning clear. I still do not understand: how is it called dependent? If taking up the aggregates is the meaning of this dependence, then since the person is constituted by taking up the aggregates, the person should be conventionally existent, as milk and curd are constituted by taking up form and so on. If depending on the aggregates is the meaning, since the person is established because of the aggregates, the person would also have this same fault, but it is not so established. How is it established, then? This is like establishing fire in the world in dependence on firewood: how can fire be said to depend on firewood? It is not that apart from firewood fire can be established, yet firewood and fire are neither different nor identical. If fire is different from firewood, firewood should not be hot. If fire is the same as firewood, what is burned would be what burns. Thus the person is established not apart from the aggregates. Yet the person is neither different from nor identical with the aggregates: if it is different in substance from the aggregates it should be permanent, and if it is identical in substance with the aggregates it should be annihilated. You should now definitely say here, what is fire and what is firewood, so that I may understand the meaning of fire depending on firewood. What should be said? If one says that what is burned is firewood and what burns is fire, then it should further be said what is burned and what burns, what is called firewood and fire. Moreover the world commonly understands: things that do not blaze and are burnt are called firewood that is burned.

諸有光明極熱炎熾能然之物，名能燒火。此能燒然彼物相續，令其後後異前前故。此彼雖俱八事為體，而緣薪故火方得生，如緣乳酒生於酪酢，故世共說依薪有火。若依此理火則異薪，後火前薪時各別故。若汝所計補特伽羅，如火依薪依諸蘊者，則定應說緣蘊而生，體異諸蘊，成無常住。若謂即於炎熾木等煖觸名火，餘事名薪，是則火薪俱時而起，應成異體，相有異故。應說依義，此既俱生，如何可言依薪立火？謂非此火用薪為因，各從自因俱時生故。亦非此火名因薪立，以立火名因煖觸故。若謂所說火依薪言，為顯俱生或依止義，是則應許補特伽羅與蘊俱生或依止蘊。已分明許體與蘊異，理則應許。若許蘊無，補特伽羅體亦非有，如薪非有火體亦無。而不許然，故釋非理。然彼於此自設難言：若火異薪，薪應不熱。彼應定說熱體謂何？若彼釋言熱謂煖觸，則薪非熱，體相異故。若復釋言熱謂煖合，則應異體亦得熱名，以實火名唯目煖觸，餘與煖合皆得熱名。是則分明許薪名熱。雖薪火異而過不成，如何此中舉以為難？若謂木等遍炎熾時說名為薪亦名為火，是則應說依義謂何？補特伽羅與色等蘊定應是一，無理能遮。故彼所言如依薪立火，如是依蘊立補特伽羅，進退推徵，理不成立。又彼若許補特伽羅與蘊一異俱不可說，則彼所許三世無為及不可說五種爾焰亦應不可說，以補特伽羅不可說第五及非第五故。又彼施設補特伽羅，應更礭陳為何所託？若言託蘊假義已成，以施設補特伽羅不託補特伽羅故。若言此施設託補特伽羅，如何上言依諸蘊立理，則但應說依補特伽羅。既不許然，故唯託蘊。若謂有蘊此則可知，故我上言此依蘊立。是則諸色有眼等緣方可了知，故應言依眼等。又且應說，補特伽羅是六識中何識所識？六識所識。所以者何？

(The treatise continues:) Things that have light, extreme heat, and blaze, and can burn, are called fire that burns. It burns and makes the continuity of that thing so that each later moment differs from the earlier, and although both have eight elements as their substance, fire can arise only because of firewood as condition, as curd and vinegar arise from milk and wine as condition, and so the world commonly says there is fire depending on firewood. If by this principle fire is different from firewood, because the later fire and the earlier firewood are at different times; if the person that you posit depends on the aggregates as fire depends on firewood, then it should definitely be said to arise in dependence on the aggregates, with substance different from the aggregates, and to be impermanent and not abiding. If one says that the warm touch in blazing wood and so on is called fire and the other things are called firewood, then fire and firewood arise simultaneously and should be of different substance, since their characteristics differ. It should be said what "depend" means: since these arise simultaneously, how can one say fire is established in dependence on firewood? It is not that this fire takes firewood as cause, since each arises simultaneously from its own cause. Also this fire is not named because of firewood, since the name of fire is established because of warm touch. If one says that the saying fire depends on firewood is to show simultaneous arising or dependence, then one should accept that the person arises simultaneously with the aggregates or depends on the aggregates. Having clearly accepted that the substance differs from the aggregates, reasonably one should accept that if the aggregates do not exist, the substance of the person also does not exist, as when firewood does not exist the substance of fire does not either. Yet they do not accept this, so the explanation is unreasonable. Yet they themselves raise an objection here: if fire is different from firewood, firewood should not be hot. They should definitely say what the substance of heat is. If they explain that heat is warm touch, then firewood is not hot, since the substances differ. If they further explain that heat is combination with warmth, then different substances should also get the name of hot, since actual fire is named only for warm touch, and others combined with warmth all get the name hot. Then it is clearly accepted that firewood is called hot. Although firewood and fire are different, the fault is not established; why is it raised here as an objection? If it is said that when wood and so on are entirely blazing they are called firewood and are also called fire, then it should be said what dependence means. The person and the aggregates of form and so on must be one, and there is no reasoning that can prevent this. Therefore what they say, establishing the person in dependence on the aggregates as fire is established in dependence on firewood, is not established by reasoning, whether advanced or retreated. Also, if they accept that the person is inexpressible as same or different from the aggregates, then the three times and the unconditioned that they accept and the five kinds of knowable, the inexpressible, would also be inexpressible, since the person is the fifth that is inexpressible and not the fifth. Also, that person they posit should be stated more clearly: on what is it based? If it is said to be based on the aggregates, then the meaning of being conventional is already established, since the positing of the person is not based on the person. If it is said that this positing is based on the person, how is it reasonable to say above that it is established in dependence on the aggregates? One should then only say it depends on the person. Since they do not accept this, it is based only on the aggregates. If one says that when the aggregates exist this can be known, and so I said above that it is established in dependence on the aggregates, then forms can be known only through the eye and other conditions, and so one should say it depends on the eye and so on. Also one should say, of the six consciousnesses, by which consciousness is the person cognized? It is cognized by the six consciousnesses. Why?

若於一時眼識識色，因茲知有補特伽羅，說此名為眼識所識，而不可說與色一異。乃至一時意識識法，因茲知有補特伽羅，說此名為意識所識，而不可說與法一異。若爾，所計補特伽羅應同乳等唯假施設。謂如眼識識諸色時，因此若能知有乳等，便說乳等眼識所識，而不可說與色一異。乃至身識說諸觸時，因此若能知有乳等，便說乳等身識所識，而不可說與觸一異。勿乳等成四或非四所成。由此應成總依諸蘊假施設有補特伽羅，猶如世間總依色等施設乳等，是假非實。又彼所說，若於一時眼識識色，因茲知有補特伽羅。此言何義？為說諸色是了補特伽羅因？為了色時補特伽羅亦可了？若說諸色是了此因，然不可言此異色者，是則諸色以眼及明作意等緣為了因故，應不可說色異眼等。若了色時此亦可了，為色能了即了此耶？為於此中別有能了？若色能了即能了此，則應許此體即是色，或唯於色假立於此。或不應有如是分別，如是類是色、如是類是此。若無如是二種分別，如何立有色、有補特伽羅，有情必由分別立故。若於此中別有能了，了時別故此應異色，如黃異青前異後等。乃至於法徵難亦然。若彼救言：如此與色不可定說是一是異，二種能了相望亦然，能了不應是有為攝。若許爾者，便壞自宗。又若實有補特伽羅，而不可說色非色者，世尊何故作如是言：色乃至識皆無有我。又彼既許補特伽羅眼識所得，如是眼識於色此俱為緣何起？若緣色起，則不應說眼識能了補特伽羅，此非眼識緣，如聲處等故。謂若有識緣此境起，即用此境為所緣緣，補特伽羅非眼識緣者，如何可說為眼識所緣？故此定非眼識所了。若眼識起緣此或俱，便違經說。以契經中定判識起由二緣故。又契經說：苾芻當知，眼因色緣能生眼識。諸所有眼識皆緣眼色故。又若爾者，補特伽羅應是無常，契經說故。

(The treatise continues:) If at one time eye-consciousness cognizes form, and from this one knows there is a person, then this is called cognized by eye-consciousness, but it cannot be said to be the same as or different from form. And so on, up to when at one time mental consciousness cognizes dharmas, and from this one knows there is a person; this is called cognized by mental consciousness, but it cannot be said to be the same as or different from dharmas. If so, the person that is posited should be like milk and so on, merely a conventional designation. That is, as when eye-consciousness cognizes forms, if from this one can know milk and so on, then it is said milk and so on are cognized by eye-consciousness, but it cannot be said to be the same as or different from form. And so on, up to when body-consciousness speaks of the tangibles, if from this one can know milk and so on, then milk and so on are said to be cognized by body-consciousness, but it cannot be said to be the same as or different from the tangible. Let milk and so on not be constituted by four or not four. By this it should be established that a person exists as a conventional designation depending on the aggregates generally, just as in the world milk and so on are designated depending on form and so on generally, being conventional and not real. Also, regarding what they say, that if at one time eye-consciousness cognizes form, from this one knows there is a person, what does this mean? Is it saying that forms are the cause for cognizing the person? Or that when form is cognized the person can also be cognized? If it is said that forms are the cause for cognizing this, and yet it cannot be said that this is different from form, then since forms have the eye, light, attention and so on as conditions for cognition, it cannot be said that form is different from the eye and so on. If when form is cognized this can also be cognized, does form cognize this as it cognizes? Or is there a separate cognizer here? If form's cognition is itself the cognition of this, then one should accept that this substance is form, or that it is only provisionally established on form. Or there should not be such distinctions as: this kind is form, this kind is the person. If there are not these two kinds of distinction, how can one establish that there is form and there is a person? Sentient beings are necessarily established by distinction. If there is a separate cognizer here, then, because the times of cognition differ, this should differ from form, as yellow differs from blue and before differs from after. And so on for interrogation up to dharmas. If they defend by saying: As this and form cannot be definitively said to be one or different, so too the two cognizers in relation to each other, so the cognizer should not be conditioned; if they accept this, it ruins their own school. Moreover if there is a real person and yet one cannot say it is form or not form, why did the World-Honored One say: Form up to consciousness all have no self? Also since they accept that the person is obtained by eye-consciousness, then eye-consciousness arises with this together with form as conditions? If it arises with form as condition, one should not say eye-consciousness can cognize the person, since this is not the condition of eye-consciousness, like sound spheres and so on. That is, if consciousness arises taking an object, it uses that object as its object condition; if the person is not a condition of eye-consciousness, how can it be said to be the object of eye-consciousness? Therefore it is definitely not cognized by eye-consciousness. If eye-consciousness arises taking this or together with it as condition, it contradicts the sutra, because the sutra definitely judges that consciousness arises from two conditions. Also a sutra says: Bhikshus, know that the eye and form as conditions give rise to eye-consciousness. All eye-consciousness takes the eye and form as conditions. Also if so, the person should be impermanent, since the sutra says so.

謂契經說：諸因諸緣能生識者皆無常性。若彼遂謂補特伽羅非識所緣，應非所識，若非所識應非所知，若非所知如何立有？若不立有便壞自宗。又若許為六識所識，眼識識故應異聲等，猶如色，耳識識故，應異色等，譬如聲。餘識所識，為難准此。又立此為六識所識，便違經說。如契經言：梵志當知，五根行處境界各別，各唯受用自所行處及自境界，非有異根亦能受用異根行處及異境界。五根謂眼耳鼻舌身，意兼受用五根行處及彼境界，彼依意故。或不應執補特伽羅是五根境，如是便非五識所識，有違宗過。若爾，意根境亦應別。如六生喻契經中言：如是六根行處境界各有差別，各別樂求自所行處及自境界。非此中說眼等六根，眼等五根及所生識無有勢力樂見等故。但說眼等增上勢力所引意識名眼等根，獨行意根增上勢力所引意識，不能樂求眼等五根所行境界。故此經義無違前失。又世尊說：苾芻當知，吾今為汝具足演說一切所達所知法門。其體是何？謂諸眼色眼識眼觸，眼觸為緣內所生受，或樂或苦不苦不樂。廣說乃至。意觸為緣內所生受，或樂、或苦、不苦不樂，是名一切所達所知。由此經文，決判一切所達知法唯有爾所，此中無有補特伽羅，故補特伽羅亦應非所識，以慧與識境必同故。諸謂眼見補特伽羅，應知眼根見此所有，於見非我謂見我故，彼便蹎墜惡見深坑。故佛經中自決此義，謂唯於諸蘊說補特伽羅。如人契經作如是說：眼及色為緣生於眼識，三和合觸俱起受想思。於中後四是無色蘊，初眼及色名為色蘊，唯由此量說名為人。即於此中隨義差別假立名想，或謂有情不悅意生儒童、養者、命者、生者、補特伽羅，亦自稱言我眼見色。復隨世俗說，此具壽有如是名、如是種族、如是姓類、如是飲食、如是受樂、如是受苦、如是長壽、如是久住、如是壽際。

(The treatise continues:) That is, the sutra says: All causes and conditions that can give rise to consciousness are of impermanent nature. If they then say that the person is not an object of consciousness, it should not be cognized; if it is not cognized it should not be known; if it is not known, how can it be established as existing? If it is not established as existing, their own school is ruined. Also if they accept that it is cognized by the six consciousnesses, then because it is cognized by eye-consciousness it should differ from sound and so on, like form; because it is cognized by ear-consciousness it should differ from form and so on, like sound. The objection regarding what other consciousnesses cognize follows the same pattern. Also if they establish this as cognized by the six consciousnesses, they contradict the sutra. As a sutra says: Brahmin, know that the five faculties have different ranges and objects, each enjoying only its own range and its own objects, and it is not that a different faculty can also enjoy the range and objects of another faculty. The five faculties are eye, ear, nose, tongue and body; the mind enjoys together the ranges of the five faculties and their objects, since it relies on mind. Or one should not hold that the person is an object of the five faculties; in this case it would not be cognized by the five consciousnesses, which contradicts their school. If so, the object of the mind faculty should also be different. As the sutra of the six kinds of birth parable says: In this way the six faculties each have different ranges and objects, each separately delighting in its own range and own objects. It is not that the six faculties, eye and so on, spoken of here, the five faculties, eye and so on, and the consciousness arisen from them, have no power to delight in seeing and so on; but what is said is that the mental consciousness drawn by the dominant power of the eye and so on is called the eye faculty and so on, while the mental consciousness drawn by the dominant power of the mind faculty acting alone cannot delight in the ranges and objects of the five faculties, eye and so on. Therefore this sutra has no fault in meaning as stated above. Also the World-Honored One said: Bhikshus, know that I will now fully explain to you all the teachings of what is reached and known. What is their substance? The eye, form, eye-consciousness, eye-contact, and the feeling arisen internally with eye-contact as condition, whether pleasant, painful or neither, and so on at length up to feeling arisen internally with mind-contact as condition, whether pleasant, painful or neither: these are called all that is reached and known. By this passage of the sutra it is definitively judged that everything reached and known is only as much as this, and there is no person here; therefore the person also should not be cognized, since wisdom and consciousness necessarily have the same object. Those who say the eye sees a person should know that it is the eye faculty that sees what is here; in seeing what is not self, they mistakenly see what is mine, and so they fall into the deep pit of evil view. Therefore in the Buddha's sutra he himself determined this meaning, that a person is spoken of only with respect to the aggregates. As the sutra of the person says: The eye and form as conditions give rise to eye-consciousness, and the meeting of the three, contact, arises together with feeling, perception and volition. Among these the latter four are immaterial aggregates, and the first, the eye and form, are called the aggregate of form; only by this measure is it called a person. Within these, according to differences of meaning, names and perceptions are conventionally established: or someone thinks of sentient beings, unpleasant ones, offspring of Manu, nurturers, living ones, those who are born, persons, and one also says of oneself: My eye sees form. And following worldly custom one says: This venerable one has such a name, such a clan, such a family, such food, such experience of pleasure, such experience of pain, such long life, such long abiding, such life span.

苾芻當知，此唯名想，此唯自稱，但隨世俗假施設有。如是一切無常有為，從眾緣生、由思所造。世尊恆勅依了義經，此經了義，不應異釋。又薄伽梵告梵志言：我說一切有唯是十二處。若數取趣非是處攝，無體理成。若是處攝，則不應言是不可說。彼部所誦契經亦言：諸所有眼、諸所有色，廣說乃至苾芻當知，如來齊此施設一切建立一切有自體法。此中無有補特伽羅，如何可說此有實體。頻毘婆羅契經亦說：諸有愚昧無聞異生，隨逐假名計為我者，此中無有我我所性，唯有一切眾苦法體將正已生，乃至廣說。有阿羅漢苾芻尼名世羅，為魔王說：

(The treatise continues:) Bhikshus, know that this is only a name, only a self-designation, merely conventionally designated according to worldly usage. All such things are impermanent, conditioned, arising from many conditions and made by volition. The World-Honored One constantly instructed to rely on sutras of definitive meaning, and this sutra is of definitive meaning and should not be explained differently. Also the Bhagavan told a brahmin: I say that all that exists is only the twelve bases. If the person (one who repeatedly takes rebirth) is not included in the bases, then it is established as having no substance. If it is included in the bases, then it should not be said to be inexpressible. The sutra recited by that school also says: All eyes and all forms, and so on at length, bhikshus, know that up to here the Tathagata has designated and established all things that have own-being. Here there is no person; how can it be said to have a real substance? The sutra of Bimbisara (a king's name) also says: Those ignorant, unlearned ordinary beings who follow conventional names and take them as a self, here there is no nature of self or mine; there is only the substance of all the dharmas of suffering about to arise or already arisen, and so on at length. There was an arhat bhikshuni named Sela (a bhikshuni's name) who said to Mara:

汝墮惡見趣，於空行聚中，

You have fallen into an evil view, in a mass of empty formations,

妄執有有情，智者達非有。

You falsely cling to sentient beings, but the wise understand they do not exist.

如即攬眾分，假想立為車，

As by gathering many parts one conventionally conceives and establishes a chariot,

世俗立有情，應知攬諸蘊。

So worldly convention establishes sentient beings; one should know they gather the aggregates.

世尊於《雜阿笈摩》中為婆羅門婆拕梨說：

In the Samyuktagama the World-Honored One said to the brahmin Bhadali (a brahmin's name):

婆拕梨諦聽，能解諸結法，

Bhadali, listen carefully, I can explain the dharma that loosens the fetters,

謂依心故染，亦依心故淨。

That is, the mind is defiled by reliance on mental states, and also purified by reliance on mental states.

我實無我性，顛倒故執有，

The self in truth has no self-nature, one clings to it because of inversion,

無有情無我，唯有有因法。

There are no sentient beings and no self, there are only dharmas with causes.

謂十二有支，所攝蘊處界，

That is, the twelve limbs of existence, and the aggregates, bases and elements they include,

審思此一切，無補特伽羅，

Examine all of these carefully, there is no person,

既觀內是空，觀外空亦爾，

Having contemplated that the inner is empty, the outer is empty likewise,

能修空觀者，亦都不可得。

And the one who cultivates the contemplation of emptiness cannot be found either.

經說：執我有五種失，謂起我見及有情見墮惡見趣，同諸外道越路而行，於空性中心不悟入、不能淨信、不能安住、不得解脫，聖法於彼不能清淨。此皆非量。所以者何？於我部中曾不誦故。汝宗許是量，為部為佛言？若部是量，佛非汝師、汝非釋子。若佛言者，此皆佛言，如何非量。彼謂：此說皆非真佛言。所以者何？我部不誦故。此極非理。非理者何？如是經文諸部皆誦，不違法性及餘契經，而敢於中輒興誹撥，我不誦故非真佛言。唯縱兇狂，故極非理。又於彼部豈無此經，謂一切法皆非我性。若彼意謂補特伽羅與所依法不一不異，故說一切法皆非我。既爾，應非意識所識，二緣生識經決判故。又於餘經如何會釋？謂契經說：非我計我此中具有想心見倒。計我成倒，說於非我，不言於我，何煩會釋。非我者何？謂蘊處界。便違前說補特伽羅與色等蘊不一不異。又餘經說：苾芻當知，一切沙門婆羅門等諸有執我等隨觀見，一切唯於五取蘊起。故無依我起於我見，但於非我法妄分別為我。又餘經言：諸有已憶正憶當憶種種宿住，一切唯於五取蘊起，故定無有補特伽羅。若爾，何緣此經復說我於過去世有如是色等？此經為顯能憶宿生一相續中有種種事。若見實有補特伽羅於過去生能有色等，如何非墮起身見失？或應誹撥言無此經，是故此經依總假我，言有色等如聚如流。若爾，世尊應非一切智，無心心所能知一切法剎那剎那異生滅故。若許有我可能遍知，補特伽羅則應常住，許心滅時此不滅故，如是便越汝所許宗。我等不言佛於一切能頓遍知故名一切智者，但約相續有堪能故，謂得佛名諸蘊相續成就如是殊勝堪能，才作意時於所欲知境無倒智起故名一切智，非於一念能頓遍知。故於此中有如是頌：

The sutra says: Clinging to a self has five faults, namely giving rise to the view of self and the view of sentient beings, falling into evil views, going astray like the non-Buddhists, being unable to awaken in the mind to the nature of emptiness, unable to have pure faith, unable to abide, unable to attain liberation, and the noble Dharma not being pure for them. All this is not authoritative. Why? Because it is not recited in our school. Does your school accept it as authoritative, as the school's word or the Buddha's word? If the school's word is authoritative, the Buddha is not your teacher and you are not a Sakya disciple. If it is the Buddha's word, then all this is the Buddha's word, so how can it not be authoritative? They say: This teaching is not truly the Buddha's word. Why? Because our school does not recite it. This is extremely unreasonable. Why unreasonable? Such sutra passages are recited by all schools and do not contradict the nature of the Dharma or the other sutras, yet they dare to slander them, saying that because we do not recite them they are not truly the Buddha's word; this only indulges fierce madness, and so is extremely unreasonable. Also does that school not have this sutra, namely that all dharmas are not of the nature of self? If they intend that the person is neither the same as nor different from the dharmas it depends on, and so say all dharmas are not self, then it should not be cognized by mental consciousness, since the sutra definitively judges that consciousness arises from two conditions. Also how do they reconcile other sutras? As a sutra says: To take what is not self as self, here there are fully inverted perception, mind and view. Taking self is inverted, and it is said of what is not self, not said of self, so what need is there to reconcile? What is not self? It is the aggregates, bases and elements. This would contradict the earlier statement that the person is neither the same as nor different from the aggregates of form and so on. Another sutra says: Bhikshus, know that all ascetics and brahmins who hold and contemplate the self and so on, all of them do so only regarding the five aggregates of grasping. Therefore there is no basis for self-view arising apart from self; rather, regarding dharmas that are not self they falsely discriminate and take them to be self. Another sutra says: All who have remembered, rightly remember, or will remember various past lives, all do so only regarding the five aggregates of grasping, and therefore there is definitely no person. If so, why does this sutra further say: In the past I had such form and so on? This sutra is to show that within the one continuity that can remember past lives there are various things. If one sees a real person who could have form and so on in a past life, how is one not falling into the fault of giving rise to self-view? Or one should slander and say this sutra does not exist; therefore this sutra, based on the overall conventional self, speaks of having form and so on like a heap or like a stream. If so, the World-Honored One should not be omniscient, because there is no mind or mental factors that can know all dharmas that change, arise and cease moment by moment. If one accepts a self, it could know everything, and then the person would be permanent, since one accepts that when the mind ceases this does not cease, and thus one goes beyond the school you accept. We do not say the Buddha is called omniscient because he can know everything at once, but because of the capacity of his continuity: the continuity of aggregates called Buddha accomplishes such excellent capacity that at the moment of directing attention, non-inverted knowledge arises toward whatever object one wishes to know, and so he is called omniscient, not because he knows everything at one instant. Regarding this there is a verse:

由相續有能，如火食一切，

Because of the capacity of the continuity, like fire that consumes everything,

如是一切智，非由頓遍知。

So omniscience is not by knowing everything at once.

如何得知約相續說知一切法，非我遍知？說佛世尊有三世故。於何處說？如有頌言：

How does one know that the knowing of all dharmas is spoken of in terms of continuity and not of a self knowing everything? Because it is said that the Buddhas, World-Honored Ones, have three times. Where is this said? As a verse says:

若過去諸佛，若未來諸佛，

Whether the Buddhas of the past, or the Buddhas of the future,

若現在諸佛，皆滅眾生憂。

Or the Buddhas of the present, all extinguish the sorrows of beings.

汝宗唯許蘊有三世，非數取趣，故定應爾。

Your school accepts only that aggregates have three times, not the one who repeatedly takes rebirth, and so definitely it should be thus.

三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

Translated by the Tripitaka Master Xuanzang by imperial order

破執我品第九之二

Chapter 9, Refutation of the Doctrine of Self, Part 2

若唯五取蘊名補特伽羅，何故世尊作如是說：吾今為汝說諸重擔、取捨重擔、荷重擔者。何緣於此佛不應說？不應重擔即名能荷。所以者何？曾未見故。不可說事亦不應說。所以者何？亦未見故。又取重擔應非蘊攝，重擔自取，曾未見故。然經說愛名取擔者，既即蘊攝，荷者應然，即於諸蘊立數取趣。然恐謂此補特伽羅是不可說常住實有，故此經後佛自釋言：但隨世俗，說此具壽有如是名，乃至廣說。如上所引人經文句，為令了此補特伽羅，可說無常非實有性。即五取蘊自相逼害得重擔名。前前剎那引後後故名為荷者，故非實有補特伽羅。補特伽羅定應實有，以契經說諸有撥無化生有情邪見攝故。誰言無有化生有情？如佛所言：我說有故。謂蘊相續能往後世，不由胎卵濕名化生有情。撥此為無，故邪見攝。化生諸蘊，理實有故。又許此邪見謗補特伽羅。汝等應言，是何所斷？見修所斷。理並不然，補特伽羅非諦攝故，邪見不應修所斷故。若謂經說有一補特伽羅生在世間，應非蘊者，亦不應理，此於總中假說一故，如世間說一麻一米一聚一言。或補特伽羅應許有為攝，以契經說生世間故。非此言生如蘊新起，依何義說生在世間？依此今時取別蘊義，如世間說能祠者生、記論者生，取明論故。又如世說有苾芻生、有外道生，取儀式故。或如世說有老者生，有病者生，取別位故。佛已遮故，此救不成。如勝義空契經中說：有業有異熟，作者不可得。謂能捨此蘊，及能續餘蘊，唯除法假。故佛已遮。頗勒具那契經亦說：我終不說有能取者。故定無一補特伽羅能於世間取捨諸蘊。又汝所引祠者等生，其體是何而能喻此？若執是我，彼不極成。若心心所，彼念念滅、新新生故，取捨不成。若許是身，亦如心等。又如明等與身有異，蘊亦應異補特伽羅。老病二身各與前別，數論轉變如前已遣，故彼所引為喻不成。

If only the five aggregates of grasping are called a person, why did the World-Honored One say: I will now explain to you the heavy burden, the taking up and putting down of the burden, and the bearer of the burden? Why should the Buddha not say this here? The burden should not itself be called the bearer. Why? Because this has never been seen. A thing that cannot be spoken of also should not be spoken of. Why? Because that too has never been seen. Also the burden to be taken up should not be included in the aggregates, since the burden taking itself up has never been seen. Yet the sutra says craving is called the one who takes up the burden; since it is included in the aggregates, the bearer should also be so, and the one who repeatedly takes rebirth is established on the aggregates. But fearing that this person might be taken as inexpressible, permanent and really existent, the Buddha himself explained after this sutra: But following worldly convention, one says this venerable one has such a name, and so on at length. As in the passage of the sutra of the person quoted above, it is to make one understand that this person can be said to be impermanent and not of real nature. The five aggregates of grasping themselves, oppressing one another, get the name burden. Because each earlier moment draws the later ones, it is called the bearer, and so it is not a really existing person. The person must be really existent, because the sutra says that those who deny that there are beings born by transformation are included in wrong view. Who says there are no beings born by transformation? As the Buddha said: I say that there are. That is, the continuity of aggregates can go to a later world, and what is not born from womb, egg or moisture is called a being born by transformation. To deny this is included in wrong view, and so the aggregates of those born by transformation reasonably exist. Also you accept that this wrong view slanders the person; you should say, by what is it severed, by seeing or by cultivation? Reasonably neither is so, because the person is not included in the truths and because wrong view should not be severed by cultivation. If one says the sutra says that there is a person born in the world, which should not be the aggregates, that is also unreasonable, since this is a conventional designation of one within a whole, as the world says one sesame seed, one grain of rice, one heap, one word. Or the person should be accepted as included among the conditioned, since the sutra says it is born in the world. This word "born" does not mean newly arising like the aggregates; on what meaning is it said to be born in the world? On the meaning of taking up different aggregates at this time, as the world says a sacrificer is born, an expounder of treatises is born, taking up the Vedas. Or as the world says a bhikshu is born, a non-Buddhist is born, taking up ceremonies. Or as the world says an old person is born, a sick person is born, taking up different stages. Because the Buddha has already prevented it, this defense is not established. As the sutra on ultimate emptiness says: There is karma and maturation, but the doer cannot be found, namely the one who can give up these aggregates and continue other aggregates, except for conventional designation of dharmas. Therefore the Buddha has already prevented it. The sutra of Phalguna (a sutra's name) also says: I never say that there is one who takes up. Therefore there is definitely no single person who can take up and give up aggregates in the world. Also what you cite about the birth of a sacrificer and so on, what is its substance that can serve as an analogy? If you hold it is a self, it is not agreed to. If it is mind and mental factors, they cease moment by moment and arise newly each time, so taking up and giving up is not established. If you accept it is the body, it is also like the mind and so on. Also as with the Vedas and so on, which differ from the body, the aggregates too should differ from the person. The old and sick bodies each differ from the previous, and the Samkhya transformation was refuted before, and so what they cite as an analogy is not established.

又許蘊生非數取趣，則定許此異蘊及常。又此唯一，蘊體有五，寧不說此與蘊有異？大種有四，造色唯一，寧言造色不異大種？是彼宗過。何謂彼宗？諸計造色即大種論。設如彼見，應作是質：如諸造色即四大種，亦應即五蘊立補特伽羅。若補特伽羅即諸蘊者，世尊何不記命者即身？觀能問者阿世耶故。問者執一內用士夫體實非虛名為命者，依此問佛與身一異。此都無故，一異不成，如何與身可記一異？如不可記龜毛䩕軟，古昔諸師已解斯結。昔有大德名曰龍軍，三明六通具八解脫。於時有一畢隣陀王，至大德所作如是說：我今來意欲請所疑。然諸沙門性好多語，尊能直答，我當請問。大德受請。王即問言：命者與身為一為異？大德答言：此不應記。王言：豈不先有要耶？今何異言不答所問？大德質曰：我欲問疑。然諸國王性好多語，王能直答，我當發問。王便受教。大德問言：大王宮中諸菴羅樹所生果味為酢為甘。王言：宮中本無此樹。大德復責：先無要耶？今何異言不答所問。王言：宮內此樹既無，寧可答言果味甘酢？大德誨曰：命者亦無，如何可言與身一異？佛何不說命者都無？亦觀問者阿世耶故。問者或於諸蘊相續謂為命者，依之發問。世尊若答命者都無，彼墮邪見，故佛不說。彼未能了緣起理故，非受正法器，不為說假有。理必應爾，世尊說故。如世尊告阿難陀言：有姓筏蹉出家外道，來至我所作是問言：我於世間為有非有？我不為記。所以者何？若記為有，違法真理，以一切法皆無我故。若記為無，增彼愚惑，彼便謂我先有今無。對執有愚，此愚更甚，謂執有我則墮常邊，若執無我便墮斷邊。此二輕重，如經廣說。依如是義，故有頌曰：

(The treatise continues:) Also if they accept that the arising of aggregates is not the person who repeatedly takes rebirth, then they definitely accept that this differs from the aggregates and is permanent. Also this is one while the aggregates are five in substance; why not say that this differs from the aggregates? The great elements are four and derived form is one; why say that derived form is not different from the great elements? That is a fault of their school. What is their school? Those who hold the theory that derived form is the great elements themselves. If, as they view it, the great elements are what derived forms are, one should make this argument: as derived forms are the four great elements, the person should also be established as the five aggregates. If the person is the aggregates, why did the World-Honored One not say that the living one is the body? Because he observed the disposition of the questioner. The questioner holds that the inner functional male-person has a real substance that is not a mere name, called the living one, and on this basis asks the Buddha whether it is the same as or different from the body. Since all this is nonexistent, same and different are not established; how can one answer same or different with the body? It is like the inability to answer whether the hair of a tortoise is soft or hard; the ancient masters have already untied this knot. Long ago there was a great master named Nagasena (the name of a master), who had the three knowledges and six powers and the eight liberations. At that time King Milinda (a king's name) came to the great master and said: I have come to ask about my doubts. But ascetics are by nature talkative; if you can answer directly I shall ask. The great master accepted. The king asked: Is the living one the same as the body or different? The great master answered: This should not be answered. The king said: Did we not agree beforehand? Why do you now say something else and not answer my question? The great master challenged: I wish to ask a doubt. But kings are by nature talkative; if the king can answer directly I shall ask. The king agreed. The great master asked: Great king, are the fruits born from the mango trees in your palace sour or sweet? The king said: There are originally no such trees in the palace. The great master reproached him in turn: Did we not agree beforehand? Why do you now say something else and not answer my question? The king said: Since there are no such trees in the palace, how can one answer whether the fruit is sweet or sour? The great master taught: The living one also does not exist; how can it be said to be the same as or different from the body? Why did the Buddha not say there is no living one at all? Also because he observed the disposition of the questioner. The questioner takes the continuity of aggregates to be the living one and asks on that basis. If the World-Honored One answered that there is no living one at all, the questioner would fall into wrong view, and so the Buddha did not say so. Because he had not yet understood the principle of dependent origination, he was not a vessel for the true Dharma, and the conventionally existent was not taught to him. Reasonably it should be so, as the World-Honored One said. As the World-Honored One said to Ananda: A non-Buddhist ascetic named Vatsa came to me and asked: Do I exist in the world or not? I did not answer. Why? If I answered that it exists, it would contradict the true principle of the Dharma, since all dharmas have no self. If I answered that it does not exist, it would increase his delusion, for he would think that I once had a self and now do not. To one who holds that there is a self, this delusion is even greater; holding that there is a self falls into the extreme of permanence, and holding that there is no self falls into the extreme of annihilation. The relative weight of these two is explained at length in the sutra. In accordance with this meaning, there is a verse:

觀為見所傷，及壞諸善業，

Observing that he would be hurt by views and ruin good karma,

故佛說正法，如牝虎銜子。

Therefore the Buddha spoke the true Dharma as a tigress holds her cub in her mouth.

執真我為有，則為見牙傷，

Holding that a true self exists, one is wounded by the fangs of views,

撥俗我為無，便壞善業子。

Denying that the conventional self exists, one ruins the child of good karma.

復說頌曰：

Another verse says:

由實命者無，佛不言一異，

Because there is no real living one, the Buddha did not say same or different,

恐撥無假我，亦不說都無。

Fearing the denial of the conventional self, he also did not say there is none at all.

謂蘊相續中，有業果命者，

That is, within the continuity of aggregates there is a living one of karma and fruit,

若說無命者，彼撥此為無。

If one says there is no living one, one denies this as non-existent.

不說諸蘊中，有假名命者，

He did not say there is a conventionally named living one among the aggregates,

由觀發問者，無力解真空。

Because he observed that the questioner lacked the power to understand true emptiness.

如是觀筏蹉，意樂差別故，

So he observed Vatsa, because of the difference in his disposition,

彼問有無我，佛不答有無。

When he asked whether there is a self or not, the Buddha did not answer yes or no.

何緣不記世間常等？亦觀問者阿世耶故。問者若執我為世間，我體都無故，四記皆非理。若執生死皆名世間，佛四種記亦皆非理。謂若常者，無得涅槃。若是非常，便自斷滅，不由功力鹹得涅槃。若記為常亦非常者，定應一分無得涅槃，一分有情自證圓寂。若記非常非非常者，則非得涅槃，非不得涅槃。決定相違，便成戲論。然依聖道可般涅槃，故四定記皆不應理。如離繫子問雀死生，佛知彼心不為定記。有邊等四亦不記者，以同常等皆有失故。寧知此四義同常等？以有外道名嗢底迦，先問世間有邊等四，復設方便矯問世尊：為諸世間皆由聖道能得出離、為一分耶？尊者阿難因告彼曰：汝以此事已問世尊，今復何緣改名重問？故知後四，義與前同。復以何緣世尊不記如來死後有等四耶？亦觀問者阿世耶故，問者妄計已解脫我名為如來而發問故。今應詰問計有我者，佛何緣記有現補特伽羅，不記如來死後亦有？彼言恐有墮常失故。若爾，何緣佛記慈氏汝於來世當得作佛，及記弟子身壞命終，某甲今時已生某處。此豈非有墮常過失？若佛先見補特伽羅，彼涅槃已便不復見，以不知故不記有者，則撥大師具一切智。或應許不記，由我體都無。若謂世尊見而不說，則有離蘊及常住過。若見非見俱不可說，則應漸言，不可說佛是一切智非一切智。若謂實有補特伽羅，以契經言諦故住故，定執無我者墮惡見處故。此不成證，彼經亦說定執有我者墮惡見處故。阿毘達磨諸論師言：執我有無俱邊見攝，如次墮在常斷邊故。彼師所說深為應理，以執有我則墮常邊，若執無我便墮斷邊。前《筏蹉經》分明說故。若定無有補特伽羅，為說阿誰流轉生死？不應生死自流轉故。然薄伽梵於契經中，說諸有情無明所覆、貪愛所繫馳流生死，故應定有補特伽羅。此復如何流轉生死？由捨前蘊取後蘊故。如是義宗前已徵遣。

Why did he not answer whether the world is permanent and so on? Also because he observed the disposition of the questioner. If the questioner holds that the self is the world, since the substance of the self does not exist at all, all four answers are unreasonable. If he holds that birth and death are all called the world, the Buddha's four kinds of answers are all unreasonable. That is, if it is permanent, there would be no attainment of nirvana. If it is impermanent, it would annihilate itself and all would attain nirvana without effort. If he answers that it is both permanent and impermanent, then definitely one part would have no attainment of nirvana and one part of sentient beings would realize nirvana themselves. If he answers that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, then it is neither attaining nor not attaining nirvana; this is definitely contradictory and becomes idle talk. Yet one can enter nirvana by relying on the noble path, and so all four definite answers are unreasonable. As when the son of the Nirgrantha asked about whether a sparrow was alive or dead, the Buddha knew his mind and did not give a definite answer. The four, finite and so on, were also not answered, because like permanent and so on they all have faults. How does one know these four have the same meaning as permanent and so on? Because there was a non-Buddhist named Uttika (a non-Buddhist's name) who first asked about the world being finite and so on, four, and then devised a method to question the World-Honored One deceitfully: Do all the worlds get out by the noble path, or only a part? The Venerable Ananda then said to him: You already asked the World-Honored One about this matter; why do you now change the name and ask again? Therefore one knows the latter four have the same meaning as the former. Why did the World-Honored One not answer whether the Tathagata exists after death and so on, the four? Also because he observed the disposition of the questioner, since the questioner falsely holds that the self that has been liberated is called the Tathagata and asks on that basis. Now one should challenge those who hold that there is a self: Why did the Buddha answer that there is a present person but did not answer that the Tathagata also exists after death? They say that he feared falling into the fault of permanence. If so, why did the Buddha predict that Maitreya will become a Buddha in the future, and predict that when disciples' bodies break and lives end, so-and-so is now born in such-and-such a place? Is this not falling into the fault of permanence? If the Buddha first saw the person and after nirvana no longer saw it, and so did not say that it exists because he did not know, then they would deny that the great teacher possesses omniscience. Or one should accept that he did not answer because the substance of the self is wholly non-existent. If one says the World-Honored One saw but did not say, then there is the fault of being apart from the aggregates and permanent. If seeing and not seeing are both inexpressible, then one should gradually say that it cannot be said that the Buddha is omniscient or not omniscient. If one says the person really exists because the sutra says it is a truth and abides, and that those who definitely hold there is no self fall into the place of evil views, this is not proof, since that sutra also says that those who definitely hold there is a self fall into the place of evil views. The masters of the Abhidharma say: Holding that there is a self or that there is none are both included in extreme views, falling in order into the extremes of permanence and annihilation. What those masters say is deeply reasonable, since holding that there is a self falls into the extreme of permanence, and holding that there is no self falls into the extreme of annihilation, as is clearly stated in the earlier Vatsa sutra. If there is definitely no person, who is said to transmigrate in birth and death? Birth and death should not flow by themselves. But the Bhagavan says in the sutras that sentient beings, covered by ignorance and bound by craving, run on in birth and death, and so there should definitely be a person. How then does this person transmigrate through birth and death? By giving up the former aggregates and taking up the later aggregates. This meaning and doctrine were examined and dismissed before.

如燎原火雖剎那滅，而由相續說有流轉。如是蘊聚假說有情，愛取為緣流轉生死。若唯有蘊，何故世尊作如是說：今我於昔為世導師名為妙眼。此說何咎？蘊各異故。若爾，是何物謂補特伽羅？昔我即今，體應常住，故說今我昔為師言，顯昔與今是一相續，如言此火曾燒彼事。若謂決定有真實我，則應唯佛能明瞭觀，觀已應生堅固我執，從斯我執我所執生，從此應生我我所愛。故薄伽梵作如是言：若執有我便執我所，執我所故於諸蘊中便復發生我我所愛薩迦耶見，我愛所縛則為謗佛，去解脫遠。若謂於我不起我愛，此言無義。所以者何？於非我中橫計為我，容起我愛。非實我中，如是所言無理為證，故彼於佛真聖教中無有因緣起見瘡皰。如是一類執有不可說補特伽羅。復有一類總撥一切法體皆非有。外道執有別真我性，此等一切見不如理，皆不能免無解脫過。若一切類我體都無，剎那滅心於曾所受久相似境何能憶知？如是憶知，從相續內念境想類心差別生。且初憶念為從何等心差別無間生？從有緣彼作意相似相屬想等，不為依止差別愁憂散亂等緣損壞功德心差別起。雖有如是作意等緣，若無彼類心差別者，則無堪能修此憶念。雖有彼類心差別因，若無如是緣，亦無能修理，要具二種方可能修。諸憶念生但由於此，不見離此有功能故。如何異心見，後異心能憶。非天授心曾所見境，後祠授心有憶念理。此難非理，不相屬故。謂彼二心互不相屬，非如一相續有因果性故。我等不言異心見境異心能憶，相續一故。然從過去緣彼境心，引起今時能憶念識。謂如前說相續轉變差別力故生念何失？由此憶念力，有後記知生。我體既無，孰為能憶？能憶是何義？由念能取境。此取境豈異念？雖不異念，但由作者，作者即是前說念因，謂彼類心差別。然世間所言制怛羅能憶，此於蘊相續立制怛羅名。

(The treatise continues:) Like a fire on the plain, although it ceases moment by moment, transmigration is spoken of on account of continuity. In this way, sentient beings are conventionally spoken of as a mass of aggregates, and with craving and grasping as conditions they transmigrate in birth and death. If there are only aggregates, why did the World-Honored One say: I in the past was the guide of the world named Sunetra (Excellent Eye)? What fault is there in this? The aggregates are each different. If so, what thing is called the person? I of the past are the same as I now, and the substance should be permanent. Therefore the statement that I now was in the past a teacher shows that the past and the present are one continuity, as one says this fire once burned that thing. If one says there definitely is a real self, then only the Buddha could clearly contemplate it, and having contemplated it one should give rise to firm clinging to self, from this clinging to self clinging to what is mine arises, and from this love of self and mine should arise. Therefore the Bhagavan said: If one clings to a self then one clings to what is mine, and because one clings to what is mine, one again gives rise among the aggregates to love of self and mine and the view of a real self; one bound by love of self thereby slanders the Buddha and is far from liberation. If one says that one does not give rise to love of self toward the self, this saying is meaningless. Why? Because in what is not self one rashly takes it as self, and love of self may arise; in a real self there is no such reasoning to prove it, and so such a one has no cause or condition for seeing sores and boils in the Buddha's true noble teaching. This is one kind of person who holds there is an inexpressible person. There is another kind who generally deny that the substance of all dharmas exists at all. The non-Buddhists hold there is a separate true nature of self. All such views are unreasonable and none can avoid the fault of having no liberation. If the substance of a self wholly does not exist in any kind, how can a mind that ceases moment by moment recall and know an object formerly experienced, a similar object after a long time? Such recollection and knowing arises from within the continuity from distinct kinds of mind that perceive the object by mindfulness. First, from what distinct mind does the initial recollection arise immediately after? It arises from distinct minds that have attention toward that object, similar and belonging perceptions and so on, not damaged in their qualities by dependence on conditions such as sorrow and distraction. Even with such attention and other conditions, if there is no distinct mind of that kind, there is no capacity to cultivate this recollection. Even with the cause of a distinct mind of that kind, if there are no such conditions, there is also no reason to cultivate it; one must have both for it to be cultivated. Recollections arise only from this, and no capacity is seen apart from it. How can a different mind see and a later different mind recall? The mind of Devadatta (a person's name) cannot have seen an object, with the later mind of Yajnadatta (a person's name) recalling it; this is not reasonable. This objection is unreasonable, since they do not belong to each other. That is, the two minds do not belong to each other, unlike one continuity having the nature of cause and effect. We do not say that one mind sees an object and a different mind recalls it, since the continuity is one. Rather, from the past mind that took that object as condition, the consciousness that can recall at the present time is brought about; that is, what fault is there in mindfulness arising by the power of change in the continuity as said before? By the power of this recollection, later recognition arises. Since there is no substance of self, who is the one who recalls? What does it mean to be able to recall? It is that by mindfulness one can take the object. Is this taking the object different from mindfulness? Although it is not different from mindfulness, there is an agent by which it is done, and the agent is the cause of mindfulness spoken of earlier, namely the distinct mind of that kind. Yet the world says Citra (a person's name) can recall; here the name Citra is established on the continuity of aggregates.

從先見心後憶念起，依如是理說彼能憶。我體若無，是誰之念？為依何義說第六聲？此第六聲依屬主義，如何物屬何主？此如牛等屬制怛羅。彼如何為牛主？謂依彼彼所乘所搆所役等中彼得自在。欲於何所驅役於念，而勤方便尋求念主？於所念境驅役於念。役念為何？謂令念起。奇哉自在起無理言，寧為此生而驅役此？又我於念如何驅役？為令念起、為令念行？念無行故，但應念起。則因名主，果名能屬。由因增上令果得生，故因名主。果於生時是因所有，故名能屬。即生念因足為念主，何勞立我為念主耶？即諸行聚一類相續，世共施設制怛羅牛，立制怛羅名為牛主。是牛相續於異方生，變異生因故名為主。此中無一實制怛羅亦無實牛，但假施設，故言牛主，亦不離因。憶念既爾，記知亦然。如辯憶知，熟為能了誰之識等，亦應例釋。且識因緣與前別者，謂根境等，如應當知。有作是言：決定有我，事用必待事用者故。謂諸事用待事用者，如天授行必待天授。行是事用天授名者，如是識等所有事用，必待所依能了等者。今應詰彼：天授謂何？若是實我，此如先破。若假士夫，體非一物，於諸行相續假立此名故。如天授能行，識能了亦爾。依何理說天授能行？謂於剎那生滅諸行不異相續立天授名，愚夫於中執為一體，為自相續異處生因。異處生名行，因即名行者。依此理說天授能行。如焰及聲異處相續，世依此說焰聲能行。如是天授身能為識因故，世間亦謂天授能了。然諸聖者為順世間言說理故，亦作是說。經說諸識能了所緣，識於所緣為何所作？都無所作，但以境生。如果酬因，雖無所作而似因起，說名酬因。如是識生，雖無所作而似境，故說名了境。如何似境？謂帶彼相。是故諸識雖亦託根生，不名了根，但名為了境。或識於境相續生時，前識為因引後識起，說識能了亦無有失，世間於因說作者故。

(The treatise continues:) From an earlier seeing mind, a later recollection arises, and according to this principle it is said that "he" recollects. If a self does not exist, whose is the memory? And on what meaning is the sixth case-ending based? This sixth case-ending is based on the meaning of possessor and possessed. How is a thing possessed by which owner? It is like cattle belonging to Caitra. How is he the owner of the cattle? Because he has authority over them in respect of what is ridden, tended, employed and so on. In what are you trying to employ memory, that you diligently seek the owner of memory by contrivance? You employ memory with respect to the object remembered. What is the employing of memory? It is making memory arise. How marvelous, to assert that one has authority and to speak so unreasonably: would one make this arise by employing this? And how would the self employ memory? Is it to make memory arise or to make memory act? Since memory has no action, it can only be to make it arise. Then the cause is called the owner, and the effect is called the possessed. The cause, through its dominance, makes the effect arise, and so the cause is called the owner; the effect, at the time of arising, belongs to the cause and so is called the possessed. The cause that gives rise to memory is itself sufficient to be the owner of memory; what need is there to set up a self as the owner of memory? In the same way, in a collection of conditioned factors of one kind in continuity, the world conventionally designates Caitra and cattle, and sets up the name Caitra as the owner of the cattle. The cattle continuum arising in a different place is a cause of transformed arising, and so is called owner. Here there is no single real Caitra and no real cattle, but only a provisional designation; and so one speaks of the owner of cattle, and yet it is not apart from the cause. As it is with recollection, so it is with remembering and knowing. As in explaining remembering and knowing, the questions of who is the knower and whose is the consciousness and so on should also be explained by analogy. Moreover, the causes and conditions of consciousness are different from the above, namely the faculty and the object and so on, as should be known. Someone says: There must be a self, because an activity must depend on one who acts. That is, activities depend on one who acts, as the walking of Devadatta must depend on Devadatta. Walking is the activity and Devadatta is the name of the agent; so too the activities of consciousness and the like must depend on a basis who is the knower and so on. Now we must ask: What is Devadatta? If it is a real self, this has been refuted before. If it is a provisional person, the substance is not one thing, since this name is provisionally set up for a continuum of conditioned factors. As Devadatta can walk, so consciousness can know. By what reasoning is it said that Devadatta can walk? In a continuum of momentarily arising and ceasing factors that do not differ, the name Devadatta is set up; foolish people take it as one entity. It is the cause of the arising of one's own continuum in a different place. Arising in a different place is called walking, and the cause is called the walker. According to this reasoning it is said that Devadatta can walk. As with a flame and with sound, which continue in a different place, the world says on this basis that the flame and the sound walk. Likewise, because Devadatta's body can be a cause of consciousness, the world also says that Devadatta can know. And the noble ones also speak so in accord with the principle of worldly usage. The sutra says that consciousnesses can know their objects; what does consciousness do with respect to its object? It does nothing at all, but merely arises from the object. Like a repayment of a cause: though it does nothing, it arises like the cause and is called a repayment of the cause. In the same way, when consciousness arises, though it does nothing, it resembles the object, and so is said to know the object. How does it resemble the object? It bears that object's aspect. For this reason, though consciousnesses also arise relying on the faculties, they are not called knowing the faculties but only knowing the objects. Or when consciousness arises continuously with respect to an object, the earlier consciousness is the cause that draws out the later consciousness, and there is no fault in saying that consciousness can know, because the world speaks of an agent in terms of the cause.

如世間說鍾鼓能鳴，或如燈能行，識能了亦爾。為依何理說燈能行？焰相續中假立燈號，燈於異處相續生時說為燈行，無別行者。如是心相續假立識名，於異境生時說名能了。或如色有色生色住，此中無別有生住者。說識能了，理亦應然。若後識生，從識非我。何緣從識？不恆似前，及不定次生，如芽莖葉等，有為皆有住異相故。謂諸有為自性法爾，微細相續後必異前。若異此者，縱意入定，身心相續相似而生，後念與初無差別故，不應最後念自然從定出。諸心相續亦有定次，若此心次彼心應生，於此心後彼必生故。亦有少分行相等心方能相生，種性別故。如女心無間起嚴汙身心，或起彼夫彼子心等。後時從此諸心相續轉變差別還生女心。如是女心於後所起嚴汙心等有生功能，異此無功能，由種性別故。女心無間容起多心，然多心中若先數起、明瞭近起，先起非餘。由如是心修力強故，唯除將起位身外緣差別。諸有修力最強盛者，寧不恆時生於自果？由此心有住異相故，此住異相於別修果相續生中最隨順故。諸心品類次第相生因緣方隅我已略說，委悉了達唯在世尊，一切法中智自在故。依如是義故，有頌言：

(The treatise continues:) As the world says that a bell or drum can sound, or as a lamp can move, so consciousness can know. By what reasoning is it said that a lamp can move? In a continuum of flame the name "lamp" is provisionally set up, and when the lamp arises in a continuum in a different place it is said that the lamp moves, and there is no separate mover. In the same way the name "consciousness" is provisionally set up in a continuum of mind, and when it arises with a different object it is said to know. Or as form has arising and abiding of form, though there is no separate one who arises and abides, so when one says consciousness can know, the reasoning should be the same. If a later consciousness arises, it arises from consciousness and not from a self. Why from consciousness? Because it is not constantly like the former, and because it does not arise in a fixed order, like a sprout, stem and leaves, since all conditioned things have the characteristics of abiding and change. That is, by the natural order of the own-nature of all conditioned things, a later subtle continuum must differ from the earlier. If it were otherwise, then even when the mind enters concentration, the body and mind would continue to arise similarly, and the later thought would not differ from the first, so the last thought should not emerge from concentration of itself. The mental continua also have a fixed order: if this mind is next, that mind should arise, because that mind certainly arises after this mind. Also only mind with a similar mode, in some part, can give rise to the next, since their lineage differs. For example, a woman's mind immediately gives rise to adorned or soiled body and mind, or gives rise to the minds of her husband or her son. Later, from the differences of transformation in the continuum of these minds, she again gives rise to a woman's mind. Thus a woman's mind has the capacity to give rise to the later adorned or soiled minds and so on, and otherwise has no such capacity, because of the difference of lineage. After a woman's mind, many minds could arise without interval, but among those many, the one that has been frequently arisen earlier, that is clear and recent, arises first, not the others. This is because the power of cultivation of that mind is strong, except at the stage when the mind is about to arise and the external conditions of the body differ. Would it not be that the one with the strongest power of cultivation always gives rise to its own effect? Because this mind has the characteristics of abiding and change, and these characteristics of abiding and change are the most favorable for the continuous arising of the effect of another cultivation. I have briefly described the direction of the causes and conditions by which the classes of mind arise in order; to understand them fully and completely lies only with the World-Honored One, who has mastery of knowledge in all dharmas. Because of this meaning, a verse says:

於一孔雀輪，一切種因相，

In a single peacock's wheel, the characteristics of all kinds of causes,

非餘智境界，唯一切智知。

are not the realm of other knowledge; only the Omniscient One knows.